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ABSTRACT
Problems, Puzzles, and Paradoxes for a Moral Psychology of Fiction
By Katherine Tullmann

Adviser: Dr. Jesse Prinz
The goal of my dissertation is to provide a comprehensive account of our psychological
engagements with fiction. While many aestheticians have written on issues concerning art and
ethics, only a few have addressed the ways in which works of fiction offer problems for general
accounts of morality, let alone how we go about making moral judgments about fictions in the
first place. My dissertation fills that gap. I argue that the first challenge in explaining our
interactions with fiction arises from functional and inferential arguments that entail that our
mental states about fictional entities are non-genuine. This means that our mental states during
our engagements with fiction are different in kind from typical beliefs, emotions, desires, etc.
that we have in real-life contexts. I call this position the Distinct Attitude View (DAV). In its
place, I propose a common-sense, standard attitude view (SAV): the idea that our psychological
interactions with non-real entities can be explained in terms of the intentional content of those
states as opposed to a distinct type of mental state. In expanding the SAV, I develop several
independent accounts of social cognition, emotions, and moral judgments. I also show how the
SAV can dissolve standard problems in the philosophy and psychology of aesthetic experience:
the paradox of fiction, the problem of imaginative existence, and the sympathy for the devil
phenomenon, amongst others.
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Chapter 1: The Distinct Attitude View

1. Stranger than Fiction

You wake up early one morning and turn on the television. A newscaster informs you of a pair of
brothers, known on the streets as “the Saints,” who have committed multiple murders in the name
of God. You haven’t heard of the Saints and you are intrigued. The newscaster describes how the
brothers only kill “bad people”: Russian mobsters, murderers, hitmen, and the like. You then watch
as the newscaster interviews people on the streets of your city. Their reactions to the Saints vary
widely, from open approval of their actions (“Where can I sign up?”, “Love the Saints, man! I
think they’re doin’ a great job!”; “They’re making the world a safer place”) to revulsion (“Who
are they to be judge and jury?”; “Killing for good?!”; “This is going to create something so much
worse…”) to fear (“I’m afraid to leave my house at night!”), and even social awareness (“You’re
giving them the power!”; “You’ll walk into a kid’s bedroom, it’s gonna’ be there—Batman,
Superman, and the Saints”).
You, too, develop an opinion of the Saints as the broadcast continues. Maybe you think
that their vigilante crime-fighting is good for society. After all, it’s not like they are killing innocent
people. Or maybe you are appalled by the hypocrisy of religious fanatics “playing God.” Or
perhaps you just worry about even more crime in the city. The thought of a mob war or
underground street fight fills you with apprehension and anxiety for your own safety.
1

Then the screen cuts to credits. Slightly abashed, you realize that the news story was just
that—a story. As the credits role, you discover that the newscast was a scene from a film called
The Boondock Saints, a story about two Bostonian, Irish-Catholic brothers who decide to take the
law into their own hands after the murder of a close friend.
Your interpretation of the Saints broadcast has changed. You now know that the events
portrayed are a part of a fictional story. Before you believed that the Saints and their actions were
real; now you know that they are not. You realize that the people and future consequences that you
were afraid of are not actual threats. But what about your appraisal of the Saints? Has that changed
as well? Say that you decided that the potential cost of the Saints’ vigilante justice outweighs the
benefits. While watching the clip, you pronounced a moral judgment that their actions were wrong.
Now, after the clip is over, are you forced to accept that this moral judgment was not a real
judgment?
There are some philosophers (Walton 1990, Currie 1995, Currie and Ravenscroft 2002,
amongst others) who would answer this question with a resounding “yes.” Our moral judgments
of fictions—as well as our beliefs, desires, and emotions—are not genuine judgments. Rather, our
evaluation of the Saints is a pretend, imaginary, or judgment-like mental state. This claim leads to
a peculiar, yet surprisingly popular, interpretation of the previous example. When we watch a
fictional film, read a novel, or see a play, the beliefs, desires, judgments, and emotions that we
experience are not standard or stereotypical beliefs, desires, judgments, or emotions. Yet, when
we consider a similar—even an almost exactly similar—event on BBC or in The New York Times,
our mental states are stereotypical simply because their object is part of the actual world.
I will call this the Distinct Attitude View (DAV; based on Schroeder and Matheson’s
Distinct Cognitive Attitude View, or DCAV. See Schroeder and Matheson 2006). The DAV holds
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a dominant position in both the philosophical and psychological work in aesthetics. As we will
see, some versions of the DAV claim that our mental states towards fictions are not ordinary states
because they arise from functionally and inferentially different input and result in distinct cognitive
and behavioral outputs from analogous real-life scenarios. We can contrast this view with a
standard attitude view, or SAV, which states that we utilize the same types of mental states during
our engagements with fictions and real-life; differences in behaviors and responses to fictions can
be explained in terms of the content of standard beliefs, emotions, judgments, etc. I will defend a
version of the SAV in this dissertation.
Proponents of the DAV typically focus on the nature of our emotions or beliefs about
fictions. I am interested in our moral evaluations of fiction, like our judgment of the Boondock
Saints. While many philosophers and psychologists have accepted some form of the DAV, few
have considered its implications for moral issues and moral psychology—Gregory Currie’s 1995
paper, “The Moral Psychology of Fiction” and Elisabeth Camp’s unpublished work “Perspectives
in Imaginative Engagement with Fiction” are exceptions. Indeed, my project here is largely a
critical response to these papers. Furthermore, many aestheticians have written on issues
concerning art and ethics, but only a few (e.g. Currie 1995, Nussbaum 2001) have addressed the
ways in which works of fiction offer problems for general accounts of morality, let alone how we
go about making moral judgments about fictions in the first place. Finally, moral psychologists
ask questions concerning our moral judgments of real-life people and events. Although they utilize
fictional cases and thought experiments in their studies, few have discussed how the ontological
status of these cases may affect the participants’ responses. Ironically, the way in which we know
about real-life/standard/typical mental states is through psychological studies that often utilize
fictions in their experiments.
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This dissertation attempts to fill these gaps. In doing so, I offer a comprehensive moral
psychology of fiction. As we will see, determining whether our mental states towards fictions are
stereotypical or not will be paramount to our understanding how we judge fictional characters,
how we act on those judgments, and the propriety of those judgments. The questions I will address
in the following chapters are very similar to those found in papers on “real-life” moral psychology.
For instance: do moral judgments involve conscious reasoning? What role do emotions play in our
moral judgments? Can we make unconscious moral judgments? Moral psychologists also ask
questions concerning how people acquire moral values: can we use our reason to come to an
evaluation? Are moral values culturally-constructed or innate? Finally, are we always motivated
to act on our moral evaluations of a person or situation? I will spend the majority of the following
chapters evaluating potential responses to these questions. I argue that fictions often pose unique
problems for moral psychology, but that these problems can be avoided if we base our moral
theories on adequate accounts of emotions, moral judgments, and social cognition.
In the present chapter, I will analyze the implications of the DAV in greater detail. Along
the way, I will highlight the explananda of a moral psychology of fiction, the basic features of our
interactions with fictions that any adequate account should address. In §2, I discuss the “puzzles
of fiction,” a set of intriguing problems that have been taken to suggest that there is an asymmetry
between how we respond to real life and analogous fictional scenarios. §3 illustrates two versions
of the DAV in greater detail: a theory of make-believe and theory of imagination. §4 evaluates
three arguments that are typically used to support the DAV: arguments from the functional and
inferential roles of mental states and another from research in cognitive neuroscience. In §5, I raise
four further challenges to the DAV. I conclude by providing a sketch of my own view— the
standard attitude view, or SAV—and a look ahead to the following chapters.

4

2. The puzzles of fiction

Some of the most persuasive evidence for the DAV stems from the asymmetries between our
responses to analogous real-life and fictional scenarios. Some of these asymmetries are captured
by the following puzzles of fiction. Since Plato’s Republic, philosophers and psychologists have
taken these puzzles to present problems for theories of our mental attitudes towards fiction. One
of my goals in this dissertation is to diffuse these puzzles; I will show why they are not really so
puzzling to begin with. In this section, I will give a brief overview of the different puzzles that we
will encounter in the chapters to come.
First, the paradox of fiction concerns whether we may have genuine emotions towards
fictional entities and states of affairs. It is largely understood that emotions play a significant role
in an organism’s survival by tracking features of our environment that may impact our well-being
(see Damasio 1994; LeDoux 1996; Currie 1995; Prinz 2004a, etc.). Yet, this point seems difficult
to reconcile with the claim that we experience genuine emotional responses towards fictional
objects. Perhaps we can broaden our notion of “well-being” in terms of an object’s general impact
on our mental or physical state. But even this seems problematic for fictional objects, for we know
that what happens in a fiction generally has little impact on us at all—and, even if it does impact
us in some way, we still need an explanation of why and how. There are three different issues that
must be untangled here: the question of whether fictional objects have an impact on our well-being,
the nature of our emotions about fictions, and, finally, the scope of the behavioral and cognitive

5

dimensions of our emotional responses to fictions. Any adequate solution to the paradox of fiction
should address all three. I will discuss the paradox of fiction more thoroughly in chapter 5.
There are several further puzzles that arise primarily in respect to our moral judgments of
fiction: the puzzle of disparate response, the sympathy for the devil phenomenon (Carroll 2004 and
Camp, in preparation for terms), the puzzle of imaginative resistance (Walton 1994, 2006; Gendler
2000, 2006; Currie 2002; Moran 1994), the puzzle of moral motivation (indirectly addressed in
Walton, 1990), and the question of moral learning. The puzzle of disparate response covers the
asymmetrical mental responses that we have to fictions and real-life people. This includes a
character’s moral indiscretions. The most obvious examples of this can be found in fictions that
portray violence and law-breaking in a positive light, such as mafia and heist films like The
Godfather, Ocean’s Eleven, and Le Cercle Rouge. Westerns like The Searchers or The Good, the
Bad, and the Ugly romanticize violence and portray “heroes” with whom we probably would not
want to be friends in our real lives. Even superheroes and vigilantes would enrage many audiences
if they were discovered in their own cities (an issue interestingly explored in films like The
Boondock Saints, Watchmen, and The Dark Knight).
The sympathy for the devil phenomenon is a special instance of the puzzle of disparate
response. This puzzle concerns why we have positive responses (identification, empathy,
sympathy, concern, etc.) to anti-heroes and villains in a fiction, characters that we would abhor in
the actual world. Both historical and contemporary fictions abound with examples of alluring antiheroes, from Milton’s charismatic Satan in Paradise Lost, to Nabokov’s Humbert Humbert, and
Breaking Bad’s Walter White. In each case, we cheer on and have positive emotional and moral
responses to these characters whose real-life counterparts we would find repugnant. I will address
the sympathy for the devil phenomenon in chapter 7.
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The puzzle of imaginative resistance describes a similar phenomenon. Fictions often
present us with highly improbable or metaphysically impossible scenarios (maybe even logically
impossible ones), such as time travel, the ability to create and enter another person’s dream, and
the existence of vampires. Most audiences take these impossibilities in stride. We accept that time
travel, dream invasion, and vampires are possible in the fictional world. Yet there seem to be some
fiction/real world inconsistencies that an audience member will not (and maybe should not) accept.
These include moral actions, and values that are positively portrayed in a fiction, but we would
not endorse in real life (see, e.g. Currie 2002; Gendler 2000 & 2006; Hume, 1757/1994; Moran,
1994; Walton 1994 & 2006; Weatherson, 2004).

Tamar Gendler describes the puzzle of

imaginative resistance as: “the puzzle of explaining our comparative difficulty in imagining
fictional worlds that we take to be morally deviant” (2000, p. 56). I will return to this puzzle in
chapter 8.
Another moral puzzle I will consider has received only tangential treatment in the
literature, but will nevertheless play a considerable role in the chapters to come. We tend to think
that our moral judgments are motivating; if we believe that a certain action is morally wrong, then
we generally will not perform it and we may take measures to prevent the action from occurring.
Yet we are not motivated to act on our moral judgments about fictions. This is the problem of
moral motivation. If morals are necessarily (or even only usually) motivational, why do we rarely
act upon our moral judgments of fictional characters and situations? For example, witnessing
horrific gang violence in a film rarely leads one to call the police. The easy answer to this is that
we know that fictions are not real, so we know that we cannot call the police in a story to report a
fictional crime. Another, more pressing question is whether the recognition of a morally bad action
in a fiction should somehow cross the ontological boundary into real-world judgments, and
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influence subsequent real-world behavior. Part of this puzzle rests on issues concerning the
functional role of our mental attitudes towards fictions; I will address this in §4 of this chapter,
and again in chapter 6.
Finally, I will consider the possibility of learning about morality from fictions. It may seem
strange that we can learn anything about the actual world from works of fiction. After all, fictions
generally do not purport to tell the truth. Yet many people would argue that fictions are an
important resource for learning about other perspectives and cultures, even if the characters and
places are not real. It also seems like we can develop our knowledge of folk psychology and
morality by the scenarios fictions present, and we can hone our emotional and moral abilities by
“practicing” on fictions. These positive accounts of learning from fiction need some explanation
of how we can learn about the real world from fictional material. I will consider several positive
accounts of learning from fictions (Lamarque 2009, Nussbaum 1995, Robinson 2005) as well as
several arguments against this idea (Currie 2013) in the final chapter of this dissertation.
The puzzles of fiction comprise a serious challenge to a moral psychology of fiction. Any
adequate theory of our psychological interactions with fiction must account for them. Indeed, the
puzzles of fiction are often taken to be so problematic that philosophers have concluded that we
need to reinterpret how we understand our mental attitudes about fictions and even propose new
types of mental attitudes. I reject this move. For now, though, let’s explore the adversary’s position
in more detail.

3. The Distinct Attitude View

Imagine that you are reading The Hobbit. Tolkien introduces you to a strange new world where,
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amongst other magical occurrences, you fictionally encounter dragons. Your responses to Smaug
are probably nothing like what they would be if you encountered the wily beast in real life; you
would fear Smaug rather than feel curious or intrigued by him and you would run away from the
creature rather than remain in your comfy chair. Indeed, we often do not physically react to the
objects we see on a screen or read about in a novel. Our desires concerning the fate of a fictional
character have a different relation to our other beliefs, thoughts, and desires than they would if that
character was a real person. Call this the asymmetry problem: we behave and respond differently
to fictional entities than we would to their real-life counterparts. We draw different cognitive
inferences and make different emotional and moral judgments of them. What explains these
differences?

3.1. Two interpretations
There are two general ways we can explain the asymmetry problem. One is to suggest that the
content of our mental attitudes towards fiction is different than the content of our mental attitudes
towards real-life objects. Call this the content-based view; this will be the basis for my SAV. The
other account urges that we have different types of mental attitudes towards fictions and real-life
events and objects. This is the distinct attitude view (DAV). In this section, I will present the
general outline of both views and offer several reasons why we should prefer the former. In §4, I
will expand upon, and reject, three typical arguments given in favor of the DAV.
The content-based view holds that our engagements with fictions and their real-life
counterparts result in different behaviors and cognitive inferences due to a difference in the
intentional content of our mental attitudes about each. In other words, our thoughts, beliefs,
desires, emotions, etc. have different types of objects than they would in real-life situations. When
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we engage with a fiction, we recognize that what we encounter is not real; the events in a fiction
generally do not or did not actually happen. For example, when I see a production of A
Midsummer’s Night Dream, I recognize that the actors on the stage embody fictional characters
that do not physically exist in our actual world. This recognition informs our further mental
engagements with the fiction, both consciously and unconsciously.
The content-based view also requires that we tacitly employ a fictional operator when we
speak about fictions. When I say “I believe that Demetrius treated Helena very poorly” I mean “I
believe that Demetrius treated Helena very poorly [in the fiction]” (see Kripke 2011 and
Thomasson 1999). The same holds for our mental attitudes; the fictional operator is implicit in our
beliefs, thoughts, and desires about fictional entities (see also Matravers 1991 & 2014, Neill 1993).
The recognition that the object of our mental attitudes does not exist is the backdrop against which
they are formed. So I may have a belief “that Smaug is a wily beast [in the fictional world]” but
not “Smaug is a wily beast” tout court.
There is quite a bit more to be said about the nature of our mental states and speech acts
concerning fictions, as well as the metaphysical implications of the content-based view. I will
expand upon some of these issues in chapter 3. For now, it is enough to note the differences
between this type of view and the DAV. Importantly, the content-based view maintains the
possibility that our mental attitudes towards fictions are not different in kind from those about
actual objects. We treat characters as fictional objects, but we nevertheless have standard beliefs
about them. The DAV, on the other hand, holds that a solution to the asymmetry problem requires
a distinctive cognitive attitude that we employ in our engagements with fictions.
The nature of the distinct attitude varies by the theorist. Quite often, they posit a mental
“box” or mechanism that we utilize exclusively when considering non-actual objects, including
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fictional ones (see, for example, Nichols & Stich 2003), but also hypothetical and counterfactual
thought, mental activities involving deliberation and decision-making, mental imagery, and
mindreading (attributing mental states to other people).
Alternatively, we may use largely the same mental processes as in real-life situations, but
these processes are run “off-line,” disconnected from their typical functional and inferential output.
The result is a different kind of mental state than we would have if we considered a real-life/actual
object. The result is that we adopt pretend (Searle 1975; see also Kripke 2013), simulated (e.g.
Walton 1996, Currie & Ravenscroft 2002), or imaginary beliefs, desires, emotions, and thoughts
toward non-actual objects (e.g. Schroeder & Matheson 2006, Weinberg & Meskin 2006). These
states are isomorphic to genuine mental attitudes and may even be phenomenologically
indistinguishable from them. Still, we cannot say that they are the same type of state due to their
distinct functional and inferential roles.
I want to resist this move. I will argue that a content-based view of our mental attitudes
towards fiction can fully solve the asymmetry problem. This means that we do not need to posit a
distinct cognitive attitude in the first place. Note that the content-based view does not entail that
our experiences with fictions and real-life are exactly the same. Of course we respond differently
to an actual, face-to-face snarling dog than we would to one that we encounter on a movie screen.
The challenge will be to explain how, on my view, we can explain the behavioral differences if
the mental states are of the same type.
The content-based view also does not imply that we have the exact same kinds of thoughts
about fictional and real-life objects. A mental state’s inferential role—what mentally causes it or
what further mental processing it results in—could be roughly the same whether its object is nonactual or real. However, the mental state’s intentional content differs in each case. This difference
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may account for asymmetrical behaviors and cognitive inferences. The content-based view implies
that our knowledge that fictional objects are fictional informs our mental attitudes towards it, but
does not imply that the attitude is no longer of the same kind. It only implies that the attitude is
about something different.

3.2. Make-believe
I will now present two versions of the DAV: a theory of make-believe and a theory of imagination.
According to a theory of make-believe, our engagements with fiction draw on our capacities for
imagination and pretense. While reading a novel, for example, we play a game of make-believe,
creating a “fictional world” in which the propositions presented in the novel are fictionally true.
So, in contrast to the content-based view, the mental state type during our engagements with fiction
differs from real-life situations, but we treat the intentional content in each case the same—as if
the object is a real one.
On this view, each reader is the participant and creator of her own fiction-based game.
Fictional worlds are similar to the imaginary worlds that children create during their pretend play
(Walton 1990; Currie 1990, Harris 2000). For our purposes, pretense is the activity of acting and
thinking as if some proposition or state of affairs is true, while knowing that it is not. In their games
of make-believe, a child may pretend that a couch is a house, the underneath of a dining room table
is a dungeon, and a baseball bat is a magnificent sword—all while knowing that none of these are
actually the case.
Theories of make-believe hold that something similar occurs when adults engage with
fictions, but this time the props are largely imaginative. While reading the Harry Potter series, we
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pretend that there is a world similar to our own in which witches and wizards go to a secret school
called Hogwarts, and there’s a Dark Lord lurking in the shadows. The novel itself acts as a prop,
each line feeding into our fictional world and adding layer upon layer of detail to our game of
make-believe. The game of make-believe extends to our psychological states: we pretend to
believe that Harry Potter defeated the Dark Lord at the tender age of one and we pretend that it is
true that Harry is the youngest Quidditch seeker in over one hundred years. Furthermore, we have
fictional feelings about Harry and his crew and fictional desires for the young wizard to vanquish
the Dark Lord.
A theory of make-believe attempts to explain two things: the ontology of fictions and the
nature of our psychological states about them. Both rely on engaging in pretense-based games.
Let’s begin with the ontological question. Do fictions and fictional characters exist? What are
fictional entities such that we can think about them, speak about them, etc.? Theories of makebelieve have a ready response to these questions: fictional entities do not, strictly speaking, exist
outside of one’s game of make-believe. Instead, when we discuss fictional entities, we make
merely pretend illocutions concerning pretend objects. Like an actor in a performance of Hamlet,
we do not make genuine assertions when we speak about the goings-on of fictions. We merely
pretend to do so as a part of the game (see also Searle 1975). Fictional entities are not objects that
can be found in space or time, even if the images or words used as props can be (a painted figure,
a film image of a person, or words that describe a villain).
Walton contrasts his view with a realist Meinongian theory, according to which fictional
entities exist eternally as abstracta, similar to Platonic forms (1990; see also Sainsbury 2010 and
Wolterstorff 1980). On this view, fiction entities are not created, but rather drawn upon and put
together in creative ways by authors, filmmakers, dramatists, etc. Meinongian theories have come
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under strong attack, and rightly so. However, contrasting a pretense theory with the Meinongian
position ignores the more fine-grained concerning the existence of fictional entities. The middle
ground includes other broadly realist theories, such the possible objects view (Lewis 1974) or the
abstract artifact view favored by Kripke (2011 & 2013), Salmon (1998), Schiffer (1996), and
Thomasson (1999).
Importantly, neither a realist nor pretense-based ontology entails that our mental states
about fictions are distinct in type. It could be that we merely pretend that fictional objects exist
when we think about and discuss them. Our mental states about those objects are the standard
mental states, about something fictional. That is one possible way in which to understand the
ontological and psychological questions of fiction: an anti-realist ontology of fictional entities
coupled with a genuine attitude view of mental states. Unfortunately, this view raises a host of
questions concerning the possibility of referring to nonexistent objects.
For this reason, many anti-realists about fictional entities do not go this route. Instead, they
favor the DAV according to which our mental states towards fictional entities are not stereotypical
mental states. One popular way in which to ground a psychology of make-believe is to adopt some
form of simulation theory (ST). ST is typically used in cognitive science as a way to explain how
we attribute mental states to others, especially to predict their behaviors and understand their
emotional state (see Goldman 2006, Gordon, 1986, Currie & Ravenscroft 2002, Nichols et al 1996,
Prinz 2002). Currie and Ravenscroft (2002) argue that imagination essentially involves the
capacity to put ourselves in the place of another or our self in another place or time. Importantly,
both Walton and Currie/Ravenscroft hold that the mental attitudes we adopt in our imaginings are
substitutes for genuine ones; we have imaginative or fictional beliefs about fictions instead of
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beliefs simpliciter. On their view, imagining simulates the role of other states, such as the role
beliefs play in inferential processes (ibid, 49).
The upshot of a theory of make-believe—combining anti-realism about fictional entities
and ST to explain our psychological states towards them—is that is allows proponents of the DAV
a theoretically cohesive and elegant means in which to solve the puzzles of fiction. For example,
we can solve the paradox of fiction by arguing that we do not possess ordinary types of beliefs
about fictional entities. We feel “sympathy for the devil” because that emotion is distinct from our
normal cognitive processing, which allows us to experience unique emotional and moral responses
towards entities that do not match how we would respond to their real-life counterparts. And so
on. However, if the theory of make-believe entails that our mental states towards fiction are nonstereotypical, then this proposal is not available to those who dismiss the DAV. The content-based
view needs some alternative method to explain, or explain away, the puzzles of fiction.

3.3. Imagination
The proponent of a content-based view seems to be at a disadvantage in explaining another aspect
of our engagements with fiction. Note that theories of make-believe rely heavily on our capacity
to imagine things that are not the case. It is often assumed that imagination draws upon our powers
of pretense and mental simulation. Another version of the DAV holds that imagination is necessary
for our experiences with fiction; fictions call us to imagine certain propositions and states of
affairs; this may include distinct, imaginary kinds of mental states. Since imagination seems to be
involved in both the creation and enjoyment of fictions, then, on this logic, pretense or simulation
must be as well. But if imagination requires pretense, and pretense requires distinct attitudes, how
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can the content-based view explain this extremely important facet of fictions?
It is worth asking whether our imaginative capacities do, in fact, require pretense. I think
that this is doubtful. Some imaginative engagements do not require that we hold some non-actual
proposition to be true. We may imaginatively entertain a proposition, consider an alternative state
of affairs, or “call to mind” an object without automatically holding that it is the case. Entertaining,
considering, and calling to mind may not require pretending that the given state of affairs is true.
Perhaps this is the case with fiction; we consider or entertain fictional propositions but do not
accept their truth in the actual world.
The act of imagination is also sometimes thought to require simulation. On this view, when
we imagine that something is the case, we run our mental states off-line, disconnected from their
typical functional and inferential roles. We simulate typical mental processes. ‘Imagining that X
is true’ means that we simulate that X is true. Again, I think that it is a mistake to equate
imagination and simulation. Perhaps imagining that something is the case sometimes involves
simulation. But simulation is not required for imagining in general. We can consider or entertain
non-actual states of affairs without simulating mental processes as if that they are actual.
If I am right here, then we must take care to distinguish between imagination, pretense, and
simulation. Unfortunately, we are now left with the question of what imagining actually amounts
to, if not one of these other capacities.
Neil van Leeuwen (2013) helpfully distinguishes between three types of imagining, each
of which may (but arguably need not) be involved in our experience with fictions. The first type
is constructive imagining. This kind of imagining involves developing the content of mental
representations, such as objects, ideas, premises, etc. (ibid, 221). We create the objects of our
mental states. This kind of imagining could be involved when an author writes a novel, or even
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when a scholar pens an article. But constructive imagining could also be involved on the recipient’s
(the person who reads the novel or the article) side. We often do much more than casually entertain
thoughts concerning fictional characters. We consider implications for a character’s future or we
may consider what the story would be like if some event had or had not occurred. For example,
we may wonder whether the boy will ever get the girl or if the vampire has a heart after all. We
may also imagine what it would be like to be Elizabeth Bennett when she first arrives at Pemberley
or Bruce Wayne when he learns the truth about Bane’s past.
Van Leeuwen’s second type of imagining is attitude imagining. Here, we regard the content
of our imagination as fictional rather than as describing the world as it really is. I take it that this
is the most important type of imagining that needs to be discussed. This type of imagining is also
sometimes called propositional imagining; we are imagining that something is the case.
Lastly, imagistic imagining is when we visually, auditorily, or in some other way use
mental imagery to represent some intentional content. We can close our eyes and imagine the
opening measures of Beethoven’s Eroica or picture a character from our favorite novel enact her
most daring exploits. This type of imagining is not greatly at stake in my discussion. I will,
however, briefly discuss this type of imagining in §4 since it is sometimes used as evidence in
favor of the DAV.
Despite its widespread popularity in theories of fiction, I reject the claim that imagining—
and especially attitude imagining—is necessary to explain our interactions with fictions. This is a
hard line to sell, but one that I think is acceptable if we keep the distinctions I’ve made in this
section in mind. I deny that constructive imagining and imagistic imagining are necessary for our
engagements with fiction, although the former may be required for the construction of fictions
(writing a novel, creating a film, etc.). And although we may often have a great deal of mental
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imagery involved in our experiences with fiction, we do not need to. It may not be a part of our
conscious experience of fictions that we imagistically imagine what Jane Eyre looks like, for
example.
Some philosophers argue that some kind of imagining is required in order for us to make
sense of a fictional story (Camp, unpublished manuscript). Imagining in this sense means “holding
in mind objects or states of affairs that are not present to us.” This is roughly equitable to
considering, supposing, or entertaining a proposition.

My claims in this dissertation are

compatible with the imagination thesis if this is all that is meant by imagining. However, those
who support the DAV typically take imagining to mean more than merely considering or
entertaining a proposition–they make claims concerning the nature of the mental states or
processing involved, often appealing to imaginary, offline mental states. I object to this aspect of
the imagining thesis. Finally, it is important to distinguish this kind of imagining (if it is imagining)
is different from both pretense, make-believe, and simulation, all of which make stronger claims
concerning the types of mental activity involved in these processes.
I do not deny that these further kinds of imagination can play a role in how we engage with
fictions. Rather, I argue that imaginative engagement is not necessary for our engagements with
fiction (see also Matravers 2014). I will take a neutral stance on the ontology of fictional
characters, although in general I favor an abstract artifact view. I think that my SAV is compatible
with most ontological theories of fictional entities. In contrast, the proponent of the DAV generally
holds that questions concerning the nature of fictional entities go hand in hand with how we think
and feel about them. Non-actual objects need to be understood in terms of atypical mental states.
I will return to this in chapter 3. For now, though, let’s consider several arguments in favor of the
DAV.
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4. Three arguments for the DAV

The main theoretical support for the DAV stems from a folk psychological and functionalist
understandings of the nature of mental attitudes. Beliefs, desires, judgments, etc. have
characteristic behavioral and inferential roles, understood in terms of inputs from stimuli and their
cognitive and behavioral outputs. Real-life beliefs and their imaginative counterparts might utilize
much of the same causal and inferential pathways to bring about certain responses, but they employ
significantly different inputs and result in very different output (see, e.g. Currie 1990, Currie &
Ravenscroft 2002, Weinberg & Meskin 2006, Schroeder & Matheson 2006). Furthermore,
research in psychology and cognitive neuroscience seems to support the idea that engaging with
non-actual objects utilizes many, but not all, of the same neural pathways as our mental activities
concerning actual things (Kosslyn 1997; Kosslyn, Thompson & Ganis 2006). These studies help
to explain why our reactions to imaginative activity are often so robust, but may also suggest that
we utilize a distinct attitude in our engagements with fiction (Damasio, 1994; Schroeder &
Matheson 2006).
In this section, I will present and critique three arguments in favor of the DAV: the
argument from functional role, the argument from inferential role, and the argument from
neuroscience. Doing so clears the path for my own content-based view by eliminating the main
motivation behind positing a distinct cognitive attitude to begin with.
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4.1. The argument from functional role
Proponents of the DAV argue that mental states such as beliefs and desires can be identified in
terms of their characteristic functional roles. Consider beliefs. It is generally understood that our
beliefs about real-life and non-actual objects utilize many of the same causal and inferential
pathways. However, they have significantly different inputs and result in very different outputs.
Our real-life, everyday beliefs are about things that we can see, touch, and hear— things that exist
spatio-temporally (concretely). These objects act as the input for our everyday, stereotypical
beliefs. In contrast, beliefs about fiction (and other non-actual objects) do not take actual, concrete
objects for their input. Rather, they are about fictions, however that is cashed out ontologically.
The output of our mental processing about actual and fictional objects is also different; they result
in different kinds of behaviors. So while our beliefs about real life and our beliefs about fictions
are similar in many ways, proponents of the DAV hold that they are different enough to constitute
a distinct kind of mental state. The result is that we have belief-like attitudes towards the content
of fictions, but not beliefs simpliciter.
A folk-psychological account of mental attitudes helps to motivate this claim. Standard
belief-desire psychology holds that a belief that X, together with a desire to Y, motivates action, all
things being equal. This position is echoed in the literature on fiction. Proponents of the DAV take
it as a basic fact about our cognitive processing that beliefs generally motivate action (see Walton,
1990; Currie & Ravenscroft, 2002; Schroeder & Matheson, 2006; Weinberg & Meskin, 2006). If
there is no resulting motivation to act, then we do not have a stereotypical belief. We will see that
the same idea applies to other mental states, including emotions. As Walton argues: “Fear
emasculated by subtracting its distinctive motivational force is not fear at all” (1990, 202).
This statement captures the neo-behaviorist, or “purely motivational” conception of belief.
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David Velleman describes this view as follows: “all that’s necessary for an attitude to qualify as a
belief is that it disposes the subject to behave in certain ways that would promote the satisfaction
of his desires if its content were true” (Velleman 2000). The problem with this view, as Velleman
notes, is that it cannot account for a variety of cases that we want to describe as instances of belief.
For example, there may be cases in which a subject “believes that P, but this belief does not bring
with it a disposition to act in P-concordant ways because of some feature of the subject” (Gendler
2008, 653; emphasis added). Another possibility is that the subject believes that P, but does not
act in P-concordant ways because the belief lacks behavioral implications altogether. Finally, there
are cases in which a subject is disposed to act in P-concordant ways, but does act on them because
she lacks other required beliefs (ibid, 653).
Each of these three cases may apply to our interactions with fictions. Perhaps I am not
disposed to act on a belief about a fiction because I lack the relevant desire. Or maybe my belief
about a fiction simply lacks any behavioral implications. My belief that Sherlock Holmes lives at
221B Baker Street does not necessarily motivate me to do anything. Finally, I could lack other
relevant beliefs for action, such as the belief that Sherlock Holmes is a flesh-and-blood person.
Of course, there are different ways in which we can understand the nature of belief besides
the neo-behaviorist conception (see Tullmann & Buckwalter, forthcoming). For instance, L.
Jonathan Cohen argues that the belief that x is the disposition to feel that x is true (Cohen 1989).
This notion of belief could work for our engagements with fictions if we take the truth condition
to be true according to the fiction, as we saw in the previous section. For now, let’s assume that
the functionalist picture of belief is correct. Does it necessarily entail the DAV? I will argue that
it doesn’t; we can also evaluate the motivational role of belief in terms of the state’s content.
Consider Currie and Ravenscroft’s (2002) argument for imaginary mental states. They
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maintain that beliefs serve as part of an inferential network, motivating not only action, but also
other beliefs, desires, and thoughts. The authors posit that beliefs about a fiction are run “off-line,”
disconnected from their normal behavioral and cognitive networks. The same goes for other
activities with non-actual content, such as hypothetical thought and pretend play. These states are
not stereotypical beliefs, but rather imaginative ones, because stereotypical beliefs are understood
in terms of the behavior that they produce.
If Currie and Ravenscroft are correct, then we do seem to have a distinct attitude for
fictional and other activities. Before we accept this conclusion, however, I want to explore two
other possible interpretations of the functional data that do not entail the DAV. First, note that the
main charge against a content-based view is that we do not have the right kind of behavioral
responses to fictions; our “beliefs” about them do not play the right kind of functional role for
motivating action. In contrast, I argue that we do have genuine beliefs about our imaginative
activities, but we do not act because due to the influence of other facts and judgments that we have
(that the object is not real, for one)—even if we are motivated to on some subconscious or
precognitive level.
Second, our beliefs about non-actual objects do sometimes result in actual behaviors. This
is especially clear in cases of hypothetical deliberation and pretend play. For example, a child
pretending to have a tea party will go through the motions as if she was really having a tea party;
someone deliberating on an important decision may go through some of the actions she would
need to perform in order to test a potential outcome, as if she were really going through with that
outcome. I will make the case for acting on the basis of beliefs about fictions as well.
If I’m right, then we are at least sometimes motivated to act on our beleifs about fictions,
even though we know that the object of our belief is not real. Let’s begin with my second claim:
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we sometimes act in response to fictions. There are two ways in which fictions might motivate
actions the first relates a fictional scenario to an analogous real-life situation; the second has to do
with judgments of the fiction qua fiction. According to the first kind of motivation, there may be
cases in which engaging with a fiction and imaginatively considering it will shape our future
actions in our daily lives. For example, after watching Blood Diamond, I make sure that the jewelry
I purchase comes from legitimate sources that do not utilize slave labor. It may be quite common
for fictions to shape our lives in this way; we “export” information from the fiction and apply it to
real-life. In this respect, beliefs about fictions can play a role in our everyday behavioral networks.
An obvious response to this account of fiction-based action is that it does not really address
the relevant type of behavioral motivation. We need some account of our behavioral responses to
fictions qua fiction. It may seem like it is extremely rare that we are ever motivated to act in this
way. For example, we are seldom motivated to attempt to speak to or walk alongside a fictional
character. I am typically not motivated to punish a fictional villain for his crimes that take place in
the fiction, and will not leave a theater demanding that justice be served (if it is not in the narrative).
But there are other ways in which we may actually act towards things that we know are not real.
This is especially true if we consider acting out of an emotion. I cry for Jane Eyre when I find out
about Mr. Rochester’s wife; I would cry for her too if she were my actual best friend. When I
watch a scary film I clutching my armrests, cover my face with my hands, I yell at protagonist to
“watch out!” These are all types of actions—and they are all performed even though I know that
the character, monster, etc. do not actually exist. Of course, we do not act in the exact same way
that we would if that fictional monster were in our town. But we cannot say that beliefs and other
mental states about fictional objects do not yield any functional output. Nor can we say that the
functional output is always distinct in kind. At least some of our actions-out-of-emotion towards
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fictional entities will match those we would perform towards real-life people.
I take it that the proponent of the DAV will not be wholly satisfied with this (admittedly)
limited response. So let’s consider my first claim: we are often motivated to act on the basis of our
beliefs about fictions, even if those actions are not carried to fruition. On this account, it is possible
that we are motivated to act in response to our interactions with fictions even if we do not follow
through with the action. Perhaps my belief that there is a monster oozing towards the screen (think
Walton’s Green Slime) may dispose me to act. Again, some of these behaviors are carried out—I
gasp and worry my hands in anxiety. Other behaviors are not; I do not run screaming towards the
exit, yelling for the other characters to go hide. Why does my belief that there is a green slime
terrorizing the town motivate me to act in some ways but not others?
I hold that some motivated actions do not come to fruition because they are inconsistent
with my recognition that the slime is not real. My belief that the green slime is going to harm me
may have unconsciously primed me to act; my motor system may have been activated and prepared
for flight. In the neo-behaviorists’ terms, I am disposed to act. But that action is ultimately blocked
from occurring due to other beliefs and thoughts that I may have—most importantly, the disbelief
in the slime monster’s actual existence.
Whether or not unconscious, automatic behavioral priming does, in fact, occur is a question
for empirical investigation. We can imagine a study in which we compare a participant’s
behavioral reactions to beliefs about fictions to analogous beliefs and actual, carried-out behaviors;
if the relevant neural circuitry matches, even in part, we would have some evidence that we are
primed for action based on our beliefs about fictions. Indeed, there is some evidence that this is
the case (see, for example, Freedberg & Gallese 2007).
The psychologist Paul Harris (2000) provides further evidence for this view, particularly
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in terms of our emotional responses to imaginings. Very young children tend to be overcome by
the emotions caused by their imaginative activities—e.g. fearing the monster under the bed or
witches that they saw in a movie—even if they know that the fiction is not real. Older children and
adults are generally able to regulate and override these emotions, but still may often become
absorbed in their imaginative activity. We get “lost” in a film or novel and experience strong
emotional reactions, emotions that color our real-life activities.
One way to explain these reactions is to consider the evaluative process of emotions.
Emotions are inherently value-laden insofar as they represent objects in our environment that may
affect our well-being. Harris points out that we “do not appraise the inputs from a perspective
outside of that imagined framework” (ibid, 66). Rather, we appraise an imaginative activity from
within the imaginative framework itself. In that respect, we may be at least motivated to act, even
if it is on an unconscious or subpersonal level. Typically we do not act, though, because other
regulatory processes kick in (what Harris calls “control processes”). For example, we remind
ourselves that the scary scenario is just a fiction or focus on how the story was produced instead
of its scary content. These are ways of detaching ourselves from the fiction. Doing so overrides
the standard functioning of our ordinary emotional responses.
I think that something similar is going on in a great deal of our interactions with fictions.
We may be have low level motivations to act on but generally do not because of other regulatory
thoughts, judgments, and beliefs. The motivation to act may not be able to override these other
factors, especially the knowledge that what we encounter does not actually exist. So our mental
states towards fictions still have their characteristic functional role, but it is blocked by some other
attitude. Our dispositions to act sometimes do not result in action. Having the belief that fictional
objects are not real may act as a kind of traffic light for behavior, stopping some behaviors from
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ever coming to fruition while allowing others to proceed. This does not mean that the beliefs
involved in actually motivating those behaviors are any different in kind from ordinary, real-life
beliefs. It does imply that there is some deterring factor (namely, some other mental state) that
allows for some behavior while barring others.

4.2. The inferential role argument
Even if I am right that the functional argument for the DAV fails, one could still claim that there
is a difference in the inferential role of mental states about actual and non-actual objects. This
difference is enough to claim that mental attitudes about fictions are different in kind from those
about actual things. A mental state’s inferential role includes both its meaning and relation to other
mental states. For example, on conceptual-role semantics, for a state to possess the content that it
does is simply for it to play a certain role in cognition. A belief that X will play a role in bringing
about further thoughts, beliefs, desires, etc. The belief is also caused by other mental states.
Importantly, the difference between the inferential role of a stereotypical belief about an actual
object, and a belief-like state about a fiction, may be a difference that makes a difference. We do
not have stereotypical beliefs concerning fictions because our real-life and fictional beliefs play
different types of inferential roles. They are caused by, and result in, different types of states and
so possess different meanings. I will show that this conclusion is unfounded.
To begin, one could argue that the difference in inferential role results from a difference in
intentional content. If that is the case, then we have an explanation for why the real-life and
fictional beliefs seem to play different inferential roles: they are beliefs about different things!
Consider the following example. When you watch the film American Psycho, you witness Patrick
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Bateman’s dalliances from one exorbitantly-priced dinner to another, examining and trading
business cards, discussing the merits of Versace versus Gucci suits, and picking up prostitutes to
torture and kill. You form certain beliefs about Patrick: “Patrick is a superficial maniac”; “Patrick
is a product of our materialistic culture”; “Patrick is a moral monster.” These beliefs were caused
by other beliefs, thoughts, emotions, etc. and in turn cause other beliefs, thoughts, and emotions.
Now imagine that you encounter someone just like Patrick in your real life: a superficial,
charming, handsome Wall Street exec that you discover has a secret passion for torture and murder.
Your beliefs about this Wall Street exec play roughly the same inferential role as those in the
fiction because they have roughly the same content. We believe that this Patrick is a superficial
maniac, etc., and this causes further beliefs, thoughts, and judgments. However, no matter how
similar this real Wall Street exec is to Patrick, he is not exactly the same. Specifically, our belief
about the fictional Bateman has a fictional operator; we believe “that Patrick Bateman is a Wall
Street exec [in the fictional world of American Psycho].” This difference could make the
difference in terms of the state’s inferential role: different mental content, different belief, different
inferential role.
It could be argued that it’s possible for a fictional scenario to have the exact same content
as a real-life one. The proponent of the DAV could argue that even if the content were exactly the
same, our beliefs about fictions and a real-life counterpart would play distinct inferential roles.
We can vary the American Psycho example slightly to highlight this point. The fictional
story of Patrick Bateman is the same, but this time imagine that, unbeknownst to Bret Easton Ellis
(the author of American Psycho) there is, in fact, a real Patrick Bateman who is exactly like the
Patrick of the story. The proponent of the DAV would have to show that in this case our mental
states still play distinct inferential roles, despite an exact similarity in content. But it is not clear
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how one could make this argument. In this case, it is just an accident that the Patrick Bateman of
the fiction is exactly the same as the Patrick Bateman of the actual world. A reader would still treat
the fictional character as a fictional character because she does not know any different. Even if the
reader finds out about the real Patrick, she may still have different types of mental states about
them—namely, that the first one is Patrick of the story, and the other is Patrick of the actual world.
In fact, I think that it is generally impossible for a fictional and real-life scenario produce
the exact same mental content. If they did, it is not clear what would separate the fiction from the
non-fiction—what would make the fiction fictional? Wouldn’t we just call American Psycho a
non-fiction? Now, one could respond that it is just a coincidence that Ellis wrote a story that exactly
imitates the life of a real person. That does not make his work any less a fiction (Borges’ “Pierre
Menard, Author of the Quixote” comes to mind here). Moreover, we might speak of the Napoleon
of Tolstoy’s War and Peace as if he is the actual Napoleon, for example, and so equating the two
in our mind. But this is a mistake. Here we have a fictional portrayal of a (once) actual person, but
differs in important ways from the actual Napoleon. Even in this case, as with the two Patrick’s,
we are left with a difference in intentional content, the difference of being in a fictional story versus
the actual world. This results in two different mental states. We do not need to bring in a distinct
mental attitude to explain a difference in inferential role.
There is a further response we can make against the DAV, one similar to my second claim
concerning the functional role argument. Just because the mental state has different behavioral or
cognitive output does not mean that it is a distinct type of state or that there are distinct cognitive
mechanisms involved in their processing. The distinct inferential role may be taken as evidence
for the DAV, but it does not entail it. Regardless of the fictional/real-life mental attitude’s content,
it will still play some inferential role. We can explain this role in the same way we would a belief
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with actual content, in terms of the mental attitudes it causes. The resulting difference between the
real-life and fictional intentional roles can be explained by the other beliefs, desires, thoughts, and
emotions that brought it about. This will generally include the belief that a particular character or
scenario is not real or only exists in the fictional world. This places the belief in a distinct role, but
does not seem to require that we adopt a whole new cognitive mechanism.
I conclude that the argument from inferential role does not entail the distinct attitude view.
A difference in content likely explains the inferential differences in our mental attitudes towards
fictions. Moreover, we do not need to posit a distinct cognitive attitude even if the content is
exactly the same.

4.3. The argument from neuroscience
The functional and inferential role arguments are the most common justifications for the DAV.
Some DAV proponents, however, also believe that research in cognitive neuroscience supports
their view. Here I will briefly consider some of this research and how it has been utilized by various
philosophers, in particular, Timothy Schroeder and Carl Matheson (2006). My response to their
arguments is quite similar to my response to the previous two: there are multiple interpretations of
the neuroscientific data, and these interpretations are either just as plausible as the distinct attitude
interpretation, or more so.
First of all, we must clarify what the neuroscientific research is best suited to explain. It
seems clear that much of the neuroscientific research on imagining concerns van Leeuwen’s third
category, imagistic imagining. For example, Stephen Kosslyn argues that about two-thirds of the
processes utilized in vision are also employed in visual imagery. The similarity arises because
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mental imagery relies on previously organized and stored information; the difference arises
because some of the low level processes involved in actual perception do not occur in imagistic
“seeing,” “hearing,” etc. (Kosslyn 1997). Alvin Goldman (2006) argues that there is also evidence
that we use many of the same processes when we imagine a face as when we actually see it
(O’Craven and Kanwisher, 2000). The fusiform gyrus is activated in both cases; lesions to the
fusiform face area impair both face recognition and the ability to imagine faces (Damasio et al.
1990). Finally, Goldman argues that there are neural similarities in motor execution and motor
imagination. Imagining a moving hand utilizes the same neural mechanisms that would normally
be used when we actually move that hand (Parsons et al. 1998, Freedberg & Gallese 2006).
This research provides evidence for the similarities and differences between imagistic
imagining and actual perception or movement. I doubt that anyone would deny that there is a
difference between mental imagery and actual perception—and, furthermore, that at least some
different cognitive and neural mechanisms are involved in each. But this is not the kind of
imagining that is at stake in the distinct attitude debate. Rather, the significant question seems to
be whether, in spite of their similarities to real-life situations, we need to posit a distinct mental
state to explain our attitude and constructive imaginings about fictional content. Again, based on
the previous two arguments, it is unclear that we do.
Nevertheless, Schroeder and Matheson build on the neuroscientific imagistic data in order
to account of our emotional reactions towards fictions in a way that supports the DAV. Their
arguments are similar to Goldman’s; research in cognitive neuroscience shows that we employ
mental attitudes that are “akin to beliefs [etc.] in structure and in some of their effects, but
distinguished from beliefs in others” (2006, 20). Their task is to clarify these similarities and
differences.
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To begin, the authors discuss how sensory and quasi-sensory representations are produced.
The stimulation of the sensory organs produces neural signals that then produce patterns of activity
in the brain known as unimodal sensory representations (ibid, 26). These unimodal representations
are thought to come together to form multimodal representations that can be evoked through
multiple sensory systems. Multimodal representations portray things like snakes, trees, and other
objects in our environment that can be experienced by the use of more than one sensory modality.
Our semantic memory contains dispositions to token representations of these objects. These are
activated by sensory stimulation just as unimodal representations are (ibid, 26).
Importantly, multimodal representations are signaled to a number of different neural
targets, including the orbitofrontal cortex, the affective division of the striatum and the amygdala
(ibid, 26; see Rolls 2000, Mello & Villares 1997 and LeDoux 1996). Each of these areas is involved
in producing affective responses and emotional feelings. The orbitofrontal cortex is largely
involved in the “discrimination of rewarding and punishing stimuli, in order to influence feelings,
visceral responses, and decision-making” (ibid, 27). The affective division of the striatum is
involved in producing reward signals that affect emotional feelings. Finally, research by the
neuroscientist Joseph LeDoux suggests that the amygdala is involved in basic emotional responses
to stimuli, resulting in bodily reactions such as the increased heart rate, sweating, breathing, and
facial expressions characteristic of fear and other emotions (ibid, 27; see also LeDoux 1996).
Schroeder and Matheson argue that not only are these affective areas stimulated in reallife situations, they are also activated in our imaginative activities, including engagements with
fictions. In fact, there are no distinct anatomical mechanisms involved in our emotional responses
to actual or non-actual objects (ibid, 28). For instance, our uni-and-multimodal representations are
activated when we perceive something scary in a film. This information is sent to the affective
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regions of the brain just as if we encountered something frightening in our actual environment.
The same applies to what the authors call “free-floating imaginative stimuli” not directly caused
by external stimuli (ibid, 29). There is some neuroscientific evidence to support this claim (see
Kosslyn et al, 1993). For example, research suggests that a monkey’s representational systems
respond powerfully to puppet faces and even “extremely schematic two-dots-over-a-line-faces”
(Schroeder & Matheson 2006).
The authors take this evidence as powerful support for the DAV. I agree that it certainly
establishes the first half of their claim: our emotional responses to fictions are akin to those about
actual objects. But they have not yet established the second, crucial part of their claim that our
emotional responses to fictional and actual objects are inherently different kinds of states. What is
their argument for the distinct attitude? It should look familiar. The authors argue that “although
fictional and otherwise imaginary stimuli have many of the same effects as ‘real’ stimuli do, they
obviously do not have all the same effects, or else people would leap onto stages in order to prevent
murders, and so on” (ibid, 29). They continue:

Perhaps, then, coming to have an imaginative faculty as a [distinct cognitive
attitude] comes down to learning to treat representations that one creates oneself,
or representations created by what one grasps to be fictions or the like, as not
warranting the sorts of behavioral responses that they would were the
representations created externally by non-imaginary events and objects: learning,
that is, to give such representations a distinct functional role (ibid, 34).

So rather than explain the necessity of a distinct cognitive attitude in terms of data from cognitive
neuroscience, Schroeder and Matheson fall back on the same kind of functional differences we
have already considered. This is essentially the same argument that we discussed above and it is
subject to the same kind of critique. The functionalist argument does not entail the DAV. The
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differences can be explained purely in terms of the intentional content of the mental state.
Alternatively, we could be disposed or motivated to act towards fictions, but other judgments,
beliefs, and regulatory processes prevent us from doing so.
Interestingly, these explanations are compatible with a further point that Schroeder and
Matheson make concerning the influence of background knowledge and dispositions on our
responses to imaginative activity. It may be that these factors, including top-down judgments about
the ontological status of fictions, keep our behaviors in check even if we are subpersonally and
automatically primed or motivated to act or respond emotionally to them. This is consistent with
the neuroscientific data the authors present. Engagements with fiction (and other non-actual
objects) can generate actual emotional responses because they employ the same neural
mechanisms as real-life situations do. It is also quite possible that the uni-and-multi-modal
representations involved in emotional responses do not “pay attention,” as it were, to the existence
of the thing that they represent before signaling the relevant brain areas. Recognizing that the
object of our interaction is not real requires top-down judgments from different cognitive pathways
(see Damasio 1994, Harris, 2000 & LeDoux, 1996). The emotion goes through.
This section constitutes my preliminary remarks against the DAV, clearing the way for my
own standard attitude view. I will return to these arguments in the following chapters.

5. Resisting the DAV

The DAV could provide us with a unified explanation of our psychological interactions with
fictions, accounting for all of the puzzles of fiction in terms of one general approach. Furthermore,
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work on the imagination and simulation lends the view empirical credibility and a potential
integration with broader psychological theories.
I have already rejected the three main arguments in support of the DAV: arguments
concerning the functional role, inferential role, and neural processing of our mental states
(particularly beliefs) do not entail a distinct cognitive attitude. What I have not shown is why we
should prefer a content-based, or standard attitude view, over a distinct attitude view. I will spend
the next four chapters attempting to show why the SAV is preferable to the DAV. Here are several
preliminary suggestions.
First, one concern with the DAV is that many accounts build their theory on a flawed notion
of the nature of the mental states in question (particularly emotions). If we get things right on in
terms of the ontology and psychology of mental states (or at least put forward the best view we
can) then it is unlikely that a distinct attitude is warranted to begin with.
The second critique is related to the first. Those who argue in favor of a distinct attitude
rarely explain what, exactly, the distinct attitude amounts to. As we’ve seen, theorists generally
try to explain the distinctness of our imaginative attitudes in terms of functional role (behavioral
outputs) or inferential role (mental outputs); our mental states towards fictions do not lead to the
kinds of thoughts and behaviors that they would for real-life objects. This problematically assumes
a straightforward functionalist view of mental states that, while attractive in terms of folk
psychology, does not accurately capture the nature of how mental states motivate action or
inferential processes. I will argue against this assumption in my dissertation. Doing so undermines
the motivation behind the DAV to begin with; if mental states are not individuated in terms of
functional role, then we may in fact have standard mental states towards fictions, despite the fact
that we do not act towards fictional objects as we do towards real-life ones.
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Third, one can argue from a principle of parsimony that there is no need to posit a distinct
mental attitude if typical ones have the same explanatory power. I will attempt to show that we
simply do not need to posit a DAV if we adopt an appropriate view of emotions and moral
judgments, as well as suitable explanations for the puzzles of fiction.
Finally, the DAV (especially one utilizing a theory of make-believe or simulation theory)
does not seem to be able to account for our actual phenomenological—that is, conscious, possibly
introspectible—experiences with fictions. Our emotions, beliefs, desires, and other mental states
towards fictions feel natural and relatively automatic, not like we are playing a game of makebelieve, or simulating a possible course of action. In fact, our mental states about fictions often do
not seem any different than those about actual things.
The proponent of the DAV may dismiss the phenomenological worry by arguing that the
game of make-believe or simulation takes place unconsciously and, after some practice, quite
rapidly. Some of the imaginings involved in a game of make-believe are often deliberate and
consist in conscious, occurrent mental states. But others are spontaneous, unconscious, and
automatic. We do not tell ourselves to begin imagining what is going to happen to our favorite
television character. We simply do it, sometimes without realizing it. Walton says that when this
happens our imaginings “have a life of our own” and we feel less like an author than a spectator
to the imagining (Walton 1990, 14). I grant that this may be true for simulation (an issue I’ll return
to in chapter 4). But it is hard to imagine that we engage in an unconscious game of make-believe—
how would the game work? What would the rules be, and how would it be initiated? Walton and
other theorists of make-believe claim to have a theoretical answer these questions. What they do
not seem to be able to explain is the phenomenology of our actual experiences.
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6. The Standard Attitude View

Based on my discussion so far, we can isolate four questions that an adequate moral psychology
of fiction must address:

1. Why do we often have asymmetrical psychological responses to analogous fictions
and real life situations? Call this the asymmetry problem.
2. What is the nature of our mental attitudes toward fictions, especially those involved in
moral judgments? Call this the fictional attitudes problem.
3. How, and to what extent, are we motivated to act in response to fictions, especially
morally? Call this, as we have seen, the problem of fictional motivation.
4. What psychological theory can adequately account for our actual phenomenological
experiences toward fictions, particularly in terms of our moral judgments? Call this the
experiential problem.

The issues that I have raised against the DAV in the preceding sections should at least
suggest that a different approach to a psychology of fiction is in order. I will argue for a standard
attitude view (SAV), which, as the name suggests, holds that we form standard mental states
concerning fictions. This implies that we can understand our mental states about fictions in much
the same way we would any actual context—a simple enough claim, but one that has been strongly
challenged by proponents of the DAV. Arguing for this position requires that I explore the alternate
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interpretations to the functional, inferential, and neuroscientific data typically employed to support
the DAV that I offered in the previous section.
It is a tall order for any theory to answer each of the above four questions. Nevertheless,
in what follows I will argue that my SAV can explain them just as well or better than the competing
DAV theories. Some of the different versions of the DAV and SAV may be able to address several
of these questions, but I will show that only my view can adequately account for them all.
I will develop my own moral psychology from the “ground-up.” To begin, I will discuss
one further potential worry against the SAV: the illusion theses, the idea that we are under either
a cognitive or perceptual illusion while engaged with fictions. However, developing my moral
psychology of fiction does not only require that I debunk the DAV. I must also develop a theory
that can explain our actual moral experiences with fictions. In chapter 3, I introduce a key concept
for doing so: the fictional stance. I will then sketch a picture of my own theory of how we
understand the mental states of fictional entities in chapter 4 in terms of a modified theory-theory
for mindreading, while also critiquing other potential theories. In chapter 5, I will address the
unique problems that emotions pose for a psychology of fiction. This will involve a discussion of
the paradox of fiction, the nature of emotions, and the intelligibility of these responses. In so doing,
I will develop my multi-level appraisal theory of emotions, which will serve as the backbone of
my theory of moral judgments about fictions. I will take up that issue in Chapter 6 in which I argue
for a sentimentalist, multi-level appraisal theory of moral judgments. I will also summarize my
conclusions from the previous chapters and weaving together the various strands into my SAV.
The remaining three chapters will each discuss a different puzzle of fiction: the puzzle of
disparate response/sympathy for the devil phenomenon in chapter 7, the puzzle of imagination
resistance in chapter 8, and the question of moral learning in chapter 9. I will also return to the
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four questions from this section and show how I have resolved them with my SAV.
While my arguments predominantly apply to our interactions with fictions, they also carry
over into other areas of philosophy and cognitive science. Indeed, our mental states towards
fictions are often important counterexamples to general theories of emotions, perception, and
mindreading. So it is important to take them into account when we develop our general
psychological and philosophical theories. But there are three other ways in which the underlying
question of this dissertation—the DAV versus the SAV—is philosophically significant. First, there
is an independent question of whether we should explain aspects of human behavior in terms of
the content of our mental states or in terms of new mental attitudes. If both content and attitudebased views have a great deal of explanatory power, then how should we adjudicate between them?
I take my work here to cast a mark in favor of the content-based approach.
Second, individuating and defining mental states is a complicated and controversial area
of philosophy of mind. Fictions provide us with interesting, complex, and challenging examples
and counterexamples for theories of mental state individuation. Finally, this dissertation covers
very broad range of philosophical topics, from the nature of perception and belief to moral learning
and emotional rationality. Indeed, I will sketch several positive theories in the following chapters:
the modified theory-theory, an appraisal theory of emotions and moral judgments, and a theory of
emotional responsibility. Indeed, this dissertation is as much an exploration of the nature of our
mental states as it is an examination of our experiences with fictions.
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Chapter 2: The fictional illusion theses

1. The “magic” of fiction

This chapter focuses on a potentially perplexing aspect of our interactions with visual
representations, and especially visual fictions (including film, paintings, pictures, even video
games): it seems like, in some cases, that visual fictions can play tricks on us. We may “suspend
our disbelief” while engaged with fictions so that we come to believe that fictional objects are real
and events actually occur.
The notion of suspending disbelief was first introduced by the British Romantic poet
Samuel Coleridge, who argued that we suspend our disbelief in the nonexistence of fictional
objects during our engagement with fictional stories (Coleridge 1817). This supposedly explains
our emotional responses to fictional entities; we emotionally respond to them because we believe
that they actually exist!
While it’s certainly true that we sometimes become very absorbed in fictions, it is a genuine
question whether we actually forget or are tricked into believing that fictional characters and events
actually exist. For example, watching Christopher Nolan’s 2006 film The Prestige, we may come
to believe that the two magicians—Robert Angier and Alfred Borden—are real people, that their
magical rivalry actually occurred, and maybe even that their illusions are real. Generally speaking,
we know that the objects in fictional film are nonexistent, just like we know that magician’s
“magic” isn’t real. The question is whether we can we be tricked, perhaps momentarily, into
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believing otherwise.
Following Noël Carroll (Carroll 2008), let’s characterize this challenge as the illusion
thesis: we fall prey to some kind of illusion during our engagements with fiction. So far, we have
been discussing one type of illusion, concerning belief. Carroll characterizes two types of potential
illusion:
1) The Cognitive Illusion Thesis (CIT): one might come to believe that fictional events,
characters actually occur or exist. This would mean that when I watch The Prestige, I
come to believe that Angier and Borden are real and the events in the film actually take
place.
2) The Perceptual Illusion Thesis (PIT): we are committed to the existence of the
represented fictional objects on a perceptual level. This implies that we perceive
fictional entities like Angier in the same way that we do real-life objects and, further,
that our perception is somehow implies the existence of the perceptual object.

Different artistic media may commit us to one or both of these illusions. For example,
reading a novel might subject one to a cognitive illusion, but not a perceptual illusion. Perceptual
illusions generally apply to visual fictions, although we can imagine someone listening to an
audiobook in her car falling prey to the perceptual illusion that the narrator is an actual person.
Many philosophers reject both versions of the illusion thesis out of hand. Indeed, what is
the motivation behind them? One potential argument in favor of the illusion thesis comes from our
dispositions to act on the basis of our beliefs or perceptions of fictional objects. In chapter 1, I
argued that we may be motivated to act while we are engaged with a work of fiction. However,
many of our motivated behaviors will never come to fruition because of competing judgments
concerning the fictional status of the work. This argument formed the basis of my attack against
the DAV (distinct attitude view), in favor of the SAV (standard attitude view). Our beliefs about
fictions are ordinary beliefs that play typical functional roles, even if those beliefs do not
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necessarily lead to action.
Interestingly, one could argue that any motivation to act in response to fictions, even if that
motivation is entirely unconscious and never amounts to actual behavior, implies that we believe
in the existence of the fictional object. This would suggest that my SAV position is committed to
the CIT, and perhaps the PIT as well. Doesn’t any kind of emotional response imply that we believe
in the existence of fictional entities, either on a perceptual or cognitive level? Of course, it’s worth
pointing out the functionalist assumption behind such claims, as I noted in the last chapter. If we
assume strong version of functionalism about mental states, such that beliefs and percepts can be
individuated and identified primarily in terms of functional role, then our low level behavioral and
emotional responses may suggest that we believe that a zombie (for example) is real, or that we
perceive it as such.
I want to resist the illusion theses, partly by resisting their functionalist assumption. I face
the challenge of developing an alternative explanation for these subconscious motivations to act,
an explanation that does not appeal to an illusory belief in the existence of fictional entities.
Furthermore, one may be tempted to think that illusory attitudes do not count as standard beliefs,
desires, and emotions, or that they are unstable grounds for further genuine attitudes about fictions.
Such views could open the door to a pretense theory of fiction; a suspension of disbelief in the
nonexistence of fictional entities could imply that the viewer is engaged in some kind of pretend
play or game of make-believe; we pretend that fictional objects are real. This would be problematic
for the SAV.
I grant that we may be victims of some illusions while engaged with fictions. Most
prominently, we might be under the illusion that objects actually move while we watch a film due
to the speed of the projection (see Carroll 2008). We might also be under the illusion that a
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particular actor has changed appearances (with makeup or prosthetics) or that we witness a magic
trick (as in The Prestige). I do not deny that we are often “victims” of these kinds of illusions.
Such illusions are commonplace, and generally easy to explain in terms of the material and
construction of fictions. It is also possible that sometimes we are under more general illusions
while engaging with fictions such that we perceive or believe that the fiction is real. Perhaps we
encounter a performance of a play that takes place in the streets of our city and, being unfamiliar
with the play, we do not realize that those are actors.1 This would be a genuine case of a cognitive
illusion.
In this chapter, I will argue that both the illusion theses are false if we think of them as
general accounts of our experiences with fiction. It is not a part of our general experience with
fictions that we believe or perceive fictional objects as existing. To make this argument, I will
begin by drawing out further implications of the illusion theses and provide some preliminary
remarks against them, beginning with the CIT. I will argue that we do not fall prey to the CIT, but
that standard remarks made against the thesis are inadequate. In fact, there are three versions of
the CIT; standard responses against the CIT can only account for two of them. The third version
of the CIT is, I argue, actually a form of the PIT. This means that the CIT boils down to a question
about perception and perceptual content. I will explore the PIT in §3 and §4. §5 addresses the
possibility of the cognitive penetration of perception and how it may bear on the illusion theses. I
will conclude by briefly presenting an alternative explanation of the behavioral and emotional
responses that served as motivation for the illusion theses, and explanation that is compatible with
the SAV.

1

Many thanks to John Greenwood for pressing me on this point.
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2. The cognitive illusion thesis

Carroll presents and critiques both illusion thesis in his book, The Philosophy of Motion Pictures.
He characterizes the CIT as follows: during the duration of a movie, the viewer believes that the
objects she encounters are real, so she treats them as she would any real object. As we’ve seen, the
CIT essentially constitutes a suspension of disbelief in the objects and events of the fiction
(Coleridge 1817, Hurka 2001). For example, a viewer suspends her disbelief in the nonexistence
of the magician Angier while she watches The Prestige. Doing so allows her to recognize fictional
objects as real things. This leads to some low level (subpersonal, automatic, non-deliberate)
behavioral and emotional responses towards fictional entities.
What is the nature of the belief implied by the CIT? This question is not typically addressed
in the literature on this topic. The assumption is that we’re discussing inferential beliefs, which are
traditionally ‘cognitive’ in nature; they result from inferential processes working together with
current content, information about the world, and stored background knowledge (see Lyons 2005).
This includes beliefs like “Moscow is the capitol of Russia.” Some beliefs, however, arise directly
from perceptual capacities. We may believe that the sky is grey (for example) by merely perceiving
a grey sky, without further inferential processing. These are perceptual beliefs. I will show that
both types of belief maybe subject to the CIT.
The CIT could potentially explain a wide-range of our experiences with fictions, including
how we recognize objects in fiction as well as our cognitive interactions with them (emotions,
thoughts, desires, etc.). However, most philosophers seem to think that it would be patently absurd
to accept the CIT, since it seems to entail that we would act towards a character in just the same
way that we would act towards a real person. As Katherine Thomson-Jones points out:
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I am able to appreciate the vivid depiction of an army of zombies surging forward with
arms outstretched, the use of special effects or highly emotive music, the importance
of the scene for the narrative, and so on. Surely, if I had suspended my belief that the
zombies are fictional, I would be too frightened to appreciate film in this way (2008, p.
107).
The problem is that the majority of our behaviors towards fictions (or lack thereof) are inconsistent
with the idea that we even temporarily suspend our disbelief about the reality of a fiction. We do
not act as if we believe that the fiction is real. The same idea works for other mental attitudes, such
as desires and emotions. Moreover, our conscious experience of watching a film is also antithetical
to the cognitive illusion thesis. If asked, we would deny that fictional entities are real. We would
also deny that we were tricked into believing otherwise.
These remarks comprise the standard responses to the CIT: we do not act as if we believe
that fictional objects are real and we do not have the conscious experience of believing that they
exist. The standard response provides adequate evidence against the CIT much of the time,
especially if we accept the functionalist idea that beliefs have certain functional and inferential
roles that often lead to behavior; if the relevant behavior is missing, then the belief probably is too.
However, there is a way to interpret the CIT that makes it much more of a challenge than
writers typically acknowledge. In fact, I think that there are three ways to cash out the CIT:
CIT#1). We have a conscious belief that the objects of fiction actually exist (spatiotemporally). E.g. I have a conscious belief that Hamlet exists.
CIT#2). We have an unconscious belief that the objects of fiction actually exist
(spatio-temporally). E.g. I unconsciously believe that Hamlet exists.
CIT#3). We have an unconscious perceptual belief that the objects of fiction
actually exist (spatio-temporally). E.g. I have a perceptual belief that Hamlet exists.

We now have to ask ourselves whether the standard responses to the CIT still work in light of this
reinterpretation. Only CIT#1 entails that we consciously believe in the concrete existence of
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fictional entities. A film viewer would actually believe, while watching a zombie film, that those
very zombies are out there somewhere. Now, if this is true, then surely the standard responses
would be correct—we would run screaming from the movie theater. We do not, so CIT#1 fails.
The same basic argument applies to CIT#2. It is generally accepted that both conscious
and unconscious beliefs can influence and motivate behavior (see Rosenthal 2008). Indeed, our
motivations for action are often unconscious; we are not always consciously aware of what feature
of our thoughts or environment causes us to speak or act. For example, consider what unconscious
beliefs are in play when you choose an apple at the grocery store, type a paper on your laptop, or
ride your bike to work. This implies that unconscious thoughts, judgments, and beliefs can cause
behavior. If CIT#2 is right, then an unconscious belief in the existence of an object of fiction may
often motivate behavior. For example, we may have an unconscious belief that the zombies on a
screen are real, and so we may be motivated to run screaming from the theater. The fact that we
do not run screaming from the theater suggests that we have neither a conscious nor unconscious
belief in the existence of the zombies—if we grant the functionalist assumption. So CIT#2 also
fails.
What about CIT#3? Do the standard responses count against it? Unfortunately, they do
not. CIT#3 rests on the idea that we can have perceptual beliefs that may contradict our consciously
held inferential beliefs. So, for example, I may consciously (cognitively) disbelieve that Hamlet
exists, while at the same time I have a perceptual belief that he does (see Quilty-Dunn,
forthcoming, for a defense of CIT#3). I watch a zombie film and perceive the images on the screen
as zombies. It could be that the processes involved in seeing the image and judging it to represent
a zombie involves a belief that we are in the presence of an actual zombie. Perhaps recognizing an
image of a certain object automatically commits us to a perceptual belief that we are in the presence
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of that object. We have a perceptual belief that the zombie exists. Recall that perceptual beliefs
are formulated directly from perceptual evidence and not from inferential cognitive processes. For
example, I may directly formulate the belief that it is raining outside from looking out of my
window; I do not need to draw any further inferences to believe this.
This means that our perception of the zombie-images causes us to have the perceptual
belief in their existence. And perceptual beliefs may in turn motivate some actions and emotional
responses. This interpretation of the CIT is compatible with my suggestion in chapter 1 that we
may be primed, disposed, or motivated to act on the basis of fiction even if these actions do not
result or manifest in actual behaviors. After all, if the functional role is fulfilled, aren’t we
experiencing some kind of belief, one that motivates our low level responses towards the fictional
entity? For instance, it could be that perceptual beliefs explain how one’s motor cortex primes for
action while face to face with real people, but also when faced with paintings and statues of people
(see Freedberg & Gallese 2007, Gallagher 2013; see Goldman 2006 for an overview). Perhaps we
form an unconscious perceptual belief that the person in a painting or statue is real. This belief
does not manifest in actual behavior (running from the theater) since it is blocked by other beliefs
and judgments. But the illusion still occurs.
I will explore an alternative explanation of the low level behavioral and emotional data in
the last section. For now, it’s worth noting how we have reinterpreted the CIT. The standard
responses worked against the notion of global cognitive illusion, but, at the same time, the CIT
was clearly false. My reinterpretation of the illusion theses is more charitable towards proillusionists and more philosophically and scientifically interesting. The CIT boils down to a
question about perception, about whether we perceptually experience fictional entities as existing
before us. I will now examine this claim.
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3. The perceptual illusion thesis

The PIT states that we have the perceptual experience of seeing real things while engaged with a
visual fiction. We perceive the material of which the fiction is constructed in a non-illusory way—
e.g., the image on our television or computer screen, or the paint on a canvas. We also perceptually
recognize representations on a screen or canvas as being of particular objects: people, trees,
animals, places, etc. The question is whether we perceive these objects in an illusory way. Carroll
compares our visual experience of motion pictures to traditional perceptual illusions such as the
Müller-Lyer illusion or perceiving a straw in a glass of water as bent when it is really straight
(Carroll 2008). In each case, our visual system leads us to perceive something in the world as being
some other way than it actually is. In the case of fiction, we would perceive the objects represented
as real objects.
There are two criteria required to get the PIT off the ground. First, our visual experience of
the illusory object must be sufficiently similar to the object it represents. So, for example, our
illusory perception of a person must be very similar to our perception of that person in the actual
world. I do not think that the illusory experience must be perceptually indistinguishable from
perceiving the analogous object. But they must be similar enough to trick our visual system into
perceiving the illusory object as if it were the real thing. This may manifest in the behavioural
motivations that we have discussed. Second, the PIT implies that the object’s reality is a part of
our visual experience. That is, we see the object as existing. This follows from the CIT#3: our
perceptual experiences cause us to be disposed to believe that the fictional object exists.
Many visual representations meet the first criterion for the PIT. Traditionally created
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motion pictures create a physical record of actual objects. And many paintings, photographs, and
drawings are remarkably life-like. But that does not necessarily mean that we perceive these
objects as existing, as meeting the second criterion.
Carroll rejects the PIT, arguing that it our visual experiences do not meet the first criterion.
Our perception of movie screens and actual objects are not identical, or even sufficiently similar
to the perceptual experience of real-life objects. There are surface interferences—scratches and
dirt on a film strip, hair on the projector slide, the size and shape of the screen, etc.—which make
the viewer aware of the screen and remind her that the objects in the movie are not really in front
of her. Carroll also points out that we typically perceive edge phenomena; we can see around the
edge of an object as we move. We do not experience edge phenomena in our visual perception of
film. We cannot look around a character to see what is going on behind her. We can give the same
sort of explanation for other fictional media. We do not perceive plays in the same way that we do
real-life people and events, because of the stage and other spatial and physical discrepancies
between them. Pictures are always framed and are not subject to edge phenomena, just like films.2
Even listening to an audiobook will probably not sound identical to listening to real people give
an account of their lives. Each of these aspects of our experience of fiction block the first criterion
of the perceptual illusion thesis.
Carroll thus rejects the perceptual illusion thesis and argues for a recognition prompt thesis
to explain how we come to recognize objects in a motion picture. He claims that “humans acquire
the capacity to recognize pictures, including moving pictures, naturally, rather than conventionally,
at the same time that they acquire the capacity to recognize the objects that pictures represent”

2

See Derrida 1987 and Foucault 1970 for interesting discussions of the relevance of frames and
framing for how we experience paintings.
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(ibid, 109). This means that we can recognize representations of real things in a motion picture;
motion picture shots are “natural recognition prompts” (ibid, 110). We recognize the airplane in a
picture of an airplane; we recognize Abe Lincoln in his portrait. We may also recognize unreal
entities like vampires, not because vampires exist in our world, but because we are familiar with
the concept of a vampire and, probably, have seen pictures of vampires before. Importantly, the
prompt allows us to recognize the object that it represents but does not force us to perceive the
fictional representation as existing. This means that our general experience of fictions may fail to
meet the two criteria for the perceptual illusion thesis.
I am sympathetic to Carroll’s recognition prompt thesis. Indeed, I think that something
like this theory can explain how we perceive objects on a movie screen or in a picture. It can also
explain the basis of our emotional and moral responses to fictional entities. I will return to this
point in the following chapters. For now, though, I want to point out a potential problem for this
proposal. Perhaps in most cases (maybe even all cases) there is enough similarity between a
represented object and its real-life counterpart for us to recognize the representation as a
representation. In most cases there are also sufficient visual differences between our perceptual
experiences of the fictional and real-life objects, so that we do not perceptually confuse the two
(barring some trompe l’oeil paintings). But there are two points worth making here. First, it is at
least conceptually possible that a film could be in every way visually identical to a real-life
experience. Suppose, for instance, that sometime in the near future we will be able to enter into
virtual realities that are perceptually indiscernible from the actual, physical world. If this is true,
then our perceptual experience meets the two criteria for a perceptual illusion.
Carroll takes pains to point out that his recognition prompt thesis concerns our everyday
experiences with actual films—not a possible virtual reality like the one I just mentioned.
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Nevertheless, I think that the virtual reality example highlights something missing in his critique
of the illusion thesis, something that must be accounted for if we are to fully reject it. My second
point is that the very recognition of fiction objects is a kind of low level sensory illusion. One
could argue that, in terms of basic sensory information, our perception of visual fiction is
sufficiently similar to those of real-life objects in order to motivate action. This would imply a
perceptual illusion at very early stages of visual processing even if later judgments concerning the
reality of the perceptual object block any kind of behavioral or cognitive reactions to the fictional
object in terms of an actual thing. Neither Carroll’s critique of the PIT nor the recognition prompt
thesis can adequately explain this.

4. The perceptual dilemma

Imagine that you are standing along the wall of a narrow, rectangular bedroom. What do you see?
The walls are a pale blue, the only window a light mint green. Several portraits line the wall next
to the door. A landscape painting teeters over a large, wood-framed bed covered by a bright red
blanket. Chairs, towels, and dressing tables scatter the little remaining space. Now imagine that
you are at the Van Gogh Museum in Amsterdam. Standing in front of the painting Bedroom in
Arles (1888), you encounter the same scene—only smaller, of course, and in the style of the PostImpressionist painter. Once again, you perceive a rather awkward arrangement of furniture and
wall-coverings.
What’s the difference between our perception of these two scenes which, let’s imagine, are
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identical in terms of the objects, colors, proportions, etc.? The van Gogh painting will never trick
a viewer into thinking that it really is the bedroom, due to both its size and style. Stylistic
differences will act like motion pictures’ edge phenomena, keeping us from seeing the painting as
a real scene. But imagine that someone took a color photo of van Gogh’s bedroom in Arles and
made the print large enough to match the size of the actual room. What then? The main difference,
of course, is on the one hand we perceive a representation of a bedroom, while on the other we see
the bedroom itself. Surely we would not be tricked into thinking that we actually see the painter’s
bedroom. The context is all wrong, the light in the scene will never change, we can’t move in that
space, etc.
We do not see an actual bedroom in front of us. Yet it doesn’t seem strange or out of place
to say that we nevertheless see a chair, bed and landscape in the painting (see Lopes 2005). What
do we see when we visually perceive a painting, film, cartoon? Indeed, what sorts of things do we
actually perceive, in general? An investigation of this question will help us to make sense of the
illusion thesis and determine whether it is plausible that we perceive visual fictional objects as real
objects.
There are two questions worth addressing here. First, we want to know what kinds of
objects and properties we perceive—in other words, what kind of properties we visually represent.3
According to many theories of perception, we only perceive very basic kinds of properties, such
as shapes, colors, depth, motion, location, and illumination (e.g. Clark 2000, Brogaard 2013,

3

I assume that some version of representationalism is correct (see Byrne 2001, Harman 1990, Tye
1995, amongst others). An interesting extension of my argument here would be to examine how
the illusion thesis bears on disjunctivist theories of perception (see Fish 2009, Martin 2004,
McDowell 1982, etc.).
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Dretske 1995,Tye 1995; see Siegel 2010 for an overview).4 It’s another question whether we
actually perceive depth or illumination in a two-dimensional screen or painting as opposed to
colors that merely suggest depth or illumination. So the contents of our perception of the van Gogh
painting, then, only include the blueness of the walls, the greenness of the window, redness of the
blanket etc. On this view, we do not perceive objects, but rather just the surface of objects (Clark
2000). Low level properties result from retinal stimulation; all other visual properties, including
objects or object types, are the result of later cognitive processing—thoughts or judgments—of
this basic sensory information (O’Shaughnessy 2000).
Other theorists hold that we perceive properties beyond color, shape, etc. (e.g. Bayne 2009,
Peacocke 1992, Siewert 1998, Siegel 2006). On this view, we can perceive natural and/or artificial
kind properties (animal, dog, or chair), causal properties (that A causes B), emotional properties
(being happy or angry), and semantic properties (hearing a word’s meaning). For example, Siegel
argues that there are cases in which a knowledgeable subject encounters a visual stimulus of a pine
tree and she sees not only an array of shapes and colors at particular locations, but also a pine tree.
This may suggest that our background knowledge, beliefs, and abilities can influence our
perceptual experience (Siegel 2006). As we will see, the high and low level theories of perceptual
content will have different implications for the illusion thesis, but neither implies that the object
of our perception exists. That is, we do not perceive things as existing or not existing.
The second question concerns whether or not there is a difference between our capacity to
perceive actual objects and representations of objects. We literally see the paint that van Gogh
used to create Bedroom in Arles. But do we also see a bed? There is a vast literature on the

4

Although it is debated whether causal properties and objecthood are perceptually low or high
level.
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transparency of photographs which states that, due to the mechanistic nature of the production of
photographs, we literally see the objects represented in a photograph (Lopes 2003 & Walton 1984;
see Currie 1990 & Carroll 2008 for critiques of the transparency thesis). Photographic transparency
may also carry over to the transparency of film and digital media, so that we literally see the objects
being filmed/recorded. Of course, paintings and cartoons are not transparent even if photographs
and film are, so some other account is required to explain how we see objects in them.
Alternatively, it may just be a natural fact of our perceptual system that we see represented shapes
as objects, as Carroll’s recognition prompt thesis holds (see also Lopes 2005 & Wollheim 1980).
A painting or film does not need to be transparent in order for us to recognize objects as being
represented.
I will return to this question in the following chapter but, for now, I will remain largely
silent on it. I do not think that the recognition of a represented object requires that the
representation be transparent (so that we really do see through the representation to the object
itself; see Walton 1984). It is enough to show that we can recognize the representation of an object
on a screen or canvas. The question is whether our recognition of objects amounts to a perceptual
illusion. I think that answering this question depends on how we respond to the first: which kinds
of properties are represented in perception? I argue that both the high and low level positions pose
serious problems for the illusion theorist. Let’s begin with the idea that we perceive high level
properties.

Option 1: we perceive higher-level properties
First point, what kinds of high level properties must we perceive in order for the illusion thesis to
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be true? Remember that the perceptual illusion thesis claims that we are “tricked” into perceiving
the visual objects of fiction as actual objects. It is not enough that we recognize fictional objects
as objects. We also need to perceive them as actual, existing things—that they are perceptually
present to us (see Dokic 2012, Noë 2006, Siegel 2010).
Here’s an example. Imagine that you are walking down the street and you see a neighbor
walking her collie puppy. On the current view, you perceive the puppy as belonging to a particular
kind: “animal,” “dog,” and maybe even “collie,” besides also seeing the object’s shape, size,
motion, color, etc. Similarly, when you are watching an old Lassie rerun, you may perceive the
dog as an “animal,” “dog,” or “collie” due to visual recognitional cues, along with other low level
properties. Importantly, in both the real-life and fictional cases, we perceive the dog as a dog. The
question is whether the fact that you perceive an object at all implies that you see it as an actual,
existing thing. This would require that we perceive the neighbor’s collie as possessing a property
of existing—or, similarly, that we are in its presence. The PIT further requires that we also perceive
Lassie as existing, even while we know that she doesn’t.
Do we have the perceptual experience of objects as a) existing or b) present to us? Let’s
consider the first possibility. There are ways to understand this. First, it could be that our default
position is to perceive all objects as existing, as possessing the property of existence. This means
that we perceive represented objects in paintings, films images, etc. as existing by default and we
form a perceptual belief in the existence of the object. Thus, we would be under both a perceptual
illusion and a cognitive illusion. Of course, other judgments, beliefs, and knowledge about the
fictional status of the object may undermine this. We may discard or override the perceptual belief
so that we never come to believe that the fictional entity is real. These other judgments, etc. could
prevent our actually behaving as if the object exists, but not necessarily our early stages of
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behavioral motivation or priming.
One issue with this interpretation is that it makes the perceptual illusion thesis trivially true.
We perceive representations of objects as existing, but that’s because we perceive everything as
actually existing. We would never perceive fictional things as “being fictional” because we
perceive everything as actually existing. The question is whether our perceptual abilities are
actually equipped to perceive things as existing, as possessing the property of existence. Note that
even philosophers of perception who do argue in favor of high level perceptual properties (such as
Susanna Siegel) do not claim that we perceive complex properties like “existing.” Indeed, the most
these philosophers claim is that we can perceive kind properties. If so, then we do not, strictly
speaking, perceive objects as existing or not existing; we judge them to be so.
The second possibility complements this last claim. We do not perceive an object
possessing properties like “existing” or “nonexistent.” Attributing those properties to an object
must be the result of cognitive processing, not perceptual processing. On both interpretations, the
perceptual system does not distinguish between fictional and non-fictional objects. The difference
is that, on the former view, we default by perceiving the object as actually existing. On the latter,
we default by suspending judgment as to the ontological status of the object, because existence is
not the kind of property that we can perceive without cognitive mediation. In both cases, we may
be motivated to act based on our perception due to direct behavior links that do not require
cognitive processing, such as a cognitive belief.
The difference between these two positions is subtle, but quite important. On the second
position, cognitive processing is required to interpret the object as non-existent, as a representation
on a canvas or screen. Perception alone cannot indicate that something is non-actual.
The “no distinction in perception” position implies that the PIT fails, at least on the reading
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that we perceive that fictional objects exist. It’s possible, however, that we perceive fictional
objects as “in our presence”—as in front of us spatially, just as we would real things. This seems
unlikely. On most accounts of perceptual presence, we are perceptually present with an object if
that object is in our egocentric space (Dokic 2012, Noë 2006 and Siegel 2010; see also Evans 1982
on direct reference). This means that we are disposed to act in certain ways towards the object, and
such actions will affect how we perceive it. For example, a tomato is perceptually present to us if
we can orient our body in relation to it. This isn’t the case for visually represented objects; as
Carroll notes, represented objects lack edge phenomena and other egocentric perceptual capacities.
I conclude that we do not perceive fictional objects as existing; our visual experience of
fictions does not meet the second criterion of the perceptual illusion thesis. And if we do not
perceive fictional objects as existing, then we will not be disposed to cognitively believe that they
exist either. That means that CIT#3 fails as well.

Option 2: we only perceive low level properties
Perhaps the question of whether we can perceive objects as existing is a moot point. After all,
many philosophers of perception argue that we only perceive low level properties (color, shape,
location, illumination, motion, depth, etc.), not high level ones and certainly not properties like
“existing.”

This means that thoughts and judgments that allow us to process perceptual

information as objects of particular kinds (Stokes 2014).
Let’s illustrate this in terms of the Lassie example. When I’m walking down the street and
I see my neighbor’s collie, all that I actually perceive is a particular color, shape, size, motion, and
location in my visual field. Later cognitive processing puts this information together and informs
my experience of it; now I see that this thing is a dog that is walking towards me and, if I’m a dog-
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sophisticate, that this particular dog is a collie. But properties like “dog,” “collie,” and even
“object” may not feature into my basic perceptual experience. Now consider my perception of
Lassie on TV. Here, too, I perceive an image in front of me that transmits information like color,
shape, motion, and location. I do not represent the properties of dog, collie, or Lassie until more
cognitive processing has taken place.
So where is the perceptual illusion? On this position, there is none! We do not perceive
objects, real or unreal. We only judge, in some way, that we see an object. In other words, our
perception in this cases passes the first criterion for the perceptual illusion, but fails to meet the
second. It is very likely that our perception will be informed by other cognitive beliefs and concepts
that indicate that this thing we see on the television screen is a fictional entity. An exception to this
would be if we are completely ignorant of whether the image we see is real or not, as in a perfectly
indiscriminable virtual reality. I am willing to grant that this would be a perceptual illusion.

5. Cognitive penetrability & the illusion thesis

It is possible that the perception of high level properties is mediated by top-down beliefs and
judgments—specifically, knowledge about the fictional status of the object we perceive. If so, then
it may also be possible that our beliefs about the nature and properties of an object may shape how
we perceive it. On this view, we might actually perceive objects as existing or not existing because
of a cognitive mediation from beliefs and judgments about the ontological status of the object. One
basis for the cognitive judgment that a fictional object is nonexistent stems from the visual
discrepancies between visual representations and real-life objects that we discussed above: two57

dimensionality, screen/canvas/photographic obstructions, etc. These differences cause us to judge
that the object we perceive does not actually exist. That judgment, in turn, shapes how we perceive
what is represented on the screen, in the sense that our experience is not sufficiently similar to
perceiving a real-life object (criterion 1) and that we do not see the object as existing (criterion 2).
This would mean that our perception of a visual representation is cognitively penetrable;
our thoughts, beliefs, and knowledge about an object may influence how we actually perceive it.
This is an interesting, though controversial, possibility. If true, it may be possible that we perceive
fictional things differently than we perceive real things. Combined with Carroll’s points
concerning the visual differences between visual fictions and real objects, the possibility of
perceiving fictional entities as real objects never arises in our everyday experiences.
The cognitive penetrability thesis holds that our knowledge, beliefs, and thoughts about an
object can influence how we perceive it. I address this issue separately since cognitive penetrability
can apply to either high or low level perceptual properties. Importantly, if cognitive penetration of
perceptual experience actually occurs, then our beliefs and thoughts about the status of the fictional
object might help us to literally see the object as not actual. I will not argue for or against the
cognitive penetrability of perception. My goal here is to simply explore its implications for our
perception of visual representations.
Carroll’s account of the perceptual illusion theory implies that perception is cognitively
impenetrable.5 This means that, no matter what we believe or know about an object or illusion, our
perception of it will remain the same. The dog expert and novice will have the same visual
experience of the collie. In contrast, Siegel states that:

Carroll borrows this notion from Zenon Pylyshyn’s arguments on cognitive impenetrability
(Pylyshyn 1999). See also Jerry Fodor’s modularity thesis (1983).
5
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if visual experience is cognitively penetrable, then it is nomonologically possible
for two subjects (or for one subject in difference counterfactual circumstances, or
at a different time) to have visual experiences with different contents while seeing
and attending to the same distal stimuli under the same external conditions, as a
result of differences in other (including affective) states (Siegel 2012, 4).
Dustin Stokes (2014) argues that cognitive penetrability has interesting implications for
our evaluation of artworks. Someone who possesses a great deal of knowledge about an artwork
(its artist, historical context, genre, etc.) will perceive the work differently than someone who lacks
that knowledge. Information-rich perceptions of an artwork help us to evaluate it; the informed
viewer may be capable of making more appropriate aesthetic evaluations than the novice.
I am neutral on Stokes evaluative claim. I am more interested in the case he makes for how
cognitive penetrability impacts our perception of both and high and low level properties.
Perceptible high level aesthetic properties include the “standard aesthetic properties of being
graceful, serene, vivid, or delicate (ibid, 15). The expert’s internalized knowledge of a work’s
category, historical context, and artist, will affect her overall perceptual experience so that she
perceives it in terms of these aesthetic properties, as well as others. She will perceive Picasso’s
Guernica not just as a painting with certain colors and shapes, but also as violent, disturbing, or
sorrowful. Stokes suggests that it is also possible for the expert to perceive additional high level
properties that pertain to the work’s category: “One may just see the impressionism or just hear
the Brahmsianism in a work” (ibid 16). In both cases, the expert’s knowledge of the work
influences her perception of it.
Stokes makes a similar argument concerning the cognitive penetration of low level
perceptual properties (for those skeptical of high level property perception). What we know about
an object may change how we perceive its color, shape, or size. For example, we associate certain
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objects with stereotypical colors (a blue Smurf, a red Coca-Cola icon, a yellow banana).6 We
expect to see these objects as being a certain color, so when we are put in a situation in which we
have to experimentally match these objects with a color, we tend to identify it with the expected
color. This occurs even when this particular object actually possesses a unique color-property, like
a pink Smurf instead of the standard blue (Siegel 2011). Stokes (and others) takes this as evidence
for cognitive penetrability effecting our perception of low level properties; our belief that a Smurf
is typically blue shapes how we see Smurfs. We will expect them to be blue and perhaps even
perceive them as blue when they are not.
The same basic principle can apply to artworks. It could be that an expert perceives the
organization of low level properties differently than the novice—it’s not that they see a different
color, but rather that the expert sees how those properties are organized while the novice does not
(Stokes 2014, 21). For example, the expert will see the relation between the lines and colored
rectangles of a Mondrian Composition piece differently than a novice will. The expert sees the
same colors and shapes as the novice, but also the “lack of negative space and the dominance of
colored rectangles,” because the expert is familiar with Mondrian’s oeuvre and the novice isn’t
(ibid, 21). Stokes also suggests that it is possible that the actual low level properties themselves
might be differently perceived by the expert and the novice. We learn to associate certain colors
with certain paintings (bright red for Matisse, blues and grays for Picasso’s blue period, pinks and
creams for his rose period, black and white for Motherwell, etc.). These learned associations may
influence how we expect to see a work, just like the blue Smurf. In Stokes’ example, a Rothko
expert who is familiar with the painter’s monochromatic multiforms, such as the all-black
paintings in The Rothko Chapel, will likely perceive subtle variations in each painting—unusual

6

See Witzel et al 2011 for the empirical study. See Deroy 2013 for a discussion of these studies.
60

patterns in the all black canvas, for example—whereas the novice will not, even though they are
both looking at the exact same painting that has the exact same properties.7
The cognitive penetrability of perceptual experience may motivate the idea that knowledge
that the object of our perception is a nonexistent object, rather than an actual one, may influence
how we perceive it—both in terms of what low level properties we notice, expect, and perceive as
well as how we categorize the image. For example, an expert may notice aspects of van Gogh’s
Bedroom in Arles that make her perceive the image as being impressionistic, highlighting the
visual discrepancy between the representation of the objects in the painting and how they would
appear in real life. Someone who is competent at watching film fictions may note that the use of
sound and shade in a film-noir are overly dramatic, much more so than they would be in real life.
Does this mean that we perceive the property of “being fictional”? I do not think so. It does
mean, however, that our perception of fictional entities will be slightly different than our
perception of actual entities, because of the properties that we are inclined to notice. Experts may
have the capacity to perceive both high level properties of a fictional object and low level
properties in a different way due to their knowledge of the fictional status of the object. This
suggests that the illusion would not obtain in such cases, if the cognitive penetration of perception
is possible. The expert may not perceive fictional entities as actual ones. The differences between
perceiving an object as fictional or actual may be subtle (and maybe unconscious), but they will
nevertheless be there. Our background knowledge that the object we perceive is fictional may
shape how we perceive it. If that’s true, then we may not fall prey to a perceptual illusion. Our

It’s important to distinguish a genuine case of cognitive penetration from that of perceptual
learning, according to which one can learn to recognize particular properties and objects. In a case
of cognitive penetration, the subject directly perceives a property in a different way due to her
knowledge of a particular object—so, for instance, she sees the Matisse painting as redder than
she would if she did not know about Matisse’s work and associate it with the color red.
7
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knowledge that an object is fictional will make us perceive that object differently than we would
if we were actually in its presence.

6. Resisting the illusion thesis

Let’s return to the three versions of the cognitive illusion thesis that we encountered in §2. They
state:

CIT#1). We have a conscious, occurrent belief that the objects of fiction actually
exist.
CIT#2). We have an unconscious belief that the objects of fiction actually exist.
CIT#3). We have a perceptual belief in the existence of fictional objects.
I have argued that the standard functionalist/phenomenological responses to the CIT provide
sufficient evidence to block CIT #1 and CIT#2. We generally lack both conscious and unconscious
beliefs in the existence of fictional objects. If we did, we would likely act in different ways towards
fictions than we actually do.
However, the behavioral evidence left open the possibility that we have an perceptual belief
in the existence of fictional objects. This could mean that we are, in fact, motivated to act based
on our belief in the existence or presence of a fictional entity. CIT#3 rests on the further claim that
we perceive fictional entities as existing—in other words, that we fall prey to a perceptual illusion
concerning the actuality of a fictional entity. I have argued that the PIT is largely a question
concerning the types of content that we can perceive: high level or low level properties. But neither
view suggests that we can perceive objects as existing or not. Finally, research concerning the
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cognitive penetrability of perception, if possible, may also support my rejection of the perceptual
illusion thesis. It is possible that our thoughts and beliefs concerning the existence of fictional
entities actually effect how we perceive them, as fictional.
I will now briefly sketch my alternative explanation of the low level behavioral and
emotional data, based on what I called the “no distinction in perception” view in §4. On my view,
perception itself is silent concerning the actuality of an object; it only allows us to recognize
objects. This means that there really is no perceptual illusion thesis; if there is an illusion, it comes
in at the cognitive level of belief. It is more likely that our perception of fictional entities is neutral
concerning the objects’ existence and that later judgments (or top-down beliefs and thoughts) later
come into play to determine their existence. Generally speaking, these judgments will determine
that the fictional entity is, in fact, fictional.
This view further implies that unconscious, automatic dispositions to act are not actually
based on beliefs, but rather stem straightforwardly from perceptual processes. We may perceive
the fictional entity as being a certain type of object, but we do not form a perceptual belief that the
object is real, that it actually exists. Basic perceptual processes (combined, perhaps, with some
associative processing or inferences from stored concepts, as well as cognitive judgments) allow
us to recognize objects in visual fictions. Perceiving something as a being particular object may
prime certain actions—that is, there may be a direct link between the perceptual processes involved
in object recognition to action priming. For example, I will behaviorally respond to a coiled up
piece of rope if I recognize that object as being snake-like. This does not entail that I perceptually
believe that I am in the presence of a snake. The perceptual system does not distinguish between
existing and non-existing objects on this view, but rather will respond to both similarly; I will
defensively react to both the coiled up rope and a snake. Later, cognitively meditated judgments
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may prevent some primed actions from arising. I may step around the coiled object rather than flee
once I realize that there is no snake in front of me.
I think that this position can make sense of our behavioral and psychological responses
towards fiction. Perhaps the reason why we fear fictional monsters, snarling dogs, and serial killers
is because we perceive them in much the same way that we would the real thing—not as
perceptually identical to the object, but as possessing enough recognitional cues for us to visually
recognize it. Some quick, automatic behavioral responses to these objects are the direct result of
our perception, before later judgments kick in to influence them. This could mean that we have
automatic affective responses to a fictional entity before we have another belief (conscious or
unconscious) to the effect that the entity is not real. We would be primed to respond to fictional
entities, at least until later cognitive processing kicks in to halt those behaviors. On the other hand,
slower, more complex actions—like getting up from one’s seat and leaving the theater—would be
blocked by the judgment that an object is fictional.
As a result, we also do not form a perceptual belief that what we perceive in a fiction is
real, because we do not perceive it as such. But what about our low level behavioral priming? One
way to interpret this data suggests that we are primed for action when we perceive a character’s
movement in a painting or on a screen even though we consciously know that the character is not
real. It could be that these areas of the brain—the so-called mirror neurons in motor cortex—are
not influenced by top-down knowledge, unlike visual perceptual areas. Thus we will often be
primed to act even when we do not believe that the objects we perceive are real things with which
we can interact. Again, this means that action priming may arise directly from our perceptual
experience. It’s likely that we automatically react to certain value-laden objects in our environment
even before we make any judgment concerning that object’s existence. This would be a good
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survival strategy. Behavioral priming results from purely brute, causal recognitional cues; anything
remotely resembling a person or animal (for example) may prime us for action in one way or
another.
I resist calling this a cognitive illusion; belief does not seem to play a role in the
perceptual/recognitional capacities that prime us for action. This seems to be the case for our
affective reactions which may lead to behavior even without this neural representation reaching
cortical areas of the brain that mediate beliefs (see LeDoux 1996 & 2012; Damasio 1994 for just
some evidence of this). This basic framework may also apply for non-emotional perceptual
processes as well. Of course, one might say that these low level responses are irrational even if
they are not illusory, because they contradict what we consciously know and endorse about the
world. Better yet, they are arational because they are not shaped by cognition. We will be primed
to respond to certain objects whether we believe that these things are real or not. Generally we do
not believe that fictional entities are real. As I suggested above, our beliefs coincide with our actual
behaviors, or, as the case may be, how we do not behave. If we do not act as if a fictional character
is real, then we probably do not believe that it is.

I have spent some time reviewing and arguing against the illusion theses in order to thwart
a potential worry for the SAV. One could argue that illusory perceptions or beliefs are sufficiently
different from non-illusory ones to constitute a different type of mental state. I have attempted to
show that this worry is unfounded. Even if the illusion thesis is true, it does not entail that the
distinct attitude view is correct. We perceive fictional objects in the same way—by the same
mechanisms and in terms of the same broad types of mental states—as we do actual things. We do
not need to posit a distinct cognitive attitude to explain our perceptual experiences of fictions.
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Chapter 3: Taking the Fictional Stance

1. Two foundational questions of fiction

Imagine watching a local performance of Much Ado About Nothing. You see actors playing
Benedict, Beatrice, Claudio, and Hero, the scaffolding representing an Italian villa, and papiermâché rocks and trees portraying the country landscape. Whether in a bustling theater or lounging
on a park lawn, what we see on a stage is nothing more than this: scaffolding, papier-mâché, fake
wooden tables and chairs, and actors. But it also seems like we “see” something more than the
mere stuff on a stage: the fictional world of the play.
There is a sense in which the second type of seeing is perceptual; I see Benedict and
Beatrice. How is this possible, if physically, there are only actors on the stage, and not fictional
entities? I contend that “fictional seeing” of this sort involves a kind of transformation. Of course,
we cannot physically transform a papier-mâché tree into a fictional one. The transformation must
occur mentally. There is much debate concerning the type of mental activity is involved in an
audience’s capacity to see physical materials as the fictional entities they represent. It requires the
capacity for object recognition: we recognize the objects on a stage, screen, or painting as people,
tables, trees, etc. But the capacity to see things as objects is not enough for us to see the actors on
a stage as the fictional entities, Benedict and Beatrice. For what we seem to see does not actually,
currently exist. How is this transformation possible? Call this the question of fictional
transformation.
Another issue arises here. We generally know that the object of our engagement isn’t real.
How, then, do we take the objects of fiction as the types of things that we can respond to and
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judge—emotionally, morally, and otherwise? In other words, why is it that we have mental
attitudes towards the objects we encounter in fiction? Call this the question of fictional response.
Together, these two questions capture the foundational characteristics of our psychological
interactions with fiction: how we understand objects as fictional objects, and why we respond to
them as we do. Ideally, we can develop answers to both the question of fictional transformation
and the question of fictional response with one theoretical framework, as other philosophers have
attempted (see, for instance, Currie 1990 and Walton 1990). My goal in this chapter is to do just
that.
Let’s begin by considering several possible answers to the two questions. We encountered
these positions in chapter 1; I will discuss them in more detail here. First, it may be that we pretend
that the objects we perceive onstage are fictional characters, places, and things (see Searle 1975 &
Kripke 2013). Our mental states about fictional entities are pretend mental states; we pretend to
believe that Benedict secretly loves Beatrice, but we do not actually believe this. Likewise, we
pretend that we see Benedict and Beatrice, but we know that we don’t actually do so. Second, we
may just imagine that we see fictional objects before us; we imagine that something is the case
when, in fact, it is not (see Weinberg & Meskin 2006; see Van Leeuwen 2013 for more on different
types of imagining). Finally, theories of make-believe involve the application of both pretense and
imagining. According to these theories, we make-believe that the objects on stage are actual in a
fictional world (see Currie 1990 & Walton 1990). Theories of both imagination and make-believe
posit that we have imaginary mental states about fictional stories (e.g. we have an imaginary belief
that Benedict loves Beatrice).
Pretense theories, imaginative theories, and theories of make-believe each posit that we
utilize mental states during our engagements with fiction that are different in kind from those used
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during our everyday interactions with people and things. These theorists also generally hold that
pretense, imagination, etc. are a part of other capacities as well, such as pretend play and
hypothetical thought. I will focus here on our interactions with fictions, although many of my
arguments will transcend to these other areas. The distinct attitudes allow us to mentally transform
the actual objects we encounter into fictional ones. They also explain how we can mentally respond
to fictional entities that we know are not real. As we have seen, I call this general position the
distinct attitude view (DAV). Our emotions, beliefs, judgments, and desires about fictional objects
can be easily explained insofar as we pretend (etc.) that these are the types of objects that we can
respond to. We have pretend mental responses to fictional entities.
I argued against the main motivations behind the DAV in chapter 1. One concern with the
DAV is that many accounts build their theory on a flawed notion of the nature of the mental states
in question. Once we have a clear grasp on the functional role and ontology of mental states then
it is unlikely that we will find a distinct attitude warranted to begin with. Furthermore, one can
argue from a principle of parsimony that there is no need to posit distinct mental attitudes if
ordinary ones have the same explanatory power. I will attempt to show that we simply do not need
to posit a DAV to answer the two foundational questions of fiction. Finally, the DAV cannot
account for our phenomenological—that is, conscious, possibly introspectable—experiences with
fictions. Our emotions, beliefs, desires, and other mental states towards fictions feel natural and
relatively automatic, not like we are playing a game of make-believe, simulating, or even
imagining a possible course of action. In fact, our mental states about fictions often do not seem
any different than those about actual things.
Because of worries like these, I argue that the answers to the questions of fictional
transformation and response are compatible with a standard attitude view (SAV). This is the idea
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that the mental state types involved in our interactions with fiction are not unique to those contexts,
but rather are of the same type as those in ordinary, real-life contexts. We have standard beliefs,
emotions, desires, etc. about fictional entities and states of affairs. Rather than positing unique
mental states for our interactions with fictions, I will argue that we can explain the two questions
in terms of a difference in the intentional objects of our mental states (i.e. fictional objects vs. reallife ones).
The SAV can take many forms. In what follows, I will develop my own version: the
fictional stance. In brief, we take the fictional stance when we recognize that the object of our
engagement is fictional. Doing so allows us to see representations of fictional entities as fictional
entities. We do not pretend or imagine that Benedict is on the stage before us; we (in some sense)
see and think of him there. Taking the fictional stance also means that we treat fictional objects as
the kinds of things that are appropriate objects of our mental engagement. By taking the fictional
stance, we see the fictional objects as the real objects that they represent, objects that we would
normally pity, care for, feel with, and judge. The fictional stance does not count as an instance of
the DAV. Rather than explaining our behavioral and attitudinal responses towards fictions in terms
of distinct mental state types, I explain them in terms of a particular kind of intentional content. In
other words, we utilize the same types of mental states and mechanisms during our engagements
with fictions that we do in our everyday lives, but these mental states are about fictional objects.
The following sections flesh out the fictional stance as an alternative to the DAV. The
arguments in each section are cumulative, building off each other until we garner a complete
picture of our psychological engagements with fictions. The full explanation of the fictional stance
will not be complete until §4. The central tenets are as follows:
1.) We know that the representation meets three conditions for being a fiction: is non69

actual, is created, and depends on particular objects and people in order to persist.
2.) We can recognize representations as of or about particular kinds of objects.
3.) We recognize these represented objects as being fictional objects.

I will present each of these points in §3, thus establishing the foundation of the fictional stance,
after critiquing the DAV positions in §2. My own view builds off a commonsense ontology of
fiction, an account of representational seeing, and a variation on Arthur Danto’s concept of the ‘is’
of artistic identification (Danto 1964). None of these individual positions can answer the two
foundational questions on its own. Nevertheless, together they form the foundation for the fictional
stance which, I argue, can both answer the two questions and serve as a general framework for a
psychology of fiction. In §4, I will lay out the fictional stance and show how it answers the
questions of fictional transformation and response. I will consider two other versions of the
fictional stance in §5. §6 applies the fictional stance to several ubiquitous metaphysical and
semantic questions concerning fictions. I conclude with a brief comment on the explanatory power
of the fictional stance.

2. Pretense, make-believe, & imagining

I have argued that we are under neither a perceptual nor cognitive illusion while engaged with
visual fictions. A more plausible possibility is that we pretend, make believe, or imagine that
fictional objects are real. These terms are often used interchangeably in the literature. I suggested
in the first chapter that doing so is a mistake. As we will see, we can differentiate between these
types of mental activity in various ways. I will attempt to make these distinctions clearer in this
section.
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The DAV can be cashed out in terms of one of two claims. First, we want to know whether
there is a unique mental state that is utilized solely in fictional contexts—a pretend or imaginative
belief, for example, that is similar to, but cannot be identified with, a stereotypical belief. Second,
we want to know whether pretense, imagining, or make-believe are necessary to make of what a
narrative fictional. I deny both claims. But it is worth noting that one can deny the first, concerning
mental state types, without denying the second. The idea there would be that imagining, for
example, is not a mental state type that is unique to fiction, but it still is a necessary part of a
engaging with fictions. This would make our engagements with fictions distinct from our
engagements with non-fictions. We need to deny both claims in order to properly combat the DAV.
I will consider the different versions of the DAV in turn. We encountered the pretense
thesis back in the first chapter. This view states that an appreciator of fiction pretends that the
fictional story, characters, and world are real for the duration of her engagement with it. This
position has important ramifications for the ontology and semantics of fiction. Fictional objects,
places, and characters are not actual things (either concrete objects or abstracta). Rather, we merely
pretend that they are real, like the objects of pretend play. We speak, feel, and think about fictional
entities as if they are real things, but we know that they are not. This view makes the most sense
in terms of dramatic art. Actors pretend to embody the character that they portray. In so doing,
they represent a fictional story; for instance, the development of a romance between Benedict and
Beatrice in Much Ado About Nothing. The actors pretend that they are certain fictional characters
and the audience joins in their pretense. We pretend that we see real events and people, even though
they are actually fictional representations of events and people.
Semantic considerations may be the greatest motivation behind pretense theories. Pretense
theories state that speech acts about fictional entities are neither genuine assertions of propositions
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nor do they refer to actual objects. Rather, we pretend to make assertions about fictions and pretend
to refer to nonexistent things. Saul Kripke (2013) claims that pretense is also involved in the
composition of fictions. An author pretends to refer to an actual person when she creates a
character. The character itself can either be understood as an abstract entity, possible object, or
definite description. In each case, when we say the name ‘Benedict’ or ‘Beatrice’ we pretend to
refer to a real, existing person. For some sentences, we may refer to the abstract entity, possible
object, or utilize a definite description. This is the case when I say “Emma Woodhouse was created
by Jane Austen.” But for other sentences, we merely pretend to refer to a character. The author
pretends that the name refers and the reader/audience goes along with this pretense. Kripke calls
this the pretense principle, arguing that it applies to sentences internal to a fictional story, such as
“Beatrice is in love with Benedict, but she won’t admit it to herself.” According to Kripke, the
pretense principle holds no matter what one thinks about the nature of fictional propositions or
fictional names (ibid, 24).
Pretense theory can also explain the two questions we raised in the first section: the
question of fictional transformation and the question of fictional response. Our response to the first
question will differ slightly depending on the art form. When we engage with a stage production
of Much Ado, we pretend that the actual, physical objects on stage are the real thing—the papiermâché boulders are real boulders and the living, breathing actors are the characters in the story.
When we watch a film production of the play, such as Kenneth Branaugh’s 1993 version, we
pretend that the images we see on the screen are actually the Italian villa and countryside as
opposed to wherever the film was shot. We pretend that Branaugh is Benedict and Emma
Thompson is Beatrice, even though we know that they aren’t really. Comparable stories could be
told for video games and opera, and maybe even fictional representations that we encounter in
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pictures and photographs (though I will not focus on those art forms here).
Pretense theorists can answer the question of fictional response in a similar way. Because
we pretend that fictional entities are real ones, we emotionally respond to, morally judge, believe,
and desire things about them in much the same way we would if they were real. These responses
will always be in the context of the pretense and so will not engender the same kinds of behavioral
responses as they typically would. Our mental states are run “offline,” disconnected from their
standard functional role.
So pretense theories seem to have a great deal of explanatory power when it comes to our
psychological interactions with and speech acts about fictions. Still, many philosophers have
argued against pure-pretense theories and have instead incorporated pretense into more
sophisticated theoretical frameworks. I will not review these argument here (but see Currie 1990,
Walton 1990). Instead, I will review general arguments against pretense theories, arguments that
apply to other versions of the DAV as well.
One approach that utilizes pretense is a theory of make-believe. Theories of make-believe
hold that our engagement with fiction is a part of an elaborate game of make-believe, similar to
games we play as young children (Currie 1995, Walton 1990). These games involve an element of
pretense, but also another, distinct kind of mental activity: imagination.
I will focus on Kendall Walton’s theory of make-believe from his text Mimesis as Makebelieve (1990). This remains the most detailed, comprehensive, and influential version of the view.
Walton argues that all representations involve make-believe, including fictions. An important
application of make-believe concerns a definition of what it means for a representation to be
fictional. In typical games of make-believe, the subject stipulates certain rules concerning objects
that we take to be a part of the game. For example, when children pretend-play house, they stipulate
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that a mud pie is a cherry pie; the mud pie in a box is a cherry pie in an oven; the tree house in the
backyard is a cottage in the woods.
Derek Matravers (2014) explains how this applies to fiction. One makes a stipulation that
there is some truth about the actual world that, somehow, will take us to a truth about a fictional
world (eg. there is a glob of mud  there is a pie; there is an actor  Henry V). But it is not
enough that we create or understand this stipulation. Walton argues that we also need a particular
kind of mental activity to get us from the actual to fictional world: imagination. Stipulated truths
about the actual world are prescriptions to imagine—or, alternatively, principles of generation,
propositions that mandate the reader/audience to engage in a game of make-believe. Audiences
understand fictional representations, including both verbal and depictive representations to serve
as props in games of make-believe. They are objects that call for us to imagine the fictional story,
respond to it, and even think of ourselves as a part of it.
Matravers describes Walton’s position in terms of two criteria. Each describe the
imagination’s role in transforming an actual object or proposition into a fictional one. First, the
transformation criterion states that “something is a fiction if the imagination is required to
transform a proposition true in the actual world into a different proposition true in the fictional
world” (Matravers 2014, 13). During the game of make-believe, we imagine that the objects in a
dramatic representation, the images in a picture or on a screen, or the propositions in a novel each
generate fictional counterparts. We make-believe that the stage actor Ian McKlellan is Macbeth on
the stage, that Kenneth Branaugh is Benedict in the film, or that the propositions in Much Ado
make genuine assertions about a real person named Beatrice.
Second, Walton argues for the engagement criterion: “something is fictional if it engages
our imagination as only the imagination can account for facts concerning our engagements with
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fiction” (Matravers 2014, 16). The idea is that an imaginative game of make-believe is required to
explain the perspective that readers/audiences take of the fiction as well as the vivacity of our
psychological responses to it. Walton argues that we do not merely imagine the objects in a fiction.
We also imagine ourselves in the fiction, as a part of the fictional world that observes the action
(Walton 1990, 29). This helps to explain why our affective responses, judgments, and simply our
engagement itself feels so intense—or, as Matravers puts it, why it possesses such vivacity.
These two criteria answer the question of fictional transformation and even suggest an
answer to the question of fictional response. We use our imagination during the game of makebelieve in order to transform the objects on a stage or on a screen into the actual objects in a
fictional story. Just as children imaginatively transform a mud pie into a cherry pie during their
games, so do adults imaginatively transform McKlellan into Macbeth and Branaugh is into
Benedict.
Our intense participation in games of make-believe leads to equally intense psychological
responses to fictional objects: emotional responses to fictional characters, judgments about them,
desires concerning their well-being, etc. According to Walton, though, the mental states that
function within the game of make-believe are not genuine mental states, because they lack
behavioral motivation. This is so even though they feel the same as non-imaginative mental states
(Walton 1990). The audiences’ speech acts (e.g. “Watch out for the slime!” or “Mr. Knightley is
so charming”), emotional responses (fear towards a fictional villain or compassion for a
protagonist), and other mental attitudes (believing that Firefly’s Captain Reynolds is a good person
despite his gruff exterior; wanting Desdemona to survive even if we know that she won’t, etc.)
should all be understood as acts of pretense within the world of make-believe.
We should compare our psychological engagements with fiction to a child’s pretend-play.
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A child creates a world of make-believe around props in her environment and she acts and speaks
from within that world. A couch and set of chairs become a dungeon, a box becomes a house, a
high heeled shoe becomes a ruby slipper (see also Harris 2000). Indeed, Walton suggests that one
of the reasons why fictions are so important and entertaining for adults is because they are an
extension of our childhood pretending. Creating such a rich make-believe world requires a fair
amount of imaginative labor from both the audience and creator, but it’s an ability that is readily
undertaken and mastered by both adults and children.
Theories of make-believe have a certain appeal. They can explain our mental states towards
fictional entities, our speech acts about them, and even the nature of those entities. Nevertheless,
some of the implications of these theories have been called into question. For example, some
philosophers argue, like me, that pretend or imaginary states—i.e. non-standard ones—should be
resisted (see especially Matravers 2014 and Carroll 2008). Furthermore, several philosophers have
argued that theories of make-believe cannot capture our actual first-person experiences with
fictional stories; it does not feel as if we are involved in a game of make-believe (Carroll 1990;
Neill 1993).
There is one more view to consider: that we imagine that fictions and fictional entities are
real, but without pretending or make-believing that they are. On the imagination view, watching a
stage production of Much Ado involves imagining that there is a world in which Benedict falls in
love with Beatrice. This is a different kind of mental activity from pretense. Pretense involves
taking some state of affairs to be true or some object to exist in the actual world. As I noted in the
first chapter, imagining does not necessarily have this tie to truth. Imagining may be more like
entertaining a proposition, or supposing that something is true, without thinking that it actually is
or merely considering something not present. We can imagine what it would be like for some state
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of affairs to occur without thinking that it actually does, either in this world or a fictional one. This
applies to attitudinal (or, propositional) imagining in which imagining that something is the case
is analogous to believing that it is the case.
Some imagination theorists contend that our imaginings about fiction constitute a distinct
attitude. I imagine that there is a world in which an Italian lord visits an old friend and marries his
daughter when I watch Much Ado. My mental attitudes are imaginative. I seem to have genuine
beliefs about Henry, desire things for him, and emotionally respond to him. But imaginative beliefs
(etc.) are not genuine beliefs, again, because of the distinction in motivation for behavior.
We must be careful here. I am not denying that we ever use our imagination when engaged
with fictions. Nor am I denying that imagining is a different kind of mental act than believing.
Clearly they are different. What I do deny, however, is that there are distinct types of states called
“imaginative beliefs,” “imaginative emotions,” etc. I also deny that propositional imagining, makebelieving, etc. is necessary for our engagement with fiction, even though we may sometimes take
up these mental activities.8 Unfortunately, not all philosophers are careful to make these
distinctions.
Let’s consider several general arguments against pretense, make-believe, and imagining.
First, it is questionable that these theories can accurately explain our conscious experience of
fictions. Alex Neill (1991) has argued that anyone who plays a game of make-believe knows that
she is doing is. Children make conscious stipulations concerning actual objects and are aware of
the resulting make-believe world in which they insert themselves. The same may go for our
engagements with fictions; if we begin a game of make-believe while engaged with a fiction, then
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It may be that imagistic imagining is necessary for our engagements with fictions. But this hardly
counts as a distinct type of state; we imagistically imagine all the time, in all sorts of contexts. See
chapter 1 for more on the different types of imagining.
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we will know that we are doing so. The problem is that most people would probably deny that they
are, in fact, “make-believing” or “playing pretend” or even “imagining that something is the case”
while watching a film, attending a play, or reading a novel. Their conscious experience of the
fictional story will generally be more loosely experienced than this, lacking concrete stipulations
or rules to generate imagining. In fact, it often feels like we are in the direct presence of fictional
entities, or at least their representation—not that we have created a fictional world of make-believe
(see Wilson 2011).
A reader or audience member may, if pressed, concede that she imagines or pretends that
that something fictional is actually true. But we generally do not have this conscious experience
during the time of our engagement with the story. This is especially persuasive if we consider our
psychological response towards fictions, which feel the same as any typical emotion, desire, belief,
etc. This kind of phenomenological point is not a knock-down argument against the DAV, for it
could very well be that games of make-believe, pretense, or imaginings typically occur without
conscious initiation or continuation. Still, one would suspect that if make-believe, pretense, or
imagining is a necessary part of our engagement with fictions then it would at least sometimes be
consciously experienced by some people. And that often doesn’t seem to be the case for a general
experience of fictions.
A second critique of the DAV concerns our reference to fictional entities and the use of
fictional names. Recall Kripke’s pretense principle: we make pretend assertions about fictions and
pretend to refer to fictional entities, when in fact there is nothing to assert and nothing to which
we can refer. There is a question, though, about whether the pretense principle can really do the
work that the DAV needs it to. Consider a point raised by Nicholas Wolterstorff (1980): pretense
theory puts the “fictioneer” (the author, playwright, filmmakers, etc.) in a role of pretending to
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make an assertion and pretending to refer. Who, for example, does Nikolai Gogol refer to when he
writes “Chichikov set out to look the town over”? One might naturally think that it is Chichikov,
who or whatever that might be. But why think that pretense escapes the referential problem? Why
can we pretend to refer to something that doesn’t exist if we can’t actually do so? What’s so special
about pretense, such that it bridges this ontological gap? Wolterstorff’s point seems to be that any
kind of reference—whether actual or pretend—requires that its object exists in some way.
I leave this as an open challenge for the pretense/imaginative views concerning fictional
names. It need not be the case that these theories utilize the pretense principle, although Walton’s
own view (amongst others) maintains that we make pretend assertions and references to fictional
entities.
Finally, we can ask whether pretense, make-believe, or imaging entails a distinct attitude.
On one reading, they do. By definition, pretending, making-believe, and imagining are distinct
kinds of activity that we use during our engagements with fictions, but not in real-life. We pretend
(etc.) that an image is a person; we do not (generally) pretend anything about the nature of a real
person. On another reading, however, it could be that these views to not require a distinct attitude.
It could be that we pretend that fictions are real while still maintaining that throughout this pretense
we have genuine mental states that are processed in roughly the same way that a genuine state
would be (barring differences in content and keeping in mind my points concerning motivation to
act). The idea would be that I pretend that Hamlet is real while genuinely believing that he is the
prince of Denmark, that his mother was involved in his father’s death, etc.
One might still worry that imagining, pretending, etc. mark a distinctive activity that is
used solely in our engagements with fiction. But this is not the case. We imagine, pretend, and
make-believe about actual or possible objects, as well as fictional ones. Derek Matravers makes a
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relevant point here (Matravers 2014). It is not only fictions that stimulate pretense, imagining, and
make-believe. These activities can be stimulated by historical narratives, news broadcasts, and
biographies in the same way they would by fictional stories. Furthermore, we attitudinally imagine
outcomes for day to day decisions: what we will have for dinner this evening, where we would
like to attend graduate school, what kind of car we would like to purchase. We might even pretend
that we have a new fancy car or make-believe that our current clunker is a Porsche. These mental
activities are not strictly relegated to fiction and so they are insufficient as general accounts of our
psychological experience of them. Matravers argues that if there is a distinct attitude at work in
fiction, then that attitude also is at work in our engagements with narrative representations in
general as opposed to just fictions.
My own view contends that not only are imagining, pretense, or make-believe insufficient
for our experiences with fictions, they also are unnecessary for those experiences. We can
plausibly explain our engagements with fictions without appealing to these notions. It’s not that
these capacities are never involved in our engagements with fiction. Rather, I argue that they do
not need to be. There does seem to be clearly something psychologically interesting going on when
we engage with a work of fiction. If we shouldn’t explain our behaviors, emotions, beliefs, and
desires in terms of a distinct attitude, then how should we?

3. Foundations of the fictional stance

We spend a great deal of our lives engaging with fictions: films, novels, TV shows, etc. So it is
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important to develop an account of these engagements that appeals to commonsense ideas and
mental capacities. The fictional stance provides just that. Each of the following three concepts may
seem like a special skill or type of knowledge. However, I argue that they capture aspects of our
experiences with fictions that are easily understood in terms of standard cognitive capacities.

3.1 Works of fiction
It is well beyond the scope of this paper to present a fully articulated ontology of fiction.
Nevertheless, it will be important in what follows to understand what we mean by a work of fiction
as opposed to nonfiction.
There are three ways (at least) to distinguish between fiction and nonfiction. First, the
objects of our engagement are not actual. By this, I mean that we do not engage with a concrete
object that we can encounter in our spatio-temporal world. This condition leaves open the
possibility that fictional entities are abstract artifacts (Kripke 2013, Thomasson 1999, Schiffer
1996, Salmon 1996), possible objects (Lewis 1978, Plantinga 1974), definite descriptions (Russell
1905; see also Quine 1953), or even eternally existing abstracta (Priest 1997; see also Meinong
1904/1981). It also leaves open the possibility that fictional entities could exist or existed in the
past.
Second, fictional entities, as well as the fictional world in which they are found, have been
created by an actual person or group of people (author, playwright, filmmaker(s), etc.)—or, at least
have been called into being by some person or persons. I think that the more commonsensical
claim is that fictional entities (or representations or descriptions of them) are created by an author
(etc.), but at this point I will grant that fictional entities may be eternally persisting abstracta for
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the sake of theoretical neutrality (i.e. fictional entities may be denizens of a Platonic heaven that
authors draw upon but do not, strictly speaking, create; see Wolterstorff 1980; Meinong
1904/1981).
The two previous conditions are implicit in how we treat and talk about fictional entities.
If asked, I think that audiences would readily grant them. There is also an implication of the first
two conditions that is worth stressing. Fictions have dependence conditions. They depend on other
things in order to exist (or, if not exist, then in order to be represented). Fictional entities depend
on creators in order to come into existence. They also depend on particular media in order to
persist, to continue in existence. Represented objects in a painting depend on that painting in order
to persist. Film characters depend on tokens of the film, literary characters on tokens of novels,
dramatic characters on tokens of plays. A fiction’s persistence also depends on everyday people.
If every token of Hamlet was destroyed Fahrenheit 451-style, and every person who knew about
Hamlet passed away or had their memory erased, then, arguably, the character Hamlet would cease
to exist (again, barring the idea that fictional entities are Platonic abstracta). We think of fictions
as depending on particular media and people.
In contrast, nonfictions are about actual events and entities (either present or past). The
subjects of nonfictions are not created by an author, filmmaker, etc. even if the representation of
them are. Furthermore, the subjects of non-fiction do not depend on a particular medium, creator,
or audience in order to persist. I argue that we distinguish between fiction and nonfiction in these
three ways. Indeed, it is part of our experience of fiction that we understand the object of our
engagement to meet these conditions. We are either engaged with a fictional medium, creating
one, or recollecting a previous engagement with one.
Three challenges immediately arise here. First, a reader (or viewer) may mistake a fictional
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representation for a non-fiction. Second, a reader may not know whether a representation is
fictional or non-fictional. Finally, it is unclear how the three conditions can deal with fictions that
contain actual people, places, or events, such as Napoleon Bonaparte or London, England. I will
return to these three questions in the final section, after completing my discussion of the fictional
stance. In fact, I think that the fictional stance can handle these concerns quite easily.
The first feature of taking the fictional stance involves recognizing that the representation
with which we are engaged is a fictional one. We must know that we are engaged with a fiction
before taking the fictional stance. This does not mean that we must always consciously keep in
mind that the objects with which we are engaged are fictional; the point is that this knowledge is
consciously accessible. Indeed, as we will see, this knowledge permeates and influences the
judgments and emotional responses that we have towards fictional entities.

3.2. Seeing fictional objects
In the opening of this chapter, I claimed that there is a sense in which audiences “see” the fictional
characters Benedict and Beatrice during a stage performance of Much Ado. The question of
fictional transformation presents us with the challenge of explaining how this is possible, if all we
actually perceive are actors on a stage. A further question concerns the difference between seeing
a fictional character and imagining seeing that character, or even merely seeing a representation
of a character.
I maintain that there is a sense in which we literally see fictional entities in visual fictions
(film, plays, opera, TV shows, video games, even some paintings and photographs). In the case of
nonvisual fictions, we can be said to hear fictional entities (i.e. listening to an audiobook or radio
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story) or think about fictional entities (as in literary fictions). I will focus on visual fictions for now
and return to literary works and auditory fictions in the following subsection.
Consider William Blake’s illustration of Milton’s Paradise Lost: Satan Watching the
Endearments of Adam and Eve. Imagine that a friend turns to you, asking: “What do you see when
you look at this painting?” Setting aside any metaphorical interpretations of this question, there
are still several ways you could answer. First, you see brushstrokes on a canvas. Even more
reductively, you perceive splashes of color, fine lines, and a variety of shapes. Both of these
answers are true, but they do not really answer your friend’s question. You may respond by saying:
“I see objects: two entwined figures, another flying above with a snake wrapped around him.” This
is also a correct answer. Finally, there is a natural sense in which you can respond that you see
Satan—you perceive the Prince of Darkness flying over Paradise, looking longingly down on
Adam and Eve.
I understand each of the above responses as characterizing different senses of ‘seeing.’
First, there is strictly perceptual seeing. Second, we see objects. Third, there is identification of
that object as being a particular thing, or kind of thing. We can straightforwardly refer to the first
sense as perceptual. Call the second object seeing. I will refer to the third as recognitional seeing.
I will also discuss seeing a representation as an object. Here, ‘seeing as’ can require either the
object seeing, recognitional seeing, or both. I will try to make this clear in what follows. The
question is, which senses of ‘seeing’ explains our interactions with visual fictions?
Let’s examine the three types of seeing in further detail. Recalling my discussion of the
perception of fictional entities from the previous chapter, we might ask ourselves what it is that
we ever perceive, in real-life or fictional contexts. Philosophers of perception have extensively
debated this point. According to many theorists, we only perceive very basic kinds of properties,
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such as shapes, colors, depth, motion, location, and illumination (e.g. Clark 2000, Brogaard 2013,
Dretske 1995,Tye 1995; see Siegel 2010 for an overview). On this view, we do not perceive
objects, but rather just the surface of objects (Clark 2000). Low level properties result from retinal
stimulation. All other visual properties, including objecthood or object-type, are the result of later
cognitive processing (thoughts and judgments) of this basic sensory information (O’Shaughnessy
2000). Our perception of Blake’s painting only includes lines, basic shapes, and shades of green,
tan, and red. Further judgments and inferences are required to see the representation as Satan. In
contrast, other theorists hold that we do, in fact, perceive properties beyond color, shape, etc. (e.g.
Bayne 2009, Peacocke 1992, Siewert 1998, Siegel 2006). We can perceive objects and higherlevel natural and/or artificial kind properties (e.g. dog or chair, respectively), causal properties
(e.g. seeing A cause B), and emotional properties (e.g. being scary). In this case, we may see
Blake’s painting as representing certain objects (people, snake, etc.) and not merely shapes, lines,
or colors.
We can be neutral concerning the content of visual perception. It is an open question
whether object seeing is perceptual as opposed to a cognitive judgment. In our terms, recognitional
seeing may go beyond mere object seeing. Recognitional seeing requires further cognitive
processing, including a judgment that the perceived object is of a particular kind. Our capacity to
recognize part of the Blake’s painting as the Angel of Light involves a mixture of perceptual and
cognitive processes, such as judging or inferring that the figure at the top of the painting is Satan.
The knowledge that the object of our perception is a fictional representation plays a role here;
contextual information, including the title of the painting and a basic familiarity of Paradise Lost,
clues us in to the fact that we see Satan, as opposed to some random figure.
Once we break down our experience of Blake’s painting in terms of the above capacities,
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it seems plausible that we see Satan. Seeing a representation as an object utilizes the same
perceptual and cognitive capacities as seeing objects in our everyday lives. I must perceive and
judge that an object is our neighbor’s dog. Seeing an object as being a particular kind requires that
we perceive it its properties and perhaps also judge it to be of that kind. There is nothing
perceptually unusual about seeing a representation as Satan. In the fictional case, I do not merely
see a representation of Satan; I see the representation as Satan.
So there is a sense in which we see an object before us when we perceive its representation.
The upshot of seeing fictional entities—as opposed to imaginatively seeing them or merely seeing
a representation of them—is that it can explain the immediacy of our visual experience. We do not
pretend to, make-believe, or imagine that we see Satan; we do see Satan! That is not to say that we
do not also see the representation as well; again, we perceive brushstrokes, lines, colors, shapes,
etc., as well as the painting’s canvas, frame, and wall surrounding it. 9 We never forget that the
object we encounter is a representation; we are not deluded into believing that the object of our
engagement is real. This will allow us to act in certain ways towards the fictional object, but not
others.
The task of this subsection is to show that there is a way in which we can be said to see
fictional entities and, further, that seeing fictional entities does not require imagination, pretense,
or make-believe. Instead, our capacity to see a fictional entity be entirely explained in terms of
standard perceptual and cognitive processes. I grant that this is not the same as perceiving an actual,
physically present object. Our seeing a representation as an object lacks many of the qualities that
actual seeing possesses. However, object-seeing/seeing as is an important part of normal

See also the Ernst Gombrich’s discussion of ‘seeing as’ (Gombrich 1960) and Richard
Wollheim’s ‘seeing-in’ (1980). See also Dominic Lopes (2005) for a discussion of representational
seeing. Nelson Goodman (1976) also discusses these issues, and critiques Gombrich’s position.
9
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perceptual processing, both in this case and in real life. This is also not to say that we never use
our imagination while engaged with visual fictions; surely we do in many cases. The point is that
imagination does not play a necessary role in how we see fictional characters.

3.3. The ‘is’ of artistic identification
In his seminal article, “The Artworld,” Danto asks us to imagine the artistic neophyte Testadura,
who encounters Rauschenberg’s Bed for the first time (Danto 1964). Testadura doesn’t quite know
what to do with the piece. It’s actually a bed, after all, even if it is an odd one. Should he sleep on
it? Why would a bed be in an art gallery? Why does it have splotches all over the comforter, and
why is it so oddly shaped? Testadura looks at Bed and all he discerns is a bed, not an artwork.
However, as Danto points out, that’s really all there is (ibid, 575). Nevertheless, Testadura has
gotten something wrong. Danto contends that understanding just how he went wrong is greatly
important for understanding what makes an object an artwork, when the artwork is (physically)
nothing but the object.
Danto introduces Testadura’s response to Rauschenberg’s Bed in order to motivate his art
historical/theoretical view of the nature of art. To recognize that Bed is an artwork, and not a mere
bed, we need “something the eye cannot decry—an atmosphere of artistic history, a knowledge of
the history of art: an artworld” (ibid, 580). To recognize Bed as more than the bed that it is,
Testadura needs knowledge of the artworld: art theory, history, artistic intention, the works role in
the current art scene, etc.
I am interested in Testadura for a slightly different reason. There is an interesting similarity
between Danto’s ‘is’ and my notion of seeing represented objects. As Danto points out, we may
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see a blob of paint as well as see that blob of paint as a person. While watching a film, we see
colored, seemingly moving images and see them as people—fictional people. Most interestingly,
at a play we see a real person and, somehow, also see that person as a fictional character. How do
we do this? The first step is to perceive the object before us. We then see the representation as
representing objects (this may involve purely perceptual or a mixture of perceptual and cognitive
capacities). But this cannot be the whole story. We need to understand how we see the figure in a
painting, the person in a film, and the person on stage not only as objects, but as of fictional objects.
This is not, strictly speaking, a perceptual capacity. We do not perceive properties like “being
fictional,” even on theories of perceptual content that grant that we can perceive some higher-level
properties. Nevertheless, we do see fictional entities. The ‘seeing’ here is more like what I have
been calling recognitional seeing, involving a judgment about the particular object that we see.
Part of this involves judging that the object is fictional; that is, that it meets the three conditions I
posited in §3.1.
Let’s further draw out the analogy between seeing fictional objects and the ‘is’ of artistic
identification. Imagine standing in front of Brueghel’s Landscape with the Fall of Icarus. You
scan the painting for the doomed young man. He isn’t easy to find. You finally spot him and,
pointing to the painting, you proclaim: “That white dab of paint is Icarus.” Danto notes that this
“is” needs explaining:
There is an is that figures prominently in statements concerning artworks which is
not the is of either identity or predication; nor is it the is of existence, of
identification, or some special is made up to serve a philosophic end. Nevertheless,
it is in common usage, and is readily mastered by children. It is the sense of is in
accordance with which a child, shown a circle and a triangle and asked which is
him and which his sister, will point to the triangle saying "That is me"; or, in
response to my question, the person next to me points to the man in purple and says
"That one is Lear" (ibid, 576).
Danto calls this the “is of artistic identification.” Mastering the ‘is’ of artistic identification is
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required for us to understand that Rauschenberg’s Bed is not merely a bed, that Warhol’s Brillo
Box is not merely a Brillo box, and that Duchamp’s Fountain is not merely a urinal. It allows us
to understand that these are artworks. In fact, recognizing any artwork as not merely the physical
stuff of which it is composed, but also as an artwork requires that we master the ‘is’ of artistic
identification. Danto argues that the ‘is’ of artistic identification is essentially the ‘is’ of metaphor,
not of predication or identity (Danto 1981). When we hear that “Juliet is the sun” or “All the world
is a stage,” the special use of is in each cases invites the audience to consider the subject of the
sentence as something else. Likewise, recognizing that an object is also an art object “transfigures”
the object into a new, glorified status: an artwork. We now consider the object in a new way.
Danto’s ‘is’ has garnered a fair amount of critique. For instance, it is unclear that
recognizing an object as an artwork does, in fact, require application of a metaphor. I want to be
neutral here, especially since I think that Danto’s suggestion depends on a theory of metaphor, a
determination of which is beyond the scope of the current discussion. Luckily, I think that we can
distance ourselves from this debate for our present purposes. I understand the ‘is’ of artistic
identification in terms of representation rather than metaphor. When I say “that is Icarus” or “that
one is me” I mean that Icarus is represented there, by that white dab of paint, or that the stick
drawing represents me. In each case, some transfigurative process occurs; I now consider the object
in a way I didn’t before. The same basic idea applies to Rauschenberg’s Bed. What I once thought
of as merely a (physical) bed, I now know to be an artwork. I understand now that the object
represent certain artistic ideas or intentions.
I want to make the case that the ‘is’ of artistic identification is a special application of
seeing represented objects. Awareness of a representation as a fictional representation requires
knowledge of a particular kind. According to Danto, to think of an artwork as an artwork will in
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each case require that the audience master the ‘is’ of artistic identification. I want to make a similar
claim about how we see objects in artworks as fictional entities and, likewise, we see
representations as representations of fictional things. During every encounter with fiction we
perceive whatever physically comprises the fictional representation (film, paint, physical person,
or even words on a page). We also see the representation as presenting objects. Finally, applying
our knowledge that the work is fictional, we recognize that the objects we see are fictional. My
proclamation that “That white dab of paint is Icarus” not only points out where the subject is
located in the painting, but also implies that I see and understand Icarus as a part of the
representation (as a part of its fictional world, if you will).
When watching a production of Much Ado, I may point to a brown-haired actress on stage
and tell my companion, “That one is Beatrice.” Statements like this indicate that I have mastered
a special kind of ‘is.’ Following Danto, let’s call this the ‘is’ of fictional transformation. I see the
represented object as a fictional entity. I judge that the representation before me is fictional. This
allows me to think and speak about the represented objects in terms of their being fictional. As I
noted in chapter 1, there is an implicit fictional operator in our speech acts about fictions. When I
say “I believe that Demetrius treated Helena very poorly” after watching A Midsummer’s Night
Dream, I mean “I believe that Demetrius treated Helena very poorly [in the fiction]” (see Kripke
2013 and Thomasson 1999). The same holds for our mental attitudes; the fictional operator is
implicit in our beliefs, thoughts, and desires about fictional entities (see also Matravers 1991 &
2014, Neill 1993). So I may believe“that Beatrice secretly loves Benedict [in the fictional world].”
The recognition that the object of our mental attitudes is fictional forms the backdrop against which
these attitudes are formed.
The ‘is’ of fictional transformation doesn’t only apply to visual representations. It also
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explains how we interact with non-visual fictions, like literature. Unlike paintings, films, or
photographs, you cannot point to anything in a novel and proclaim “There is Elizabeth Bennett.”
We would never mistake a word on a page for a fictional character. However, we still need to
recognize that the object of our engagement is a fictional representation in order to get our literary
experience off the ground. One needs to recognize that the words on a page are designed to be
taken up and considered as a fiction. This requires utilizing the ‘is’ of fictional transformation; we
perceive the words on a page and also recognize that those words represent fictional objects that
we can directly think about and respond to. This causes us to treat the statements found in the
literary work as representing a fictional story.

4. The fictional stance

The three concepts we have discussed so far—the ontology of fiction, seeing represented objects,
and the ‘is’ of fictional transformation—form the backbone of the fictional stance. I offer the
fictional stance as a general account of our psychological interactions with fictions, including how
we understand objects as fictional and how we come to mentally respond to them. By taking the
fictional stance, we recognize a work as fictional. This recognition shapes our mental states and
allows us to understand and interpret the story. It also allows us to have beliefs, desires, and
emotions towards fictional objects even while we know that those objects are not real. We know
that the objects of fiction are not actual denizens of our world, but we think of and respond to them
in similar ways notwithstanding.
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In sum, by taking the fictional stance we recognize, both perceptually and cognitively, that
a representation is fictional. This means:
1. We know that the representation meets three conditions for being a fiction: is nonactual, is created, and depends on particular objects and people in order to persist
(the ontology of fiction).
2. We can recognize representations as of or about particular kinds of objects
(representational seeing).
3. We recognize the represented objects as fictional objects (the ‘is’ of fictional
transformation).
When we engage with a fiction we perceive objects, images, and words: the physical medium of
which the fiction is constructed. We also see fictional entities. We do not pretend to see them or
imagine that we do—we actually see representations as fictional objects. I see the actor who
portrays Benedict and Benedict the fictional character. I see the physical stuff that makes up the
dramatic props: the scaffolding, the papier-mâché, the painted wood comprised the furniture, even
the actors’ bodies. It’s not that I ever stop seeing those materials. Rather, I also see them as fictional
entities. I can identify each physical thing as a fictional one; that boulder is a rock in Italian
countryside, that brazier is a torch on the walls of the Italian villa, that man is Benedict. I have
argued that an extra step is needed in order for us to understand these objects to be representations
of fictional entities, beyond object recognition. This step is the ‘is’ of fictional transformation,
through which we come to understand that the object of our engagement is fictional.10
We see representations as fictional entities. We also have emotional responses towards
these entities, morally judge them, desire things for them, and believe certain things about them.
Importantly, nothing about the fictional stance requires that we analyze these mental attitudes as

This is similar to Robert Hopkin’s notion of “collapsed seeing in” according to which film
audiences typically see the events represented in the film’s story, but not the representation of
those events (the actors, props, etc.). (Hopkins 2008).
10
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being different in kind from ordinary mental attitudes. I contend that our mental attitudes towards
fictions are standard mental states. Our mental states contain fictional content (they are about
fictional entities), but are of the same type as typical mental states and they utilize the same
cognitive mechanisms.
That is not to say that there are no differences between how we respond to fiction and reallife objects. Consider, for example, the differences in how we would behave towards fictional and
real-life objects. As Katherine Thomson-Jones (2008) points out, I do not run screaming from a
movie theater when I see a frightening serial killer hiding in the shadows, as I likely would if I
encountered the killer in real-life. Such discrepancies in our behaviors towards real-life and fiction
are typically used to motivate the DAV. Assuming functionalism about mental states (mental states
are individuated, at least in part, by their functional role), then a lack of motivation to act suggests
that the mental state itself is not present, or runs ‘off-line’ (Currie 1995; Currie & Ravenscroft
2002). This amounts to a pretend or imaginative belief in the presence of the fictional killer, but
not a genuine belief. Genuine beliefs motivate action, fictional beliefs do not.
The fictional stance offers a different interpretation of these behavioral discrepancies. We
do have ordinary mental attitudes towards fictional objects. Our mental processes are not taken
off-line. Instead, behavioral discrepancies can be explained in terms of a difference in the
intentional content. We recognize that the objects of our engagement are not literally present to us
(they are non-actual). This recognition informs our responses to fictional entities. As I stated in
§2, our mental attitudes towards fictions have a kind of fictional operator; we have beliefs,
emotions, desires, etc. about a fictional character/fictional world. My belief about the serial killer
on the movie screen states: “I believe that there is a serial killer lurking in the shadows [in the
fictional world].” This belief does not functionally motivate a fleeing response, as it likely would
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in real-life contexts. It may, however, motivate other kinds of behaviors, such as covering one’s
eyes, turning from the movie screen, etc.
I think that the same sort of story can explain all of our mental attitudes towards fictions,
including emotions. A further worry arises here in terms of the question of fictional response. If
we know that the object of our engagement is fictional—non-actual, created, dependent—then
why do we have any responses to it at all? This question concerns the appropriateness of our
mental attitudes towards fictional entities. I have two thoughts here. First, I have argued that we
see representations as fictional characters. We see the actor portraying Hamlet, but we also see the
fictional character Hamlet. This means that see Hamlet as a person. We do not stop seeing him as
a person when we also acknowledge that he is a fictional character. It is likely, then, that we will
interact with Hamlet as we would if he were a real person—if not physically, then at least in terms
of our psychological engagement. This means that we will emotionally respond to Hamlet, judge
his actions, etc.
Perhaps this is all that we need to get our psychological responses off the ground; we
recognize fictional characters as the types of things that we would typically respond to in our
everyday lives. This may take place subconsciously and unintentionally. Recall that object-seeing
can take place before we judge whether the object is fictional or not. Maybe some emotional
responses, behavioral motivation, and even judgments also occur before we make that judgment.
I proposed this in chapter 2 and will flesh out this possibility in the following chapters. We also
have beliefs and desires about fictional entities while, at the same time, we acknowledge that the
object of our belief and desire is not real.
In sum, taking the fictional stance involves the application of several mental abilities. First,
we see representations as objects. To make this the fictional stance, we must also realize that the
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object with which we interact is fictional, that it has non-actual content, was created by someone,
and depends on particular people and things in order to persist. All this occurs implicitly and
naturally upon learning the conventions of fiction. We then apply the ‘is’ of fictional
transformation which allows us to see representations as being of fictional entities. Our mental
engagements with fictions rely upon our general capacity to see objects in fictional representations
and respond to such objects; we see the representation of the fictional entity as an object that thinks,
feels, acts—in short, as an object that we would respond to in our everyday lives. We mentally
interact with fictional entities in much the same way we would real-life entities even though we
acknowledge that, strictly speaking, fictional entities are not the sorts of things that possess mental
states or have things happen to them.
I grant that the fictional stance is not a complete explanation of our mental responses to
fictions, especially our emotional and moral responses. Simply recognizing an object may
sometimes be enough to bring about a moral or emotional response, but it often won’t be. The
fictional stance lays the foundation for further explanations of why we respond to fictional objects
as we do; it makes such responses possible. I will explore other aspects of our engagements with
fictions in greater detail in the chapters to come.

5. Variations on the fictional stance

In my terms, taking the fictional stance is a matter of seeing and mentally responding to fictional
entities while at the same time acknowledging that those entities are fictional. This is not the only
way to characterize the fictional stance. There are at least two other prominent versions of the
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fictional stance, or, as they call it, the fictive stance. In this subsection, I will compare my account
stance to Lamarque and Olsen’s and Wolterstorff’s positions. I will also determine whether my
version commits me to the DAV.
Let’s begin with Lamarque and Olsen’s fictive stance. These authors grant that the
distinction between fiction and nonfiction is fundamental. It is of utmost importance to both
creators of fiction and audiences that they are dealing with a fiction, for this knowledge shapes
how they approach it and the responses they have to the objects within it (see also Currie 1990).
So far, this view is quite similar to mine. But the authors go further, stating that fictions in general
are defined in terms of how an audience takes the fictive stance:

The fictive story-teller, making up a story makes and presents sentences (or
propositions, i.e. sentence-meanings) for a particular kind of attention. The aim, at
first approximation, is this:
For the audience to make-believe (pretend or imagine) that the standard speech
act commitments associated with the sentences are operative even while knowing
that they are not.
Attending to the sentences in this way is to adopt the fictive stance towards them
(Lamarque and Olsen 1994, 43; quoted in Matravers 2014, 54-55).
This view conforms to what I have been calling the DAV and what Matravers calls “the consensus
view.” Understanding a work as fictional requires a distinct mental state, either imaginary, pretend,
simulated, make-believe, or some variation of one of these. Matravers denies this requirement and
also denies that there is a fundamental difference between fiction and nonfiction. In making the
first claim, he seems to argue against fictive/fictional stances in general. Could it be that any
version of the fictive stance requires a unique mental state? If so, that would be a serious challenge
for my position.
The main difference between Lamarque and Olsen’s fictive stance and my fictional stance
is that my view is not primarily a theory of fiction, but rather how we recognize and respond to
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fiction. In taking the fictional stance, we recognize that the object of our engagement has the three
conditions I listed in the previous subsection: it is about something non-actual, it is created, and it
has certain dependence relations. These conditions make a narrative a fictional one whether we
know that it is or not. We take the fictional stance in response to our acknowledgement of a
narrative meeting those conditions. So if imagination or make-believe is involved in our
engagement with fictions, those aspects of our psychological engagement do not, on my view,
make the narrative a fictional one. This means that there is no essential connection between
imagination or make-believe and fiction. This should eliminate any worry that Matravers’ might
have that my fictional stance conforms to the consensus view.
Nevertheless, a worry may remain that the fictional stance commits me to some kind of
DAV, as Lamarque and Olsen’s does. I think that this worry can partially be eliminated by the
previous point, but it is worth examining more closely. The fictional stance is not primarily a kind
of mental state. It is a way of treating a particular kind of intentional content. The fictional stance
does not utilize a distinct or unique kind of mental state or process. In fact, we utilize the same
kinds of mental states and processes as we would for a nonfictional representation, or, indeed an
everyday object with which we are confronted. Here Matravers and I part ways; he argues that our
mental states towards representations are run offline. I deny this. Our mental states are run online,
but with fictional content. Asymmetries in behavior and motivation can be explained accordingly;
difference s result from the content of those processes and states. We have genuine perceptions,
beliefs, desires, etc. about fictional objects. By “taking the fictional stance” I simply mean that we
recognize the fictional nature of the object with which we are interacting.
The second version of the fictive stance that I want to consider comes from Wolterstorff’s
Worlds and Works of Fiction. Wolterstorff proposes that the fictive stance is something that an
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author does when she projects (creates) a fictional world. Wolterstorff’s theory of the nature of
fictional worlds is quite complex and can be ignored for present purposes; suffice it to say that
fictional worlds are sets of particular propositions. We can already see one main difference
between this position and my own. Wolterstorff argues that authors take the fictive stance during
acts of creation. In contrast, I take it that both authors and audiences take the fictional stance during
their interactions with fictions.
Wolterstorff equates the fictive stance with a kind of linguistic force. We can treat the same
state of affairs—e.g. “The king is dead”—with different moods. We can assert that the king is
dead, wish that the king is dead, promise that the king is dead, ask whether the king is dead, etc.
(ibid, 231). Creators of fiction take ordinary sentences but do not assert them, or even pretend to
assert them. Instead, the creators present or offer sentences for an audience’s consideration. This
allows us to reflect on, ponder over, and wonder about the content of the fiction without pretending
or make-believing that it is real:

[The author] does this for our edification, for our delight, for our illumination, for
our cathartic cleansing, and more besides. It’s as if every work of fiction were
prefaced with the worlds ‘I hereby present that…’ or ‘I hereby invite you to
consider that…’ Of course all of us on occasion invite others to take up this stance
toward some state of affairs. But most of us do so only incidentally. The novelist
and the dramatist make a profession of what for the rest of us is only an incidental
diversion. That is what makes them fictioneers (ibid, 233).

Thus, like Lamarque and Olsen, Wolterstorff contends that the essence of fiction depends on an
author taking up the fictive stance, by presenting material in a certain kind of way. Presumably,
the audience would know that this is what the author intended to do, and so realize that the narrative
they are considering is a fictional one.
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I think that understanding a fiction as a fiction, as opposed to a nonfiction, concerns the
properties of the work itself rather than a mood we take toward it. Nevertheless, I agree with
Wolterstorff that the fictional stance should apply to what authors to create fictions. I disagree,
though, that this is the sole application of the fictional stance. This may just be a stipulation on
Wolterstorff’s part. He does have an account of an audience’s engagement with fictions, but does
not include it in the fictive stance. This also separates Wolterstorff from other philosophers, like
Currie (1990) and Walton, who argue that fiction is essentially a kind of linguistic force we take
towards certain representations. I think that this is the path to the dark side, for it easily allows us
to posit unique attitudes for our engagements with fiction. In contrast, I would argue that authors
and audiences are doing basically the same thing while they are creating or responding to fictions,
respectively. They are considering, thinking about, responding to a certain kind of content.
Finally, Wolterstorff is at pains to show that the fictive stance applies to a variety of
fictional art forms. I admire this aspect of his view. I, too, argue that the fictional stance applies to
all fictions—not just literature, but also film, drama, opera, video games, and maybe even
nonfactual objects represented in the visual arts. One might think that this is impossible on my
view, since I have characterized the fictional stance in terms of seeing as. But the fictional stance
also applies to non-visual fictions. Paramount to the fictional stance is the idea that we recognize
the fictional object as fictional. I put this recognition in terms of visual perception above, but it
need not be. This would be true in the case of literature. We read a literary work and take the
fictional stance. We typically know that the work is a fiction and that the words on the page
represent fictional entities and events. This knowledge shapes our interactions with it: we know
that the objects represented in the fiction are non-actual, are created, and depend on people and its
particular medium. Nevertheless, we are still able to think about the fictional objects as
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representations of objects: as people, places, and things.

6. Ontological housekeeping

Let’s return to the three challenges to my account of fiction that I discussed in §3.1 and explore
their implications for the fictional stance.
First, it’s possible that an audience mistakes a fictional representation for an actual one.
For example, we can imagine a viewer watching a film that is shot as if it were a documentary, but
actually is a realistic fiction, like The Boondock Saints example from chapter 1. In this case, I
would argue that the viewer does not take the fictional stance. However, while the viewer does not
know that she is reading a fictional work, the work itself still meets the three conditions, and so
still counts as a work of fiction. She will treat the objects in the narrative as if they were a
documentation of real-life, actual events. The reader may come to have different responses towards
the representation later on if and when she finds out that she was watching a fictional story.
That was a relatively easy case for the fictional stance to explain. But there are two further
cases that prove to be more of a challenge. First, there may be situations in which a reader does
not know whether the narrative she is reading is fictional or real. Perhaps she is reading a wellresearched crime drama and the book jacket, preface, and reviews are ambiguous concerning
whether the book is based on a fictional murder or a real one. Typically one of these cues will
indicate that a story is fictional, if we didn’t know already. Or there could be any other number of
contextual clues about the fictional status of a work: what we know about the author, how the book
is marketed, what our friends, social media, newspaper, etc. have told us about it, even where we
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find the book in the bookstore and how it is marketed online. If these fail, then the content of the
story will often indicate that it is a work of fiction. All of these cues will be indications for us to
take the fictional stance. But we can still imagine that a reader simply finds a book and neither the
context nor the content of the narrative indicates whether the book is fictional or not. Does she
take the fictional stance in this case?
I think she doesn’t. In general, it may be best to be skeptical about the fictional status of a
work if we lack any indication to treat it as such. This is also Matravers’ position and, perhaps,
Kendall Walton’s. Matravers’ follows David Davies’ fidelity constraint: we assume that an
author’s desire to be faithful to how actual events took place constrains nonfictional narratives.
We do not have the same assumption with fictions; we think that the author was guided by some
other story-telling purpose (Davies 2007). Walton’s reality principle states that we should treat
fictional worlds like the actual one except in places where we are indicated otherwise (Walton
1990). The fidelity constraint and the reality principle both suggest that fictional worlds may be
like the actual one in many respects, but differ in others. In fact, we can assume that the fictional
world is like the actual world unless we are explicitly told otherwise. This may not be true for
some genres, such as fantasy or science fiction, as both philosophers acknowledge, but these will
probably not be ambiguous cases to begin with. But in many other cases these principles hold. If
so, we should not take a narrative that seems to be very much like the actual world as fiction unless
we have some good reason to do so. This means that we should not take the fictional stance towards
a truly ambiguous narrative.11
The second difficult case concerns fictions that contain propositions, objects, places, and

11

See Matravers 2014 for a nice list of narratives that blur the lines between fiction and nonfiction
narratives. In these cases, it may be best to be skeptical about the fictional status, and to recognize
the aesthetic purpose behind writing a narrative that is ambiguous between fiction and nonfiction.
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characters that are a part of the actual world. Two favorite examples in the literature are Conan
Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes stories, which take place in London, and Tolstoy’s War & Peace, which
features Napoleon’s land invasion of Russia. London is a real place and, arguably, we need to
recognize it as such while we are reading the stories in order for them to make sense. The same
with Napoleon; Tolstoy’s philosophy of history is based on the idea that the narrative he presents
is based on events the reader knows actually happened.
There are two possible ways that the fictional stance can deal with the actual objects (etc.)
that occur in works of fiction. First, it may be that we take the fictional stance towards the entire
work, including the objects and propositions that correspond to actual world objects and states of
affairs. On this view, we take the fictional stance towards something that is true in the actual
world. We treat the actual object as part of the world of fiction, as something that fits together with
all the rest of the created, non-actual objects. This weaves together the (actually) true and (actually)
false propositions in the story into one fictional narrative. The challenge for this view would be to
explain how we see the proposition or object as fictional and also as true in the actual world.
A second possibility is that we only take the fictional stance towards the clearly fictional
elements in the story and not the actual ones. This view has the advantage of keeping separate the
(actually) true and (actually) false aspects of a narrative. It may seem like this advantage comes at
the expense of a disjointed narrative. If we treat the non-actual events in a story separate from the
actual ones, how do we understand them to be part of the same fictional narrative? One way to do
so is to keep in mind that works of fiction are created by authors who themselves take the fictional
stance. Authors create a representation of a fictional world that bears some resemblances to our
own. The reader should keep in mind the real aspects of the story for aesthetic reasons. Readers
compartmentalize the actual content in a narrative so as not to confuse it with the fictional content.
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We draw upon our knowledge of London to inform ourselves about Watson and Holmes’ antics,
but we nevertheless know that the events in the fiction are mainly fictional and so non-actual. Still,
both elements work together to create a fictional world that bears many resemblances to our own,
perhaps according to Walton’s reality principle.
I won’t decide here which of these two positions is correct. The solution may boil down to
whether readers actually do compartimentalize actual truths separately from merely fictional ones
(Matravers 2014). It may be that readers do not compartimentalize the actually true information in
their mental model of the fictional world. Nevertheless, they are able to tell which propositions are
true of the actual world and which only of the fictional one while engaged with the fictional story.
Both positions, I think, are compatible with the fictional stance. It’s also worth noting that the
actual people, places, and things involved in fictional stories are slightly different from their real
world counterparts; they are fictionalized versions of actual things. Napoleon says and does
slightly different things in War and Peace than he did in real life, different events take place in
Sherlock Holmes’ fictionalized London. We bring information about these characters and places
to our engagement with the fiction, but then let the fiction guide our further thoughts and responses
to them. This may be a point in favor of the view that we take the fictional stance towards the
entire narrative, including actual objects contained in it.
Another major area of debate in the philosophical literature concerns the ontology of
fictions and fictional entities. Do fictions, and the objects presented in them, actually exist? Clearly
they are not concrete objects, but do they exist in some other way? There are several possible
answers to this question. First, it could be that fictional entities are pretend objects; we pretend or
imagine that they exist, but they actually do not. This is the view held by many theorists of makebelieve, including Walton (1990; see also Sartre 1940/2004). Second, it could be that fictional
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entities are not actual objects, but rather possible ones; they exist in some other possible world
(Lewis 1978 & Plantinga 1974). Third, perhaps fictional entities are linguistic constructs, such as
Russellian definite descriptions (Russell 1905). This is an anti-realist position; fictional names do
not refer because there is no actual thing for them to refer to. We speak as though fictional entities
exist, but they do not really (see also Quine 1953). Fourth, fictional entities might be eternally
existing abstracta, as Meinong famously posited (1904/1981). Fictional entities are not created by
authors. They also do not exist, but rather ‘subsist’ (a different kind of existence) in an abstract
realm and are drawn upon by writers of fiction (Wolterstorff holds a similar position, 1980).
Finally, fictional entities might be abstract artifacts: abstract in the sense that they are not concrete
particulars, artifacts in the sense of being created (Kripke 2013, Salmon 1998, Schiffer 1996,
Thomasson 1999 & 2003).
Three of these views are inconsistent with the fictional stance and one would be a challenge
to incorporate. The first is the Meinongian thesis that fictional entities are abstracta that exist like
Platonic forms—they are eternal, not created. The other inconsistent view is that fictional entities
are possible objects. In the first chapter, I argued that fictional entities are probably not possible
objects belonging to possible worlds, because possible worlds are complete and consistent, and
fictional worlds need not be. That is, for any proposition A, in a possible world B, A must be either
true or false. This is not so in fictional worlds. To use the famous example, the question “how
many children does Lady Macbeth have?” has no answer. One can say that “Lady Macbeth has
fourteen children” but this proposition is neither true nor false in the fictional world, because there
is nothing in Macbeth to indicate an answer. The number of children that Lady Macbeth has had
is indeterminate, so the fictional world is also indeterminate. If Lady Macbeth was a denizen of a
possible world, then there would be an answer to this question (see also Thomasson 1999 and
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Wolterstorff 1980 for similar arguments; see Priest 1997 for a counterargument). Finally, the
pretense view directly appeals to distinct mental attitudes and make-believe. Perhaps there is a
way to have a pretense-based view that denies any non-standard mental states for fiction, as we
saw in §2, but this view may still commits us to a weaker form of the DAV according to which
distinct processes and states (pretend ones) are used in our engagements with fiction.
This leaves the Russellian-type definite description view that denies existence to fictional
entities and the abstract artifact view that grants it. Both theories have their virtues and both have
their potential flaws. Both also seem to be compatible with our basic understanding of fictions as
created by authors. I mentioned in chapter 1 that I favor the abstract artifact theory. The question
is whether the fictional stance entails this view. I do not intend for it to do so. Although questions
concerning the ontological status of fictions and our psychological interactions with them are
related, I do not think that there is anything about the fictional stance that requires us to be a realist
about fictional objects. In fact, it might not matter which of these two positions is right if one is
solely concerned with the psychology of fiction. This is because both of these views deny that
fictional characters possess spatiotemporal existence. All of the issues concerning our
psychological interactions arise from the fact that fictional entities are not directly present to us.
How we feel about the ontology of fiction may not matter for our psychology of fiction, at least if
we accept the descriptivist or the artifactualist theories, both of which seem compatible with the
fictional stance and how we tend to think of and interact with fictional entities.
So the antirealist position is compatible with the fictional stance, at least in principle. In
practice, however, most antirealists appeal to some version of pretense in order to explain our
mental attitudes and speech acts about fictions due to issues concerning reference to nonexistent
entities (I will return to these momentarily). This gives us some reason to be wary of joining with
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the antirealists.
Let’s examine Thomasson’s realist artifactual theory more closely to see if it fares better.
This view states that fictional entities are abstract artifacts, objects which have no spatiotemporal
location (and, so, are abstract). They exist, but as neither as objects of make-believe, a la Walton,
eternal abstracta according to Meinongians, nor as real (but non-actual) citizens of another possible
world. Fictional entities are not alone in being abstract artifacts. Thomasson lists everyday objects
such as theories, laws, governments and literary works as similar constructed abstracta (see also
Kripke 2013). Like fictional characters, these objects are “tethered to the everyday world around
us” by their relation to their creators and copies of their instantiation onto a physical object (e.g. a
written down or spoken law).
Fictional characters can be found “in” literary works, but here a similar question arises—
where are literary works, if anywhere? We possess copies of Emma, but the work itself does not
exist in a particular location and the character Emma exist in the location of a copy of the novel
(Thomasson 1999, 37). Furthermore, we must treat fictional characters as abstract artifacts
because they cannot be located in the locations or time they are purportedly supposed to be. We
would be disappointed if we were to drive the thirty some-odd minutes south from London to the
manor Hartfield in Surrey and hope to find Emma Woodhouse waiting inside. We would not find
Emma there and we would also have committed a strange categorical mistake. Competent readers
understand this as they engage with fictions. As Thomasson states: “[i]n our everyday discussion
of literature we treat fictional characters as created entities brought into existence at a certain time
through the acts of an author” (ibid, 16). The sense in which fictional characters do seem to be real
stems from their created nature: “We do not describe authors as discovering their characters or
selecting them from an ever-present set of abstract, nonexistent or possible objects. Instead, we
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describe authors as inventing their characters, making them up, or creating them, so that before
being written about by an author, there is no fictional object….a work of fiction is necessarily tied
to its particular origin” (ibid, 6-7).
The abstract artifact view is one possible way of understanding the ontology of fictional
characters, a view that is compatible with the fictional stance and the SAV. There are two main
issues worth addressing here: whether sentences in fictions possess truth values and, relatedly,
reference to fictional entities. We already saw that one reading of the fictional stance states that
some propositions in a fiction do possess a truth value—that is, they can be true or false about the
actual world. These are sentences like “Napoleon and his army invaded Russia” and “Baker Street
is in London.” Other sentences do not possess a truth value for the actual world, but rather for the
world of the fiction. They can be true or false in or according to the story. This is the reading that
I am inclined towards because it seems to fit nicely with the SAV. But it is not the only possibility.
Again, I do not think that there is an essential relation between the view that our mental states
towards fictions are genuine and a positive answer to the question of whether fictions have truth
values and authors make genuine assertions. The alternative might be that authors pretend to make
assertions when constructing a fiction. But considering my general anti-pretense position, I am
disinclined to take this route.
Here’s another way in which we can understand the semantic content of a fiction. Kripke
(2013) and Thomasson (1999), amongst others, have each argued that there are two general kinds
of sentences we can construct about fictional entities: internal and external sentences. Some
sentences possess content that is internal to the fictional world. “Claudius killed his own brother,”
“King Joffrey was a tyrant,” and “Frodo carried the Ring to Mordor” are all sentences internal to
a fictional world (Hamlet, A Song of Ice and Fire, and The Lord of the Rings, respectively). Other
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sentences possess content about the actual world, a world external to the world of the fiction.
“Sherlock Holmes was created by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle” and “Emma Woodhouse does not exist
in this world”12 are both external sentences, sentences about fictional entities (or definite
descriptions) but not about the world of the fiction. External sentences are genuine propositions
that are actually asserted and possess a truth value (both true, in this case). They also possess names
that refer to fictional entities; on both of these philosopher’s views, fictional entities are abstract
artifacts. “Frodo” refers to the abstract artifact Frodo, “Claudius” to Claudius the fictional
character, etc.
Internal sentences are trickier. Kripke argues that the internal sentences possess the
implicit, unspoken fictional operator “in the story.” This means that when we say “Claudius killed
his own brother” what we really mean is “Claudius killed his own brother [in the fictional world
of Hamlet]”. Kripke does not think that these are genuine assertions (see Kripke 2013, lecture II).
Instead, he thinks that the speaker pretends to make assertions about states of affairs internal to a
fictional world. Only external sentences are genuine assertions. We also pretend to refer to a
fictional character. This is because fictional entities, if they exist at all, are not the types of things
that can kill, think, etc. They are abstract artifacts, which cannot possess the right kind of properties
(having a body, being about to think, etc.)
I want to resist the pretense move if at all possible. Unfortunately, most realist philosophers
have adopted some kind of pretense to explain certain types of sentences about fictions (including
Thomasson, Searle, & Schiffer; Salmon 1998 being an exception).
Why propose that fictional entities exist and can be referred to for some sentences, but not
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This is a negative existential, a sentence type that has plagued philosophers for decades. See
Thomasson 2003 and Kripke 2013 for a discussion.
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all of them? As Nathan Salmon says, “it is like buying a luxurious Italian sports car only to leave
it garaged” (Salmon 1998, 298). This means that one would have to propose a different way to
make genuine assertions about fictions and refer to fictional entities. I am inclined towards a view
that we refer to actual, abstract artifacts in both external sentences and internal sentences. The
main challenge for this view is to explain how we speak about fictional entities as possessing
properties that they don’t seem to actually possess. Abstract artifacts cannot possess properties like
“being rich” or “living in London” because they are not concrete objects. Only concrete objects
can have these kinds of properties, because only concrete objects can live in London and have
money (etc.).
This is an area that is fraught with controversy. As Kripke notes, we need to be able to say
that a student is speaking the truth when she says that “Emma Woodhouse is rich” (even if she is
pretending) and false when she says that “Emma Woodhouse is poor.” One possibility is that the
abstract artifact really does possess the property of “being rich.” But this stretches the notion of an
abstract entity; how can something that doesn’t take up space have a lot of money? Another, better
explanation stems from the fictional stance itself. I agree with Kripke and Thomasson that
statements made in internal fictional contexts—sentences that take the fictional world as their
content—should be understood as implicitly describing what is true to the story. Hence the notion
of a fictional operator. When I say that “Emma Woodhouse is rich,” my statement is true according
to the story but false in the actual world.
So far this agrees with most realist philosophers’ theories of reference and predication. But
where other realists propose pretense in order to explain our mental attitude during these
statements, I deny this. When I make statements like “Emma is rich” I am taking the fictional
stance: I represent this object as having properties that I know that it does not really, physically
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possess. Just like speaking about lightning as desiring to strike in a certain location is, strictly
speaking, a categorical mistake, so too is it a mistake to say that Emma is rich if we do not include
the fictional operator (see Dennett 1997). Neither speech act necessarily requires pretense. When
I say that the lightning wants to strike the metal pole, I do not pretend that the lightning possesses
mental states. I am treating it as if it actually does possess those states—and, more than that, I am
accepting that it does have that desire. A scientifically-minded friend might come along and say,
“Well the lightning doesn’t really want to hit the pole. Lightning can’t want anything, after all.”
The likely response would be that this was “a manner of speaking.” I talk about the lightning as if
it desires certain outcomes, but I know that it doesn’t really. Still, I speak and think about the
lightning as if it really does possess mental states.
The same may apply to our speech acts about fiction. I do not pretend that the fictional
character Emma Woodhouse is rich. I really do think that this character is rich in the context of the
story. In the fictional story, Emma Woodhouse has all sorts of properties. By taking the fictional
stance I treat the representation of the fictional character in some ways as if Emma is an actual
person. I do not do this by pretending that Emma is real, since I simultaneously treat her as a
fictional entity, but rather in terms of how I speak, think, and respond to the character. Moreover,
when I speak about Emma Woodhouse, I refer to Emma the fictional character—the character that
actually lacks properties concerning wealth. But I still refer to that character.
My claims concerning the ontology and semantics of the fictional stance need further
explanation and elucidation. It is well beyond the limits of this dissertation to do so. I leave it as
an exciting and philosophically rich project to develop an ontology and semantics of fiction that is
fully compatible with the fictional stance. For the rest of this dissertation I will explore the
psychological side of our interactions with fictions, now that we have established how we come to
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see fictions as fictions and how it is possible to have psychological responses to them. In the next
three chapters, I will explore different ways in which we psychologically participate with fictions:
attributing mental states to fictional entities (chapter 4), our emotional responses to fictions
(chapter 5) and our moral judgments of fictional characters (chapter 6). The fictional stance is the
foundation for each of these chapters, as well as the following chapters that dissolve the sympathy
for the devil phenomenon, the puzzle of imaginative resistance, and the question of moral learning.
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Chapter 4: Understanding fictional characters

1. A fictional mind-meld

Navigating our social climate would be so much simpler if we could be a little more like the
Vulcans. Star Trek’s Mr. Spock simply places his fingers against someone’s temples and instantly
accesses her thoughts, memories, feelings, and past experiences. This allows the Vulcan to
immediately understand (or, at least, become familiar with) another’s experiences and mental
states in a deeply personal, intimate way.
Unfortunately, we are not Vulcans. We can’t simply mind-meld with another person to
learn what she is thinking and what she has been through. But that does not mean that we mere
humans are unable to access the mental lives of others. It is often relatively easy to tell what another
person is thinking. We attribute mental states to others on the basis of their behaviors, verbal
reports, facial expressions, body language, and even bodily reactions like perspiration, muscular
tension, etc. For example, I guess that my friend is thirsty if she goes to the kitchen to get a glass
from the cupboard. I also guess that she believes that the third cupboard from the left contains
glasses if that’s the one she reaches toward. I predict that my friend will then go to the sink and
turn on the tap. This requires that I attribute beliefs, desires, and intentions to my friend.
We can also attribute emotions to others. You watch as your sister gets increasingly irritated
and angry with her colleague’s insensitive comments about a coworker. She crosses her arms,
frowns, and scoffs at her colleague’s remarks. You may watch as your friend becomes frightened
and anxious as he watches a Hitchcock thriller, as he grabs the sides of his chair or clutches his
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face in nervous anticipation, eyes wide. Indeed, we are generally quite good at telling when
someone feels irritated, scared, sad, etc. The same goes for other mental states; we often have little
trouble attributing both mental state types and content based on another’s facial expressions, bodily
responses, and behaviors.
In fact, we seem to have an advantage over the Vulcans when it comes to certain kinds of
social cognition, our ability to attribute mental states to other people (aka, mindreading) and to
predict their actions. It is unclear whether Mr. Spock can really understand those around him (at
least, the non-Vulcan around him!). This is obviously true in the Star Trek series, when the sayings
and antics of Captain Kirk and the rest of the Enterprise crew continuously puzzle and annoy him.
This chapter explores our human capacity to understand the mental states of fictional
entities. While watching a film or reading a novel, we want to know what a character thinks,
feelings, and believes. This isn’t always explicitly told to us by a narrator or voiceover, so we have
to use our own general social cognitive abilities to glean a character’s thoughts, beliefs, emotions,
and desires. This understanding takes the shape of propositional “knowledge that” (for instance,
knowledge that another person is sad) as well as experiential knowledge (I have the same kind of
sorrowful feeling as another and so have a similar, but not identical, emotional experience).
The proponent of the DAV has a ready explanation of our social cognition of fictional
characters. We encountered it back in the first chapter: simulation theory (ST). Consider one
example from the opening of this chapter: we watch our sister becoming annoyed with her
colleague who is spreading rumors about another coworker. How do we know that our sister is
annoyed, and what she is annoyed about? Simulation theorists argue that we imagine (roughly)
what it would be like to be in our sister’s situation: her beliefs, thoughts, emotions, perspective.
Doing so allows us to understand how we would feel if we were “in our sister’s shoes.” From there,
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we judge that our sister must feel the same way: annoyed about her colleague’s callousness.
This is a rough sketch of how we simulate more generally; we imagine ourselves in a
target’s position, imaginatively adopting their mental states, and judging that they must feel and
think as we do while engaged in the imagining. ST also applies to fictional characters. We can
imagine ourselves in their situation just like a real person’s. Moreover, we can see how ST is
compatible with the DAV. ST proposes distinct mental processing during our social cognition of
both actual and nonactual targets. So we may have imaginative beliefs, imaginative emotions, and
imaginative desires about our target, but not stereotypical ones. Our simulated mental states are
supposedly run offline, disconnected from their typical functional role. Indeed, ST has become the
dominant theory of mindreading in contemporary aesthetics (see Currie & Ravenscroft 2002,
Freedberg & Gallese 2007, Goldman 2006, Harris 2000, Nichols 2004, and Walton 2006).
We will explore the question of whether ST is committed to a distinct cognitive attitude in
§3. If so, and an empathy-based ST is the best explanation of our social cognitive capacities for
fictional entities, then the SAV is in trouble. The SAV is committed to the idea that we utilize nonimaginary, stereotypical mental states during our engagements with fiction. This is incompatible
with the basic principles of ST.
There is hope for the SAV. In this chapter, I will reject ST as the best theory of how we
understand the mental states of fictional entities. In fact, ST faces several challenges as a theory of
social cognition in general: it doesn’t seem to be able to explain the breadth of our social cognitive
capacities and, on many versions of the theory, it leads us to an undesirable conclusion concerning
our ability to introspect our own mental states. Even if ST could surmount these difficulties, it
faces challenges when applied to fiction, as we will see.
I will propose a different theory of how we understand the mental states of fictional entities:
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a modified version of theory-theory (TT). Philosophers of art do not typically appeal to TT in order
to explain our social cognition of fictional entities. This is likely because, unlike ST, TT does not
appeal to imagination and imaginary mental states. While TT does not appeal to the consensus
DAV, it is perfect for a proponent of the SAV. TT states that we attribute mental states to others
through a process of inference-drawing from tacit folk psychological knowledge about mental
states and particular perceptions and judgments about a target’s behaviors and bodily expressions,
to conclude that the target must think or feel a certain way. TT faces several standard objections
in the social cognition literature, most notably that it proposes an overly complex cognitive
architecture. Perhaps we can directly perceive the mental states of others, as opposed to inference
or simulation. Direct perception theorists (DPT) argue just that. It certainly feels like we can
directly perceive when another person is angry or sad, or even that she has certain intentions or
desires. TT also faces the challenge of explaining the immediacy of or social cognitive capacities.
I will supplement the traditional account of TT with an account of social referencing: a
heuristic model of how we quickly understand our social surroundings (see Bermudez 2005). I
argue that this updated version of TT can adequately account for the challenges the standard
account faces. It will also be a solid foundation for explaining how we understand the mental states
of fictional entities in a way that is completely compatible with the SAV. We use stereotypical
mental states and mechanisms when we theorize about fictional minds.
In §2, I will explore a scene from Steve McQueen’s 12 Years a Slave and present the basic
explananda for a theory of how we understand fictional characters’ mental states. I will then
consider ST more thoroughly and how it applies to our engagements with fictions before critiquing
it. §4 discusses two alternatives to ST: DPT and TT. I present challenges to both views before
moving on to my modified TT and social referencing. I conclude by showing how my version of
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TT can best explain our social cognition of fictional entities.
Social cognition has its own extensive literature in philosophy, psychology, and
neuroscience, with implications ranging from childhood development and autism, basic cognition,
language, evolution, and animal cognition. It is impossible for me to do justice to the extent and
intricacies of the debate in this chapter. Nevertheless, I think that my arguments in this chapter are
enough to show the extent and importance of mindreading for our understanding of fictions. We
can also make some headway in explaining an extremely significant aspect of our social lives in
general.

2. A case study in mindreading

Let’s consider a scene that compels its audience to mindread a character’s mental states. I will use
this scene as an explananda for an adequate theory of fictional social cognition throughout this
chapter. If a theory cannot explain how and why we engage with this character, then we should
look elsewhere for a theory that can.
The scene I have chosen occurs late in Steve McQueen’s 2013 film, 12 Years a Slave.
Solomon Northrup (played by Chiwetel Ejiofor), is a free black man living in New York with his
family. He was tricked, captured, and forced into slavery in the Deep South. Northrup is shipped
from plantation to plantation and master to master and eventually finds himself picking cotton on
a plantation owned by the cruel, violent, drunken Edwin Epps (Michael Fassbender). Northrup has
cautiously formed friendships with several of the other slaves, including the pretty, innocent, hardworking Patsey (Lupita Nyong’o). Patsey has already asked Northrup to end her life after Epps
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repeatedly rapes and beats her. Northrup refuses. Northrup’s constant fear and anxiety reaches its
zenith when a white man named Treach comes to work on the estate. After the two men converse,
Northrup begs Treach to bring a letter to his friends in the north, men who can vouch for Northrup’s
freedom. Treach agrees to take the letter. Sadly, Northrup later discovers that Treach did not
deliver the letter, but rather disclosed the scheme to Epps—no doubt to raise his own favor and
gain some easy money in the process. Northrup cleverly talks his way out of trouble when Epps
confronts him, but the damage is done.
This is Northrup’s bleakest hour. Northrup quietly, resignedly continues his work on the
plantation, not outwardly communicating his despair. But at the funeral of a fellow slave, Edward,
Northrup finally breaks down. A fellow slave woman sings “Roll, Jordan, Roll” over the burial
site. The other slaves’ faces are passive, seemingly resigned to their fate on the plantation. But as
the camera focuses on Northrup, we see another story entirely. A complex emotional narrative is
expressed in his face. The other slaves sing in the background, but Northrup does not join in.
Instead, we see a look of bewilderment pass over him, as if he doesn’t quite understand what has
happened or where he is. There is some shock there as well, perhaps from Treach’s sudden betrayal
and his own rapid transition from hope to despair. There is also sorrow, but at first it is rather
subdued. Finally, Northrup joins the others in song. Only then does he break down, quickly
expressing grief and even anger as he looks skyward, perhaps appealing to a seemingly-absent
God. The scene ends with Northrup’s voice rising above the other singers’, his face expressing the
deep hurt that arises from the hopelessness of his situation.
It is impressive that a relatively simple scene—one long, close-up shot of a singing man’s
face—is able to communicate so much and so effectively. How am I able to understand so much
about Northrup’s mindset from this brief shot, one in which no linguistic communication occurs?
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Context helps; I am quite familiar with Northrup by this point in the story. I know where he has
been and what obstacles he has faced. I have developed a strong bond with him, a bond that this
scene both relies on and reinforces.
What’s interesting is how easy it feels to glean Northrup’s current state. I must pay attention
to the story as it unfolds, as well as Northrup’s face throughout the scene. However, I do not seem
to engage in a great deal of deliberation, thinking through and weighing potential options about
what Northrup might be thinking at that time—at least, not consciously. Instead, I make quick,
fairly accurate guesses about Northrup’s thoughts and mood. On some occasions I might have to
consciously and deliberately consider a target’s facial expression, behaviors, etc. in order to
appropriately attribute mental states to her. I may even have to put myself in her shoes, taking her
perspective and imagining that it is my own. However, it often seems like we can immediately tell
what someone thinks and feels, as I could with Northrup. How is this possible?
One way to access a person’s mental state—and especially emotions—is by examining
her face. This scene in particular would be far less effective at communicating Northrup’s state of
mind if the audience viewed a full-body shot instead of a shot framing his face. There is something
about the human face that effectively communicates and expresses how one currently feels. Alvin
Plantinga (1999) calls the face of a film character a “scene of empathy”; a direct, basic source of
our understanding and feeling with her. That certainly seems to be the case here. Indeed, this scene
is extremely emotionally powerful the experience is for the viewer. If others are like me, then
watching Northrup will have elicited a range of strong emotions, such as sorrow and compassion
for Northrup and anger and betrayal on his behalf.
I take our responses to this scene as data concerning how we understand fictional
characters’ mental states. There are several points in need of explanation. First, we seem to have

118

propositional knowledge of Northrup’s mental states automatically, without conscious deliberation
or inference-drawing. I just know that he feels sorrow and believes that he has been betrayed.
There is a sense of ease and immediacy to our ability to know how Northrup thinks and feels, and
why.
It could be that our quick, seemingly automatic understanding of a target’s mental states is
caused by equally quick, automatic neural processes. These include mirroring, mimicry, and direct
association (see Hoffman 2008). Mimicry is an “innate, involuntary, isomorphic response to
another’s expression of emotion” (ibid, 441). There are two steps involved in mimicking the
emotion of a target. First, there is an automatic change in the subject’s facial expression, voice,
and posture at the same time as a corresponding change in the target’s facial expression, vocal
intonation, posture, etc. These changes then trigger the same feelings in the target as those present
in the target. There is also some evidence that subjects can mirror the motor intentions of a target;
witnessing movement in another (or even in a statue!) results in the subject’s motor cortex to be
activated, as if she were the one moving (Freedberg & Gallese 2007).
Mirror neurons may be the neural basis of mimicry. These neurons are triggered when one
person observes the actions or emotional expression of another. This results in the same kind of
neural pattern in the subject as if she were actually performing the observed action or having the
same emotion herself (ibid, 441; see also Freedberg & Gallese 2007, Clay & Iacoboni 2011, and
Decety & Meltzhoff, Goldman 2006).
Direct association occurs when we perceive a target who undergoes an event that is similar
to one that we have experienced in the past (ibid, 441). For example, a friend of mine has recently
lost her pet dog and displays sorrow-related signals (crying, having a “long-face,” slouched
posture, etc.). My memory of a similar situation in which I lost my pet parrot makes me also
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express these signals and even consciously experience sadness. I make this association
unconsciously, without thinking about it or planning to do so.
Mimicry, mirroring, and direct association might all serve as the basis of how we quickly
recognize and know about another’s emotional state. The perception of another person causes us
to have our own emotional responses. We then attribute particular emotions to the target on the
basis of our own feelings.
While some of our social cognitive abilities seem to occur automatically, there are other
cases in which understanding a target’s mental state requires a slower, more thoughtful and
deliberate processes. Sometimes we may need to take on a character’s perspective in order to know
how she feels or what she will do next. Perspective-taking seems especially important in
ambiguous scenes in which we do not know enough about a person or her context, and so we have
difficulty in judging how she feels, believes, or desires.
Sometimes perspective-taking is equated with empathy. When a subject X empathizes with
a target, Y, she imaginatively takes on Y’s mental states as closely as possible. X shares in Y’s
mental state and, further, that X’s responses are caused by and involve the same type of state as
Y’s. In taking another’s perspective, I “put myself in her shoes,” and imagine what she must think
or feel in a particular situation.
Like mimicry, empathy can also engender similar emotional states in the subject. Martin
Hoffman (2008) lists three types of perspective-taking. The first is self-focused; imagining that the
subject’s situation is happening to ourselves evokes an empathetic response in us. For example, I
think about how my friend Sarah must feel after she lost her pet dog. Putting myself in her position
also makes me sad, as if I were the one whose dog has gone missing. Next, perspective taking can
be other-focused, during which we attend to the victim’s feelings, behavior and “current life
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condition” (ibid, 442). In such cases, the observer’s empathy may feel more cognitive than
affective. I may observe Sarah’s sorrow and imagine how she feels without (consciously) feeling
the sorrow to the same extent, or imagining that I have gone through the same experience. Hoffman
argues that self-focused perspective-taking is more intense than other-focused perspective taking,
perhaps because it is more likely to lead to direct association from past events in our own lives
(ibid, 442). Finally, perspective taking can focus on both the self and the other person, a mixture
of the previous two types in which we focus on both how we would feel in a situation and how the
target must feel.
Perhaps we have to take on Solomon’s perspective in order to fully appreciate how he feels
and what he has been through. Indeed, empathetic perspective taking is also sometimes equated
with simulation. In both cases, we imagine ourselves in the situation of a target (Goldman 2006).
It would be a major win for the DAV if perspective-taking requires imagination and, further,
perspective taking of this kind is required for understanding fictional characters. I will reject the
identification of perspective taking, empathy, and simulation in the following section—
importantly, by denying that perspective taking requires imagining. My challenge, then, is to
explain how we can understand difficult and ambiguous fictional scenes without appealing to
imaginative processes. It could be that some other mental process—such as association, theorizing,
and inference-drawing—can explain our conscious, deliberate thinking about a fictional
character’s perspective.
The scene from 12 Years a Slave captures the intricacies of our relationships with fictional
entities: we attribute mental states to them, attempt to understand their past and current context,
and try to determine their prospects for the future. We also seem to have a direct connection to
characters through our perceptual capacities. I will repeatedly return to this scene as a test case for
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the main theories of social cognition, as well as my own. It may be that one of the theories is
particularly effective at explaining mirroring and direct association, but not deliberate perspective
taking. Ideally, though, we can discover a theory that is capable of explaining all of them together.
For ease of reference, I will call the seemingly automatic processes (mimickry, mirroring,
direct association) “low level mindreading” and the slower, deliberate processes “high level
mindreading.” I will now turn to ST and determine whether it can adequately explain how we
understand fictional characters.

3. Simulating fictional characters

3.1. Varieties of simulation
Simulation theory arose in the late 1980’s with the work of philosophers like Alvin Goldman
(1989, 1993 & 2006), Robert Gordon (1986 & 1996), and Jane Heal (1996). ST holds that we
utilize our own perceptual, emotional, and cognitive mechanisms while mindreading. We project
or imagine ourselves in the situation/context of the observed person. These mental mechanisms
are run “offline,” disconnected from their typical functional output (see Currie & Ravenscroft
2002). This results in imaginative mental states that are distinct from stereotypical mental states.
ST has become immensely popular in aesthetics, as well as the social cognitive literature
in general. This is partly due to the breadth of ST’s explanatory power. ST seems to explain child
development and autism spectrum disorder (ASD) (Harris 2000, Currie 1996, & Goldman 2006).
It also may be able to handle questions concerning high and low level social cognitive capacities
that I discussed in the previous section. Finally, in the aesthetics literature, many proponents of
the DAV adopt some version of ST (see Nichols 2006, Currie 1995, Goldman 2006, Walton 1997).
122

We utilize pretend input (non-genuine beliefs, for example) and garner pretend output (a pretend
belief about what a character will do next) when we simulate the mental states of a fictional entity.
There are many different varieties of ST. I will briefly discuss two: Alvin Goldman’s
enactive imagining and Robert Gordon’s radical simulationism (Goldman 1993 & 2006, Gordon
1987 & 1996; see also Harris 2000, Nichols & Stich 2000, Heal 1996, Currie 1995, Currie &
Ravenscroft 2002, Walton 1997, etc.). Central amongst these theories is the idea that simulation is
the key to understanding mental concepts, mental development, and social interaction.
Let’s first consider Goldman’s theory of enactive imagining (1993 & 2006). Goldman
argues that we attribute mental states to another after we recognize our own mental states under
actual or imagined conditions. I do not pretend to be the target person; rather, I transform myself,
imaginatively, into her. I imaginatively take on her relevant beliefs, desires, emotions, and
perspective. This is called enactive imagining—or, e-imagining, for short—because I utilize my
own mental processes for simulative imagining. Imagining the mental states of another involves
enacting certain perspectives and states, especially when we deliberately take another’s
perspective. Once I e-imagine myself as the target, I can introspect what I feel during this particular
situation. I then judge that the target feels the same way. So there is some amount of folk
psychological knowledge and inference drawing done in the service of simulation. However, such
knowledge could not be developed without first engaging in imaginative, simulative capacities
(compare this interpretation of the role of folk knowledge and theorizing to TT, below).
There is a further question about how the simulator infers the target’s mental states.
Goldman (1993) argues that the recognition of one’s own mental states requires introspective
access to our own thoughts, emotions, beliefs, judgments, etc. One implication of this position is
that all mental states must have some consciously introspectible property. Indeed, Goldman argues
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that we introspect the conscious, qualitative feel of each mental state. Just as the taste of chocolate
has a particular conscious taste, and the color red has a particular qualitative perceptual appearance,
so too for all of our mental states including beliefs and intentions. If this is true, then we can
recognize our own e-imagined mental state by its conscious qualitative features.
This is a controversial position, as we will see in the following subsection. Some versions
of ST seem to rely on a subject’s clear and reliable introspective access to her own mental states.
Without this access we wouldn’t be able to understand what another person thinks or feels based
on our own simulated feelings (see Carruthers 1996 for a critique).
Not all ST’s require conscious introspection. Gordon (1996) offers his radical simulation
theory as an alternative to such theories. On Gordon’s view, the subject projects herself into the
situation of another person, makes the relevant adjustments for differences between herself and
the other person, and then sees how she would react. This sounds quite similar to Goldman’s
position, but there are several important differences. First, Goldman’s view does not require that
the simulator possess knowledge of mental concepts, such as beliefs and desires. This is important,
since very young children can take the perceptive of others without knowledge of mental states
(Nichols 2004a). Second, the view does not appeal to conscious introspection of our own mental
states. Gordon takes these two points as benefits of his view, since it does not align him with view
of self-knowledge according to which our knowledge of our own mental states is incorrigible (we
cannot be wrong about what state we are in) and transparent (we always know what type of mental
state we are in while we are in it) that may plague introspective accounts like Goldman’s (Moran
2001).
How can we simulate without the recognition of conscious qualitative states? Gordon
suggests that simulation utilizes “ascent routines” from one higher, introspective semantic level to
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another, non-introspective level. Let’s say that I am trying to determine whether my friend thinks
that the film that we are watching is any good. I imaginatively transform myself into her state,
taking on her perspective and accounting for relevant differences between us, such as her lack of
expertise in this film genre compared to my relative abundance, as well as her current emotional
state, energy level, etc. Now that I have transformed myself into my friend, I simply have to ask
myself whether I think that the film is any good. I don’t have to ask whether I have a particular
belief about the film—or, more accurately, that I have formed a particular aesthetic judgment of
it. There is no higher-order mentalizing at work here, no introspection at all. Rather, I ask a direct
question about the world—in this case, about the film. Is the film any good? Yeah, it’s good for
what it is (a zombie apocalypse flick, let’s say). I then remove myself from the ascent routine and
conclude that this must be what my friend thinks as well. Note that I have attributed a particular
type of mental state as well as its content; my friend has made a positive aesthetic judgment about
the zombie film.
Goldman and Gordon—as well as other simulationists, like Nichols & Stich (2000), Harris
(2000), and Currie & Ravenscroft (2002)—both adopt a “hot” simulative methodology. This
means that we utilize our own mental state processes while attributing mental states to others. It
draws upon our own capacity to form beliefs, desires, emotions, and intentions while imagining
how another person feels. The important question for us is whether the imaginative state involved
in simulating different in kind from typical, non-simulative states. In other words, does ST imply
the DAV?
There are two places where simulation may involve a distinct attitude type: the mental
states used in imagining the target, and the resulting mental states. Currie (1995) and Walton
(1990) both argue that the imaginative state involved in simulation and the resulting mental states
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are of distinct in kind. This, as we’ve seen, is due to the fact that they are run offline and possess
different functional roles than stereotypical states. Goldman (2006), in contrast, argues that the eimagined states are not stereotypical beliefs, desires, etc.—also for functionalist reasons—but that
the mental state that results from e-imagining is. We have a genuine belief that our friend feels a
particular way or makes a particular kind of judgment. Finally, still other theorists distinguish
between different kinds of mental states. Currie & Ravenscroft (2002) deny that the beliefs,
desires, intentions, and judgments involved in simulation (at both stages) are genuine. But
emotions are. These authors adopt a feeling theory of emotions according to which emotions are
constituted by affective feelings. Affective feelings are certainly present during simulation, so the
emotion is a genuine one.
So it seems generally accepted that some distinct kind of mental state goes into or is the
result of the simulative process. This makes ST a good psychological basis for the DAV because
it explains our understanding of fictional entities in terms of the imagination. Indeed, many writers
on the psychology of fiction either explicitly (Feagin 2011, Freedberg & Gallese 2007, Goldman
2006, Harris 2000, Nichols 2004b, Walton 1997, etc.) or implicitly (e.g. Kieran 2010) buy into
some version of ST. This makes sense given the assumption that imaginative processes require
that we run our standard mental states and processes offline, and, further, that this requires
simulation.
I will now examine Gregory Currie’s prominent simulation-based psychology of fiction.
In much of his early work on fiction, Currie (1990 & especially 1995) adopts a version of the ST
that holds that mental processes must be run offline, disconnected from their typical
motor/behavioral output and, further, that offline mental states are of a different type from online
mental states. Currie has backed away from a strong simulative approach in some of his recent
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work, but the general assumption of offline ST remains the same (see Currie & Ravenscroft 2002).
Like Walton, Currie argues that our basic psychological interactions with fictions involve games
of make-believe, games which are based on imaginatively simulating fictional actions and the
minds of fictional characters:
I take on, temporarily, the beliefs and desires I assume someone in that situation
would start off by having; they become, temporarily my own beliefs and desires.
Being, thus temporarily, my own, they work their own effects on my mental
economy, having the sorts of impacts on how I feel and what I decide to do that my
ordinary, real beliefs and desires have. Thus I might start off my imagining by
taking on in this way the beliefs and desires and also the perceptions of someone
who suddenly sees a fierce and enraged lion rushing towards him. These beliefs
and desires then operate on me through their own natural powers; I start to feel the
visceral sensations of fear, and I decide to flee. But I don’t flee; these beliefs and
desires—let us call them pretend or imaginary beliefs and desires—differ from my
own real beliefs and desires not just in being temporary and cancellable. They are
also, unlike my real beliefs and desires, run ‘offline,’ disconnected from their
normal perceptual inputs and behavioral outputs…The function of the simulation
is not to save me from a lion, since I am not actually threatened by one, but to help
me understand the mental processes of someone who is (ibid 252, 253).

Here Currie presents a standard simulative account: we imaginatively take on the mental states of
another as closely as possible, and run our “mental economy” in order to see how we would feel
in that situation. This makes Currie’s view more like Goldman’s e-imagining, rather than Gordon’s
radical simulation. Note, also, how Currie explicitly adopts the DAV; our mental attitudes about
imaginings are not stereotypical mental attitudes, but rather pretend/imaginary ones. This is
because these states lack their typical functional role.
Currie’s account depends on two further features of simulation: imagination and
identification. According to Currie’s ST, audiences are intended to adopt imaginative attitudes
toward fictional characters and situations (Currie, 1990). Currie distinguishes between primary
imagining and secondary imagining. Primary imaginings involve what is true in a story, “those
things which it makes fictional” (1995, 255). We adopt the fictional beliefs necessary to maintain
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a coherent fiction, while disregarding those which contradict it. I disregard my real belief that no
objects can move faster than the speed of light while I am watch Star Wars. I also adopt the
imaginative belief that there is a supernatural Force that guides all things. When I watch 12 Years
a Slave and come to learn that Treach has betrayed Northrup, I do not acquire a new belief that
“Treach has betrayed Northrup.” Instead, I acquire a “belief-like imagining” about Treach’s
betrayal. I may also imaginatively desire that Northrup’s letter plot succeeds. My imaginings run
offline in each case. They are simulations of the real mental processes that take place when I
acquire beliefs and desires about the real world (ibid, 256).
Currie’s ST plays a more prominent role in our secondary imaginings about fictions.
Secondary imagining is a form of simulation that occurs when we engage in an empathetic
reenactment of a character’s situation (ibid, 256). First, I put myself into a fictional character’s
position: I imagine what it would be like to be Solomon Northrup during the funeral scene, singing
amongst the other slaves. I imagine that I, too, have been wrongfully enslaved and taken away
from my family for years, beaten, over-worked, and finally betrayed by someone I trusted. Then I
reflect on what I currently feel as the result of this imagining: betrayed, downtrodden, and hopeless.
Once I identify my thoughts, desires and feelings, I then imagine that that is how Northrup feels
as well. In this sense, secondary imagining helps us to identify and empathize with fictional
characters. I then remove myself from the simulation, so to speak, and attribute these same feelings
to Northrup.

3.2. Complications with ST
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ST provides us with a comprehensive psychological foundation for our engagements with fictions
if Currie (and others) are right. However, ST also faces several problems as a theory of our social
cognition of fictional characters—besides the fact that it appeals to imaginary mental states, which
I criticized in the previous chapters. In this section, I will discuss two problems facing ST in
general, and two facing ST as a psychological foundation of fiction.
First, perhaps secondary imagining—or e-imagining—can help us to discover how a
character like Northrup thinks and feels. But in order to achieve this understanding we must first
be able to recognize and identify our own mental states. As we have seen, high level perspective
taking seems to require that we consciously recognize and identify our own mental states through
their qualitative feel. This means that we should be aware of our simulation as we do it. Two
questions arise here: a) is simulating a part of our conscious experiences with fictions? and b) is it
a part of our experience of mindreading others more generally?
I suggested in chapter 1 that we do not consciously engage in a game of make-believe while
we watch a film or real a novel. The same goes for simulation; I doubt that most audiences
consciously enter into a simulation or go through the simulative process in order to understand
how a character feels or what she believe. Of course, the simulation theorist could reply that
simulation occurs unconsciously. Note that Currie and Walton both take imaginative simulation to
be the foundation of our emotional engagements with fictional characters in general. Certainly the
simulation should be conscious some, or even most of the time. Moreover, how can we square
unconscious simulation with the idea that we understand the mental states of others based on our
own state’s conscious, qualitative character?
Goldman argues that there are some mental states that are necessarily conscious, and it is
in virtue of their qualitative character that we can introspect these states (see 2006, §9.6). We can
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challenge both of these claims. First, there is significant philosophical and empirical support for
the idea that mental states—including qualitative ones, like perceptions and emotions—can occur
without conscious awareness (LeDoux 1996, Rosenthal 2005 & 2008, Prinz 2004a, etc.). Goldman
argues that our social cognitive capacities generally take place without conscious awareness. But
it is hard to see how this is possible for his theory of e-imagining, since e-imagining requires
deliberate perspective-taking that we use to recognize our own mental states. The states that we
introspect must be available, in some way, to consciousness. How can we square this last point
with Goldman’s assumption that e-imagining can occur unconsciously? It seems that Goldman
must either give up the idea that the possession and recognition of our e-imagined states necessarily
have a qualitative feel, or that e-imagining can occur unconsciously.
Second, people tend to be quite poor at introspecting their mental states, even for seemingly
intense states like emotions (see Carruthers 2010, Mandelbaum 2013, Rosenthal 2008, &
Schwitgebel 2007, among others). We often do not know what we currently feel or what our
occurrent beliefs are. Goldman seems to be perfectly willing to accept that our introspection is
fallible. We may not correctly recognize our own mental state or we may misrepresent the target’s.
The challenge is to show that our introspective capacities are reliable enough to account for the
ease and regularity with which we navigate our social landscape. Some philosophers, though, are
skeptical that they are (Carruthers 2010; Schwitzgebel 2007).
So there are problems involved with our capacity to simulate others. Gordon’s radical
simulation might serve us better; recall that his theory does not require conscious introspection in
order for us to understand a target’s mental states. This is true; I have not provided knock-down
arguments against ST here. Rather, I have considered one aspect of ST that contradicts our actual
social experiences: we do not always consciously consider other’s mental states by introspecting
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our own. My other, more general critique of ST concerns its appeal to imaginative mental states:
ST faces the same functional and inferential challenges that “offline” theories of make-believe,
imagination, and pretense face.
I also think that there are several problems facing ST as a general psychological basis for
our engagements with fictions. Even assuming that ST doesn’t face problems concerning
conscious experience, it still may be questionable that simulation is required for understanding
fictional characters. Recall the connection between simulation and empathy: both require that we
put ourselves in another’s position, taking on their beliefs, desires, and emotions as closely as
possible. Empathy also involves a kind of emotional state, in which we “feel with” another on the
basis of imaginatively taking on their perspective. I will have similar emotions to the target if I am
successful at imagining her mental perspective—and my emotional state will be caused by hers
(Gaut 1999, Hoffman 2008). For instance, I may imagine what it is like to lose a close relative
after my best friend’s mother passes away. I imagine that I have lost my mother and feel sorrow
as a result. My sorrow was caused by witnesses my friends and by empathizing (simulating) her
perspective.
Indeed, when people describe our capacity to empathize with fictional characters, they
often mean that we undergo some kind of simulative process. Does empathy adequately capture
the ways in which we understand fictional characters? If so, then ST might still be a good theory
for fictions, if not for social cognition in general.
Noël Carroll argues that empathy is generally both unnecessary and insufficient for
explaining our emotional engagements with fictional characters (Carroll 2008). First, our
emotional state is generally not type-identical to a character’s, even if our emotions are about the
same thing (they take the same object). Consider my example from 12 Years a Slave. I had very
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strong emotional responses to the funeral scene. But were my feelings type-identical to
Northrup’s? Maybe some of them were—both Northrup and I felt sorrow and despair concerning
his unfortunate situation. But I mostly felt compassion towards a character that I greatly admire,
whereas he felts betrayal, confusion, and hopelessness. I do not feel any of those things; I am not
the one betrayed, even if I do feel anger towards Treach. I do not feel hopeless or confused about
Northrup’s position. Carroll calls this an “asymmetry of affect” (ibid, 168); there is a significant
difference between the character and audience’s perspective, situation, and knowledge. This means
that our emotional responses will often be radically different.
Furthermore, even if our emotions are type-identical, that does not mean that the
character’s emotion causes the audiences.’ While watching Star Trek, both Kirk and I fear the
Romulan ship. Our emotions are type identical and have the same object: we feel fear about the
approaching Romulans. But that is not to say that Kirk’s fear caused mine. My fear was caused by
the prospect of a Romulan attack.
Carroll introduces the notion of criterial prefocusing in place of ST. Popular film fictions
are created to be understood by wide audiences. In order to get such diverse groups of people to
understand and respond to fictions, filmmakers prefocus the narrative—they provide us with
certain information about the characters, show them in a certain light (literally and figuratively),
and deploy features of the medium to guide our thoughts and responses. In fact, virtually every
controllable factor of a fiction can be utilized to guide an audience’s emotional responses. If we
accept the notion of prefocusing, then, Carroll suggests, we generally do not need to introduce the
notion of simulation. Our emotional responses and allegiances will already be present without it.
According to Carroll, what we have are “vectorially converging emotive states” with a character
(ibid, 171). Our emotions are often similarly valenced to the characters, but not type-identical to
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them. That is, they will both be qualitatively positive or negative. Both Kirk and I experience
negative emotions, as do Northrup and I, but not always the exact same type of negative emotions.
I contend that the same basic arguments apply to other mental states besides emotions. We
do not generally need to simulate a fictional characters to understand their beliefs, desires, or
intentions. Narratives are constructed in such a way that much of the guess work is already done
for us. Characters explicitly tell us how they feel or how they intend to act. We are given plenty of
information about a character’s personality and context so that their beliefs about a situation are
often the same as ours—except in cases of dramatic irony, for instance, or when information about
a character or situation is deliberately withheld from the audience for some kind of narrative effect.
We may simulate characters in some cases, but it is generally not necessary to do so.
Carroll rejects ST as the primary type of emotional attachment that we form with fictional
characters (2008 & 2011). I think that this rejection is warranted, at least in terms of how we take
on the perspective of fictional characters. What about the low level feeling with, such as mirroring,
mimicry, etc.? Can ST explain them?
In fact, Shaun Nichols (Nichols et al 1996 & Nichols 2004a) denies that simulation is
involved in either low or high forms of mindreading. Empathy need not be based on simulative
processes, so Goldman and other simulation theorists’ equation of the two concepts is misleading.
Nichols argues that some empathy is caused by information that the subject already possesses
about a particular target. He calls this “information-based empathy.” Consider direct association.
This holds that we feel with a target when we perceive or hear of her emotion. This triggers an
association with a stored representation of one of our own past experiences. Recalling this
experience triggers a similar type of emotional response in us. On this view our own empathetic
response is at best only indirectly caused by the target and may not require any kind of simulation.
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Furthermore, Nichols (2004a) is skeptical that mirroring is a kind of simulation (see also
Carroll 2008). Mirroring and mimicry are best understood as basic, roughly automatic responses
to certain triggers in one’s environment, not as a simulation of that person’s emotional state.
Nichols argues that the latter interpretation assumes a significant amount of folk psychological
knowledge that must be internalized before simulation occurs. But, again, Nichols cites significant
evidence that mirroring and mimicry occur at very young ages, including in newborns (ibid, 64;
Decety & Meltzhoff 2011).
Simulation theorists could respond that humans and some other mammals are
neurologically hardwired to simulate in this way, and so folk psychological learning is not required
for very basic kinds of emotional mindreading. Still, I agree with Nichols that it seems implausible
that simulation is at play in mirroring, mimicry, and direct association. We could construe
simulation as the representation of another’s mental state that then automatically triggers a similar
mental state in us. But why think that this is simulation as opposed to a brute, associative
neurological process? It seems that in order to construe low level mindreading as simulation we
must water down the concept to make it significantly less interesting and informative.
I think that we have enough reason to reject ST as the primary explanation of how we
attribute mental states to fictional entities. I will now turn to two other prominent theories of social
cognition to see how they fare: direct perception theory (DPT) and theory-theory (TT).

4. DPT: Social cognition without mindreading

I will begin by briefly explaining DPT. This theory seems to capture the immediacy of our social
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cognitive capacities about fictional characters as well as the theoretical basis of mirroring,
mimicry, and association. However, as we will see, this view also faces several problems as a
general account of social cognition.
Perhaps we have gone about trying to understand our capacity to understand fictional
characters in the wrong way. So far, we have been exploring theories of mindreading: how we
think about and attribute mental states to others. But what if we can just see a target’s mental
states?
This is the claim put forth by direct perception theorists. Shaun Gallagher (Gallagher &
Varga 2013, Gallagher forthcoming), a leading proponent of DPT, notes that the current trend in
the social cognition literature frames the debate as a problem of accessing another’s mind. He calls
this the “principle of imperceptibility”: other people’s mental states are hidden away from outside
observers and so are perceptually inaccessible. Attributing mental states and predicting their
behavior thus requires the capacity to mindread. The perception of facial expressions and bodily
movements may serve as a starting point for mindreading; it is the basic information that gets taken
up in inferential or simulation processes. According to ST (and TT, see below), we can only
perceive “mere bodily activity, patterns of mechanical movements that warrant the inference or
suggest the correct simulation to the other’s intentional states” (Gallagher & Varga 2013, 186).
Direct perception theorists deny this, arguing instead that perception may go beyond the
recognition of mere bodily movement to the meaning or intention behind those expressions and
movements. Gallagher & Varga state: “On this account, in our everyday interactions with others,
we are able to directly perceive their intentions and emotions; perception can grasp more than just
surface behavior—or to put it precisely, it can grasp meaning—the intentional in intentional
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behavior and the emotion in emotional expression” (ibid 186, 187).13
Theory-theorists like Carruthers and simulation theorists like Goldman deny that we can
directly perceive another’s emotions and goals (see Carruthers 2013 & Lavelle 2012). Our own
phenomenological experience may be that of direct perception—that is, it feels like we can directly
perceive the mental states of other people without mindreading capacities. In actuality, though, a
great deal of unconscious, rapid simulation or theorizing is required before we can attribute mental
states to others.
It may be quite difficult to determine which of these views is correct, at least if we use our
own conscious experiences as data points. It does seem quite easy for us to glean the emotional
state of another person through directly perceiving them, as in Eckman’s famous pictures of the
six basic emotions (Eckman 1999; see also Plantinga 1999). A curl of the lip, broad smile, or
furrowed brow can all indicate a particular emotional state. DPT states that the perception of these
expressions is the perception of the mental state itself. This requires that emotions are at least in
part constituted by bodily reactions, including (but not limited to) facial expressions. Contrast this
position with the weaker claim that we directly perceive the expression of another’s emotion, and
then unconsciously infer that she is in a particular emotional state. However, if emotions are
defined in part by their perceptible bodily reactions, then it makes sense that we can directly
perceive another’s emotional state. If not, then some kind of inference may be required in order
for us to move from a perception of a facial expression to seeing a person’s state.
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Gallagher and Varga are further committed to the embodied cognition, the view that cognitive
processes extend beyond the central nervous system to movements and responses from the whole
body, and maybe even beyond the physical body to involve one’s physical and social environment
(see also Noë & O’Regan 2001, Noë 2004; see Block 2005 and de Vignemont 2011 for critique of
the embodied thesis). The authors note that one can buy into their DPT without this further
commitment.
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A further worry, as Gallagher and Varga admit, is that sometimes perception leaves both
the type and content of mental states underdetermined. But, they contend, that does not mean that
we must appeal to inferential or simulative processes to explain them. Social context and
knowledge of a target will also add specification. Unfortunately, the authors do not discuss just
how social context plays this role in mental state attribution. The challenge would be do show that
background information and social context play role in mental state attribution without also
requiring mindreading.
There are two further challenges that face DPT, both as a theory of real-life and fictional
social cognition. First, what, exactly, does it mean to directly perceive a mental state? Second, can
we really eliminate mindreading altogether?
To begin, directly perceiving a mental state seems mysterious. Suppose that we directly
perceive a facial expression, such as a smile. On some views of perceptual content (as we saw in
chapters 2 and 3), even recognizing a smile requires the inference or judgment that the object we
see is of a particular kind. Other theories of perception, such as Susanna Siegel’s, hold that we can
perceive emotion-kind properties. This means that I can literally perceive happiness in a smile.
Perceiving emotion-kind properties may work for some straightforward cases. But what
about opaque situations, or even relatively straightforward cases of social cognition that do not
necessarily feature obvious emotional expressions? These situations may require even further
inference-drawing and judgments about how another person feels. Indeed, the theory-theorist
would counter that “direct perception” actually involves another kind of inference-drawing, this
time from a heuristic to a behavior prediction.
Furthermore, Siegel’s theory of high level perceptual content is controversial; perception
does require inference drawing of some kind on many views. If that’s so, then direct perception of
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emotional states is not so mysterious: it’s just inference drawing from stored information about
emotional expressions to a particular perceptual case. However, on this view, the perception isn’t
so direct.
This leads to the second worry: we cannot eliminate mindreading altogether. Gallagher
and Varga admit that there will often be situations that do not fit a particular frame and we cannot
place a person into a particular role. DPT extends only to emotional expressions and bodily
movements that correspond to emotional states and action goals. It does not tell us about mental
attitudes such as beliefs, judgments, and desires. These cannot reliably be directly perceived. If
that’s true, then we may need some kind of high level mindreading capacity to help up in opaque
or novel situations. We sometimes need to take the perspective of others in order to understand
their mental states. It seems unlikely that we can learn all about Northrup’s feelings and beliefs,
for example, just by perceiving his face.
At best, DPT can explain some cases of social cognition about certain types of mental
states. It cannot help us in opaque social situations, or sometimes even about the content of mental
states in simple ones. Furthermore, the nature of the “direct perception” is mysterious and, quite
possibly, inferential. However, DPT does seem to capture the sense of immediacy and automaticity
of both our feeling with fictional characters and understanding their emotional states.

5. Theory-theory

The concerns I raised in the previous section about DPT may suggest that we shouldn’t eliminate
mindreading altogether if we want to know how to understand another’s mental states. In this
section, I will examine theory-theory (TT). TT is often seen as the main competitor to ST.
138

However, aestheticians rarely appeal to TT as a psychological basis of our engagements with
fiction. As stated previously, I suspect that this is because TT does not appeal to our power of
imagination, while ST does.
Theory theorists argue that our mindreading capacities—our ability to attribute mental
states to others and predict their behavior—stem from our deployment of a folk psychological
theory of mind. Some argue that this theory is learned and developed early in life; others argue
that it is innate, stored in specific modules dedicated to mindreading. In either case, our theory of
mind includes a variety of general social platitudes concerning our folk psychological concepts.
These include states like beliefs, desires, intentions, emotions, and perceptions and the typical
consequences and basic inferences that arise from their combination. We draw upon this
theoretical knowledge and make inferences from particular tenets to a conclusion about what an
individual thinks, feels, or intends to do.14
TT was born out of work by philosophers such as Wilfred Sellars (1956) and David Lewis
(1972), both of whom denied that knowledge of our own mind is the result of direct introspection.
Rather, it is a matter of understanding folk psychological knowledge concerning the functional
roles of particular states. Sellars intended for this view to combat a Cartesian “Myth of the Given”
by which we have direct, infallible access to our own mental states, including both qualitative
states and mental attitudes. Similarly, David Lewis argued that folk theory of mind is implicit in
our everyday talk about mental states. We regularly discuss and consider platitudes regarding the
functional and inferential roles of our mental states. This requires that we have a basic
understanding of what kinds of actions and further mental attitudes may result from a particular
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See Carruthers 1996 (ed) for a comprehensive overview of different theories of mind and
Carruthers 2000 for a discussion of the modularity thesis. See also the Internet Encyclopedia of
Philosophy “Theory of Mind” article for a less biased approach.
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belief, desire, intention, or pairing of mental attitudes (e.g. belief + desire). We encountered this
basic functionalist idea in chapter 1. We have a basic understanding of the sorts of behaviors that
will result from our occurrent beliefs and desires.
Contemporary theory theorists include Alison Gopnik (1993), Jerry Fodor (1983), Peter
Carruthers (1996a), Alan Leslie (1996 & 2000), and Simon Baron-Cohen (1995). Each of these
theorists argues that our social cognitive abilities arise from a capacity for utilizing folk
psychological knowledge and drawing inferences about our social environment based on that
knowledge.
The two dominant versions of TT are the “child-scientist” theory held by Gopnik and the modular
theory favored by Carruthers, Baron-Cohen, and Fodor. The difference between these two versions
of TT concerns how we acquire our folk psychological theory of mind. Gopnik argues that this
knowledge is internally represented by normally functioning persons and has much the same
structure as a scientific theory, including theories, postulates, and observations. Our theory of mind
is used in much the same was as scientific theories are, as bases for our own observations and
methods to help guide our inferences. The theory starts out early in life as quite limited but
develops and becomes more sophisticated at regular periods throughout a child’s cognitive
development—as seen, for instance, in the child’s ability to pass theory of mind and false-belief
tasks around age four, but not previous to that age (Gopnik 1993; Gopnik & Schulz 2004; see
Wimmer & Perner 1983 and Harris 2000 for overviews of the task).
Carruthers and other modularity theorists find the child-scientist view untenable. He points
out that it is remarkable that almost every child develops roughly the exact same theory of mind
at the exact same stages of development. The child-scientist theory lacks the precision to explain
these regularities in development—on that view, why wouldn’t individual children develop quite
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different theories based on their unique environment and personal idiosyncrasies? The best way to
explain developmental regularities is by positing an innate theory of mind module, a psychological
mechanism that represents certain specific information and may be separate, or encapsulated, from
other modules, so that each module specifically pertains to a particular task (Fodor 1983). The
theory of mind module gradually becomes more functionally activated throughout development,
similar to a Chompskian notion of a language module that allows us to acquire a first language at
regular intervals throughout our development.
Like ST, TT also developed from research on the childhood development of social
cognition, and particularly from research on children with ASD. The cognitive, imaginative, and
social deficiencies that plague children with ASD may be the result of a deficient theory of mind,
whether learned or innate (see Gopnik & Schulz 2004 for the former position, Baron-Cohen 1995
& Carruthers 1996b for the latter; see Currie 1996 and Goldman 2006 for a denial of theory of
mind in ASD). These children often have great difficulty in navigating their social environment
because they lack the typical folk psychological knowledge that is required for maneuvering their
social environment. Contemporary theory theorists include Alison Gopnik (1993), Jerry Fodor
(1983), Peter Carruthers (1996a), Alan Leslie (1996 & 2000), and Simon Baron-Cohen (1995),
each of whom holds that our social cognitive abilities arise from a capacity for utilizing folk
psychological knowledge and drawing inferences about our social environment based on that
knowledge.
Maybe we do possess a great deal of folk psychological knowledge. But it certainly doesn’t
seem like it during our actual, first-person experience of our social interactions. Surely we
generally don’t deliberately or consciously draw inferences about another’s mental states and
behavior. Again, mindreading often seems to take place automatically, without deliberation,
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inference, or any kind of conscious theorizing. Carruthers believe that a modular TT can
accommodate this first person experience. From an early age, we internalize a great deal of
knowledge about the mental lives of others, supplementing this knowledge to our innate theory.
We practice implementing this theory on a regular basis, eventually becoming so good at mental
state attribution that it seems automatic and can occur very quickly. Furthermore, much of the
mental processing that occurs during this process takes place a subpersonally and unconsciously.
We may only be consciously aware of the end result. Consider, for example, how I come to be
consciously aware of a tree outside my window. I have no knowledge of, or access to, the variety
of processes and mechanisms involved in my perception. I am only consciously aware of the
product of all that processing. The same may be true of our social cognitive capacities; the
knowledge of our own and other minds may feel automatic, but it is always the result of some kind
of theoretical inference (Carruthers 1996a, 27).
So TT is able to sidestep the worry concerning consciousness that plagues ST. However,
TT is not typically used as a tool to explain our engagements with fictions. This is surprising,
considering the vast literature on fiction and simulation.
Mental theorizing about fictional entities would arguably be roughly the same as how we
theorize about real people. There may be some differences in terms of the intentional content of
our theorizing between real-life and fictions. We never have the experience of traveling through
space and fighting Sith Lords, for example. There may also be some limitations in terms of what
we have the folk knowledge to theorize about; e.g., some situation that is wholly unfamiliar to us
in the real-world. But this is no different than if we encountered an unusual or unfamiliar person
or circumstance in our daily lives. Finally, mental theorizing about fictional entities may require a
reader or viewer to understand the conventions of a particular fictional media. I will return to these
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points momentarily.
So far, TT sounds quite compatible with taking the fictional stance. This makes it worth
exploring as a psychological foundation for the SAV. The key to understanding how we mindread
fictional characters requires us to understand how we do so in real-life cases.
Let’s begin with an example. Suppose that you are having dinner with some friends.
Everyone at the table is laughing merrily, eating and drinking with gusto. Everyone, that is, except
for your best friend. She sits at one end of the table, barely eating and not joining in with the others’
frivolity. You want to understand how your friend currently feels (remember that this can take
place consciously and deliberately, but generally will not). Your perception of your friend—her
slouched shoulders, crossed arms, tense facial expression, quietness, untouched plate of food and
glass of wine, etc.—all serve as data points that you use in your inferences to draw a conclusion
about her feelings and beliefs. Perhaps your folk psychological knowledge tells you that, generally
speaking, that kind of facial expression and those kinds of behaviors often correspond to an
anxious emotional/mood state. Deploying your theoretical knowledge about emotions, you may
put together all that you perceive about your friend, as well as some information about social
context and your friend in general, and conclude that she is anxious about something.
We can apply this basic TT framework to our engagements with fictions. We do not project
or imagine ourselves in Northrup’s situation in order to understand what he is feeling. All we need
to do—after taking the fictional stance—is call upon our folk psychological knowledge of
emotional expressions. This squares with my discussion of Northrup in §2.1. On this view, I watch
Northrup’s face at the funeral and draw inferences from my knowledge of facial expressions and
Northrup’s relevant beliefs and desires to conclude that he feels bewildered, angry, sorrowful. I do
not need to imagine myself as Northrup, a slave in the Deep South who was recently betrayed by
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a man named Treach, in order to gain access to what he is thinking and how he feels. This also
implies that if I feel anything towards Northrup, it will not necessarily be the same emotion-type
as he feels, but rather whatever emotion that one would experience upon learning about Solomon’s
situation, which may be similar to Solomon’s but not type-identical.
There’s another positive feature of applying TT to our social cognition of fictional entities:
TT can explain how our knowledge that an object is fictional affects our responses to it.
Understanding fictional entities requires that we have some knowledge of fictional and mediumspecific conventions. Recall that when we take the fictional stance that we do not forget that the
object of our engagement is non-actual. For example, we know that Northrup is a fictional
character and does not exist in our world (even if he is based on an actual person). This knowledge
carries with it certain information. We know that individual time-slices of Northrup are supposed
to correspond to one unifying fictional person. We know, if we are watching a film, that we cannot
reach out and touch Northrup. We also know that Northrup’s story will probably follow certain
conventions. We know things about his past, although not as much as we would if we were to be
as emotionally close to an actual human embodiment of Northrup. Basically, knowledge of fictions
may be developed and employed as a special kind of theoretical knowledge, knowledge that is
fairly easily acquired for almost every human. If we consider our engagements with fictional
characters a kind of social cognition, then it may be that our knowledge of fictional characters to
be a highly specialized kind of mental theorizing.
According to TT, mirroring, mimicry, and direct association may not be a matter of
simulating another’s mental state, which implies that we ourselves must copy the observed state
of another. Instead, we take our perception of another’s facial expression or movements as data
points to be explained. A theory-theorist would argue that, once we deploy our theoretical
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knowledge about facial expressions, movements, and intentions, our own motor and emotional
systems are triggered, leading to the kind of effects that mirroring/mimicry researchers have
reported. Direct association implies that we would draw comparisons between our own
experiences of a particular type of emotional situation and what we felt in that instance, and then
infer that the other person must feel the same way. Or, as Carruthers (1996a & 2010) points out,
even if these low level mindreading does involve simulation, theoretical knowledge and inferencedrawing may still be required for us to get from the perception of another, to a representation of
her emotion, to our own simulation of that emotion, and back to mental state attribution. Granted,
these inferences and knowledge will be subpersonal and unconscious—they will not feel at all like
deliberate inference-drawing. The important point is that, prima facie anyway, folk theory and
inference-drawing can explain low level feeling with without appealing to simulation.
High level feeling with may pose more of a problem if it is necessarily imaginative. Recall
that simulation theorists argue that perspective taking involves imagining ourselves to be in the
situation of another person. For a short time, I imagine myself to be my friend, with all of her
relevant properties. I then conclude that she feels a certain way based on what I imaginatively feel.
In contrast, Carruthers and other theory-theorists argue that perspective taking draws upon a great
deal of knowledge about minds and mental processes. The ability to recognize the mental states of
another based merely on facial expressions and body language seems to require us to have a great
deal of knowledge about bodily expressions and behaviors. We also need to draw inferences from
what we know about emotions and our simulated imagining to a conclusion about the mental state
of another.
Perhaps both high and low level feeling with are primarily associative processes, and
inferring another’s mental states on the basis of those. Inferring the emotional state of another may
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be an after effect of recalling situations that are meaningful to us. Do basic mindreading capacities,
like mimicry and mirroring, require inference drawing? The theory-theorist argues that they do
(Carruthers 2013; Lavelle 2012). On their view, even these basic perceptual and affective
processes are inferential—for example, we must draw an inference from the perception of a face
and our stored representations of those kinds of faces in order to conclude that the current
perception is of a certain kind.
One potential issue with this explanation is that TT is supposed to appeal to folk
psychological knowledge—i.e. Lewis’s mental platitudes. Like other critics of TT, I find it
implausible that our basic knowledge of mental processing includes information concerning
perceptual and affective processing (see, for example, Currie 1996 & Heal 1996). If that’s true,
then TT faces a serious challenge regarding low level mindreading.
There’s a further worry about TT in general that is worth noting. The examples of mental
theorizing that I have used up to this point have been fairly general. In general, we can learn of a
target’s mental state type by theorizing from our (innate or learned) folk psychological knowledge
about behaviors expressions, body language, social context, etc. We then draw a pretty good
inference concerning the generic mental state the observed person is in. So TT may give us a fair
idea about general mental state types. But can theorizing from general knowledge and platitudes
tell us the content of a particular state? Some critics are skeptical that it can. Jane Heal (1996; see
also Perner 1996) makes this point. She notes that TT faces a problem similar to the ‘frame
problem’ in computer science. Very briefly, this implies that we have a limited capacity to store
and deploy folk psychological knowledge, but our social interactions require a vast amount of
stored information about the mental lives of others and ourselves that we deploy on a regular basis.
Our innate or acquired theory would have to be incredibly complex to deal with any particular
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situation in which we find ourselves.
Part of the problem is that the folk psychological theory has to be general enough to apply
to a great deal of situations. But then we face another problem—the theory is not specific enough
to be able to help us understand the content of another’s mental state at a particular moment. If we
really want to understand Northrup’s mental states, for example, we not only need to be able to
explain what type of emotion he feels (for example), and why he feels that way. Perhaps a folk
psychological theory could explain the content of a mental state, but then the theory would be far
too complex to be realistically mentally stored. According to theorists like Heal, Perner, and
Nichols (Nichols et al 1996), the frame problem suggests that TT must either be discarded or
supplemented by another, simpler mechanism, such as a simulative one.

6. A Modified TT

I am sympathetic to the critiques raised concerning both TT and DPT. However, I also think that
TT is the best kind of theory for explaining how we understand the mental lives of fictional
characters. Moreover, DPT captures the prima facie immediacy of our ability to perceive the
mental states of others.
In this section, I will spell out my own account of mindreading fictional entities: a modified
version of TT that, I hope, makes up for its downfalls. I achieve this by supplementing the standard
TT model with a theory of social referencing, another way in which we attribute mental states to
others that does not require high level mindreading. However, it still requires inference drawing,
as we will see.
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6.1. Social referencing
José Bermudez’ “social referencing” model contends, like Gallagher’s DPT, that social cognition
often does not require mindreading per se; rather, it is often enough that we understand certain
social scripts, roles, and schemas and make use of basic cognitive heuristics to understand a
target’s mental states and to predict her behavior (Bermudez 2005).
The idea that cognitive processes involve heuristics has become pervasive in cognitive
science. A traditional view of human cognition is that we are “rational actors”; we choose what
options to pursue by assigning and assessing the probability and results of each possible outcome,
determining the utility of each to the best of our ability, and then combining these assessments.
The option we choose—either for our own actions, judgments, and beliefs, or for understanding
another’s—is the one that maximizes probability and utility (Gilovitch and Griffin 2002). But there
is a decent amount of recent evidence that humans do not always think like this (see Nisbett &
Wilson 1977, also Damasio 1994 & Sloman 2002). We take shortcuts that minimize the amount
of cognitive strain and energy required to reach a decision, judgment, or solution to a problem. We
have “bounded rationality”; there are processing limitations to the human mind (Simon 1955).
People may reason and choose rationally within the constraints imposed by their limited search
and computational capacities. We are also “cognitive misers.” We utilize as little cognitive power
as possible that is needed to efficiently reach some conclusion or result in some action (Eiske and
Taylor 1991). We are not cognitively lazy. Rather, we have developed problem solving shortcuts
that generally allow us to quickly and effectively maneuver our social environments, freeing us to
pursue other activities.
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One method of achieving this comes from the implementation of cognitive heuristics. Very
basically, a cognitive heuristic is a problem solving capacity that allows us to make a judgment or
reach some conclusion by utilizing simple devices in lieu of more costly reasoning processes. For
example, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and his colleagues define heuristics as unconscious attribute
substitutions: we determine that X has a target attribute by unconsciously using information about
another, different attribute that is easier to detect (Sinnott-Armstrong et al 2010). For example, by
using the availability and representativeness heuristics, one forms a belief about a relatively
difficult attribute of a situation or object based on a more accessible one. In one study, participants
were asked many seven-letter words whose sixth letter is ‘n’ (_____n_) occur in the first 10 pages
of Tolstoy’s War and Peace. They were also asked how many seven-letter words ending in “ing”
(____ing) occur in the first ten pages of War and Peace. Interestingly, the average answer to the
first question was significantly lower than the answer for the second. But, as Sinnott-Armstrong
and his colleagues note, the correct answer to the first question cannot possibly be lower than the
answer to the second since every seven-letter word ending in “ing” is also a seven-letter word with
‘n’ as the sixth letter! Participants tend to make this mistake by using the availability heuristic—
their guesses are based on how easy it is for them to come up with examples, and some examples
are more readily available to us. It is significantly easier to come up with examples of the sevenletter “ing” words; less so for seven letter words with ‘n’ in the sixth spot (ibid, 249).
The recognition heuristic is similar to the mere exposure effect, according to which we
choose and tend to prefer things that we know over those with which we are unfamiliar (Zajonc
1968). An important heuristic for our purposes is the affect heuristic. Thinking about an action or
person, whatever it is, may make us feel positively or negatively. We take these feelings in turn to
constitute judgments that the action or person is morally wrong (Sinnott-Armstrong et al 2010;
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Slovic et al 2002). Our moral beliefs are based on these emotional responses instead of deliberate
reasoning processes. I will return to a discussion of the affect heuristic in chapter 6 when we
discuss our moral judgments of fictional entities.
Each of these heuristics may provide us with quick, efficient means of judging a situation,
whether we are in a social context (as with the affect heuristic) or trying to solve some problem
(as in the availability and representativeness heuristics). There is a sense in which simple heuristics
“make us smart”; they allow us to come up with judgments that we wouldn’t normally be capable
of making, or at least not as quickly or easily (Gigerenzer et al 2002). On the other hand, cognitive
heuristics are fallible and, because they are not always under our deliberate control, they can be
unduly influenced by biases or implemented without sufficient information (see Kahneman &
Tversky 2002). Still, many researchers agree that cognitive heuristics are accurate enough in
typical environments; problems arise in difficult or atypical ones.
Returning to social cognition, authors like Bermudez hold that we can utilize cognitive
heuristics to help us understand our social environments. We do not always need to go through
cognitively expensive high level mindreading processes to understand the mental states and actions
of others; rather, we can make use of simple generalizations and rules that will key us into what
another is most likely thinking. Bermudez highlights two ways in which we can utilize heuristics
for social cognition. We have already encountered the first in terms of Gallagher and Varga’s DPT:
emotional perception. Our perception of the emotional state of another person depends on cues
outside of conscious awareness. We recognize these cues, such as facial expression and body
language, without consciously or deliberately identifying them. This perception acts as a kind of
heuristic by which we attribute a more complex mental state to another based on something that is
relatively easy for us to recognize (Bermudez 2005, 199).
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Second, we can base more complex social interactions on simple social rules, scripts, and
frames. Bermudez asks the reader to imagine that you are sitting in a restaurant, about to order
lunch. A server walks towards you. We can ask ourselves what the server is thinking at this
moment and why he acts as he does (walking to the table). Do we need to go through a mindreading
process to answer these questions? Bermudez suggests that we don’t. Instead, we can put into
practice information that we already possess concerning our current social situation and social
roles we fill. In this case, you are in the ‘diner’ role. There are standard norms of behavior for how
to act in this role: you sit down, you are quiet, you do not shout across the restaurant to grab the
server’s attention, etc. There are also typical mental attitudes: intentions, desires, beliefs, etc. The
server also fills a role: his job is to seat you, bring you what you need when asked, take your order,
etc. Together, this information makes up our restaurant ‘frame’—a general template for a particular
social situation—and your server follows a general behavioral ‘script.’ To answer our questions
about what he will do and what he is thinking we do not need to engage in mindreading. We just
need to recognize and apply the right frame to the situation and roles for the person. In this instance,
we would probably be correct in determining that the server is walking towards me because he
wishes to take my order.
How would social referencing help us to understand the mental states of fictional
characters? Carroll’s own view appeals to something like Bermudez’s social referencing. Carroll’s
view of how we understand the mental states of fictional film characters, the cognitive heuristic
model, blends DPT and social referencing (Carroll 2008). Carroll discusses the heuristic model in
light of complications with both ST and the TT. Instead of simulating the mental states of another
person in order to understand their mental states (as in ST) or employing a mini scientific theory
to do so (TT), Carroll suggests that we glean the mental states of others on the basis of schemas,
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encoded scripts, prototypes, contextual cues, exemplars, and other heuristics (ibid, 174-175). He
notes that:

When we hear that a relative has secured a long-sought-after job, all things being
equal, we suppose that she is happy and we rejoice for her. There is no need for
simulation. We have access to a body of prototypes regarding emotional responses
in certain contexts as well as recognitional cues, such as facial expressions and
postures, which enable us to assess the emotional states of others. These are not
theories and they are not applied by subsuming particular situations under
nomological generalizations as the theory-theory might have it. Rather, they are
prototypes—schemas, scripts, and recognitional cues—employed by analogy
(analogy rather than subsumption) (ibid, 175).

Like Bermudez, Carroll suggests that frames, heuristics, scripts, roles, etc. are enough for us to
understand the mental states and predict the behaviors of others. This is especially true in situations
like the restaurant, according to which there are clear normative guidelines for how one should
behave. Other examples come to mind: our behaviors and feelings at sporting events, in museums,
on the subway, in a doctor’s office, at the family dinner table, etc. Perhaps Carroll is right in saying
that fictions present us with even greater range of scripts and frames. We can generally guess,
based on prefocusing techniques as well as the narrative, how a character will act, how she feels,
and what she is thinking even without engaging in mindreading. Much of the information has been
provided to us by the filmmakers.
However, social referencing also faces similar challenges to DPT. First, it’s not entirely
clear that the use of scripts, frames, etc. is non-inferential. Second, the scripts and frames we do
possess may not help us in ambiguous, opaque, novel, or complex social situations. Any social
behavioral that is run “off-script” will not be understood. It seems, then, that we cannot completely
do away with mindreading.
Consider our attempts to understand Northrup. This scene is opaque; we need to engage in
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some kind of mindreading in order to fully understand how Northrup feels. Indeed, our social
frames may not be specific enough to apply in each particular scene that we encounter. We may
not possess the requisite knowledge of which scene to apply in a specific case. For 12 Years a
Slave, we would need to have a fairly general script about the social interactions between slaves
and masters, and slave life in general. Even if we do possess these frames, it is not clear that even
this script would apply in Northrup’s case. We would need to supplement our heuristic abilities
with mindreading in order to fully understand how Northrup feels.

6.2. TT with social referencing
Neither TT nor social referencing can explain the full range of our social cognitive capcities on its
own. I propose combining the two theories to form a modified TT that makes up for the challenges
each face on their own. Recall the explananda for a theory of social cognition of fictional entities.
We often find ourselves in social situations where we consciously desire to know more about what
another thinks, feels, or intends to do. Our social cognitive capacities seem to occur automatically,
without telling them too. It’s as if we are constantly on the lookout for social cues concerning what
other people are thinking and feeling and our social cognitive capacities are deployed without
forethought. Low level mindreading techniques may help explain how this is possible; processes
like mirroring and association take place without deliberation or thought. In other occasions, we
may need to consciously and deliberately engage in high level mindreading, like perspective
taking. This would help us in ambiguous and novel social situations.
I think that we can account for these explananda with a modified TT. On the one hand, we
think of ourselves as fully rational, deliberate thinkers that consciously work through steps of a
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problem, weigh potential outcomes, and draw conclusions. TT has a ready explanation for this.
We make associations between our current social climate, including the mindreading target, and
our folk psychological theories about how people typically act in such situations. We draw a
conclusion about what a target thinks or feels based on our beliefs, contextual information, and
knowledge about the type of situation at hand. This includes a target’s behaviors and bodily
expressions.
On the other hand, it seems quite clear that many thinkers do not typically solve problems
this way, or at least not consciously. Quite a bit of our problem solving occurs unconsciously and
automatically, utilizing quick and efficient cognitive tricks and tools that maximize efficiency and
minimize cognitive expenditure. TT can help us here as well. As I suggested in 5, even low level
mindreading, such as mirroring and mimicry, may require some kind of inference drawing from
tacit theories about social interactions and mental states. Even the ability to recognize facial
expressions and conclude that a target feels happy, sad, or anxious requires inference from stored
information to a particular case. On this view, “direct perception” isn’t that direct. Our ability to
perceive emotional and/or intentional states may actually involve some kind of inferential
judgment, even if it doesn’t consciously feel like it.
The problem was that TT seems overly complex. It requires us to hold a great deal of tacit
information about social interactions. Heal compared this to the frame problem in computer
science; the human mind cannot store as much data as TT seems to require in order for it to be
specific enough to account for complex social situations and to reveal detailed information about
the type and content of a target’s mental states.
But what if TT doesn’t require us to have detailed information about particular social
situations? What if there is a cognitively “cheaper” version of it? This is where social referencing
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enters the picture. At least some of our tacit knowledge about social situations comes in the form
of mental heuristics like scripts, frames, and social cues. When we find ourselves in commonplace
or familiar social situations, we draw upon those scripts and frames in order to understand how the
people around us think and feel. We draw inferences from our tacit scripts and frames to what we
perceive and believe about our current circumstances. We then infer what a target will do, how she
feels, or what she believes on the basis of this knowledge.
Understanding and predicting behaviors will often require us to draw upon perceptual
capacities, background information we have about the particular person, and mindreading. It may
be that in stereotypical situations we can call upon social referencing cues, frames, and scripts to
explain another’s behavior. Low level mindreading and social referencing help us here.
In other cases, particularly opaque or challenging social interactions, our seemingly
immediate mental state attributions will have to be supplemented by more deliberate social
cognitive abilities, like inferential perspective taking. Sometimes social referencing will give us a
good idea of how a target feels. However, we sometimes want to delve deeper into another’s
perspective or we just can’t tell what to think of her. This will require further, more cognitively
sophisticated, mindreading based on our tacit folk theoretical knowledge.
Let’s reexamine the scene from 12 Years a Slave, this time in terms of my modified TT.
Upon perceiving Northrup’s own highly expressive face, I come to recognize that he is in a
negative emotional state, such as deep sorrow. This judgment may arise from low level
mindreading processes like mirroring, inferred from tacit knowledge about what facial expressions
reveal about emotional states. I may also understand that Northrup feels betrayed and believes that
his situation is hopeless. I will acquire this knowledge based on the information I have about this
character and, again, what his behavior and facial expression reveal about his inner states.
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As Northrup’s expression changes, so too does my own interpretation of what he feels. I
may infer (through either low or high level mindreading) other kinds of emotions in his face, such
as anger. At the same time, I also consider what I know about Northrup and what I know about the
history of the American slavery, any other information that might be relevant to my understanding
of what Northrup feels, and why he feels that way. I may be surprised and perplexed by his sudden
look towards the heavens and then need to take on his perspective momentarily to understand why
he did this.
I argue that both low and high level mindreading processes inform our knowledge of
Northrup’s mental states. Both are inferential, some resulting from tacit knowledge of social scripts
and frames, some from more general folk psychological knowledge about human behavior and
mental states. Ultimately, I argue that this view avoids the problems that plague each of the
individual theories that we have previously encountered, and especially ST. We do not need to
posit distinct mental states, like imaginative beliefs and emotions, in order to understand how a
target feels. This is true for both real-life and fictional objects. All we need is our tacit folk
psychological knowledge about mental states and social situations.
This chapter built off the promise of the previous one. By taking the fictional stance, we
both recognize fictional entities as fictional and as the kind of thing that we would normally
attribute mental states to. That is, we see fictional representations of people as people, possessing
beliefs, desires, and emotions. At the end of the day, I do not think that there is much of a difference
between how we attribute mental states to real-life people and fictional characters. The main
difference, of course, is that the content of our mental states towards fictional entities will contain
a fictional operator from taking the fictional stance. That is, I recognize that this is a fictional
character that I can respond to. I will make similar claims concerning our emotions and moral
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judgments about fictional entities; we use roughly the same cognitive capacities and processes
when we feel for and morally judge both fictional entities and real people. Differences in reactions
will be the result of differences in the content of our mental attitudes.
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Chapter 5: Genuine, Rational Fictional Emotions

1. Emotions & fiction

One of the main reasons why we engage with fictions is to experience certain emotions. We enjoy
feeling fear while watching a horror flick. We revel in experiencing the joys of a new love along
with our favorite characters. We are excited to “visit” interesting and foreign locales. This chapter
addresses the nature of these emotions. In chapter 1, I argued that the three main arguments in
favor of the DAV—the arguments from function, inferential role, and neuroscience—are unable
to establish that we utilize a distinctive mental state in our engagements with fictions. Many
contemporary aestheticians argue in favor of the DAV for emotions even if they do not explicitly
do so for other mental states. Perhaps there are unique features of emotions that we have not yet
covered that would justify this move.
We individuate mental states, including emotions, according to various components. This
includes emotional feelings, emotions’ impact on cognition and behavior, and emotions’ semantic
and normative implications. Each of these favors is potential fodder for the DAV. If it can be
shown that the feelings, functional role, etc. of a fictional emotion are different than those involved
in emotions about actual objects, then it could be that we do not have stereotypical emotions about
fictional ones.
The paradox of fiction, one of the puzzles of fiction we encountered in chapter 1, famously
embodies the debates concerning the nature of our emotions about fictional objects. Here I show
how we can dissolve the paradox by questioning the functionalist assumption inherent in the
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typical responses to it. These assumptions also motivate the DAV; without them, the DAV loses
much of its theoretical pull.
My goal is also to understand, as best as possible, how and why we experience the
emotional responses towards fictions that we do. So my discussion of fictional emotions will go
beyond the paradox to a discussion of the nature of emotions. I discuss the paradox of fiction in
§2. In §3, I will present a multi-level appraisal theory of emotions that I believe can best explain
our emotional responses towards fiction. It is also fully compatible with the SAV and the fictional
stance. Finally, in §4 I will discuss the semantic and normative implications of our emotional
responses towards fictional objects. I will attempt to thwart one final potential argument in favor
of the DAV for emotions: our emotional responses towards fictions are not genuine because
genuine emotions have certain semantic and normative implications, and those towards fictions do
not. I will argue that we can have genuine, rational emotional responses towards both real-life and
fictional objects. I will summarize my conclusions from this chapter in §5.

2. Genuine fictional emotions

2.1. The paradox of fiction
The paradox of fiction offers a succinct summary of the claims involved in the DAV/SAV debate
concerning emotions. Cognitive belief-based theories of emotions were in full-sway when the
paradox was first introduced (Radford 1975, Walton 1978, Currie 1990). According to these
views, an emotion about an object X requires that we have some relevant belief Y concerning X’s
relation to our well-being. For example, experiencing fear requires that I believe that there is an
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object in my environment that could harm me or someone I care about. We lack the emotion if the
relevant belief is absent (Solomon 1993).
The wording of the paradox reveals an adherence to a belief-based theory of emotions.
The paradox states:
1. We have genuine emotions about fictions all of the time.
2. We do not believe that fictional characters exist.
3. We can only have genuine emotions about things we believe to exist.
The paradox captures a very natural thought concerning our emotions: if we know that we are
engaged with a fiction, then we should not have the emotionally relevant belief. No emotion should
arise. Nevertheless, we have emotional experiences with fictions all the time, whether these are
genuine emotion-states or not.
One interpretation of the paradox states that there is something fundamentally irrational
about our responses towards fictions. Colin Radford (1975) accepts each of the paradox’s
propositions, notoriously arguing that our emotions towards fiction force the reader into adopting
two contradictory beliefs: we both believe and do not believe that the fictional object of our
emotion exists.
Alternatively, it could be that our beliefs concerning fictions are different kinds of beliefs
than those we possess about the real world. This is the motivation behind the DAV: there are
significant differences between our emotional responses to fictional and real life objects. The
difference is so great that they are actually distinct kinds of mental states. Thus, a proponent of
the DAV would solve the paradox by denying the first proposition while maintaining the
cognitivist position that emotions are constituted by beliefs.
Few contemporary philosophers opt to eliminate the second proposition. Doing so implies
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that a reader or viewer of a fiction would actually believe that the fiction is real while she reads or
watches it (Coleridge 1985, Hurka 2001). Theorists who opt to reject the second proposition of the
paradox must somehow square the “suspension of disbelief” with the contradictory beliefs and
actions we seem to have in response to fictions. This proposal may work if we accept the cognitive
illusion thesis, the idea that we are deluded into believing that fictional content is real during our
engagement with it. I have already argued against this position in chapter 2.
Many philosophers opt to eliminate the third proposition. There are several ways to do
this. First, one can deny that beliefs are a necessary component of emotions, but still maintain a
cognitivist position that emotions are comprised of thoughts (Carroll 1990 & Lamarque, 1981) or
judgments (Solomon 1993). For example, when we engage with a fiction, we generally have
various thoughts about the characters. While watching The Conjuring, I may contemplate the
nature of the demon that possesses one woman. This thought fills me with terror. Importantly,
thoughts do not have the same assertoric requirement that beliefs do. We do not need to believe
that the object of our thought actually exists in order to contemplate and respond emotionally to it.
Alternatively, one can deny that any higher-order cognition is required for emotions. This
is the route taken by non-cognitive perception and feeling-based theories of emotions. According
to these views, an emotion does not require that we have a thought, judgment, or belief about an
object in our environment. Conscious feelings, bodily changes, or perceptions of those changes,
constitute an emotion (Goldie 2000, James 1890, LeDoux 1996, Prinz 2004a, Robinson 2005).
The ontological status of the emotion’s object is more or less irrelevant to whether or not the
emotion itself is a stereotypical state; if the feeling or perception of bodily changes is genuine, then
the emotion is as well.
My own theory of emotions is in line with rejecting the third proposition. I argue that
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beliefs, judgments, and thoughts are not necessary components of emotions. However, it is not my
goal here to solve the paradox by showing that one of the propositions is false. Instead, I argue that
the proponent of the SAV should reject the paradox altogether. Philosophers and psychologists
typically attempt to dissolve the paradox by appealing to one or another theory of the nature of
emotions. They argue that emotions are constituted by beliefs, thoughts, feelings, etc., and show
how this eliminates one of the propositions. My approach is slightly different. I think that most
philosophers writing on the paradox already assume the DAV assumption that we are only
motivated to act by our encounters with real-life objects in our environment. I already developed
a response to this claim in the first chapter by reevaluating what we mean by motivation towards
fictions.
The same type of argument also applies to emotions. One benefit of this approach is that it
applies to any theory of emotions—cognitive or non-cognitive—because each holds that emotions
have a functional role in virtue of their constitutive cognitive or bodily component. So in order for
the DAV to be correct, one would have to show that our emotions towards fictions do not play the
right sort of functional role as real-life emotions do, just as beliefs towards fictions purportedly do
not.
What is the functional role of emotions? The best candidate would be the actual expressive
and behavioral responses that our emotions elicit. Emotions are often associated with certain action
tendencies. These include such reflexive and automatic behaviors as a fight or flight response,
freezing, running, screaming, or covering one’s eyes in fear, clenching one’s teeth or striking out
at a foe in anger, or smiling, laughing or jumping for joy. We might also add more complex action
tendencies or dispositions, which are caused by an emotion but require further beliefs, thoughts,
desires, or judgments in order to be manifested. The moral emotions might be included here: we
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shun, blame, and punish those who are the objects of our contempt or anger. We comfort, protect,
and in other ways care for those who are the objects of our pride, pity, or compassion. If we feel
shame or embarrassment, we may withdraw from society or attempt to make amends for our
wrongdoings.
Consider an emotional response to an act of injustice. We learn that a seemingly innocent
person has been falsely accused and convicted of a crime. We emotionally evaluate the situation
and conclude that the court’s decision was unjust. Our indignation motivates us in several different
ways. First, we may express our anger via our facial expression and bouts of shouting. Second, our
indignation plays a role in our further cognitive processing, shaping, influencing, and regulating
later thoughts and decisions. Finally, our anger may help motivate us to act: perhaps you organize
a peaceful protest, sign petitions, or reach out to a local member of congress. Or maybe you simply
condemn the court’s decision amongst your close friends and family. Your emotional response to
the situation motivates you in each case.
However, if the innocent person you care for is actually a fictional character, it seems like
you cannot be motivated to act in any of these ways. This leads us straight to the heart of the matter
for supporters of the DAV. Our emotions towards fictions are not genuine because they do not
display the right kind of behavioral output. They do not lead to the same sorts of actions as a
genuine emotion would.
I contend that it is possible that we are somehow motivated to act on our emotions towards
fictions. If my favorite character in a film dies, I may be strongly motivated to leave the theater,
turn off the television, or close the book and go mope in my room for an hour, just as I would if I
learned of the death of a popular politician, sports figure, or musician. A complex fictional story
may provoke a thoughtful conversation between friends, just as the unjust court decision does. It
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is also possible that we are in some ways motivated to act on the basis of our emotions about
fictional objects, but other information and circumstances—especially the knowledge that the
object of our emotion does not physically exist in our world—blocks or regulates the action. We
may be automatically and unconsciously primed to act, but contradictory beliefs and judgments
may put a halt to that action before it reaches fruition.
So it is possible that we are sometimes motivated to act on our emotions about fictional
objects. This does not require that we suspend our disbelief about the reality of a fiction; rather,
we must reconsider what we mean by emotional motivation. We can also side-step the paradox of
fiction. Most responses to the paradox buy into the functionalist argument that we will only act in
light of things we believe to exist. My view shows how we can diffuse the paradox without that
assumption, by eliminating the functionalist motivation that inspired it.
This would be a major win for the SAV. There is nothing about our emotional behaviors
that suggests that our emotions towards fictions are not stereotypical states. The proponent of the
DAV could continue attempt to show that some other feature of emotions makes them distinct
from genuine emotions. I will consider four more emotion properties that might be different in our
emotions about fictional and real objects: inferential role, emotional feelings, emotional
evaluations, and issues concerning emotions’ semantics and normativity.

2.2. Emotions’ inferential role
The proponent of the DAV can argue that our emotions about fictional objects serve a different
inferential role than emotions that are about real things. Perhaps the distinct inferential role is
enough to constitute a different type of state.
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We must first try to understand the inferential role of emotions. In order for emotions to
play a role in cognition they must have some sort of cognitive content. What might that be? If
emotions are constituted by propositional attitudes, then we could say that their inferential role
arises due to this. For example, if an emotion is constituted by a thought with certain content—a
thought that, say, “it really irks me when my sister forgets my birthday”—then the emotion’s
inferential role would be determined by the role of that thought. The same could be said for
cognitive judgments and beliefs. The story would be slightly different for theories of emotion that
do not hold that emotions are constituted by propositional attitudes (e.g. feeling theories and
perceptual theories). But even these theories tend to accept that emotions have intentional objects;
they represent something or someone in the subject’s mental or physical environment. An
emotion’s inferential role stems from this representation. Let us suppose, then, that an emotion
plays a certain inferential role in virtue of its intentionality, however understood.
An emotion’s intentional object may be something out in one’s environment, such as a
person, animal, or state of affairs that we witness in real-life or while engaged with a fiction. The
intentional object may also be another mental state, such as a belief, thought, desire, judgment, or
perception of the environment or one’s own body. The emotion may in turn play a role in causing
or influencing further mental attitudes. For example, suppose that it’s your best friend’s birthday.
Everyone in your friend’s family has called to wish her well—everyone except her older sister.
The sister’s carelessness is both the cause and intentional object of the great annoyance you
experience on your friend’s behalf. You must have other mental attitudes in order for you to
undergo this emotional response: the desire for the sister to call, the desire for your friend to have
a nice birthday, the belief that a sister should call her sibling on her birthday, the belief that the
sister has not done so, etc. All of these attitudes contribute to your current emotion. Furthermore,
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your annoyance causes other cognitive responses: the desire to call the sister and give her a piece
of your mind, the belief that your friend would like to be cheered up, the desire to comfort your
friend, and so on.
Now consider an analogous fictional case: you are watching a film in which your favorite
character’s older sister forgets to call her on their birthday, even though everyone else remembered
to do so. Just like the previous case, you adopt beliefs about both your friend and her sister. This
in turn causes you to feel great annoyance and frustration towards the older sister and pity for your
favorite character. We can even say, like in the American Psycho example from chapter 1, that the
filmmakers created a story that is perfectly similar to your real-life best friend so that the content
of your emotional state is roughly the same. We can stipulate that the content of the story and our
beliefs about it are similar enough that they do not significantly impact our emotions’ in inferential
role—except, of course, the belief that the fictional characters are not real. This belief makes a
difference in the emotional response we have towards the characters. It requires that we take the
fictional stance towards the object of our emotion. This means that there is a difference in the
intentional content between our beliefs about the real-life and fictional cases.
Our emotions about fictional objects have a different intentional content than those about
real things. This accounts for differences in an emotion’s inferential role. We do not need to posit
the existence of imaginary or make-believe emotions to explain the differences between our
emotions about fictions and real-life.

2.3. Genuine feelings
Emotions usually involve a conscious feeling. Prima facie, we identify our emotions by how they
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feel; sorrow, anger, joy, jealousy, pride, etc. all feel a certain way to us. For our purposes, feelings
are the qualitative bodily responses that are potentially consciously experienced. Chocolate has a
particular conscious taste and red has a specific qualitative look; similarly, emotions have
conscious qualitative characters. As William James (1890) noted, feelings put the “emotionality”
in the emotion, making it salient and important to our lives. Some theories of emotions—call them
feeling theories—hold that emotional feelings are necessarily conscious; every time we experience
an emotion, we feel it (Block, 1995, Goldie 2004, James 1890, LeDoux 1996). According to some
views, however, emotional feelings need not be conscious (see, Prinz 2004a, Berridge &
Winkielman 2003, Rosenthal 2008). This distinction is not crucial for our current discussion, but
it will be relevant in the proceeding sections and chapters when we discuss our actual emotional
responses to fictions.
We seem to have genuine emotional feelings towards fictions. The DAV challenge
concerns whether these feelings are somehow unreal. It is worth noting that even Walton—who,
along with Currie, is perhaps the most ardent supporter of the DAV—does not deny that our makebelieve emotions towards fictions elicit genuine feelings. He only denies that those feelings are
necessary components of the emotion (Walton 1990).
One way to support the claim that our emotional feelings towards fictions are non-genuine
would be to show that these feelings are merely illusions. Call this the illusory feeling thesis.
Consider two other bodily feeling illusions: phantom limb pain (PLP) and the rubber hand illusion
(RHI). A phantom limb can be defined as “the continuous awareness of a (or part of a) nonexisting or deafferented body part with specific form, weight, or range of motion” (Richardson
2009, 137). There are records of phantoms corresponding to virtually every body part, including
arms, legs, teeth, tongue, breasts, bladder, etc. The phantom limb is embodied and felt. The patient
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has the sense that the missing limb remains a part of her body and she may also have sensations in
the missing limb. The patient might experience the limb as moving (kinetic illusion) or in a
particular orientation (kinesthetic illusion). The patient may experience PLP—pins and needles,
itches, dull pains, or acute pains—in the missing limb. While there is no universally agreed upon
cognitive or neurological mechanisms associated with phantom limb, potential causes include
cortical reorganization or pain memory after the limb is lost (ibid, 141).
The RHI is another bodily feeling illusion. In a study by Botvinick and Cohen (1998), a
subject sits in front of a table with one hand hidden behind a screen and the other under the table.
A rubber hand is placed on the table directly in from of her. If both the real hand under the table
and the rubber hand are stroked synchronously by a brush, the subject may feel the touch of the
brush on the rubber hand, not her real hand under the table. In some cases, subjects might even
have the impression that the rubber hand is their own. When this occurs, the subjects will flinch
and show a stronger than normal skin conductance response when the rubber hand is hit with a
hammer (de Vignemont 2007).
Here we have two examples of bodily feeling illusions. They each result in a feeling in the
subject’s body part or an inanimate object that does not belong to them—even though the subject
knows that the limb/hand does not belong to them. Perhaps one could argue that our feelings
towards fictions are illusory in a similar fashion. Our emotional feelings towards fictions are not
genuine feelings, but illusory, just as the feelings of the phantom limb and the brushstroke on “our”
rubber hand are illusory. We feel like we experience some emotional feeling, but we actually do
not. It may seem strange that we have illusory emotional feelings—but, then again, PLP and RHI
are equally strange to those who have not experienced them firsthand.
Both PLP and RHI engender false beliefs in their subjects. In PLP, the sensations of pain
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and movement in the phantom limb cause a false belief that there is a sensation of pain in my (nonexistent, deafferented) limb when, in fact, the patient lacks is missing the relevant body part. The
RHI engenders the false belief that I either a) feel a sensation in the rubber hand, or, b) that there
is a sense of embodiment in the rubber hand (the rubber hand is really my own). So both PLP and
RHI create false beliefs concerning the origin and locations of sensations in body parts that, in
actuality, are not one’s own.
Is there a comparable false belief in the case of fictional emotional feelings? I argue that
there isn’t. When we experience joy, fear, anger, etc. about a fictional object, we “feel” the emotion
in the same way we normally would if we felt a genuine emotion about a real object. That is, we
experience the emotional feeling as our own, taking place within our actual body, not in a phantom
or fake body part. We are not tricked or deluded into having emotional feelings about fictional
objects, as in the RHI. There is nothing wrong with our brains, as in PLP. Our emotional feelings
are natural reactions to objects that we know do not exist.

2.4. Emotional evaluations
Philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists alike all generally accept that emotions involve
some kind of judgment. Emotions are evaluative. When we have an emotion, it is because
something in our environment—or something that we think, remember, or imagine—bears
significance on our lives or the life of someone we care about. This may be a very quick, automatic
evaluation, like when we suddenly fear a loud noise behind us or are afraid that we will slip on an
unseen staircase. Or the evaluation could be quite complex, like when we experience jealousy
towards someone in our workplace. A proponent of the DAV could argue that our feelings towards
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fictional objects are not stereotypical states because they are the result of a fictional evaluation.
One could argue that we do not have the right kind of evaluative relationship with fictional
objects in order for us to make genuine judgments about them. Fictional characters may not be the
kind of thing that we can care about, empathize with, feel sympathy for, etc. Again, we seem to
care about and identify with fictional objects all of the time. We feel very strongly for our favorite
television, film, and literary heroes. We want them to succeed and we feel frustrated, sad, or angry
when they do not. Still, one could argue that those judgments are not real judgments because the
judgment’s object does not exist.
This is a big bullet for the DAV theorist to bite. On this view, we cannot genuinely evaluate
nonexistent objects. This means that we do not make genuine evaluations of fictional objects, but
also of any other non-literal or nonexistent object, including hypothetical, imaginary, future, or
past objects. This seems intuitively implausible. But since the DAV is ready to deny that we have
a genuine emotions towards these objects, then they may be willing to deny that these are genuine
evaluations as well. We need some independent reason for thinking that the evaluation is genuine.
We need to know whether the object of our emotional evaluation must exist in order for
the evaluation to be genuine. It seems like they must, in order for our evaluation to “refer” and
not be “empty.” My response requires a brief foray into the ontology of fictional objects (see
Tullmann & Buckwalter 2014). Specifically, we need to understand the sense of ‘exist’ found in
both the paradox of fiction and similar discussions of emotional responses towards fictions. In
other words, how do fictional entities exist? This is not a topic that is typically addressed in the
paradox literature. In fact, most philosophers take it for granted fictional entities don’t exist, in a
standard sense of the word. But examining this question more closely will help us to see how we
can take fictional entities as the objects of genuine emotional evaluations.
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Recall my discussion of the ontological implications of the fictional stance. There are at
least three ways in which a fictional object exists.15 First, an existent object might be a concrete
particular. This is the sense of exist we use when we say that a comet, person, rock, or painting
exists. They are all a part of our actual, corporeal reality. This is clearly not the sense in which
fictional objects exist (if they do at all), but it is assumed by the paradox. Consider the standard
responses to the paradox’s second proposition: we do not run screaming from the theater when we
see a zombie on a movie screen, so we do not genuinely believe that the zombie exists. Zombies
are not actual, physical creatures in our world.
Second, a fictional object could possibly exist in another world. In other words, fictional
entities might be possible objects in our (actual) world, but actual objects in another possible world.
David Lewis (1973), Alvin Plantinga (1974), and Saul Kripke (1980) all held versions of this view,
although Kripke has rejected this view in his more recent work (Kripke 2013). There are many
problems with the possibilia thesis, as we saw in chapters 1 and 3. Descriptions of fictional entities
are incomplete in detail, whereas possible objects are taken to be complete. For example, it is
indeterminate whether or not Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes had a mole on his back. If Holmes
were a possible object, then he either would or he would not (Thomasson 1999). We are also
unable to distinguish between possible objects (Quine 1953). Finally, fictional objects are created
and causally dependent upon authors and audiences. Even if Sherlock Holmes was a denizen of
another possible world, it would not be the same Holmes that Conan Doyle wrote about in his
stories (Sainsbury 2010).

15

I have not discussed Meinongianism here (Meinong 1960, Priest 2005) or the Sartrean sense of
imaginary entities (Sartre 1991). See Thomasson 1999 for an overview. One can also deny that
fictional entities exist in any sense. See my discussion of pretense theories in chapter 2, as well as
Quine 1956, Russell 1905, and Sainsbury 2010.
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So we should be skeptical of the view that fictional entities exist in this sense of the word.
But there is another, more plausible sense in which fictional entities may very well exist. The last
sense of ‘exist’ is the inverse of the first two: a fictional object is neither a concrete particular nor
possibly a concrete particular. Instead, fictional objects might be abstracta of some kind, as I
suggested in chapter 3. They are created and dependent on people and conventions. Fictional
entities would go out of existence if everyone forgot about them and there was no record of them.
We even, in a way, interact with fictional entities. Discussing a fictional object can be used to
justify one’s actions and form non-assertoric propositional attitudes (see also Carroll 1990). We
can also form thoughts about and respond unconsciously and non-cognitively to fictional
characters.
With this last sense of ‘exist’ in mind, we can turn back to the question of how we can form
genuine evaluations of fictional entities. Importantly, this sense of ‘exist’ should appeal to any
theory of the nature of emotions. First, consider feeling theories. On this view, emotions are noncognitive in the sense that they are not comprised of thoughts or beliefs. Yet emotions are also not
brute. They are evaluative—they involve judgments of objects in one’s internal (mental) or
external (physical) environment. Because the feeling theorist claims that emotions are basic in this
way, the object of the emotion need not be a concrete particular. I will examine these ‘affective
appraisals’ in more detail in the following sections; for now, it is enough to note that we will
respond emotionally to any object—real or unreal—that we perceive to bear on our well-being or
that of someone we care about. If this is the case, then we may have genuine emotional evaluations
of entities that only exist in the last, minimal sense.
We can give the same sort of explanation for cognitive theories of emotions. Like feeling
theories, cognitine theories of emotion hold that our emotions involve an evaluation of an object
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in our internal or external environment that bears on our well-being. Walton argues that this
emotion is not genuine because we are not motivated to act in the right way. We have already seen,
however, how we can eliminate this kind of functional argument about emotions. It is perfectly
possible to be motivated to act based on our emotional responses towards fictions.
Consider an example:

The unlucky-in-love Becky [thinks about] the character Mr. Darcy, just as
he is described in Jane Austen’s novel. It is this Mr. Darcy that serves as the
object of her emotions (longing, wistfulness—but also, this time, a strange
jealousy for Elizabeth Bennett and regret that such a man doesn’t exist).
These emotions may even cause Becky to engage in certain peculiar actions:
she places her copy of Pride and Prejudice on her nightstand in an oddly
affectionate manner and makes caustic remarks about Elizabeth Bennett’s
contrariness to her friends (Tullmann & Buckwalter 2014, 792).
Becky emotionally responds to a fictional entity, forming evaluations of the characters Mr. Darcy
and Elizabeth Bennett; for example, that she and Darcy would make a good couple and that
Elizabeth is a threat and is clearly up to no good. As strange as this example may seem, it shows
how we can be motivated to act based on our judgments of fictional entities—not just general
actions caused by our beliefs about fictional characters, or to people that we think are like those
characters, but actually based on our beliefs concerning fictional entities themselves. Mr. Darcy is
neither a concrete or possible object. If he exists at all, it is in the sense of being an abstract object.
If we can have genuine judgments of Mr. Darcy in this sense, then there does not seem to be a
strong argument against the idea that we can form genuine emotional evaluations of any fictional
entity.
I have considered, and rejected, three arguments against the SAV of emotions, and will
return to a fourth (about the semantics and normativity of emotions) in §4. My arguments should
apply to any theory of the nature of emotions. Emotions could be beliefs, judgments, feelings, or
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some other kind of appraisal. Regardless of what constitutes an emotion, one would have to show
that it is that feature which makes the emotion non-genuine in order to show that the emotion itself
is not genuine. The best way to do this is to argue that the emotion does not lead to the right kind
of behavioral output. And this argument fails. Importantly for our purposes, my conclusion makes
it easy for us to sidestep the traditional talk of the paradox of fiction altogether.

3. An appraisal theory of emotions

The purpose of the previous section was to dissolve the paradox of fiction and, in so doing,
motivate the SAV of emotions. I did not rely on a particular theory of emotions to do this.
However, there remain several questions concerning our emotional responses towards fictions that
do require some theoretical commitment: What sorts of mental states are involved in our emotional
responses to fictions? Are we always aware of our emotions toward fictions? Why do we consider
fictional entities to be worthy objects of our emotions? For that matter, how do we emotionally
respond to fictions in the first place? Of course, similar questions arise when dealing with real-life
emotions. Indeed, these are important questions faced by any general theory of emotions, not only
theories of fiction.
So far, I have treated emotions as a kind of evaluation without specifying the nature of that
evaluation. In this section I will try to get clearer on what I mean by this. I argue that emotions are
constituted by multi-level appraisals. Emotions are not brute reactions to stimuli. While I hold that
emotions are comprised of non-cognitive content, they can be understood as cognitive in some
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other sense: they are intentional (about something), they are evaluative, and they carry information.
While I think that our emotional responses are constituted by multi-level appraisals, I want
to stress that a proponent of the SAV may adopt virtually any theory of emotions. I favor an
appraisal theory because it can explain the interesting and difficult features of our emotional
experiences, both about fictional and actual things. It is not my goal here to fully motivate my
multi-level appraisal theory, or to fend off every potential argument against it. But, as we will see,
I do think that my theory may be the best for explaining a moral psychology of fictions.

3.1. Fictional objects as emotional objects
Emotions play a strong motivational role in our lives. They help guide our actions, shape our
relationships, and inform our decisions. Appraisal theories attempt to capture the motivational
aspects of emotions. We can think of emotional appraisals in terms of biological fitness. An
organism constantly evaluates its environment for features that might bear on its survival and
flourishing. Emotions clue us into these features, both consciously in terms of emotional feelings,
and unconsciously in terms of behavioral priming and automatic physiological responses.
I will discuss three important features of appraisal theories before turning to my own
account of emotions: the content of our emotional appraisals, the causal and constitutive
components of our emotions, and whether an emotion is best understood as a process or discrete
mental state. Finally, I will address two general objections to multi-level appraisal theories that
can be found in the emotion literature.
First, appraisal theories of emotions need some story about how a subject evaluates an
object. For my purposes, this story must also apply to fictional objects. It is easy to see how a real
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life object, like a snarling dog or a person with a weapon, is a worthy emotional object. It is less
clear how and why a fictional object would be, since the fictional object does not bear on our wellbeing in the same way as the real life object does.
A traditional way of understanding the intentionality of emotions—what an emotion is
about—relies on the cognitive stance that emotions are comprised of propositional attitudes.
According to a belief-based theory, our emotion is constituted by the belief that X. Other cognitive
theories could replace the belief state with a thought or judgment that X. This could explain how
fictions could be the objects of emotions; we make a judgment that a fictional villain is evil or
terrifying, believe that the villain is trying to harm the protagonist, or merely have the thought that
the villain is up to something no good. In turn, these cognitive states may lead to feelings of fear
and apprehension.
Unfortunately, this approach is not available to any theory that denies that the initial
appraisal of the stimuli is non-cognitive and non-propositional (as mine will). So before we can
understand how fictions can be the objects of our emotions, we must understand how non-cognitive
theories of emotion explain intentionality. Two proposals include Richard Lazarus’s “core
relational themes,” (Lazarus 1991, Smith and Lazarus 2000), a concept also adopted by Jesse Prinz
(2004a & b) and Peter Goldie’s “emotion-proper properties” (2004). Goldie describes these as the
property that things must possess in order to cause a certain bodily state associated with a particular
emotion (Goldie 2004). Core relational themes work similarly. According to Lazarus, we respond
emotionally to certain stimuli because those stimuli represent certain themes. For example, we feel
sad when we encounter a situation in which we experience a loss of some kind. We fear a snake
because it represents the core relational theme of causing harm to us or one we care about. The
same applies to other emotions, including complex emotions like jealousy: romantic jealousy
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arises when we perceive or imagine that that one’s significant other has been unfaithful (Prinz
2004a).
Neither the emotion-proper property nor the core relational theme requires that we have an
assertoric belief about the object, situation, or state of affairs the emotion is about. They do require
us to be able to perceive emotion properties, or at least be able to make low level judgments about
our perception of emotional expressions. We can also be seriously wrong about what causes an
emotion. We might, alone in our dark bedroom, think that a quick-moving shadow is a burglar
attempting to break into our room, when in fact it is was caused by a car passing outside our
window. Just the perception of this shadow may be enough to set off an emotional state. But our
fear does not require any thoughts or beliefs about what this shadow actually is or the potential
harm it can cause. This is the key to understanding how we can have genuine emotions about
fictions. We associate objects on a screen, or in a play, or even imagistically (as when reading a
novel) with an emotionally relevant property.
There is one last point we need to emphasize here. An emotional appraisal is generally
about the subject’s own well-being. But there are obvious counterexamples to this. Our emotional
responses often concern other people: we may feel pride on behalf of a family member’s
achievement, anger at an injustice committed against a friend, or joy at a partner’s success. None
of these emotions involve appraisals that directly involve applying a core relational theme to an
object in terms of one’s own well-being.
Most theories of emotion extend the notion of ‘well-being’ to include those people and
objects that we care for and about. I doubt that we need to think of others as an extension of
ourselves in order to emotionally respond on their behalf. Nor must we empathize or identify with
them. I discussed this in the previous chapter; empathy is not necessarily the basis of our emotional
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responses about fictional objects. Instead, I think that concern for another might be enough for us
to emotionally respond on their behalf. We must make some kind of positive evaluation of the
person or object. This is also why we feel anger, sorrow, joy, hope, pride, embarrassment, shame,
etc. on behalf of fictional characters: we care about them.
As we have seen, many theories argue that emotions either involve cognitive, propositional
attitudes such as beliefs, thoughts, judgments, or non-cognitive states like feelings or perceptions
of bodily changes. In general, appraisal theorists occupy a middle ground between the
cognitive/non-cognitive extremes. The challenge is to determine which psychological processes
are involved in our emotional appraisals.

3.2. Appraisal theories
Different appraisal theorists have different ideas about what constitutes an emotional appraisal.
However, there are some features that all appraisal theories share, besides the fact that they all
emphasize a subject-environment relationship (see Moors et al 2013). First, appraisal theorists
generally deny that propositional attitudes are sufficient for emotions, even if they are necessary
for them (Arnold 1960, Ellsworth 1994, Roseman 1996, Smith & Kirby 2001, Scherer 1984, Smith
& Lazarus 1990, Stein et al 2000). So appraisal theories may escape the brunt of the evidence from
neuroscience and psychology that has recently come out against belief-based theories of emotion
(Prinz 2004a). However, the appraisal theorist may still run into trouble in this regard if they hold
that a cognitive appraisal precedes and causes sub-personal bodily reactions to emotional stimuli
(Scherer 1984). This does not mean that the appraisal must be deliberate. We do not have to
consciously evaluate an object. Instead, the appraisal may be fast, automatic, and “virtually
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instantaneous” (Smith & Lazarus 1990). This leads to my next point. Appraisal theorists also deny
that emotions are necessarily conscious. This makes sense; we do not always think of ourselves as
consciously evaluating objects in our environment.
Third, each appraisal theorist posits some kind of low level monitoring system that tracks
emotionally relevant properties and objects in one’s environment. The monitoring system may
track objects in one’s environment (or objects of a thought one considers) that are relevant to one’s
goals, motives, or well-being (Scherer 1984, Roseman & Smith 2001, Smith & Lazarus 1990, Stein
et al 2000). Positive emotions like joy and pride arise when the object is appraised as goalcongruent, promoting, or compatible. Negative emotions like anger or shame interpret their object
as goal-incongruent.
Finally, appraisal theorists agree that we can individuate emotions in terms of appraisals.
This is a problem that has plagued noncognitive theories of emotions: it does not seem like each
emotion has a unique qualitative feel or set of bodily reactions. Appraisal theories accept this.
What makes an emotion a token of anger, indignation, rage, or annoyance is the particular appraisal
that one makes with respect to an emotionally relevant property or theme. This leaves room for
emotional valence—the positive or negative qualitative feel of emotions—to also play a role in
emotion individuation. But valence alone is not fine-grained enough to determine the difference
whether a particular emotion is anger or indignation, sorrow or grief, joy or elation.
It is sometimes unclear whether an appraisal constitutes an emotion or merely causes it.
Scherer (1984) seems to argue that appraisals elicits the emotion. The nature of the emotion itself
remains a mystery. Paul Griffiths (2002, 2004) makes this point in his extensive work on the
different types of emotions. To be fair, Scherer does point out that the causal/constituent question
depends on what one means by an ‘appraisal.’ Part of a solution here will depend on whether one
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thinks that emotions are an extended process or a discrete mental state, which I will address
momentarily.
Appraisal theorists agree that emotions involve the ability to perceive, mentally represent,
and process sensory information and other occurrent mental states. My multi-level appraisal theory
will draw specific lines concerning each of these aspects of the emotional appraisal. I think that
appraisals constitute an emotion, rather than merely cause them. I agree that emotions are not
necessarily conscious, are generally non-propositional, and require some kind of monitoring
device.
Appraisal models also differ with respect to whether emotions are best understood as
continuous processes or discrete, categorical states. Again, most appraisal theorists think that we
continuously subconsciously monitor our environment for significant stimuli. The main
controversy within appraisal theory concerns whether there is a set structural procedure that each
emotion must necessarily follow in order to be classified as a particular emotion or whether the
process is more flexible and open ended. Here I will examine one prominent process-oriented
model from Richard Lazarus and C.A. Smith’s (Smith & Lazarus 1990).
Lazarus and Smith’s argue that the appraisal of a core relational theme may be automatic
and unconscious (ibid, 629). There are two basic parts of the emotional appraisal. The first is
schematic: the subject appraises a stimulus in terms of how it bears on its well-being, on the basis
of past experiences with similar encounters. This requires that associative memory networks are
activated, drawing upon relevant information about the object and past responses to it. The same
stimulus information is sent for cognitive conceptual processing. This involves more abstract,
deliberate, and conscious cognitive processes through which the subject is able to evaluate the
adaptational significance of the stimulus more actively and accurately (ibid, 630).
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Importantly, Lazarus and Smith do not think that there is a set sequence or structure
specifying how the stimulus information is processed. Conceptual processing will generally follow
the initial schematic processing due to the nature of the neurological components involved. But
the conceptual processing will also be available for further schematic processing. This may result
in multiple feedback loops in which subconscious schematic processing impacts and modifies
conceptual processing and vice versa.
I am highly sympathetic to Lazarus and Smith’s process-oriented emotional model,
although their theory has come under scrutiny for being empirically implausible. Like them, I will
argue that emotions are temporally extended, involving multiple different appraisals almost at
once, each impacting the other in a feedback loops (see Damasio 1994). However, we can still
isolate emotions in terms of discrete states. I want to suggest that the major emotion categories
(joy, sorrow, anger, pride, curiosity, etc.) are “somewhat crude attempts” to describe our emotional
experiences (Scherer 1984, quoted in Roseman & Smith 2001, 14). In fact, I think that our
emotions are, to a certain extent, epistemically indeterminate. This means that we do not always
have access to what causes a particular appraisal or how stimulus information is processed. It may
be a matter of interpretation of one’s environment and internal milieu that determines which
emotion one currently experiences, or experienced in the past.
I will not spend a great deal of time defending my appraisal theory against its foes.16
However, there are two general objections to traditional appraisal theories that I wish to eliminate
right away. There has been a general trend in recent years towards theories of emotions that
emphasize bodily (somatic, phenomenal) features of emotions. One objection against appraisal
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See the Appendix at the end of this chapter for a discussion of four more potential objections to
my multi-level appraisal theory.
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theories is that they are too cognitive. Traditional appraisal theories hold that an emotion must be
caused by or constituted by a cognitive judgment of something in our environment, where
‘cognitive’ here means more than simply possessing an intentional object (see Prinz 2004a). In
light of my discussion here, however, we can see that this objection does not necessarily hold.
Most appraisal theorists argue that the appraisal that constitutes or causes the emotion can be fast,
automatic, unconscious, and non-propositional. They also generally leave room for later cognitive
processing. Most appraisal theories discuss the role of cognitive processes in our emotions, but
they do not posit that cognitive or propositional evaluations are the emotion.
Griffiths (1997, 2004) raises the objection that appraisal theories are “ecological,”
primarily concerned with explaining the significance of the environment for an organism. In doing
so, such theories do not adequately concern emotions as mental states and “[abstract] away from
the details of any particular psychological process” (Griffiths 2002). By emphasizing the way in
which emotions are brought about via core relational themes or emotion-proper properties,
appraisal theories ignore the cognitive and subpersonal mechanisms that are involved in actually
bringing about a discrete emotion. This objection also strikes me as missing the point of appraisal
theories. Griffiths is correct in thinking that appraisal theories emphasize the conditions that bring
about the emotion, but, each appraisal theorist also generally has a story about the psychological
processes and neural mechanisms involved in discrete emotional states (see, in particular, Laxarus
1991 and Scherer 1984).
I will now turn to a discussion of my own multi-level appraisal theory which, I argue,
adequately surmounts these two objections.
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3.2. A multi-level appraisal theory
I want to propose a multi-level appraisal theory that is similar to Lazarus and Smith’s process
model, but differs with respect to the nature of those appraisals and how we individuate specific
emotions. I will also draw on Scherer’s point that emotion individuation is largely a matter of
interpretation.
I suggested that we can understand appraisal theories along three different dimensions: the
nature of the appraisal itself, the components of the emotion, and whether the emotion is structural
or process-oriented. I will present my own view along the same guidelines. I agree with the other
appraisal theorists that we should understand emotions as responses to objects possessing
emotionally relevant properties. However, in light of Griffith’s ecological objection, I want to be
more specific about the psychological and neurological mechanisms that may be involved in a
subject’s recognition of these properties.
Following Lazarus, I argue that emotions generally involve two different appraisals. The
first arises when a stimulus in one’s external (physical) or internal (mental) environment causes a
mental representation of something that bears on one’s well-being. The mental representation
comprises the emotive value of the stimulus, which may be learned or innate. For example, humans
may have an innate predisposition to fear heights or looming objects and a learned fear of monsters
under the bed, certain people or social interactions (Damasio 1994). When we perceive, imagine,
or think about the looming object or monster (or something like it), we form a mental
representation that triggers an emotional response.
I understand this initial representation as a kind of appraisal that is subconsciously and
subpersonally implemented. We respond to perceived objects (in our environment, or intentional
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objects of mental attitudes) as pleasant or unpleasant, or as things to avoid or approach.
Information about the stimulus is transferred to areas of the brain that are involved in encoding
emotional reactions, such as the sensory thalamus, the affective division of the striatum, the
orbitofrontal cortex and, finally, the amygdala (LeDoux 1996, Mello & Villares 1997, Rolls 2000;
see Schroeder & Matheson 2006 for an overview), each of which are involved in initiating bodily
reactions and behaviors, such as an increased heart rate or freezing response.
At the same time, the sensory stimulus information takes a slower track to cortical regions
of the brain for further processing and input from cognitive faculties. LeDoux (1996 & 2012, also
LeDoux & Phelps 2000) call the initial pathway the “low-road” of emotions, and the slower
pathway the “high-road.” The sensory information involved in the initial appraisal reaches the
amygdala or hippocampus after first being processed by the sensory thalamus. The same
information is processed by the sensory thalamus, and also sent to the sensory cortex for cognitive
processing and availability for consciousness. Here, the subject’s knowledge about the stimulus,
her beliefs about her current environment, and desires concerning her future goals may all
influence how the stimulus information is processed. She may also deliberate, draw inferences,
and make decisions concerning the potential value of the object.
Let’s say that a subject perceives a potential threat in her environment: something she finds
fearful. Any number of objects could possess a “fearful” property, from a snake that crosses our
path to an important test that looms in the near future. Our subject perceives the snakes, drawing
on information from long-term memory that allows the subject to appraise this particular specimen.
The value of this appraisal may vary from person to person: our subject may be quite fond of
snakes and consider them fascinating, beautiful creatures. Her stored information of snakes may
include these features, whereas another person might associate snakes with harm or icky-ness. The
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stimulus information is also sent via the cortical pathway for cognitive processing. Our subject’s
beliefs about her surroundings may correspond or disagree with her initial appraisal of the snake.
She might be particularly fond of this breed of snake, or, alternatively recognize that this is not a
pet snake and so should be avoided.
The multi-level appraisal theory posits that there are generally two different appraisals
involved in our emotions, one precognitive and one cognitive (call them affective and cognitive
appraisals, respectively). But emotional processing may not stop there. Once the stimulus
information is processed by different cortical regions, it may be sent back to the low level
precortical regions, such as the amygdala and hippocampus. Several different things can happen
there. The initial reactions resulting from the initial affective appraisal may be extended,
intensified, modified, regulated, or even eliminated in light of information from cognitive
processing.
This forms a feedback loop in which subcortical information processing influences
cognitive processes, and vice versa (see Damasio 1994 and Smith & Lazarus 1990). This may
occur over the course of a second or two, or perhaps even longer as more information about one’s
environment is evaluated and weighed with respect to our affective and cognitive appraisals. All
the while, one’s perceptual systems monitor the environment for relevant objects or information
which may further impact one’s affective processing. I do not argue that there is a set, structured
method in which different appraisals follow one after another, resulting in a specific emotional
state. My view is similar to Smith and Lazarus’s process-oriented account, in which schematic and
conceptual processing occurs continuously.
In some cases, the cause and object of our emotion may not be known to us or we may
misattribute it (as in the famous Schacter and Singer studies, 1962). I would argue that these
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emotions are epistemically indeterminate; we are unaware of or lack access to the causes and/or
object of our affective responses such that we cannot accurately identify what emotional or
affective state we are (or were) in. Determining the identity our emotional state may be post hoc,
like when we say that a film is “happy” or “sad” even though it, in fact, involved a wide variety of
emotional appraisals and responses.
Scherer (1984) argues that identifying particular emotions is largely a matter of
interpretation. I agree. Like other appraisal theorists, I argue that we respond to stimuli that
correspond to an emotionally relevant property. But which objects correspond to which property
will vary from person to person; each subject will interpret different things as fearful, angerinducing, or joyous. Moreover, whether we identify an emotion as anger or rage, sorrow or grief,
shame or guilt largely depends on contextual information and our relationship to the emotional
object. For example, I might describe my downcast feelings, thoughts, and bodily responses as
embarrassment or shame depending on what sort of norm I have violated. So we not only identify
emotions in general in terms of appraisals, we also identify our own emotions in a similar way.
Note that I have not argued for particular necessary conditions that are jointly sufficient for
an emotion. My position leaves open the possibility that an emotion involves only one appraisal,
affective or cognitive. This implies that there might be completely “cool” emotions that do not
result in bodily reactions of any sort. This may be theoretically possible. If stimulus information
proceeds along two pathways, it is possible that the lower pathway becomes blocked while the
cortical pathway remains intact (but disconnected from the amygdala and other brain areas that
lead to physiological responses; see Figure 5.1). Some variation on this idea would help to explain
cases of flattened affect in which we see cognitive processing with lessened non-cognitive
processing, as well as phobias—non-cognitive processing without cognitive processing (see
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Roseman and Smith 2000). However, I do not think that many such cases will occur in everyday
emotional responses. Even phobic or flattened affect cases will involve some kind of affective and
cognitive processing, even if they are irrational or inconsistent thoughts or beliefs. And the mere
thought of an emotion-laden stimulus may result in some bodily reactions—such as a galvanic skin
response, increased pulse, or dilated pupils—even if these reactions are not consciously felt.
This means that the traditional bifurcation of cognitive versus noncognitive emotion
theories may be largely defunct. It should be clear that, on my view, both noncognitive and
cognitive processes play valuable roles in bringing about one’s overall emotional state. This theory
is non-cognitive in the sense that emotions are not caused by an initial belief, judgment, or thought,
but rather by perceptual processes. Both the initial and later appraisal may occur quite rapidly and
without conscious awareness or feeling. However, emotions generally involve cognitive
information processing of environmental or internal stimuli. This means that emotions are
intentional; they are about something.
Finally, I argue that a multi-level appraisal theory of emotions is well-suited for bolstering
the SAV. My comments against the DAV functional argument strongly rely on the notion of
emotional regulation and modification. It is possible that we are initially motivated to act or
respond emotionally to fictional stimuli when we are engaged with a fiction, but due to other
cognitive judgments, beliefs, etc., we do not actually follow through with an action. This process
can now be characterized in terms of the multi-level appraisal view. The regulation and
modification of the emotion occurs with the later, cognitive appraisal which, in a sense, blocks any
action that we might be primed to take. Of course, neither appraisal need be conscious, so this is
consistent with our actual experiences of engaging with fictions.
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4. Rational fictional emotions

There is one more hurdle to scale before we have clearly established the SAV for emotions:
explaining emotional rationality. This follows from the idea that emotions are evaluative; we tend
to think that our emotions can get things right about the world. Our anger, fear, sorrow, etc. pick
out some feature in our environment, and they do so correctly. Explaining emotional rationality is
a troublesome business in its own right. The challenge is propounded with fictional emotions. But
how could it be that our emotions concerning fictions are rational in the way that our real-life
emotions often are? If we cannot develop some account of rational fictional emotions, then we can
perhaps say that these emotional responses are distinct in this way.
I will argue for an account of rational fictional emotions in this section. There are several
different ways in which we can characterize this. Here I borrow concepts and terms from two
sources: Ronald de Sousa’s work on the semantics of emotions (their truth-conditions) (2002,
2004) and Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson’s extensive work on emotional normativity, norms
concerning when and how we should experience emotions (2000a, 2000b, 2008).
There are several ways in which emotions can be understood as being rational. First, an
emotional response may fit its object. An emotion fits its object if we have some reason to feel it.
We can compare the fit between an emotion and its object to that of a true belief and a state of the
world. Both spiders and battlefields may be fitting objects of fear; this evaluation is apt in some
way, as being proper formal objects. Our colleague’s promotion may be a fitting object of jealousy.
An off-color joke may be a fitting object of amusement. On my view, emotions fit their object in
case we have some reason to have them for that particular object (compare this to D’Arms and
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Jacobson’s slight different account of fit, which they characterize in terms of a response-dependent
feature of the object that does not require reasons or norms).
Second, emotions may have truth values. De Sousa explains emotional truth in terms of the
success and satisfaction conditions. An emotion’s success corresponds how they describe their
object; there is something that bears the relevant emotional property. In order for an emotion to be
satisfied, however, implies that the emotional property actually obtains in some object.
Finally, we can also speak of an emotion’s propriety. I take propriety to carry morally
normative implications; it suggests that there are appropriate contexts in which we can or should
have certain emotions. Importantly, fit, truth and propriety may not always match in any particular
object. An emotion may fit its object, or even be successful in de Sousa’s terms, but not necessarily
be the proper response to take. For example, even if a battlefield is a fitting object of fear, it may
not be proper for a soldier to feel if he or she has an important task to fulfill. If our colleague is
also our friend it may be improper for us to be jealous of her promotion—we should be happy for
her—even if it is fitting for us to be, since, perhaps, we were also due for a promotion and did not
get one. When we conflate the fit and propriety of emotions, we commit the moralistic fallacy:
taking the morally normative implications to be built into our emotional responses towards things
in our environment (D’Arms & Jacobson 2001a).
I will discuss each type of emotional rationality in the course of the following sections,
focusing particularly on the special issues that fictions present. Ultimately, I will argue that we
should characterize the rationality of our emotional responses in terms of fit (apt reasons we have
for justifying a particular emotion) rather than truth (success conditions).
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4.1. Is it epistemically rational to have emotions about fictional objects?
Since Plato and the Stoics, many philosophers have held that some emotions are epistemically
harmful and thwart our ability to reason clearly. However, recent literature in cognitive science
has begun to debunk the traditional bifurcation between rationality and emotions, showing that
emotions are often necessary (or at least useful) for planning, making important decisions, and
making moral judgments (Ben-Ze’ev 2001, Damasio 1994, Gordon 1987, Nichols 2004, Solomon
1993, etc.). It is debatable that these benefits extend to our emotions about fictions. For instance,
Currie (1995) points out that the concept of epistemic emotional rationality is puzzling because
fictions generally present a reader with a great deal of false information. This could undermine her
ability to function in the real world if she takes it literally.
We have already encountered Radford’s argument that fictions commit us to inconsistent
beliefs. Most theorists now reject the notion that emotions necessarily involve beliefs, especially
the belief that the emotional object exists. According to the multi-level appraisal theory that I have
presented, we can experience emotional responses towards fictional objects even if we know that
these objects do not exist in our world. We can eliminate Radford’s worry that fictional emotions
involve us in a rational inconsistency by denying that emotions require a belief in the existence of
the object of the emotion. However, one might still worry that our emotional involvement with
fictions somehow hinders our everyday epistemic capacities, since, as Currie points out, fictions
do not present us with factual information about the world. If our goal is to gain new information
and align our thoughts with the truth, then why are we wasting our time with fictions? Interestingly,
though, we also tend to think that we can learn something valuable from fictions. Fictions would
be epistemically useful in this sense.
Of course, we are not always concerned with gaining factual information from ficitons. We
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read novels and watch movies for entertainment, to relax, and to escape our everyday lives. We
may not expect to acquire factual truths from fictions. Interestingly, many philosophers argue that
fictions have something to teach us even in these capacities. Instead of factual truths about the
world, we learn about emotional, moral, and psychological tendencies and trends, while also
honing our own moral and emotional capacities.
Our emotional responses to the characters in a fictional often clue us in to significant
features of a work. Jenefer Robinson (2005) argues that we can may gain a sentimental education
by engaging with fictions. When reading a novel or watching a film, we witness the exploits of a
character, access his thoughts, and analyze his behavior. Robinson claims that fictions can teach
us important and interesting folk psychological facts if we are aware of and reflect on our
emotional reactions to a character. We may be surprised by the emotions we experience in the
course of a story and how our opinion of a character shifts as the plot progresses. We can learn
about our own emotional preconceptions upon later reflection of our emotional experience.
Robinson also suggests that our actual experience of reading a novel helps our sentimental
education. We learn to focus our attention on various details about a person or character, shift our
points of view between different characters, and reflection on our responses.
I agree that the emotional content of fictions can be highly useful for informal emotional
training. I would also like to add the idea that emotions provide meaning and context to the fictional
scenarios. Robert Gordon (1987) argues that we are often unable to correctly interpret a scene if
we are unable to understand the emotional expressions and displays of the people in it. I argued in
the previous chapter that we understand another’s behaviors, decisions, and mental states partly
by understanding their emotional reactions. Gordon’s point is that some fictions would make less
sense to us without our own emotional responses toward them.
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Consider the Heider and Simmel movie in which several triangles move about a screen and
the participant in the study is invited to narrate what takes place. Participants generally describe
the scene as if the objects moving about had mental states, referring to the triangles as “he” or
“she” and interpreting their behaviors in terms of the triangles’ desires and emotions. This exam
is utilized to test the participant’s social cognitive capacities, their ability to recognize and interpret
the mental states of others (Baron-Cohen 1990, Frith & Happé 1994). It may be that the participant
recognizes emotional behavior in the objects and, in turn, experiences emotions themselves. The
participant may fear for a particular triangle, feel anger toward another, and be happy and relieved
when the big triangle is thwarted in the end of the clip. These emotions are the basis of our feeling
with fictional characters, as well as people in our real lives. Emotional responses illustrate who
and what we find important and imbue a situation with significance.
A study by Heberlein and Adolphs (2004) further suggests that we project meaning onto
the world via our emotions. In their study, they examined the ability of patient SM, who has
complete, bilateral damage to the amygdala (which is generally associated with processing
emotional information) due to Urbach-Wiethe disease. SM has normal visual perception, attention,
language ability, and IQ, but seems to be impaired in making some emotional and social judgments
about human faces. In the study, SM was compared with nine other healthy controls (matched for
age, gender, and education) as well as subjects with damage to the OFC (orbito-frontal cortex, also
associated with emotional and social processing) in her responses to the Heider and Simmel film.
This test was specifically designed to examine the role of the amygdala in influencing social
meaning, ruling out other factors such as intelligence or damage to other parts of the brain that are
associated with emotions. Heberlein and Adolphs found that, in comparison to both control groups,
SM described the movie in less emotional and socially significant terms. SM discussed the
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movement of the shapes in the film instead of using social and emotional descriptions; for instance,
saying that “the big triangle moves inside the square” instead of “the bigger triangle was in
control…he wanted to destroy things.”
In sum, our emotional engagements with fictions may have practical and educational value
even if fictions are not truth-seeking. Our emotional responses towards fictions are epistemically
rational in the sense that they help us to develop cognitive skills that are useful in real-life cognitive
processes.

4.2. True emotions
One way of understanding the rationality of emotions is in terms of their potential truth-aptness.
Consider how the multi-level appraisal theory understands emotional appraisals: we perceive some
object in our environment as bearing on our well-being (or that of someone we care about) because
it embodies an emotionally relevant property. The fact that emotions have truth conditions would
suggest that the emotional property must actually correspond to the object it describes. De Sousa
(2002, 2004) has developed an account of emotional truth that may shed light on emotional truth.
According to his schema,

E(p) is satisfied iff p is true;
E(p) is successful iff p actually fits E’s formal object,

in which E is the emotion and p is the corresponding state of affairs (de Sousa 2004, 170).
Suppose that the formal object of fear is “the dangerous.” It is appropriate to feel fear
towards objects that we evaluate as dangerous to us or someone we care about. An emotion is
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satisfied if it refers to an object correctly; it is successful if it evaluates its object correctly.
Consider the fear of falling off the side of a cliff when you are on a hike. This fear is satisfied if
you recognize that there is some object (the cliff) that is the proper object for fear. Perhaps we are
quite close to the cliff so that it is a real possibility that we could take a tumble and doing so would
be harmful. Our fear is only successful if that evaluation is correct. If it is likely that we could trip
and fall off the side of the cliff, then our fear is successful. But we can imagine a situation in which
it is very unlikely that we would fall because there are guard rails along the cliff edge or our path
never comes within fifteen feet of the edge. In that case, our fear would be satisfied, but
unsuccessful.
Could we have a successful, but unsatisfied fear? Since satisfaction is a reference relation,
de Sousa argues that it requires that there is some actual object that is the target of one’s emotions.
It is unclear what sort of ontological status the object must have (concrete, possible, or abstract).
Could the fear of a monster be satisfied? De Sousa doesn’t specifically address this issue; however,
he does refer to the fear of a monster as unsatisfied, meaning that the fearful object doesn’t exist.
Consider my discussion of ‘existence’ in §2.3. I argued that a fictional entity may exist as an
abstract entity. If that is the case, then it would seem that a fictional object could be satisfied
because it does actually exist and is represented in a certain way (as having emotional properties).
It just isn’t a concrete particular. Furthermore, fear of a monster may still be successful even if we
do not recognize that it exists. This is so if we recognize that the fictional monster is represented
as a dangerous creature.
Even if the emotion is unsatisfied, it could still be true on this schema. De Sousa argues
that emotional truth only requires success. When successful, we have made an appropriate
evaluation of the formal object of the emotion even if it does not map on to an actual, concrete
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object. This is perfectly compatible with my multi-level appraisal theory. I have argued that the
initial affective appraisal of a fictional object, like a monster, may occur in spite of one’s
knowledge that the monster is not real. This is because the recognition of the potentially dangerous
stimuli automatically results in an affective appraisal as if the monster were real. It isn’t until a
later, cognitive appraisal that we evaluate the object of our fear in terms of its existence (see Harris
2000). We may initially experience all the tell-tale signs of fear as though the monster were real:
sweaty palms, covering our eyes, racing heart, etc. Slower cognitive feedback influences, controls,
or regulates the initial appraisal and its behavioral responses. Our initial affective appraisal of the
object of the emotions is similar to de Sousa’s success condition: it evaluates a stimulus as
dangerous even if it is not real. The second, cognitive appraisal works like the satisfaction
condition, evaluating whether or not there actually is an object to be feared, and regulating the
emotion accordingly.

4.3. Truth vs. fit
Emotional truth is based on whether the emotion appropriately describes its object; whether our
emotion evaluates its object successfully. In order to see how an emotion can be true, we must also
explain how it can be false. One might think that emotions are completely subjective and vary
from person to person. Can we have a relative notion of emotional truth?
The challenge for this view is to explain how the emotional success is not merely, or
completely, subjective. Emotional truth cannot be like (gustatory) taste, in which there is no way
to determine whether a taste is incorrect, because taste cannot be incorrect. Taste is subjective;
you either like ice cream or you do not. We cannot claim that my dislike of ice cream is false.
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De Sousa saves his conception of emotional truth from complete subjectivism by arguing
that an emotion’s success does not merely depend on an individual’s idiosyncratic evaluation of
an object. Three factors are involved in evaluating an emotion’s success: an individual’s
personality and background values, biology, and society/culture. According to de Sousa, only the
first of these lends itself to a subjectivist reading. First, how one responds to a perceived act of
injustice depends on one’s personal context, history, beliefs, and values. Second, biological
factors, such as innate or basic core relational themes or emotion proper properties, will likely play
a role in the correctness of an emotion. For example, it may be that we are innately predisposed to
respond with anger towards certain acts that we witness (e.g. violence). However, biology alone
cannot tell us how to successfully emotionally respond to certain objects. Social and cultural norms
will set a standard of truth as well. Every culture may associate anger with perceived harm and
sorrow with loss, but different cultures with count different instances and circumstances as
examples of harm and loss. The responses of our collective social group will also factor into a
standard of emotional truth.
De Sousa leaves his notion of truth purposefully open ended, with no set rules for
determining truth in any particular situation. He does not see this as a problem for his account.
However, even with the various personal, biological, social and cultural norms in play, it is likely
that the truth of an emotional response cannot be generalized across objects for different people.
Rather, different people will determine the success of an emotion on a case-by-case basis. If that
is so, then in what sense is emotional truth really truth, unless it can be conceived of as relative to
persons?
Consider an example in relation to fictions. In chapter four I introduced Carroll’s notion of
criterial prefocusing, the notion that our emotional responses towards fictions are guided by
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features of the narrative. Maybe prefocusing is enough to establish true emotional responses.
Is there a way in which my emotion toward a character could be false, by unsuccessfully
characterizing its object? I have never really liked the character Brutus in Shakespeare’s Julius
Caesar. I was horrified that he would betray his friend, even though his friend was an egotistical
despot. I remain unconvinced even at the end of the play when Marc Antony praises Brutus’s
honor and love of Rome. In other cases, one might sheepishly admit to admiring a wholly
unsympathetic fictional villain. I am perversely intrigued by Nurse Ratched from One Flew over
the Cuckoo’s Nest (both the novel and the film) even though I know that you are not really supposed
to like her. She is never presented in a sympathetic light, even when the patients on the psyche
ward debate the merits of raping her. Perhaps due to my horror at this and other allusions to sexual
violence, along with my empathetic feelings towards the nurse as the sole woman in a position of
power in a male-dominated arena, I feel some compassion for Nurse Ratched. And yet, this seems
like the exact opposite of how the narrative is intended to guide my feelings.
Prefocusing presupposes that there is some emotional guide to our experience of a fiction.
An author, playwright, or movie production team intends for their audience to respond positively
to certain characters and negatively towards others. This is what makes the fiction work. It seems
like something has gone wrong for me emotionally if I watch The Dark Knight and do not feel
sympathy for Batman and repulsed by the Joker. The information we are given about a character,
the perspective and point of view of the narrative, the symbolism, language, lighting, music—
basically every controllable aspect of a fiction—all work together to guide the audience to a certain
response. Perhaps if we do not respond in the way the authors intended, then our emotion is false.
In De Sousa’s words, my emotion towards the protagonist or antagonist of the fiction would not
be successful.
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I think that prefocusing often does play an important role in shaping an audience’s response
to a fiction. However, I am skeptical that it can ground a theory of emotional truth—nor, indeed,
does Carroll intend for it to do so. It is quite possible that a reader is sensitive to all of the narrative
and linguistic ploys that an author incorporates into his or her work. No matter how clever and
playful Nabokov portrays Humbert Humbert or how protective and caring Dexter Morgan
becomes throughout his show, some audience members will simply never like these characters.
This relates to a point I raised earlier with de Sousa’s theory of correctness: each individual
audience member approaches the fiction with his or her own values, beliefs, and personal/social
history. These background features shape how we emotionally respond to the fiction. My strong
conviction that a true friend should never betray their companion bars me from admiring Brutus’s
honor. This is so even as I recognize that Brutus was trying to do what was best for Rome, he acted
honorably in the face of death, etc.
I remain unconvinced that there is a way to define emotional truth for fictions.
Furthermore, it may be questionable that real-life emotions can have universal truth conditions,
especially since our commonplace emotional responses lack any kind of prefocusing. Perhaps
some other theory can help us to define emotional truth. However, any such theory runs the risk
of overgeneralizing emotional responses and ignoring the diversity of potential responses that
people can take.
I think that emotional fit can take the place of truth for explaining the rationality of our
emotional responses towards fictions. The appropriateness of our emotions can be explained in
terms of whether or not we have reason to respond in a certain way. Emotional fittingness may
vary from person to person and context to context. This is important if we think of emotions as
appraisals; not everyone will evaluate a particular person or situation in the same way, and so they
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will not necessarily emotionally respond to it in the same way.
An emotion’s fit can also be evaluated in terms of its shape and size (D’Arms & Jacobson
2000b). Shape refers to how an emotion represents the properties of its object. This can be a source
of error in an emotional appraisal, when one’s emotion presents an object as having (or lacking) a
property that is does not (or does) actually have. An emotion’s size refers to its intensity. I can be
either annoyed or irate that my friend broke her promise to me, slightly downtrodden or
overwhelmed by grief upon the death of my favorite movie star. We can also make errors in terms
of an emotion’s size, such as when the strength of an emotional response is out of proportion with
its object.
Emotional fit helps us to understand when it is reasonable to have an emotion, but makes
no claims concerning when we ought to have one. So fitness avoids the subjectivity problem that
bothers theories of emotional truth. Whether or not our real-life fear is fitting will depend on
context, our beliefs about the object, social norms, and its relation to us. Note that this is a different
notion than the fittingness of displaying certain emotions, which may also be subject to social
norms, both for real life events and in response to fictions (see Prinz 2004a, chapter 6). It might be
strange to display intense anger when we are watching a film with relatives or people with whom
we are not very close. But if we are having fun with friends and trying to make a point, then our
angry display might be just fine. In some situations, it may be perfectly appropriate for us to
respond angrily to a perceived slight in the real world, such as when we are with close friends. In
other situations, the emotional display might not be fitting and expressing it would be extremely
inappropriate.
Emotional fit can also explain my unusual emotional responses to Brutus from Julius Cesar
and Nurse Ratched from One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest. I had decent justifications for my

199

feelings about Brutus Nurse Ratched. In that sense, my emotional responses were rational. My
emotions fit their object. Part of the rationality of my emotions is due to my own personal
background beliefs, values, and assumptions that I bring to my experience of the fictions. Not
everyone will share my positions and so not everyone will have the same emotional responses that
I do. These responses are rational—that is, reasonable—even if they are abnormal.

4.4. Emotional propriety
Virtually any scenario, person, or thing—real or fictional—can serve as the object of our emotions.
As we saw in the previous subsections, the context in which we find ourselves will make those
emotions fitting. Our understanding of emotional rationality goes beyond this distinction, however.
Not only do we wish to know if it is appropriate or understandable that we experience an emotion,
we also may want to know which situations we should or should not have particular emotional
responses, as well as whether we can be held praise or blameworthy for doing so. I call this
emotional propriety: the conditions under which we should be held morally accountable for our
emotions towards fictions or real-life objects.
Consider the following example. A recent episode of Game of Thrones (“The Rains of
Castamere”) presents a gruesome and heart-wrenching scene in which several major characters—
the heroes and moral compasses of the series—are brutally betrayed and murdered, marking the
end of an honorable family’s just rebellion. Distraught fans displayed their dismay online and on
television immediately after the episode aired. They were outraged by the “Red Wedding” and
what it implied for the rest of the series. These fans felt shocked, sad, angry, and betrayed, just as
if someone they knew in real-life had met the Stark family’s fate. In an interview after the episode
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released, Martin commented that the scene was “like murdering two of [my] children. I try to make
the readers feel they’ve lived the events of the book. Just as you grieve if a friend is killed, you
should grieve if a fictional character is killed. You should care. If somebody dies and you just go
get more popcorn, it’s a superficial experience isn’t it?” (Hibberd 2013).
Fans of the television show certainly did feel very strongly about the Red Wedding. The
question is whether they should have. Martin clearly indicates that we should feel powerful
emotional responses towards fictions. Otherwise our engagements with fiction constitute “a
superficial experience.” Indeed, we might find it odd and slightly off-putting to learn that a friend
of ours finds a story interesting and enjoyable, but nevertheless remains totally disconnected from
the characters. On the other hand, one might think that those of us who react very strongly to
fictions are wasting “emotional energy” that might be put to better use towards things in the real
world that deserve our attention, such as social injustices, real-life friends, natural disasters, etc.:
the real sufferings of real people.
On what basis can we justify or condemn such emotions? One way to understand this is in
terms of the responsibility for our emotions. It is often understood that we can be held morally
praise or blameworthy only when we are responsible for our actions and moral judgments. Perhaps
the same idea can apply to our emotions.
It might seem strange to hold someone responsible for their emotions. After all, it often
feels like emotions are uncontrollable, and control may be a minimal requirement for
responsibility. Robert Solomon argued that we can hold people responsible for their emotions
(Solomon 1993 & 2004; see also Ben Ze-ev 2001). He notes that emotions are judgments; they do
not happen to us. They are something that we do. Certain aspects of emotions are clearly
involuntary. Alas, we cannot help blushing from embarrassment or experiencing the pangs of
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grief. But other aspects of an emotion are voluntary. We can control the situations in which we
put ourselves, the knowledge and information that we seek out, and our behaviors towards others.
All of these influence our emotions. We can control the actions we perform on the basis of
emotions (to a certain extent), like yelling when we are angry or wallowing in self-pity. It seems,
then, that we can be held responsible for some aspects of our emotion. Note that according to the
multi-level theory, emotions first arise as the result of an affective appraisal. All that I have said
to this point suggests that this preliminary appraisal is not under our conscious, cognitive control.
However, one could argue that the second, modifying aspect of our emotional may be under our
control. In fact, there is a great deal of empirical and theoretical work on emotional regulation that
suggests that our emotions can be modified, influenced, and controlled by cognitive feedback (see
Gross 2007). If that is the case, then maybe we can be held responsible for them in some cases.
I will make one (perhaps obvious) suggestion: we should hold people responsible for their
emotions when they cause (or are caused by) morally praiseworthy or blameworthy behaviors. Of
course, what counts as praise or blameworthy will vary depending on the situation. Typically,
though, I think that our responses can be evaluated in terms of the actual or potential harm or
happiness they may cause. We can relate this back to the notion of fit. We can be held responsible
for unfitting emotions as well as for fitting ones. Others may find our misshaped emotions
blameworthy if they distort a situation inaccurately. We can also be held praise or blameworthy
for an emotion’s size: if a friend’s anger is way out of proportion with its object (say, snapping at
another friend for accidentally spilling coffee on her book), then we may blame our friend for her
inaccurate emotion. Finally, the very reasons that we have for a particular emotion may be subject
to praise or blame. We do not take accidentally spilled coffee on a book as a good reason for anger
(especially extreme anger). We would say that this is not a good reason for a particular emotion;
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the reason does not justify the outburst.
If I’m right, then there are situations in which we can hold people responsible for their
everyday emotions. What about our emotions towards fictions? They seem to be a particularly
interesting case, because their object does not actually exist in our world. Perhaps this is an
ontological difference that makes a difference for emotional responsibility.
Actually, I don’t think that it does. I think that we should hold people responsible for their
emotions towards fictions in the same types of situations and for the same types of reasons that we
would hold them responsible in the actual world. Consider a young woman whose sorrow over the
death of a fictional heartthrob causes her to mope, lose sleep, or do poorly on a school exam. I
think that many people would contend that she lacks control of her emotional responses and should
be held responsible for the resulting actions. We would likely say the same thing if the woman’s
sorrow was the result of a real person’s death, someone like a movie star or athlete with whom she
has no personal relationship. The fact that the object of her emotion isn’t a concrete particular does
not seem to make much of a difference in this case. We will hold people responsible when their
emotions lead to bad results or themselves or others.
We can finally return to Red Wedding example. Are our strong emotions appropriate in
this case? First, we must ask whether the emotions fit their object. If we grant that the death of a
beloved character may be an acceptable reason to feel sorrow, then the emotion is fitting and has
a proper shape. One could argue, however, that it is mis-sized; the emotion may be far too strong
for what the case warrants. To determine whether this is true, I think that we need to turn to our
notion of emotional responsibility. Are we so caught up in the story and so distraught that we
ignore other pressing duties? If so, then perhaps we do not feel as we should. Otherwise, I am
inclined to say that the emotional response is appropriate.
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5. Summary

I have argued in this chapter that we have genuine, rational emotional responses towards fictions.
There were three distinct claims. First, our emotional responses towards fictions are genuine
mental states. My arguments here involved dissolving the paradox of fiction. I argued that the
functionalist assumptions that are implicit in the paradox are unfounded because we can be
motivated to act in response to fictions. I also argued that emotions towards fictions play the same
type of inferential role as real-life emotions, that our emotional feelings are genuine and nonillusory, and that we make genuine emotional evaluations of fictional objects. These claims paved
the way for the SAV, but left open the question of the nature of our emotional responses to fictions.
My second major claim in this chapter is that our emotions in general should be thought
of in terms of a multi-level appraisal of emotionally relevant objects. Our emotional responses
involve low level perceptual and affective processes and slower cognitive processes that work
together in a feedback loop. These processes combined make up a temporally extended emotional
process, including conscious qualitative feelings. Because I do not think that our emotions require
a belief in the existence of an object, we can say that our emotional responses towards fictions are
genuine emotions.
Finally, I have argued that our emotions towards fictions can be rational. It makes sense
that we should have emotional responses towards objects that we know do not exist. Indeed, our
emotional interactions with fictions are often epistemically fruitful. Our emotional responses
towards fictions are often appropriate—or, in my terms, fitting—according to an individual’s
personal experiences, background, beliefs about the fiction, as well as the content of the fiction
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itself. Our emotional responses about fictions can be sometimes be proper or improper. This means
that we can be held responsible for them in some cases.
The overall purpose of this chapter was to understand the nature and expression of our
emotional responses towards fictions, especially those emotions that may be involved in our moral
evaluations of the fiction. This was important to my project for several reasons. First, I suspect
that emotions play a role in our moral judgments, an idea that I will further develop in the following
chapter. Second, we saw in the previous section how propositional attitudes like beliefs can be
understood to be genuine. This chapter solidified the SAV in terms of emotions as well as dissolved
the elusive paradox of fiction. Finally, explaining my views on genuine, rational, fictional
emotions will prove to be quite useful in chapters 7, 8, and 9 when I explain the three remaining
puzzles of fiction: the sympathy for the devil phenomenon, the puzzle of imaginative resistance,
and the question of moral learning.

Appendix

I would like to consider four potential objections to my multi-level appraisal theory of emotions.
Several of these objections present challenges to any theory of emotions (2, 4) and some to
appraisal theories in general (1, 3). Luckily, my theory can handle each of them.

Objection 1: Appraisal theories cannot explain emotional responses to novel stimuli.
All appraisal theories hold that emotions are responses to stimuli in one’s internal or external
environment that bear on one’s wellbeing, or the wellbeing of a person or object on cares about.
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The appraisal is typically understood in terms of a response to an emotion-proper property; we
appraise stimuli with respect to the associations we make between them and past experiences that
we have had with similar objects, people, or situations.
But what about entirely novel stimuli, objects that are not yet associated with a particular
emotionally relevant property? How do we respond emotionally to them?
Novel stimuli would be a problem for any theory of emotions that has no argument for how
we acquire knowledge and concepts of emotionally relevant properties. In §3.2, I suggested that
some emotional information may be innate (as in the case of looming objects or darkness; see
Damasio 1994, LeDoux 2012) and some may be learned. At least some of our emotional
associations are likely acquired through social learning and experience. It has been the task of child
development researchers to discover how this learning process takes place. The psychologists Dare
Baldwin and Louis Moses (1994) studied how very young children gain emotional understanding
from their parents (see also Stein 1996). Between the ages of 2 to 3 months, children are able to
discriminate between happy and sad facial expressions. At the same age, they are able to track
another person’s line of vision by noticing that a parent is looking away from them. They can also
follow pointing gestures to objects that are close by. These are three examples of early
communicative capacities. Put together, they lead to a social referencing phenomenon which
develops at around 8 to 12 months: when a child is presented with an unfamiliar object or person,
she will typically glance toward a parent and then behave toward that object or person in terms of
the affective cues that the parent displays. Based on these observations, Baldwin and Moses
conclude that infants often spontaneously seek emotional information from a parent in order to
help them know how to interact with the new object. This involves an implicit recognition that
emotions have intentional and referential qualities (Baldwin & Moses 1994).
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So we may not be able to respond emotionally to novel stimuli until we learn more about
object and how our social group typically responds to them. Or, in other situations, if we learn to
associate objects with certain positive or negative qualities through our own individual
experiences. This is a question that bears on all theories of emotions, not just mine.

Objection 2: Emotions vs. moods vs. startle responses vs.…
One of the challenges facing emotion theorists is to define the difference between emotions and
other sorts of affective states. What is the difference between full-fledged emotions and moods?
Are startle responses full-fledged emotions? I have not presented answers to these questions in this
chapter. However, I think that my process approach may help us to sketch a response to both.
Startle responses are sometimes not taken to be genuine or “full-fledged” emotions because
they are short-lived and cognitively impenetrable (Carroll 2008). On my view, a startle response
would be a quick, automatic appraisal of an object that results from low level processing
(LeDoux’s “low road”) and so does count as a real emotion. A loud noise may trigger a subcognitive appraisal of something potentially dangerous, for example. The response may initially
be processed by the same neural structures (the sensory thalamus and amygdala, in this case) but
without the slower, cortical processing. Cognitive processing happens slightly later. This is when
we will consciously experience fear—perhaps only for a few seconds, before we realize that it was
just a car back-firing that made the loud noise, and not a gun. Perhaps the same sort of idea can
apply to other low level affective responses, such as mimicry, mirroring, and emotional contagion.
Moods are a bit more challenging to explain. Moods are sometimes thought to be longerlasting than emotions, free-floating and lacking an intentional object—in my case, not associated
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with a core relational theme or emotion-proper property, or dispositional states as opposed to
occurrent ones (see Prinz 2004a for an overview of positions).
There are problems with each of these views. Sometimes emotions can last a long time and
moods can be short lived. They can also be dispositional; I may be disposed to undergo an angry
state whenever I witness my neighbor going through my mail or an affectionate state whenever I
see a French bulldog. The intentionality proposal would be the most difficult for the multi-level
appraisal theory: how can we make affective appraisals if there is no thing to appraise? Yet it is
difficult to explain how moods can be caused if they lack intentionality. Surely there has to be
something that triggers a mood. Carroll (2003) proposes that moods may “spillover” from
emotions so that we experience a state that is similar to an emotion, but applies to many different
objects as opposed to just one (see also Prinz 2004a). This would help to explain how moods are
caused and also how they come to be associated with certain feelings and appraisals; for example,
we associate a cranky mood with something annoying or offensive and a cheerful mood from a
random act of kindness or sunny day.
We can explain this in terms of my multi-level appraisal theory. Recall that, on this view,
emotions are temporally extended. They involve different non-cognitive and cognitive appraisal
processes in a feedback loop. We have an emotion when an object is initially appraised both via
cognitive and non-cognitive processes. This may generate physical and physiological responses,
including feelings. Some of these responses/feelings may be long-lasting and continue to influence
our mental states throughout the day. Thus, if our original emotion was positive-valenced, we may
continue to take in new information and process it in light of that earlier positive state. The result
would be continued positive affect, but without a specific object: a good mood.
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Objection 3: What about drug-induced emotions?
Imagine that there is a drug that you can take that will make you consciously experience the exact
same phenomenological feelings you would if you were elated, ashamed, or enraged. Would these
feelings be genuine emotions? It does not seem like they could they be if an appraisal theory is
correct—after all, there is no appraisal occurring in this case. And yet many people will want to
claim that drug-induced states are genuine emotions.
It looks like my any appraisal theory will just have to bite the bullet on this one and deny
that drug-induced feelings are actual emotions. However, I don’t see this as a problem for my view.
I think that part of the appeal of cases like the drug induced affective state stems from our implicit
commitment to a feeling theory of emotions. We generally have access to our emotional state
through our emotions through their conscious feel: the positive, good feeling of joy, the uplifting
feeling of pride, and down-trodden feeling of sorrow, or the frenzied feeling of anger. These
feelings seem like the most important part of our emotion because they are the most salient.
However, there are at least some reasons why we can question whether feelings alone constitute
an emotion. We do not individuate emotions by their feelings alone. Rather, we tend to think that
emotions play certain functional and inferential roles as well.
Imagine that you take a drug that makes you feel just like you would if you suffered some
irreconcilable loss—but, in fact, no sorrowful event has taken place. That means we have an
affective feeling without an appraisal, and so no genuine emotion. Does this go against our
commonsense notion of what it means to experience an emotion? I doubt it. If someone were to
ask you if anything is the matter, you may respond “I feel sad.” The concerned friend would likely
follow up by asking why you are sad. She would ask you to make some appraisal of an event or
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object. You would likely respond by saying “Oh, I’m not really sad, I just took this pill that’s made
me loopy. I’ll be better soon.”
Compare this to an actual case of sorrow. When your concerned friend asks if anything is
the matter, you say “I am sad” and then, perhaps, go on to explain the object or cause of your
sorrow: “My best friend just moved to Prague and I’m afraid that I won’t see her again for a very
long time.” The point is that genuine emotions may play certain functional and inferential roles
that are explained by some object or cause of our feeling, not merely by the feeling alone.

Objection 4: How to explain pure-instrumental music?
Imagine listening to Mozart’s Clarinet Concerto. You are in a particularly reflective state of mind,
so you decide to keep track how this piece makes you feel: you find the tempo of the first
movement uplifting, the introduction of the clarinet a pleasant change, the somber, doleful tones
of the second movement rather disheartening.
We describe music as having emotional qualities. We also think that we have emotional
responses to purely instrumental, non-representational musical works. But why? What is the
source of these emotions—if they are emotions at all? This is especially puzzling if we think that
emotions are a kind of appraisal since there does not seem to be anything to appraise.
Questions like these have forced philosophers and cognitive scientists to scramble to find
a way to explain our emotional responses to music. No one denies that we do have affective
responses towards music. The question is whether these responses are genuine emotional states
(denied by both Davies 1994 & Kivy 1999), illusory states (Prinz 2004a), some other kind of
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affective state, such as a mood (Carroll 2003), or an “ineffable feeling” (Robinson 2010; see also
Renero & Tullmann, in prep).
There are actually three related questions here. The first concerns whether or not our
affective responses towards music constitute a genuine emotion (call this the genuine emotion
problem). Second, we need to know in what way music can be expressive of emotions. Call this
the foundational problem. Finally, we need to be able to explain the intentionality of our affective
responses towards music. If most theories of emotions take them to be some kind of evaluation of
our environment, we need to understand the nature of that evaluation. Call this the intentionality
problem.
These problems are interrelated: an answer to the foundational problem will explain the
intentionality problem, and the answer to the intentionality problem will explain the genuine
emotion problem. A full explanation of these issues would, sadly, require a chapter (or book) in
itself. Here I would just like to mention some possible responses to the foundational problem, each
of which would be compatible with my multi-level appraisal theory.
What is it that we affectively respond to in pure-instrumental music? We often respond
affectively to formal features of a piece: timbre, dynamics, pitch, tone, instrumentality, etc. The
difficulty here would be to explain how it is that these formal features of music are capable of
causing emotions (the intentionality problem). There are several ways in which we can explain
this (Robinson 2010).
First, it might be that we have appreciative emotional responses towards music (Kivy
1999). We respond to the beauty of a work or the craft involved in constructing it. These
appreciative responses take the work as a whole as their intentional object, but do not need to
explain how one aspect of music causes a particular affective response. Another possibility is that
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we respond affectively to instrumental music because we associate the sounds of the music with
other emotional situations or objects (see Prinz 2004a). We associate marches with patriotism and
hymns with piety. Or, we might associate a particular sound with a particular object, like an animal
or human voice. Finally, we might have an aesthetic response to understanding the structure of a
music work. We might feel relieved, surprised, satisfied, or unsettled by the introduction of certain
instruments, themes, or dynamics (Robinson 2010).
I think that all of these possibilities are compatible with my multi-level appraisal theory.
Importantly, our responses towards formal qualities of a piece—whether through association,
appreciative emotions, or structural qualities of a work—each involve a kind of appraisal of the
work or some related associated object. That is enough for the emotional appraisal process to get
off the ground. I think that it is also enough for us to explain why these are genuine emotions with
intentional objects. Unfortunately, that is a story for another day.

212

Chapter 6: Moral Appraisals of Fictions

1. Zombies, trolleys, & footbridges

Judith Jarvis Thompson’s “trolley problems” have become just as famous as the ethical theories
they were intended to comment on (Thompson 1986). The first trolley problem runs as follows:

A runaway trolley is headed for five people who will be killed if it proceeds on its
present course. The only way to save these people is to hit a switch that will turn
onto a side track, where it will run over and kill one person instead of five. It is
okay to turn the trolley in order to save five people at the expense of one? (Greene
2007).
Researchers have found that approximately 90% of participants who are presented with the trolley
problem agree that it is morally acceptable to flip the switch, thereby killing the solitary person
while saving five (Bucciarelli et al 2008).
Interestingly, the responses flip in the footbridge problem, a variation on the trolley
problem:

A runaway trolley threatens to kill five people, but this time you are standing next
to a large stranger on a footbridge spanning the tracks, in between the oncoming
trolley and the five people. The only way to save the five people is to push this
stranger off the bridge and onto the tracks below. He will die as a result, but his
body will stop the trolley from reaching the others. Is it okay to save the five people
by pushing this stranger to his death? (Greene 2007).

In this case, only about 10% of participants choose to push the stranger (Bucciarelli et al 2008).
Why are the responses so drastically different in these two cases?
The neuroscientist Joshua Greene and his colleagues have drawn several important
conclusions about the nature of morality from these two thought experiments. Greene and social
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psychologist Jonathan Haidt (2002) take the responses to these cases as evidence that emotional
intuitions play a role in our moral judgments, how we make moral evaluations. In another analysis
of these studies, Cushman, Young, and Greene (2010; see also Greene et al 2001 & Paxton et al
2011) take the divergence in responses to the two problems as evidence of a dual-process theory
of morality in which emotions and conscious reasoning play separate roles in our moral judgments.
Greene (2007) further concludes that the participants’ responses to the thought experiments
reveal the rational basis of utilitarianism and the emotional basis of deontology—a surprising
conclusion considering Kant’s own emphasis on reason. Greene explains his conclusion as
follows: we are able to rationally calculate the costs and benefits of saving five people over one in
the impersonal trolley problem because we are removed from the victim (the utilitarian response).
However, the up-close-and-personal footbridge problem evokes a strong negative emotional
reaction about the thought of pushing the stranger onto the tracks. It is challenging to rationally
overcome this reaction. Thus, respondents tend to make the deontological judgment that it is
unacceptable to kill an innocent person, even if doing so results in the preservation of five innocent
lives.
If we take these researchers at their word, then it seems that thought experiments can play
a significant role in gleaning ethical intuitions from everyday people. These intuitions are
paramount in providing counterexamples to normative ethical theories, support for others, and
evidence for how we actually make moral judgments.
Consider one more thought experiment:
It’s the zombie apocalypse. You and your band of survivors stumble upon a
secluded farm in the woods. To your relief, the farm is safe, quiet, and free from
wandering “walkers.” The only problem is that the owner of the famer has decided
to keep every walker he has encountered precariously locked in the barn near were
your group sleeps each night. Tension and fear mounts amongst your group. A few
members of the group do not want to destroy the walkers; they were people once,
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after all, and your group are guests on the farm. Others think that the walkers are a
threat and need to be eliminated for the sake of the group. You have to make a
decision—and fast. Do you agree to shoot the walkers, thereby breaking your
promise to the farmer?
Here we have another thought experiment in which one person must decide the fate of a group.
We must decide whether we should kill a few in order to save the many, or let the few live (even
if they are walkers) with the high risk that the group will be destroyed as a result. The additional
complication is that killing the walkers violates a promise the group made to the farmer.
This is not, strictly speaking, a thought experiment. It is a fiction (although I will argue that
some fictions are thought experiments in chapter 9). Fans of the television show The Walking Dead
will recognize this vignette as the central dilemma in the episode “Pretty Much Dead Already.”
The protagonist, Rick Grimes, must make a decision concerning the fate of his ragged band of
survivors. Like the trolley and footbridge cases, this episode tests our moral values. Some viewers
may take the rational response in the beginning of the episode (kill the walkers and break a promise
for the greater good). However, as Greene’s analysis would predict, these same viewers may
change their decision after they emotionally connect with the farmers. We learn that one of the
zombies is the farmer’s wife, another is his daughter, another is his son-in-law, and (most
importantly for the viewers) one is the young girl Sophia, who was separated from their group
days before. Some viewers may switch their decision from a rational response to an emotional
one upon receiving more personal information about the walkers and the farmer. Emotional
closeness in this case takes the place of the physical closeness implied in the trolley/footbridge
problems.
I have presented the trolley, footbridge, and “walker in the barn” cases to highlight the
similarities between our moral evaluations of traditional ethical thought experiments and the moral
scenarios presented in fictions. Most thought experiments just are fictions; they do not describe
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actual people or events. It is plausible, then, that the audiences’ responses to this case would likely
have the same sort of normative and metaethical implications as the trolley problems. In fact, most
fictional narratives are probably more realistic than standard philosophical thought experiments
because they capture the complexity and messiness of real world moral situations.
The fact that we may be able to learn about morality from fictional thought experiments is
important implication of the SAV. If we reason, judge, and feel about fictional event and people
the way we do towards real-life situations. My goal in this chapter is to integrate what we have
learned from previous chapters concerning our perception, social cognition, and emotional
responses towards fictions into a comprehensive moral psychology of fiction. In previous chapters,
we have determined that the mental states that could potentially be involved in our moral
judgments of fiction—our beliefs, thoughts, emotions, judgments, feelings, etc.—are all
stereotypical mental states. All that we have left to do is show that our moral judgments of fiction
are also genuine.
A moral psychology of fiction shouldn’t just concern itself with establishing whether or
not our moral judgments towards fiction are genuine mental states. It must also explain our actual
moral experiences. So establishing the SAV of moral judgments will only take up a short part of
this chapter. The rest will be devoted to explaining our moral judgments in general and those
towards fictional characters in particular.
In §2, I will make the case for a SAV of moral judgments about fictions. Next, I will sketch
a version of multi-level sentimentalism, the idea that both affective and reasoning processes are
involved in our moral judgments, based on the multi-level appraisal theory of emotions I presented
in the previous chapter. We will then be ready to address another puzzle of fiction: the problem of
moral motivation. I then bring together the various components of our emotional and moral
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responses to fictions that I have argued for in the past several chapters, presenting a unified account
of the moral psychology of fiction. I will conclude this chapter by returning to our discussion of
the semantic and normative implications of emotions in order to see how this bears on the
rationality of our moral judgments about fictions.

2. Genuine moral judgments

In the previous five chapters, I have established the SAV for our beliefs, perception, emotions, and
social cognitive capacities. Our mental engagements with fiction utilize the same types of
psychological states that we use in our everyday experiences. Any differences in our emotions,
beliefs, and motivations to act towards fictional objects can be explained in terms of the intentional
content of those states. This is what I mean by taking the fictional stance; we acknowledge that the
objects of our engagement are fictional. This affects how we mentally respond to them.
We can make the same claims about our moral judgments about fictional characters and
events. I will argue that moral judgments are constituted by both emotional and rational processes,
including moral beliefs and judgments. There is no reason why our moral judgments are nonstereotypical if emotions, beliefs, and judgments about fictional objects are all stereotypical states.
Still, a proponent of the DAV could contend that there is something unique about moral
judgments. Why would we make moral judgments about something that doesn’t exist?
Furthermore, aren’t moral judgments supposed to be motivating? If that’s right, and we have
genuine moral judgments about fictions, then shouldn’t we be motivated to act on them? I will
address these questions in what follows. I will begin by discussing the nature of moral judgments.
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I contend that our moral judgments about fictional things are genuine. This is true on any theory
concerning the constituents of our moral judgments.
It is important to understand the nature of moral judgments so that we can make sure that
there is nothing unique about moral judgments that might render those about fictions nonstereotypical. Most of the controversy concerning our moral judgments centers around three
questions.17 First, where do moral beliefs and motivations come from? We need to know whether
our moral values are learned or innate, culturally influenced, or deduced from rational principles
or emotions. Second, how does moral judgment work? Here, we wish to determine which mental
processes and mechanisms are involved in how we actually go about making moral judgments
(Haidt and Bjorkland 2007). Finally, what is different about our moral judgments about fictions,
if anything?
I will primarily focus on the second and third question in this chapter, although I will
mention the first when relevant. To begin, I will discuss moral judgments as types of occurrent,
internal states or processes. There are two general views concerning how we make moral
judgments. The first is rationalism. Rationalists argue that moral judgments are based on conscious
reasoning and deliberating. Rationalism has a long philosophical tradition. Plato believed that our
souls should be governed by our reason and that emotions bar us from making good moral
decisions (Plato 1985). Contra Greene, Kant argued that the Categorical Imperative was both a
universal and logical means of deliberation that a rational agent could employ to determine whether
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One issue I do not address in this dissertation concerns the difference between moral and other
norms. In particular, I do not describe the moral/conventional distinction, a notion introduced by
Eliot Turiel and his colleagues (Turiel, Killen, & Helwig 1987; see also Nichols 2005. They argued
that moral norms differ from conventional ones in that they are serious, authority independent, and
considered wrong due to reasons of fairness and harm to others. Although the moral/conventional
distinction has been heavily criticized by moral psychologists (Bacciarelli 2008, Prinz 2007), it
remains one of the few systematic methods for separating moral from other norms.
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an action was morally acceptable (1785/1959). Contemporary Kantians like Christine Korsgaard
follow suit; ethical judgments are based on practical reason (Korsgaard 1986). Utilitarians like J.S.
Mill (1861/2002) and Peter Singer (1995) hold that our reasoning capacities allow us to weigh the
costs and benefits of a moral decision in order to maximize utility. Finally, the social psychologist
Lawrence Kohlberg conducted a series of (now highly controversial) studies that seemed to
indicate that children and young adults develop increasingly objective and universal moral
principles and can justify their moral decisions through conscious deliberation (Kohlberg 1981).
The details of how we actually can and should make moral judgments vary between
rationalists. However, they are all committed to the idea that moral judgments is necessarily based
on reason. We can contrast rationalism to sentimentalism. Sentimentalists argue that emotions play
a significant role in how we make moral judgments. Contemporary sentimentalists trace their roots
to David Hume, who famously stated that “Morality…is more properly felt than judged of” (quoted
in D’Arms and Jacobson 2000b).
There are several different approaches to how emotions are involved in our moral
judgments. I’ll mention three of them here (but see also Hauser 2006, Huebner et al 2008, Nichols
2005, 2005, & 2008, Roedder & Harman 2010, amongst others). The social intuitionist model
developed by Jonathan Haidt is one influential sentimentalist theory (2001; see also Haidt and
Bjorklund 2008). This view states that we arrive at moral judgments through triggered emotional
intuitions as opposed to conscious reasoning processes, although post hoc rationalization may be
employed when people are called upon to justify their moral judgments in social contexts. In
contrast, Jesse Prinz’s constructive sentimentalism (2006, 2007) holds that emotions are both
necessary and sufficient for moral judgments; the mere presence of certain emotions can make a
neutral judgment a moral one (see Wheatley & Haidt 2005) and those who possess emotional
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defects—i.e. psychopaths—do not make actual moral judgments (Blair 1995, Nichols 2005, Prinz
2007). We have already encountered Joshua Greene’s dual-process model (Greene 2002, Cushman
et al 2010). According to Greene, moral judgments are a non-natural kind; they involve both
emotional and rational processes. Emotions act as a kind of “alarm-bell” for moral transgressions
and are associated with personal actions. As we have seen, emotional responses typically lead to
deontological appraisals. Cognitive moral reasoning is generally based on impersonal evaluations
and is associated with consequentialist responses.
Like the rationalists, each sentimentalist has his or her own proposal on how emotions
relate to reasoning processes and how they bring about moral judgments and motivate action.
Nevertheless, they are all committed to the idea that emotions play some role in our moral
judgments and behaviors. In the following section, I will propose a type of multi-level
sentimentalism that is similar to Greene’s dual-process model.
My own view is based on my multi-level appraisal theory of emotions, as well as the
distinctions I have made throughout this dissertation between perceptual and cognitive processing.
While that the proponent of the SAV need not adopt the theory of moral judgments that I propose
here, it is beneficial for three reasons. First, I think that is good empirical support for some form
of sentimentalism, but also both empirical and theoretical reasons why cognitive reasoning
processes are also a significant part of our moral deliberation. Second, multi-level moral appraisal
theory squares nicely with my previous arguments concerning social cognition and emotions.
Finally, my view has great power to explain the remaining puzzles of fiction as well as capture our
actual moral experiences with fiction.
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3. A multi-level appraisal theory of moral judgments

While reading a novel or watching a film, you might have a vague sense that a character is morally
vicious or has done a bad thing. You might have fast, seemingly automatic negative reactions
towards that character for what she has done. This captures one sense of our moral judgments
about fictions: they are quick, non-reflective or deliberate, and often emotionally-laced. However,
our moral judgments of fictions can also be quite complex. Watching a realistic social drama like
The Wire may cause a viewer to consciously, deliberately, and thoughtfully weigh possible
judgments before reaching a firm conclusion as to the moral worth of a character or action. Our
moral judgments about fictions may generally be a mixture of the two types: both automatic, nonreflective and emotional as well as deliberate and thoughtful. My goal is to develop a theory of
moral judgments about fictions that accounts for the variety of our moral reactions.
In this section I will lay out one potential theory that can accommodate the depth of our
moral judgments about fictions. I call it a multi-level appraisal theory of moral judgments because
it is so closely related to my multi-level appraisal theory of emotions. I will spend the next two
sections discussing moral judgments in general before exploring the implications of my theory for
fictions.

3.1. Multiple appraisals
Like some other sentimentalists, I argue that our moral judgments are the result of both affective
and rational processes. Moral appraisals can be basic, automatic, and unconscious, just like our

221

emotional appraisals. They may also be complex, deliberate, and conscious. Recall that my multilevel appraisal theory of emotions posits at least two separate appraisals that work together in a
feedback loop. There was an initial affective appraisal of a stimulus in one’s external environment
or thoughts. At the same time, slower cognitive reasoning processes evaluate the stimulus through
conscious judgments and inference drawing, the implementation of context sensitive information,
background knowledge, and personal traits that promote, enhance, regulate, or modify the original
affective appraisal. Cognitive processing is sometimes required in order to identify a state (this
state is indignation as opposed to rage; guilt as opposed to shame) or the cognitive processing
influences the initial affective appraisal so as to become an entirely different state.
I think that the same sort of process occurs with moral appraisals. Following other
sentimentalists, I contend that we undergo an automatic affective appraisal of a stimulus, which is
quickly followed by another cognitive appraisal and other cognitive processes, often including
conscious reasoning. I hesitate to call the affective appraisal an emotional intuition, as Haidt does.
First of all, I do not think that all of our affective appraisals are innate or genetically determined.
As I suggested in the previous chapter, we can learn to respond to certain objects with emotions.
Furthermore, ‘intuition’ is used by various authors in a myriad of ways. Haidt thinks that intuitions
are unconscious emotional reactions (2002; Haidt and Bjurkland 2008). Walter Scott-Armstrong
argues that intuitions are unconscious beliefs (2008). Cushman et al (2006) describe them as
unconscious principles. Johnson-Laird and his colleagues define intuition as reasoning from
unconscious premises (Bacciarelli et al 2008). Because of these various meanings, the term
‘intuition’ has the potential to engender obfuscation in the moral judgment debate. It is possible
that theorists are talking past each other—e.g. Scott-Armstrong and Johnson-Laird, who argue that
reasoning can be unconscious and Haidt, who thinks that reasoning is necessarily conscious. I will
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return to this point momentarily.
I have argued that emotions are intentional; they are about something. Specifically,
emotions are about an emotionally relevant object or property in one’s environment. The objects
that trigger an emotion are fixed independently of the response. An emotion is not solely
individuated in terms of its characteristic phenomenology or expression, but rather by an appraisal
of an object or scenario as having certain characteristics. For example, we feel guilty when we
have performed some blameworthy action that causes others to feel contempt towards us. The
affective appraisal of our action is both a reaction to external features of our environment and our
response-dependent interpretation of it.
An initial moral appraisal is very similar to an initial emotional appraisal. Moral judgments
may involve automatic affective responses to a stimulus after we think about or perceive it. This
is similar to Greene’s characterization of the “alarm bell” emotional response; we may have an
automatic appraisal of a disgusting action as “bad!”, “dislike!” or “avoid!” or an appraisal of a
kind action as “good!”, “like!” or “approach!” Some moral judgments may just consist of the initial
emotional response, like when we passively watch a film and are too absorbed in the story to
engage in further thought about a disgusting action (at least consciously). But further cognitive
processing is often involved in our moral judgments. It is here that the differences between
emotional and moral appraisals might appear.
Here’s an example highlighting the difference between typical anger and morally
significant anger. Suppose that your best friend dropped your laptop, shattering its screen and
rendering it unusable. This makes you angry. Now suppose that you witness your friend drop your
laptop as a way to get back at you for forgetting a date that you had set up ages ago. This also
makes you angry.
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Even though you experience anger in both cases, it seems to me that the first case is not an
instance of moral anger. Rather, you just experience everyday anger at your friend’s carelessness.
You probably wouldn’t say that your friend has deeply and unjustly offended you. The second
case does seem to be a case of moral anger. Your friend has acted in a way that seems morally
reprehensible. What’s the difference, in terms of emotional and rational processing? The initial
affective processing will be roughly the same in both cases; you perceive some event in which
someone has caused you harm. This triggers an automatic negative appraisal. Other information
makes the latter a case of moral anger—for instance, background information about the responsible
agent and the context of the action. In the second case, we know that our friend intentionally acted
offensively as a means of retaliation in the second case. We recognize that our friend has violated
some moral norm, such as “do not intentionally harm another’s possessions.” The same may not
be said about the previous example; your friend has not violated a moral norm and your knowledge
of her action and intentions does not indicate that she has acted in a morally reprehensible way,
even if she did make you angry!
I think that moral situations will likely be a matter of interpretation that vary on a case by
case basis (see also Bachiarelli 2008). These examples show that the initial, automatic responses
to value-laden stimuli in both moral and non-moral situations may be very similar. However, there
are differences in later stages of cognitive processing of emotional appraisals and moral appraisals.
The social context in which each arise may also be quite different. Both emotional and moral
appraisals may involve an interpretation of the implications of an object or event. This draws upon
our knowledge and beliefs about the case at hand.
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3.2. Moral reasoning
Suppose that you are watching a superhero film. You experience a range of negative reactions
towards the film’s evil villain, including automatic emotional response. You may also make moral
judgments about the villain’s actions. These may be automatic emotional appraisals, as we saw in
the previous subsection. These appraisals may never result in later cognitive reasoning. Generally
speaking, though, some cognitive reasoning will take place when we morally condemn the film
villain. We interpret the moral significance of the agent or event; we understand an action or event
as morally significant and assess that significance in terms of a judgment. Assessing the moral
worth of an action includes reasoning processes in which we (consciously or unconsciously) apply
moral principles and background knowledge to a stimulus or scenario, draw inferences from prior
knowledge, and make decisions based on our understanding of a situation.
My multi-level appraisal theory places cognitive reasoning processes in a much more
prominent position than, say, Haidt’s social intuitionist model. Haidt argues that reasoning in
moral judgments involves mere “post hoc rationalization.” Haidt considers moral reasoning to only
involve conscious inference-drawing processes. I think that this begs the question against the
rationalists.
Haidt’s main justification for the conclusion that reasoning processes are unnecessary for
moral judgments arises from his work on moral dumbfounding (2001). Consider Haidt’s infamous
vignette of brother/sister incest:

Julie and Mark are brother and sister. They are travelling together in France on
summer vacation from college. One night they are staying alone in a cabin near the
beach. They decided that it would be interesting and fun if they tried making love.
At the very least it would be a new experience for each of them. Julie was already
taking birth control pills, but Mark uses a condom too, just to be safe. They both
enjoy making love, but they decide not to do it again. They keep that night as a
special secret, which makes them feel even closer to each other. What do you think
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about that? Was it OK for them to make love? (ibid, 814).
Many participants quickly make a negative moral judgment of the siblings’ action when they are
first presented with this vignette. However, participants were unable to justify their judgments with
reasons when they were asked to do so. Many concluded by simply repeating that the action was
“just wrong,” which, as Haidt notes, is not really a reason.
It seems like participants in this study were unable to consciously reason to a moral
judgment. It is possible, though, that they reason unconsciously—a possibility that Haidt does not
consider. Thus, Haidt concludes that the moral judgment against incest could not have been reasonbased. He then concludes that the judgment must be caused by an emotional intuition. This
inference is invalid. If unconscious reasoning is possible (and there is good reason to think that it
is) then the subjects could have quickly and unconsciously reasoned from a basic moral principle
as the vignette unfolded. However, when called upon to justify their judgment, the subjects may
not have access to their unconscious reasoning, or even why they hold a particular moral principle
to begin with. Do we have a good justification for thinking that incest is wrong in the vignette?
Some people probably do not; they simply conclude that it is wrong. This does not mean that this
principle cannot be involved as a step in moral reasoning (e.g. “this is a case of sibling incest. But
I think that sibling incest is wrong. Therefore, the action is wrong.”). The basic worry is that Haidt
conflates reasoning in judgment with reasoning in justification, which are two very different
processes.
A sentimentalist could object that it is unrealistic to think that we make moral judgments
via deductive processes, even if it is done unconsciously. The deductive model just does not match
our actual experiences of making moral judgments (Harman et al 2010). Deductive reasoning may
play a small role in our reasoning processes, moral or otherwise. It could be that moral reasoning
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is a process of belief coherence according to which we attempt to make our information about a
moral situation cohere with our moral values and principles.
Gilbert Harman, Kelby Mason, and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2010) describe such a
process in terms of a connectionist model of reflective equilibrium. They propose that internal
moral reasoning proceeds through a process of “adjusting one’s beliefs and plans, in the light of
one’s goals, in pursuit of…a reflective equilibrium” (ibid, 239). This view is inspired by
coherentist models of justification, in which a new belief must cohere (be consistent) with the
subject’s standing beliefs (Quine 1951). If it does not cohere, then either the proposed belief or the
standing beliefs must be altered until a “fit” is achieved.
The authors base their theory on the psychologist Paul Thagard’s theory of constraint
satisfaction (Thagard 2000; see also Baljinder and Thagard 2003 and Daniels 1979). Constraintsatisfaction models of decision making predict that an emerging decision will be accompanied by
a general shift towards coherence across any aspects of a dispute that are relevant to the matter at
hand (Simon et al 2001). We base our practical and moral decisions on the relevant information of
a situation in which we find ourselves or that we observe. This could include our beliefs, goals,
emotions, and desires. We make use of all of these background features in coming to the
appropriate answer to important decision. Our beliefs about a particular case at hand are weighed
in light of our other relevant beliefs, emotions, etc. The shift towards coherence is the result of
taking these various aspects into account. Our conclusion is that which fits best with all the relevant
factors of a case from our own perspective.
On this view, we can change even our most firmly held beliefs. Each new proposal or
occurence must be weighed and considered against our other beliefs, goals, etc. if any
inconsistency arises between the information we have about the situation and our standing beliefs.
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Some of our beliefs might need to be rejected in light of new information. This includes moral
beliefs. When faced with Haidt’s sibling incest case, for example, it’s possible that participants
must realign what they believe about incest to account for the information given about the case
(there is no possibility for pregnancy, neither sibling was hurt, etc.). In some cases, participants
eschew their former belief that incest is morally wrong; others will stick to their original belief
because their negative emotional responses and negative stance towards appraisal weigh heavily
on their judgment. Their moral appraisal would be very difficult to change.
The constraint satisfaction model applies to both thought experiments and real-life
situations. We try to fit our information about a situation with our moral beliefs, even while
engaging with a thought experiment like Haidt’s sibling incest case. The same would be true if we
confronted with a real-life case of sibling incest (although there may be quite a bit more
information to take into account). If the constraint satisfaction process works in cases like these, it
seems likely that it would also apply to our interactions with fictions. In many cases, our
experiences with complex fictional narratives will be more similar to real-life moral situations than
thought experiments that are relayed via short vignettes with little background information about
the people or environment involved.
So while logical inference may sometimes be involved in moral reasoning, it is likely only
one of the many types of reasoning processes available to us when making a moral judgment.
Other types of reasoning include speculation on various outcomes, regulations or modifications of
the affective appraisals, analyses of hypotheses and evidence, and, as we have seen, shifts towards
coherent beliefs. All of this is done against the background of our overall goals, desires, and
emotions, each of which may influence our final moral judgment. I think that this flexible, complex
model of moral reasoning fits best with my multi-level appraisal theory. The multi-level moral
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appraisal should be understood in terms of a feedback loop in which both affective and cognitive
processes may influence the other.
Here is an example of what I have in mind. In their research on the reasoning processes
involved in moral judgments, Cushman and his colleagues discovered that there were some cases
in which participants do, in fact, consciously reason to a solution in a moral dilemma. One scenario
asked: “Is it permissible for Evan to pull a lever that drops a man off a footbridge and in front of a
moving boxcar in order to cause the man to fall and be hit by the boxcar, thereby slowing it and
saving five people ahead on the tracks?” (Cushman et al 2006, 1083). A majority of participants
answered with a positive response to the question and were able to provide sufficient justifications
for their judgments. They consciously acknowledge that norms against intended harm played a
role in their decision.
How did the participants reach this conclusion? Perhaps something like the following
occurs: a participant, Jane, reads the vignette, and automatically has affective responses to it based
on her mental representations of the information provided. This may include unconscious concern
or distress for the potential victims and anxiety about having to make a difficult decision. The same
information is processed via slower cognitive processes. Jane’s long term memory activates any
of her relevant moral beliefs. She considers and weighs various outcomes in the dilemma. Jane
finally decides that pulling the lever would be acceptable. According to the coherentist model, Jane
makes this decision because it coheres better with her emotional responses and beliefs than the
decision to not pull the lever. This whole process may take place unconsciously and result in a
relatively quick response in which Jane tells the experimenter that she would pull the lever. Or, as
Cushman and his colleagues found was often the case, Jane may think through the moral dilemma
consciously, deliberately weighing evidence and perhaps recalling a general principle that claims
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that one should try to maximize the number of lives saved whenever possible.
A multi-level appraisal theory of moral judgments can best capture the underlying
complexity and also the seeming automaticity of our moral experiences. This theory holds that
subjects will generally have a fast, affective response towards morally good and morally bad
actions and events. These affective responses are a relatively simple kind of appraisal of something
we perceive or think about. An initial affective appraisal may be a positive or negative response
that require further reasoning before arriving at an appropriate moral conclusion. Reasoning
processes occur concurrently with the affective appraisal, but take longer due to cognitive and
neural constraints.
Our initial affective appraisals account for the automatic negative feeling we have towards
immoral actions or, alternatively, the positive feeling we have towards good actions. Moral
reasoning processes at the same time give shape to these automatic responses, lending them
validity and normative weight. This means that both reason and emotions are involved in our moral
judgments. This makes my view a suitable middle ground between rationalism and sentimentalism.

3.3. Potential objections
Sentimentalist theories like mine face several standard objections concerning the role of emotions
in moral judgments, and metaethical issues surrounding the objectivity of moral judgments, the
possibility of error, and moral disagreement (see D’Arms and Jacobson 2000a & 2000b). I will
respond to the first objection here and return to the metaethical concerns in §6.
There is plenty of evidence from empirical moral psychology literature to support the idea
that emotions play some role in our moral judgments. Neuroimaging research suggests that
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emotions at least co-occur with moral judgments (Greene et al 2007, Greene and Haidt 2002) and
may influence the scope and intensity of our moral evaluations (Schnall, Haidt, & Clore 2008).
There is even some evidence that emotions are necessary for moral judgments (Blair 1995, Prinz
2006) as well as sufficient for them (Wheatley and Haidt 2005). However, as others have pointed
out, neuroscientific tools currently lacks the precision to determine when emotions occur in the
process of making a moral judgment, which neural mechanisms are involved in making them, and
which psychological states corresponds to exactly which neural activation (Prinz 2006, Huebner
et al 2008). If emotions cause a moral judgment, then we should see the initial emotion mechanism
at work followed by cognitive processing. This is what Haidt and Greene’s studies purport to show.
If emotions are necessary and sufficient for emotions, then, in theory at least, we could see
affective mechanisms activated without the mechanisms that are typically involved in reasoning
processes and a difficulty in making moral judgments if affective mechanisms are impaired (see
Blair 1997).
We cannot know for sure whether emotions influence, cause, or constitute a moral
judgment until neuroimaging technology catches up to theories of moral judgment and we have a
better understanding of neural processing. Luckily, this is not a problem for my view. Making a
moral judgment is a process that generally involves an affective appraisal and cognitive reasoning.
Determining when and how the judgment “happens” may be unimportant. We have emotional
responses to both morally praiseworthy and morally blameworthy actions. We also use cognitive
processes to evaluate a moral situation. Each process influences and shapes the other. Furthermore,
how we determine our own discrete moral judgment may be a matter of interpretation, just like it
may be for our particular emotions.
Another rationalist challenge to sentimentalism may prove more of a problem for my view.
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I have suggested that the initial step in moral judgments involves affective appraisals. Other
sentimentalist theories, including emotivism (see Ayer 1952), have argued that moral judgments
involve occurrent emotional responses. One problem here is that moral judgments do not always
seem to be accompanied by affective responses. We can make calculated, rational judgments based
on our moral principles without ever feeling an emotion. Other sentimentalists have explained this
by arguing that we are disposed to feel emotions in response to morally salient actions, but that
does not mean that we will always have an occurrent emotional state in response to them (Nichols
2004, Prinz 2007).
Another available response to this challenge is that our affective appraisals aren’t always
conscious; we will not always consciously feel anything while witnessing moral situations.
Perhaps all that is consciously available to us is the reasoning processes involved in weighing
options and reaching a judgment. It is still possible, however, that we still have some kind of low
level affective responses towards moral situations even if we have no conscious awareness of them.
This explains our intuitive experience of moral judgments according to which we can coolly,
rationally make moral judgments without feeling an emotion. The unconscious appraisal view can
also account for the psychological and neurological data that seems to show that affective
processing of some kind does occur during moral judgments. It is a great benefit of my theory that
it can account for both of these features of our moral experiences.
On my view, moral judgments are constituted by both emotional and rational processes
and states. Importantly, there is nothing about moral judgments that would entail that we cannot
make them about fictional scenarios. Indeed, most of the studies that cognitive scientists use to
test our moral judgments are fictional thought experiments. Any differences between our moral
judgments about real-life and fictional objects can be explained in terms of the judgment’s content
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(what they are about). The knowledge that the object of our moral evaluation is fictional may play
a role in how we interpret it. We do not need to posit a distinct attitude to explain our moral
judgments of fictions.

4. The problem of moral motivation

There is another way for a supporter of the DAV could undermine the idea that we make
stereotypical moral judgments about fictions. Moral judgments in real-life generally motivate
behavior, but those concerning fictions do not. I call this the problem of moral motivation: we tend
to think that our moral judgments are motivating; if we believe that a certain action is morally
wrong, then we will not perform it and may take measures to prevent it from occurring. Yet we do
not seem to be motivated to act on the basis of our moral judgments about fictions. If morals are
necessarily (or even only typically) motivational, why do we rarely act upon our moral judgments
of fictional characters and situations?
The obvious response is that we know that the object under consideration isn’t real. This
explains why we won’t be motivated to act in response to our moral judgments about them. This
claim is right in one way and wrong in another. I have argued that we are motivated to act towards
fictions, but that many of those actions never come to fruition. This is true even if moral judgments
are necessarily motivating. Alternatively, it could be that moral judgments do not necessarily
motivate action. Either possibility is compatible with the SAV.
I have already laid the groundwork for these two positions in previous chapters. In chapter
1, I argued against the standard functionalist argument that our beliefs about fictions are essentially
unmotivating. I dismissed similar arguments concerning our emotions in chapter 5. My central
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claim was that our beliefs and emotions towards fictions may motivate action, but these actions
generally do not reach fruition due to conflicting beliefs and background knowledge that we have
about the fictional work.
Moral judgments are often action-guiding. If we make the moral judgment that we ought
to donate our superfluous money to the needy, then, in general, we will be motivated to act on that
judgment by donating our superfluous income. All parties in the moral motivation debate accept
this much. Divisions arise with respect to whether or not moral judgments must be motivating.
Motivational internalists like Michael Smith (1996, 2008) claim that moral judgments are
necessarily motivating. Smith holds a form of weak internalism: “If an agent judges it right to φ
in certain circumstances C, then she is motivated to φ in C, at least absent weakness of will and
the like” (1996, 175). This position contrasts with strong motivational internalism, the view that
moral judgments are necessarily motivating and always result in action. Without the action, there
really is no motivation. Moral judgments are intrinsically motivating on both accounts; the
motivation to act is already implicit in the judgment. Motivational externalists, on the other hand,
argue that moral judgments simply supply a reason that would justify one’s acting on the basis of
that judgment (McDowell, 1978, Schafer-Landau, 2003). Moral judgments are not intrinsically
motivating. They require the presence of some other state, such as a desire, in order generate action.
The challenge is to explain weak internalism’s “weakness of will and the like.” When we
suffer from weakness of will, we know that we ought to behave in some morally praiseworthy
way, but, for some reason, we cannot bring ourselves to do so. For example, say that you have
many vegetarian friends and read a decent amount of applied ethical theory that has convinced you
that it is morally wrong to eat meat. Indeed, you have no really good reason why you should eat
meat at all, other than that this is how you’ve always eaten and you enjoy the way that it tastes.
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You recognize that habit and taste do not justify a morally blameworthy action. But you cannot
bring yourself to give up meat. This means that you suffer from weakness of will concerning your
moral judgment that eating meat is morally wrong; that judgment should motivate your action, but
it doesn’t.
Weakness of will is not the only deterrent for morally motivated action. Motivational
internalists claim that, ceteris paribus, our moral judgments motivate action. In contrast to strong
internalists, weak internalists contend that we do not always go through with the motivated action.
Maybe you don’t suffer from weakness of will about vegetarianism, but other factors prevent your
motivation from coming to fruition. For example, you live in a place where vegetarian cuisine is
not readily available, you cannot afford to buy sustainable products, or the rest of your family does
not share your beliefs. All of these reasons make vegetarianism highly impractical for you.
Smith argues that the cognitive reasoning involved in our moral judgments motivates
behavior. We could also think that the emotions involved in our moral judgments motivate
behavior, as sentimentalists do. One will be unmotivated to act if she lacks the required emotional
state. Evidence for this view comes from research on psychopathy; the psychopath lacks empathy
and compassion, besides being defective in other basic emotions (Blair 1997). On the motivational
internalist reading, this means that psychopaths do not make sincere moral judgments. They use
the same words as normally functioning agents, but do not mean the same things by them (see
Prinz 2007). Thus, they are not motivated to act morally because they lack moral concepts. On the
motivational externalist reading, the psychopath is comparable to Hume’s “amoralist,” who has
knowledge of moral concepts and makes sincere moral judgments, but has no desire to act on their
basis (Nichols 2005).
As we have seen, both motivational internalists and externalists agree that moral judgments
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generally motivate action. Weak internalists hold that overriding mental states and desires could
prevent subsequent action. We can construct the following picture with this point in mind. For any
moral judgment, we may be consciously and/or unconsciously motivated to act in some way, and
so we do. It is also possible that we are consciously and/or unconsciously motivated to act in some
way and fail to do so, due to weakness of will or conflicting reasons, beliefs, desires, emotions,
etc. Finally, we will not go through with an action if we lack any sort of motivation to perform it.
Any of these options are possible in a moral situation. For example, when we are deciding whether
or not to take up vegetarianism, we may morally judge that eating meat is morally blameworthy
and either act on that motivation, be motivated but fail to act (weakness of will), or entirely lack
motivation to act (if externalism is true).
Emotions are sometimes thought to be fundamentally motivating. So if emotions are
involved in moral judgments, then it would be natural to think that they are responsible for our
motivation to act in moral contexts. I agree that emotions are often motivating. But that does not
necessarily mean that reasoning processes are not also involved in motivating behavior, especially
on my construal of moral reasoning. Cognitive processing may regulate, modify, or completely
eliminate a behavioral motivation that arises from an affective appraisal. Our beliefs, values, and
knowledge weigh prominently in determining whether or not we act on a motivation (see
Schroeder, Roskies, and Nichols 2010 for a similar view). Conflicting desires and goals may
prevent us from acting on a motivation. So while our affective appraisals may motivate action,
they will not necessarily bring that action about; some further reasoning processes be also be
required. Furthermore, understanding moral motivation in terms of affective appraisals does not
necessarily eliminate the possibility that a belief on its own may be motivating (see McDowell
1978). This may be the case when we dispassionately consider a moral scenario and our emotional
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dispositions are not activated. I don’t think that such cases occur very often, if at all. But my view
does not rule out their possibility.
We can now apply this discussion to our moral judgments about fictions. In the first
chapter, I distinguished between being motivated to act by fictions qua fiction and being motivated
to act based on fictions. The same distinction applies to moral motivation. We can be motivated
to act in response to events and characters in the fiction or as the result of what we take away from
a fictional narrative. The former motivations generally arise unconsciously as the result of low
level perceptual processing. We perceive representations of fictional entities and have beliefs about
them in the world of the fiction. We also make moral judgments of fictional entities that are
relevant to the fictional world. For example, you may negatively judge the trigger-happy detectives
in the television show The Wire. We certainly affectively appraise the detectives’ actions. Since
affective responses are at least sometimes behaviorally motivating, we may also have some
unconscious low level behavioral reactions to the fictional story. These actions do not manifest
because they are blocked by contradictory judgments and beliefs to the effect that the affective
appraisal’s object does not actually exist.
The Wire example shows that we can be morally motivated to act towards a fiction qua
fiction. We may also be morally motivated to act in the real world on the basis of our moral
judgments about a fiction. Here is an example of what I have in mind. Say that you just saw the
movie Fruitvale Station, which recounts the last day in the life of Oscar Grant III, who was killed
by a Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) police officer in 2009. The film captures the racial tension
and discrimination that still plagues American society. The use of real cell phone footage of the
murder adds to the immediacy and reality of Oscar’s story. As A.O. Scott, the New York Times
movie critic, points out:
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The climactic encounter with BART police officers erupts in a mood of vertiginous
uncertainty, defusing facile or inflammatory judgments and bending the audience’s
reflexive emotional horror and moral outrage toward a necessary and difficult
ethical inquiry. How could this have happened? How did we — meaning any one
of us who might see faces like our own depicted on that screen — allow it? (Scott
2013).
Scott’s point is especially relevant at the time the film was released—during the midst of George
Zimmerman’s racially-charged trial for the death of Trayvon Martin, another young African
American man (Fruitvale Station was released on July 12th, 2013; Zimmerman was proclaimed
innocent on July 13th).
A sensitive American viewer may be motivated in some way to act based on their judgment
about Oscar’s death. How would this moral judgment motivate action? On my view, a negative
affective appraisal of the film is a component of the moral judgment. Negative emotions (sorrow,
betrayal, loss, etc.) may motivate real world action. It may have been the filmmaker’s goal to incite
real world action through evoking moral emotions in an audience. Cognitive reasoning processes,
including inference drawing from our beliefs about racial tension and profiling in America, may
shape and influence to our affective appraisal. In some cases, a moral judgment about the film may
incite a viewer to act. She may be motivated to take part in protests against the court’s ruling in
the Zimmerman trial, learn more about New York’s stop-and-frisk program, or in other ways
oppose laws that promote racial profiling. In other cases, one’s sincere moral judgment concerning
Oscar’s story may be deterred by such factors as weakness of will—a viewer might know that
racial profiling is wrong and that she should do something to stop it, but ask herself what she could
possibly do in the face of such broad institutional discrimination. Or conflicting desires, beliefs,
and other circumstances may prevent a viewer from acting on his or her judgment. Maybe the
viewer was emotionally affected by Oscar’s death onscreen, but for political reasons does not feel
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obliged to act in any way.
Even though one’s moral judgment of Oscar’s story motivates us to act, it does not motivate
us to act on our moral judgment of the fiction qua fiction. Instead, I think that our response towards
the fiction may serve as the basis for a more general judgment along the lines of “racial profiling
is morally wrong.” Our morally motivated action is likely based on this judgment, even though it
was brought about by the initial moral judgment of Oscar’s story.
The Fruitvale Station example may seem cheap. It is, after all, based on a true story, so it
is natural that it incites morally motivated action. However, I contend that the same picture of
moral motivation applies to fictions that are not based on a true story, like our judgments against
the elusive Willy and the racist neighborhood representative Karl Lindner in A Raisin in the Sun
(another story of race relations in America), or even against a story that is entirely removed from
our actual world, like Avatar or The Lord of the Rings. In these two cases, we might form a
judgment that it is morally unacceptable to harm innocent, sentient life forms solely for self-gain
that may motivate later action. Indeed, we often think that fictions illustrate important cultural and
psychological concepts and ideas that we can apply to the real world. Fictional dramas such as A
Raisin in the Sun and The Wire may help viewers gain new perspectives on real-life race relations,
perspectives that may motivate action in their daily lives.

5. The moral experience of fiction

We are finally ready to piece together the various components of my moral psychology of fiction.
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In chapter 2, I discussed how we perceive fictional objects. Chapter 3 presented the key notion of
taking the fictional stance, according to which we recognize that the objects of our engagement
are fictional (they are non-actual, they are created, they have particular dependence relations) while
we simultaneously “see” them as the objects that they represent. Chapter 4 discussed how we
understand the mental states of fictional objects. Chapter 5 delved into our emotional responses to
fictions in more detail. This chapter has targeted our moral judgments and actions. The three latter
chapters have heavily relied on multi-level psychological theories in order to best capture both the
immediacy and complexity of our moral experience of fictions.
Let’s consider an example of how this whole process works, using a scene from the film
District 9. In this story, a space ship stalls over the city of Johannesburg sometime in the near
future, stranding thousands of intelligent but malnourished aliens (called “prawns” for their
crustacean-like appearance) in the city. The frightened humans round up the aliens into District 9,
a slum kept apart from the rest of the city by high fences, guns and missiles. The protagonist,
Wikus Van De Merwe, executes the order to evict the aliens from District 9 to the concentration
camp District 10, further away from Johannesburg. As he and his team go about District 9 passing
on the eviction notice, we witness the Wikus and others commit various acts of atrocity against
the aliens, abusing and killing them indiscriminately, even “aborting” a nest of alien eggs.
Many viewers of District 9, recognizing the film’s not-so-subtle commentary on South
African race relations, may experience a range of moral emotions during this scene: disgust at the
killings of the aliens, anger at the cruelty of the humans, and sympathy for the relatively helpless
aliens. But even without the social association, we might feel a great deal of uneasiness and anger
at the humans’ actions. According to my multi-level appraisal theory of moral judgments, these
emotions partly constitute our moral judgments about the characters in the film. We feel
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indignation towards the humans’ xenophobia, constituting our moral judgment that their behavior
is wrong. We may also reflect on our indignation and moral belief that we should not deliberately
harm other life forms without just cause, and especially not intelligent ones. We feel anger or
disgust at the humans and draw conclusions about their actions based on our knowledge of this
particular scene, what we know about the fictional world, and our own real moral values and
principles.
Our moral judgment of the humans’ actions occurs as the result of taking the fictional
stance. We begin by perceiving the objects on the screen in a non-illusory way; we perceive
representations of aliens, humans, eggs, shanties, etc. We know that the humans and prawns in the
narrative are fictional. They do not actually exist in our world, they were created by the
filmmakers, and they depend on the film, filmmakers, and viewers in order to persist. This
knowledge forms the backdrop against which we take the fictional stance. We may not consciously
acknowledge that the objects in District 9 are fictional, but that status shapes how we think about
and respond to them. At the same time, we use the ‘is’ of fictional transformation when we think
about the fictional objects, “seeing” fictional entities as representations of objects.
Taking the fictional stance allows us to understand that the prawns and humans in the
narrative are objects towards which we can have emotional responses. We also treat them as
objects that possess mental states. My modified TT states that both perceptual and cognitive
inference drawing are involved in how we understand fictional characters. We also may use social
referencing and knowledge of a character’s social context, personality, and background in order to
inform our mental state attribution. Both perceptual/affective and more complex cognitive
processes work together to shape our understanding of fictional entities and our own emotional
responses to them.
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The multi-level appraisal theory of emotions goes hand in hand with my modified TT. We
make a quick, automatic affective appraisal of the humans in District 9. We also emotionally
appraise the humans based on our beliefs and knowledge about their character and actions. Here,
too, the automatic affective appraisal and slower cognitive appraisal work together to form a
temporally extended, flexible emotional process that shapes how we feel about the characters. Our
emotional responses about the humans also set the stage for our moral judgments of their conduct.
This is the standard process of our moral evaluations of fictions: we take the fictional
stance, perceive fictional representations, attribute mental states to fictional characters, and have
emotional responses to them. All of these processes shape our moral judgments of a character. All
of the mental states involved in our engagements with fictions are genuine, stereotypical mental
states. This means that my standard attitude approach is a viable contender to distinct attitude
views.

6. Normative implications

I now want to return to the metaethical challenges to sentimentalism that we encountered in §3:
the possibility of moral error, disagreement, and objectivity. I will draw upon the concepts of
emotional rationality we discussed chapter 5 to respond to these challenges. Since moral judgments
are constituted by emotions, it is important to understand how our emotions are used to evaluate
the world.
Fitting emotions are those that we have some reason to feel; they obtain in virtue of a
response-dependent property of an object. For example, we find an object in our environment
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frightening because we judge that it may cause harm to me or someone I care about. However, just
because one’s emotion may fit its object does not mean that it is morally appropriate to experience
it. Emotional truth and propriety capture the normative dimensions of our emotional responses.
True emotions are successful or unsuccessful depending upon whether they accurately describe
their object. For instance, feeling fear towards a harmless bunny would be unsuccessful, and so
untrue. Finally, emotional propriety captures the moral dimensions of our emotional responses and
how we can be held responsible for them. This was the case in instances in which our emotional
responses were harmful to ourselves or others.
Sentimentalist theories hold that emotions figure in our moral judgments (D’Arms and
Jacobson 2008). One challenge for these views is to explain which emotions are appropriate to a
particular moral scenarios, but without implying that the emotion itself always has this normative
implication. Another challenge lies in explaining how emotional responses can be objective.
Emotions are subject-dependent; different people will respond with different emotional appraisals
to particular objects according to their own knowledge, values, and beliefs. If that’s true, then it
may be difficult to see how there can be objective, world-based or universal emotional appraisals
that people can disagree about and get wrong.
One worry is that if sentimentalism is true, then this subjectivity about our emotions carries
over into our moral judgments. All sentimentalist theories adopt the “response dependency thesis”
(RDT), which states: to think that X has some evaluation property φ is to think that it is appropriate
to feel F in response to X” (D’Arms and Jacobson 2000b, 729). For example, projectivist theories
such as Mackie’s error theory (1977) and Simon Blackburn’s quasi-realism (1985) hold that moral
evaluations to not correspond to objective features of the people or situations, but rather are
projections of their values onto the world. Allan Gibbard’s (1990) theory of norm expressivism
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identifies moral wrongness with the acceptance of a norm that takes anger as an appropriate
response towards a particular action. I evaluate my friend’s broken promise to me as morally wrong
if I have internalized a norm that it is acceptable for me to be angry with her for breaking a promise
to me.
D’Arms & Jacobson argue that sentimentalist theories like Gibbard’s do not distinguish
between the different ways in which our emotion may be appropriate for its object. They conflate
an emotion’s fit of and its propriety. But it seems like these concepts can be separated. Fear towards
both spiders and battlefields may be fiting if it is intelligible that we should feel that way; one
could sustain serious injury on a battlefield and we think that spiders are small and icky. Envy of
a colleague’s promotion may be fitting if you are up for the same promotion. Feeling amused by
an off-color joke may be fitting if the joke is told in a charismatic way. Again, the emotion need
not be an appropriate response in order to be fitting. An emotion can be fitting even if it is morally
unjustifiable all things considered. That off-color joke that I find so amusing might be highly
inappropriate in certain contexts, yet I may nevertheless have a reason to be amused by it.
This means that sentimentalist theories need some independent way of distinguishing
between when we have a reason to respond emotionally to an object and when we should feel the
emotion—i.e., when our emotional response constitutes a moral evaluation. To do this, an adequate
sentimentalist theory must distinguish between and emotion’s fit and its propriety: when it is
reasonable or intelligible to experience an emotion and when it is morally appropriate to do so.
Luckily, the notions of emotion proper-properties and core relational themes provide this account
for my multi-level appraisal theory. These notions provide a non-circular way of explaining the
response-dependence of the emotions involved in moral judgments (contrast with Wiggins 1987
and McDowell 1998; see also Prinz 2001 & Morreall 1986)). A scary object is one that causes fear
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in us because we perceive it as a potential threat or source of harm. A disgusting object is one that
causes a feeling of disgust in us because we perceive it as literally or metaphorically toxic,
malodorous, unhealthy, or indigestible. A shameful act is one that causes me undergo shame
because I believe that I have violated a moral norm or social taboo. This response depends both on
the subject (is subjective) and on social norms. This makes it objective (at least culturally).
On my view the original affective response of a moral judgment is an appraisal of an object.
This is not an endorsement of the object’s moral propriety. It is an appraisal in terms of fit. When
we appraise an object as being scary, we form a mental representation of it; part of our concept of
this object might include properties like ‘being dangerous,’ which is then interpreted as scary. This
will generally lead to avoidance behaviors and an unpleasant, scared feeling. But it will not
necessarily be a judgment about whether or not we should take that stance towards the object. A
later, cognitive evaluation will be brought to bear on the propriety of whether we should feel afraid
of something and whether we can be held responsible for our responses to it.
Our moral judgments are subjective in the sense that different people will respond to and
interpret emotional objects differently. But they are not completely subjective. We can make errors
in our moral judgments and we can disagree with other people about how an morally relevant
property applies to an object.
Recall D’Arms and Jacobson’s contention that emotions have both a shape and size
(2000a). An emotion’s shape corresponds to how an emotion represents an object as possessing
(or lacking) a property that is does not (or does) actually have. One source of moral error arises
from misinterpreting the emotion’s shape. We may misattribute properties to an object that it
actually does not have. So, for, example, my envy of my friend’s promotion might lead me to think
that she does not deserve the promotion or that I am a better candidate than she is, when in fact
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neither of these beliefs are true. My envy is misshaped because it fails to accurately describe my
friend. An emotion’s size refers to its intensity; I can be slightly annoyed that my friend broke her
promise to me or I may be quite irate about it. I can be slightly downtrodden by the death of my
favorite fictional character or I can be overwhelmed with grief. We can also make an emotional
error in terms of our emotion’s size. Consider our friend from the previous chapter, who became
extremely involved in her favorite television shows. She was devastated when bad things happen
to her favorite characters and elated by a villain’s undoing. We may want to say that our friend has
made an emotional error; her emotions are out of proportion with their object. Specifically, the
object does not warrant the intensity of her emotion.
We can also go wrong in our moral reasoning. We can straightforwardly make errors in
our thought-processes that lead to a moral evaluation or we can misinterpret important contextual
information. Our emotions can also be in error if they influence us inappropriately, as in cases of
bias, weakness of will, or self-deception (see Barnes 1997 & Mele 2001). These may all be
instances in which our moral judgment does not cohere properly with our other standing beliefs,
desires, and values.
Both the affective and cognitive appraisals involved in moral judgments may be sources of
moral disagreement. People can disagree about how and to what object we apply an emotionally
relevant property (see Nichols 2004 and 2008). I might think that a particular object or action is
disgusting (like when people clip their nails in the subway car), whereas my friend might not find
the action disgusting at all. We disagree about the emotion’s shape. And even if we do both agree
that trimming one’s nails in a subway car is disgusting, we might disagree about the appropriate
size of our disgust. I might be totally grossed out by the nail clippings, whereas my friend is only
mildly put off by them. Finally, we can also disagree with respect to our background beliefs,
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knowledge, and values concerning a moral situation. This would be the source of dispute between
many people concerning current social and political issues like drone warfare, gun control,
abortion, and the legalization of recreational drugs. We each come to the table with our own
beliefs, knowledge, and emotional reactions to a particular moral scenario. These factors are all
potential sources of moral debate because they correspond to objective features of the emotional
object.
We can apply this discussion to our moral evaluations of fictional characters. Recall that
there may be a sense in which fictional narratives call for a particular emotional response.
Following Carroll, I called this criterial prefocusing. The emotional effect that the author,
dramatist, or film production team works to achieve is brought about by prefocusing. The author
manipulates the themes, language, symbols, etc. of a literary work, or music, lighting, dialogue,
editing of a film or play. However, as we noted, not every person in an audience will experience
the intended emotional response. I explained this in terms of the cognitive factors that often go
hand in hand with an emotion: the beliefs, values, and thoughts about the moral situation or person
that is presented in a fiction.
Our moral judgments of fictional characters can be pre-focused in the same way as
emotions. If our emotions can be prefocused, then our moral judgments can also be shaped by the
manipulation and influence of our emotions. For example, authors may shape our moral
evaluations of protagonists by engaging our positive pro-social emotions: empathy, sympathy,
compassion, identification, etc. We feel compassion for and sympathize and identify with the
likeable characters in a fiction (see Carroll 2008, Plantinga 1999, Smith 1999 etc.). This is because
the narrative presents these characters in a positive light, emphasizing their likeable, pitiable, or
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admirable qualities so that we desire for them to succeed in their endeavors and worry, fear, and
mourn them if they do not. Our positive emotions make us morally sympathetic to the protagonist.
A further interesting question concerns whether we can make inappropriate or unfitting
moral judgments about fictions. Presumably our moral judgments about fictions can be in error in
some way, if they can in real-life. There are three interesting types of case here. The first type of
incorrect moral evaluations is not, strictly speaking, an instance of moral error qua fiction.
Sometimes we sympathize with characters that we would normally abhor in real-life: Humbert
Humbert, Dexter Morgan, Beatrix Kiddo, Satan. This is a perfectly normal response to the fictional
character—possibly even an appropriate one. The artists intended for their audience to sympathize
with these morally questionable characters. Does this constitute a moral error all things
considered? Is it morally wrong to sympathize with fictional devils? I will return to this question
in chapter 7 when I address the sympathy for the devil phenomenon. Another question concerns
whether our moral evaluations are improper even if they are fitting. I will address this in chapter
8 when dealing with the puzzle of imaginative resistance.
A second type of case of moral error about fictions occurs when our moral judgments about
a fictional object are unfitting. Moral judgments may not correspond to how the author portrays a
character or event. Imagine that when I read the Harry Potter novels and, instead of admiring and
cheering on Harry, Ron, and Hermione, I instead secretly admire the evil Lord Voldemort. Instead
of morally condemning Voldemort, I quietly congratulate him in his renewed efforts to create a
world of magical purity (I do not admit this to my friends, or, if I do, they think that I am just being
intentionally, rhetorically perverse). It seems that I have made a moral judgment of the character
that was unintended by the author.
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Voldemort is supposed to be a highly unsympathetic character. Almost everything we
know about him confirms this point: he kills innocent people—including children—he uses his
followers, he is disturbingly racist, and he fits every criterion for anti-social personality disorder.
There are very, very few instances in the story in which one might find oneself feeling sorry for
Voldemort. There are some solitary examples of Voldemort’s difficult upbringing. Still, it seems
clear that we are supposed to be morally repulsed by the Dark Lord and his callous, violent
followers.
In this case, moral error can occur in one of two ways: our emotional response may not fit
the object—the emotion’s size or shape may be wrong—or our cognitive evaluation of the object
may be flawed. I think that the size of our emotional appraisal of Voldemort will not much matter
in terms of moral blameworthiness. It is either wrong to sympathize with Voldemort or it isn’t. It
does not make much of a difference if one’s sympathetic emotions are weak or strong. The
emotion’s shape is relevant, though. Imagine that one’s sympathy for Voldemort’s upbringing
causes me to attribute other sympathetic features to him (like Voldemort’s loneliness and sorrow
after being abandoned by his father) or causes one to overlook other morally questionable qualities
or actions.
We can also go wrong in our cognitive processing of the Voldemort’s actions. Perhaps in
judging Voldemort’s “Magic is right” campaign (the magical equivalent of Thrasymachus’ “Might
is right” stance in Plato’s Republic) the reader not fully consider the consequences of this position.
Maybe she does not remember important details of what brought the campaign about. She may
think that Voldemort’s campaign is consistent with her other moral beliefs, when in fact she has
not fully considered my other moral principles, such as protecting the rights of others and keeping
innocents from harm. Or maybe she suffers from weakness of will and simply concludes that this
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is the easiest path to take for universal happiness. In any case, others will likely conclude that the
reader has made a mistake somewhere in her moral reasoning, making her a less-than-ideal moral
agent.
We have made a moral error if we misunderstand a character’s qualities and misinterpret
their actions. Yet the “sympathy for Voldemort” example raises another interesting question in
terms of the moral propriety of our judgments of fiction. Can we be held morally responsible for
our judgments of fictional characters? Can I be blamed for admiring Voldemort? Let us suppose,
unlike in the previous example, that a positive judgment of Voldemort does not arise due to some
emotional or cognitive error. The reader’s emotional response towards Voldemort is fitting in
terms of both size and shape—it is not that she misattributes positive qualities to Voldemort and
ignore others, or has a disproportionate positive response towards him. Rather, she simply thinks
that Voldemort’s actions are justifiable and that he has been misunderstood by the other characters
and Harry Potter fans. In other words, the reader’s moral values are incompatible with the negative
portrayal of Voldemort and most people’s negative evaluation of him. Given Voldemort’s negative
portrayal, I take it that many people would be uncomfortable with this evaluation, even if she never
acted on it or in any way behaved like Voldemort or his followers. They would find this reader
strange, morally perverse, unusual, and potentially dangerous.
I have suggested that there might actually be a great deal of variation in how audiences
morally evaluate fictional characters. This is because each audience member brings her own
beliefs, values, and desires to her engagement with the fictional narrative. This variation carries
over into one’s moral appraisal of the work; if we have different emotional reactions towards
fictional characters, and emotions comprise moral judgments, then our moral judgments will vary
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to the same extent that our emotional appraisals do. My view, then, seems to imply a moral
relativism, similarly to some other sentimentalists (see Harman 1996, Nichols 2004, Prinz 2007).
However, my theory can also accommodate moral realism. On my view the moral
judgment process continues beyond the affective appraisal. It involves cognitive processing and
reasoning as well. These processes can factor in to our moral judgments and even modify the initial
emotional responses. While our emotional appraisals are required for moral judgments to occur in
the first place, there is no prima facie reason why we have to accept them as moral truth. Our
reasoning can modify and guide our initial judgments. If that is the case, then moral realists can
take heart in a theory that has a place for emotions in moral judgments. The reasoning processes
might serve as the normative basis for one’s moral values. This could lead us to judge the proVoldemort reader’s positive moral judgments of this character as inappropriate.
I will to conclude this chapter by addressing a related point on moral propriety. In his
forthcoming paper, “Pleasurably Regarding the Pain of Fictional Others,” Aaron Smuts attempts
to make the case the intrinsic wrongness of taking pleasure in an innocent character’s suffering. It
is possible for someone takes pleasure in the portrayal of Hermione’s physical suffering when she
is being tortured in Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows. Smuts asks us to imagine that the reader
takes a secret delight in Hermione’s suffering. Suppose that the reader never tells anyone about
her delight and her delight is never manifested in her behavior. With these constraints in place,
how could it possibly matter whether a reader takes pleasure in Hermione’s suffering?
Smut contends that those who think that there is nothing inherently wrong with taking
pleasure in the suffering of fictional characters are committed to the fictionality thesis. The
fictionality thesis holds that fictions are autonomous fantasies in which we are merely external
spectators to the action (ibid, 5-6). Importantly, as Thomas Hurka points out, we are perfectly
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capable of imagining that some immoral acts could potentially be acceptable in a fiction (Hurka
2001). Unlike in surrogate fantasies, which we hope to come true, the audience knows that the
fictional actions are generally impossible in our world. This allows her to imagine all sorts of
scenarios that she normally would not and consider moral stances that she might typically ignore
or abhor.
It follows that taking pleasure in fictional suffering is “perfectly harmless” (ibid, 8). Smuts
quotes Susan Feagin, who argues: “the freedom of imagining is freedom without responsibility.
Pleasure in what one imagines can be as fickle or as base as one likes, without consequences”
(Feagin 1984, 50; quoted in Smuts in prep, 8). Fictions aren’t real and even if fictional objects
exist in some way, they are not the sorts of things that can be harmed.
Despite the claims of the fictionality thesis, Smuts argues that taking pleasure in the
suffering of fictional characters is inherently wrong. In order to understand this point, imagine a
(potentially) real-life example:
Imagine slipping on a banana peel at the local supermarket. You spin to brace your
fall, but on the way down the corner of your mouth catches on the sharp lip of a
shelf. It rips your mouth wide open. Through the gaping flesh of your torn cheek,
most of your teeth are visible. You scream in agony. The blood fills your mouth,
pours down your face, and pools on the floor. The paramedics arrive quickly. As
they tend to your wound, a crowd gathers. Some softly snicker; others just watch.
Unbeknownst to you, most of the crowd admires the scene, taking pleasure in your
sobs of pain and the sight of the red blood oozing out of your wound (ibid, 10).
We are supposed to take it that no harm can come to the victim from the spectators’ pleasure: they
do not act on their mental attitude and the victim does not even know that they feel it.
On what basis are the spectators’ actions harmful? Smuts suggests that appealing to a
normative ethical theory can help us understand the wrongness of this scenario. The fictionality
thesis assumes a consequentialist theory of moral wrongness: morally wrong actions are those that
cause harm. Yet, in the grocery store example, there does not seem to be any harm caused by the
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spectator’s pleasure. One could argue that there is some harm done; maybe the observers who take
pleasure in the victim’s suffering harm themselves in some way—their callous pleasure makes
them worse moral agents, what goes around comes around, etc. But, as Smut points out, we are
not so much concerned about the harm done to the observers. We are concerned about the victim.
It is the harm done to him that needs to be explained. The problem is that it’s not clear that he does
come to any harm as the result of the spectators’ pleasure.
It could be that taking pleasure is morally wrong on other normative moral theories, such
as deontology or virtue theory. For example, a Kantian might argue that is it always wrong to take
pleasure in the pain of others, period. We are obligated to treat others with dignity and respect;
taking pleasure in another’s suffering undermines their worth as a rational agent. Alternatively,
one could take a virtue theoretic stance according to which we should model ourselves after the
behaviors of virtuous exemplars, in our attitudes as well as in our actions. Surely an ideal moral
agent would not take pleasure in the suffering of others.
Perhaps the same is true for straightforwardly fictional examples. Smuts asks us to consider
a case comparable to Moore’s Two World example:

Imagine two worlds, each having just one inhabitant, say a sole survivor of a
nuclear holocaust. In world A, the survivor spends her free time thinking nice
thoughts. She often imagines casts playing with rubber bands on sunny window
sills. In world B, the survivor lives a similar life, but rather than imagine cats, he
imagines torturing children with a pair of pliers and a blowtorch. Is either world
preferable?

Smuts thinks that we would obviously prefer world A over world B. He takes this to be true even
if we do not assume a consequentialist notion of goodness and harm. There is something inherently
morally preferable to world A even if the inhabitant of world B couldn’t possible harm anyone.
We might be able to interpret the wrongness of world B on a non-consequentialist moral
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stance. From a deontological perspective, we might ask whether the survivor is thinking as a
rational agent. A virtue theorist would argue that the denizen of world B is not adopting the
attitudes that a moral exemplar should. The problem here is that fictional characters are not real—
so how could we construe them as rational agents? On these views, then, I contend that no harm
is directly achieved through taking pleasure in fictional suffering.
As Feagin points out, our engagements with fictions free us from typical emotional and
moral responsibilities. I agree; the danger of taking pleasure in fictional suffering only arises if a
reader adopts a moral judgment about the fictional case and then applies it to comparable real-life
things. For example, a viewer might modify his positive evaluation of Voldemort’s “Magic is
Might” campaign, which condones eugenics and invasive surveillance, and applies it to real-world
politics. This is essentially Plato’s worry in The Republic—artworks do not properly engage our
reasoning faculties and so may undermine our moral judgments.
My arguments in this section will be important in the following chapters, in which I discuss
the sympathy for the devil phenomenon, the puzzle of imaginative resistance, and the possibility
of moral learning from fictions. As we will see, I suspect that much of the confusion surrounding
these puzzles arise due to inadequate notions of emotional and moral judgments of fiction (and in
general) as well as a confusion the potential harm of experiencing moral wrongness in a fiction.
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Chapter 7: Sympathy for the Devil

1. Admiring devils
Imagine reading John Milton’s epic poem, Paradise Lost. The story begins with a group of fallen
rebel angels gathered in their dark, depressing new home. They sit, feeling downcast and defeated,
until their stalwart, dashing leader steps forth with words of encouragement and fortitude. This is,
of course, Satan, consoling the rebel angels in Hell. As you’re reading, it is almost impossible to
resist admiring this larger-than-life character who shows such determination and resilience even
in the face of certain defeat by their infinitely stronger enemy.
Most readers of Paradise Lost likely find Satan an intriguing, admirable, and, let’s face it,
a sympathetic character. In a strange way, we want him to succeed in his ventures. You know that
you are not supposed to admire Satan and his followers—in fact, you should probably feel
disgusted by them. However, the poem sometimes makes it difficult to do so. Consider Milton’s
description of Satan: “He, above the rest/ In shape and gesture proudly eminent,/ Stood like a
tower. His form had yet not lost/All her original brightness; nor appeared/ Less than Archangel
ruined, and the excess/ Of glory obscured, as when the sun, new risen,/ Looks through the
horizontal misty air/ Shorn of his beams…” (Milton, 1667/2007, 18). There is something
admirable about the Prince of Darkness’ sheltering attitude towards his fellow fallen angels: “Cruel
his eye, but cast/ Signs of remorse and passion, to behold/ The fellows of his crime…” (ibid, 18).
Recall Satan’s determination to make the best out of a remarkably bleak situation: “Is this the
region, this the soil…this the seat/That we must change for Heaven; this mournful gloom/For that
celestial light? Be it so!...The mind is its own place, and in itself/Can make a Heaven of Hell, a
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Hell of Heaven” (ibid, 9). You have to admire Satan’s positive attitude. You cannot help it; to
your great surprise (and the consternation of many a Sunday school teacher), you feel sympathy
for Satan.
Readers have been fascinated by the portrayals of immoral anti-heroes in fiction long
before Milton. Yet this phenomenon, albeit commonplace, raises interesting aesthetic and moral
questions. After all, these are characters whom we would likely despise if we met them in the
course of our daily lives, but for whom we feel startlingly strong pro-attitudes when encountered
in works of fiction— that is, strong positive emotions, thoughts, and feelings. Milton’s Satan is
likeable and sympathetic. To a certain extent, we want him to succeed in his quest for inner peace.
Following Noël Carroll, let’s call this the sympathy for the devil phenomenon (SDP)
(Carroll 2004). This covers any of our pro-attitudes towards immoral or unlikeable fictional
entities including, but not limited to, sympathy. Other pro-attitudes include emotions such as
admiration, compassion, empathy, pity, pride, and joy. There is no doubt that this phenomenon
occurs on a regular basis. Just consider our pro-attitudes towards Mad Men’s Don Draper, Kill
Bill’s Bride, Lolita’s Humbert Humbert, or, indeed, Paradise Lost’s Satan—immoral characters,
all. The question is: why do we have the positive feelings and responses towards these characters
that we do? Certainly these characters’ charming, likeable features do not outweigh their immoral
traits and actions. Are our moral feelings so easily swayed?
I will examine and respond to these questions in the following sections. In the previous
chapter, I presented an argument for our moral judgments of fictions as integrated with our real
life beliefs, values, and emotions. The SDP seems to present a problem for this claim—our
responses are often quite different than they would be in real life! I will first consider several
potential solutions to the SDP, beginning with Gregory Currie’s decidedly distinct attitude-based
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simulation theory (ST) approach of sympathy for fictional characters. I will follow that with a
critique of Matthew Kieran’s distancing approach (Kieran 2010) and Carroll’s “best of all
characters” view (Carroll 2004 & 2008). Ultimately, I find each of these views to be inadequate
explanations of the SDP. I understand the SDP as a genuine psychological phenomenon that arises
in the course of our engagements with fictions (and perhaps in our real lives as well). If that’s true,
then we should be able to explain the phenomenon in terms of our actual mental tendencies. In this
spirit, I will propose an emotional pre-condition for our sympathy for immoral characters: they
must elicit the emotion of fascination. In the final section, I will propose my own explanation of
the SDP, the fascinated attention approach. This approach makes the SDP a matter of narrative
content and our emotional response to that content. Thus, it is fully compatible with the SAV.
My view makes up for the inadequacies of the other potential theories. This includes a
point that is often not considered when philosophers discuss the SDP: we often feel pro-attitudes
towards immoral characters because of their viciousness and other “negative” qualities, and not
solely their admirable ones. As Colin Radford pointed out, we sometimes love the rogue because
of his roguishness (see Smith 1999).

2. Simulated sympathy

Gregory Currie’s view draws upon simulation theory (ST) in order to explain the SDP (Currie
1997). We’ve already encountered this view in chapter 4. Despite Currie’s withdrawal from a
strong simulative stance in recent work, this view is worthy of consideration because it remains
one of the most thorough and articulate examinations of a DAV-based approach to the SDP.
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Simulation theory remains a popular theoretical framework used for understanding how we
attribute mental states to others and predict their behavior (Currie & Ravenscroft 2002). Like many
philosophers and psychologists, Currie understands simulation as “putting oneself in the shoes of
another” (Currie 1997, 66). We imagine what it would be like to be in the situation of another
person and possess beliefs, desires, and emotions that are similar to theirs. Currie explains:
I take on, temporarily, the beliefs and desires I assume someone in that situation
would start off by having; they become, temporarily my own beliefs and desires.
Being, thus temporarily, my own, they work their own effects on my mental
economy, having the sorts of impacts on how I feel and what I decide to do that my
ordinary, real beliefs and desires have (Currie 1995, 252-253).

When I imagine myself in the position of another person, I imaginarily take on their beliefs,
desires, and perspective as closely as possible. We come to understand the experiences and mental
lives of others by recreating, as best as possible, their own attitudes in ourselves. From there, we
extrapolate information about the target by asking how we would feel in a similar situation.
According to ST, the same basic principles apply to our mental engagements with fictional
characters (although there is an additional step to simulating fictional characters that I will return
to momentarily). When we watch a film, for example, we simulate the mental attitudes of a
character. This is typically, but not always, the work’s protagonist. We can understand how the
character feels and predict what she will do next by imagining what it would be like to be in her
position. We can thereby understand what the character experiences: her beliefs, thoughts,
emotions, desires, etc. This understanding, in turn, allows us to predict the character’s actions, just
like in real-life contexts. For example, while reading Les Miserables I may imagine what it would
be like to be Jean Valjean after he escapes from his 19 year imprisonment working in the French
galleys and then runs off with two silver candlesticks from a church. I imagine that I am in
Valjean’s situation: the relief of freedom, but also destitution of poverty and loneliness. I note that
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I feel bitter, angry, guilty, and relieved at the same time. I then extrapolate this information about
how I would feel and attribute these feelings to Valjean in his current state.
ST may be able to explain how we attribute mental states to fictional characters and
predict their behavior. But can it explain sympathy for fictional ‘devils’?
One could potentially take issue with Currie’s reliance on ST to explain our care for
fictional entities, as we saw in chapter 4. Simulation may not always be required to feel proattitudes towards fictional entities. In fact, Carroll has argued that simulation is generally
unnecessary for us to understand the mental states of fictional entities (Carroll 2001a & 2008).
This is because the narrative does much of the work for us: an author pre-focuses the story so that
we emotionally respond in a particular way to the text and a particular character. This means that
an author deliberately reveals certain details of a character so that we are able to interpret and
understand the story. We are shown positive aspects of a character that causes us to respond
positively. Of course, some fictions are emotionally or cognitively opaque, so it is quite difficult
to understand how a character thinks or feels. It will take more cognitive work to understand them,
including understanding the characters’ context, past actions, and personality. Generally speaking,
however, a narrative can guide our emotional and moral responses to particular characters.
Simulating the mental states of a fictional entity is often unnecessary; we can already tell, based
on contextual and narrative information, how a character feels without delving into her psyche.
It’s possible that simulation is necessary for understanding a fictional entity’s perspective
and actions. However, it is a further question whether we must simulate the character in order to
care for them. While Currie makes both claims, it’s worth noting that the first claim doesn’t entail
the second. We may be able to have positive emotional or moral responses for a character without
simulating her mental state. For example, we observe Frodo Baggins valiantly offering to take the
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Ring to Mordor while watching the Lord of the Rings films. We may admire Frodo’s bravery even
without understanding the mental states involved in his decision. The same works for immoral
characters; I watch the self-described serial killer Dexter Morgan save his sister from another
murderer. I can admire him for his actions even without delving into his intentions and beliefs for
doing so. Emotions about other people in general don’t require simulation; for instance, I do not
need to understand a friend’s current mental states to feel angry or compassionate about her. So
why think that they do in the fictional case? This remains unclear on Currie’s account. Note that
my multi-level appraisal theory of emotions does not require simulation at all.
For the sake of argument, let’s grant Currie’s claim that we must simulate the mental states
of fictional entities in order to care for them so that we can draw out the implications of his view.
Assuming that Currie is right, ST can explain the care that we feel for some fictional characters:
namely, the ones with positive and admirable qualities, like Frodo. But what about characters who
possess many unadmirable or immoral characteristics? Currie calls this “the problem of
personality”: I would not normally care about someone like Satan, so why do I seem to during my
engagement with Milton’s work.
I mentioned above that simulating a fictional entity requires one additional step. Currie
argues that we do not directly simulate the mental states of the fictional character. Instead, we
simulate the mental states of a “hypothetical someone who is reading a factual account of the
adventures of [that] fictional character” (Currie 1997, 72). Simulation is transitive; I simulate
someone who is simulating a character and who, further, believes that the fiction is real. I am able
to understand the mental states of the fictional character by understanding those of the hypothetical
someone. This allows me to care for a character like Frodo Baggins; I take on belief-like and
emotion-like states as the result of the transitive simulation that gives me access to his mental
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states. I care for Frodo because I have access to his many admirable and sympathetic
characteristics.
Let’s try to make sense of this mysterious “hypothetical someone.” There is a vast literature
in literary criticism and philosophy of art concerning the presence of an implied narrator: a fictional
entity that is not equated with an explicit narrator, actual author, or implied author, who guides the
audience through a fictional narrative (see Livingston 1997 and Wilson 1997). I tend be
unsympathetic to such views, but I will not take up this argument here. However, the implied
narrator is also distinct from the hypothetical someone we simulate. The implicit narrator may not
necessarily do any simulating or emotional interpretation of a character. It just presents the
fictional story. The hypothetical someone must do some emotional and moral interpretation of a
character so that we simulate that character correctly.
There are several other worries with this hypothesis. Following Carroll, I question Currie’s
claim that we cannot directly simulate the mental states of a fictional character. Note that we can
make the same point about the hypothetical someone. Why is it that we can simulate this
hypothetical someone, but not the fictional character? This seems especially problematic, since the
fictional character, at least, has human-like qualities that we can perceive, but the hypothetical
someone doesn’t. In fact, there is no direct evidence of a hypothetical someone in the narrative.
Another complication arises here. Simulating a hypothetical someone might help to explain
our pro-attitudes towards morally praiseworthy characters like Frodo. However, in order to
explain the problem of personality, it is not enough that we simulate the states of the hypothetical
someone. The audience must imaginatively take on new versions of beliefs that she currently holds
for the duration of her engagement with the fiction. This includes moral beliefs. The reader adopts
pretend versions of her relatively stable beliefs and preferences (Currie 1997). This allows her to
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consider moral propositions that she normally would not. As Currie states: “I imagine myself not
merely to be reading fact, but to be someone with an outlook different from my real one” (ibid,
73). The greater the difference between our actual moral beliefs and those of the fictional character,
the further I would have to adapt my current beliefs and take on new imaginary ones. In order to
feel sympathy for Milton’s Satan, I would have to adopt the mental beliefs of a radically different
kind of person.
One worry here is that it would be quite complicated and inefficient to modify our mental
attitudes in the way that Currie suggests. In order for Currie’s proposal to work, the viewer would
have to quickly and unconsciously switch between different moral viewpoints on multiple
occasions as the story progresses. For example, when I watch the film The Silence of the Lambs, I
simulate a hypothetical someone who simulates the FBI agent-in-training, Clarice Starling.
Clarice’s moral outlook is generally very close to my own, so I do not need to drastically rearrange
my moral beliefs while simulating her. But when I consider Hannibal Lecter, I must adopt an
entirely new, psychopathic, hyper-intelligent, and pro-cannibalistic set of beliefs. Consider any of
the scenes during which Dr. Lecter and Clarice verbally spar: I may, in the course of one scene,
both pity and feel sympathy for Hannibal (consider Dr. Chilton’s bone-chilling power plays, how
the guards dress him as a monster, how he has not seen the sun in eight years) as well as Clarice
(she’s actually trying to prevent a death). In order to understand both Dr. Lecter and Clarice’s
mental states, we would have to switch our simulations back and forth between them rapidly as
the scene progresses. A viewer would have to “take on and off” different sets of moral beliefs, one
for pro-attitudes for Lecter and another for pro-attitudes for Clarice, since these feelings may often
be inconsistent. There is quite a bit of cognitive work going on here, none of which is consciously
accessible to the viewer. Indeed, we often find engaging with fictions relaxing, which might be
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surprising given the complexity of Currie’s model.
There is a further worry here concerning the empirical and phenomenological plausibility
of this account. In particular, it is not clear that there is any independent support from social
cognition literature that we are required to simulate a hypothetical someone in order to understand
nonexistent entities. Currie introduces the hypothetical someone solely to explain the problem of
personality. This in itself is not a problem, if the proposal captures something important about our
experience of fiction or solves a problem that cannot be solved in any other way. Unfortunately,
the simulation view appears to be counterintuitive, or at least phenomenologically inaccurate. It is
not clear that any ordinary consumer of fiction would accept that they engage with a story in this
way.
Currie could counter that the simulation process occurs unconsciously. That is possible in
some cases, but one would think that the simulation must occur consciously at least sometimes.
But it is not clear that it does. Furthermore, simulating a hypothetical someone raises a host of
further theoretical challenges, some of which I have already mentioned. How could we pick the
hypothetical someone that we simulate? What sorts of features would it have? Will everyone
simulate the same hypothetical someone, or will there be unique ‘someones’ for every audience
member? Such questions cannot be answered without complicating an already complicated theory.
Complexity is not in itself a criticism against a theory, but surely a simpler theory would
be preferable if one is available. The main problem with Currie’s view is that it makes far too many
assumptions concerning the nature of our mental states towards fictions and the ontology of
fictional characters. Because of this, Currie (and perhaps some other simulation theorists) is forced
to adopt a radical view of our engagement with fictions that does not appeal to our actual
experiences. If asked, I suspect that very few readers would accept that they simulate the states of
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a hypothetical fictional someone, or even grant that such a thing exists—let alone that they adopt,
even for a short time, a radically different moral outlook on the world. Instead, it is more likely
that the reader maintains her current beliefs and takes the fiction as an opportunity to explore
alternative viewpoints and scenarios that she would not normally encounter.

3. Distancing, pre-focusing & “the best of all characters”

We have questioned Currie’s simulation-based approach to the SDP. Now we can explore two
other theories that attempt to explain our pro-attitudes towards immoral characters: Kieran’s
distancing account and Carroll’s “best of all characters” approach.
Kieran’s proposal points out that we are able to sympathize with an immoral character
because we suppose that the character inhabits a fictional world that is quite different from our
own. This fictional world encompasses a different land with different rules, including moral rules.
Call this the distancing approach. Matthew Kieran argues that imaginative distancing amounts to
a psychological distance between an audience and a devilish character (Kieran 2010). We feel free
to allow ourselves to feel pity, compassion, and sympathy for someone like Hannibal Lecter or
Milton’s Satan because of this psychological distance.
“Other-world” distancing may go a long way towards explaining how we are able to
become absorbed in a story, for it forces us to realize that the fictional character belongs to a world
that is very different than our own. Still, I am unconvinced that this is the right response to the
SDP. Satan occupies a very different world from the one I believe myself to live in, and yet I still
think that many of the features of that world, including its moral features, track from my world to
264

that one. So I should still find Satan morally repugnant in Milton’s story. The other-world
distancing also does not seem to work for a realistic film like The Silence of the Lambs. This
fictional world appears to be just like our world in most ways, including local West Virginian
geography, the president of the United States (George H.W. Bush), and the struggles that American
women face when they work in a male-dominated field. I do not imagine that Dr. Lecter occupies
a distant world from my own; I imagine that he occupies one that is very similar to mine in
important respects.
There is another way in which the distancing thesis is found wanting. When we feel
sympathy for Milton’s Satan, we recognize that this character is physically nonexistent in our
world, yet we nevertheless feel profound interest, pity, and compassion for him. The point is that
we are generally not emotionally distanced from immoral protagonists even if we are in other ways
(physically or ontologically). There is no question that we emotionally respond to fictional objects.
The problem for Kieran is that we are either emotionally distant from fictional worlds and
characters (as well as physically and ontologically distant) or, alternatively, we are emotionally
close to them despite physical or ontological distance. The SDP shouldn’t arise on the former
position, but it does on the latter. Yet, we have granted that it surely does occur quite often. This
should lead us to favor the second position: emotional closeness without physical or ontological
closeness. Kieran’s position cannot account for this; he does not explain why emotions differ from
other kinds of imaginary engagement, why we are imaginatively distant from fictional characters
while still emotionally close to them.
Consider another way of understanding distancing, one that is slightly different from
Kieran’s approach. A fictional world doesn’t have to be very different from ours in order for us to
be distant from it. It could be that the reason we feel sympathy for immoral fictional characters is
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because we simply do not have to encounter them in our daily lives. I do not have to go to lunch
with Hannibal Lecter, or the movies with Satan. Because these characters are not a part of my life,
or even my world, I am able to feel some sympathy for them. This implies that we should also feel
some sympathy for immoral people in our real lives. I accept this possibility and will return to it
in the final section. The current problem with this interpretation of the distancing approach is that
it doesn’t guarantee a positive response to any immoral people. Lenin and Ted Bundy aren’t a part
of my life. I will never encounter them. But this does not guarantee that I will feel sympathy for
them. We need an explanation of what triggers our sympathy to begin with.
We have already encountered one way to explain our emotional closeness to an immoral
character: emotional prefocusing (Carroll 2008 & Smuts in prep). An author may intend for her
audience to feel pro-attitudes towards a particular character. This character is often morally corrupt
or deviant in some way but, for whatever reason, the author desires for the reader to sympathize
with her.
I agree with Carroll that prefocusing is an important part of an explanation of how and why
we respond to immoral characters in the ways we do. Our emotional responses to characters are
often a matter of how a narrative is constructed and how the details of a story influence our feelings
about particular characters. Currie’s simulation-based approach did not take advantage of this
feature of fictions. However, prefocusing alone does not give us a complete explanation of the
SDP. It does not tell us what it is about the immoral character that we admire, or how the narrative
must be constructed in order for us to feel sympathy for her. The challenge is to flesh out the notion
of pre-focusing to explain these points.
Carroll’s own view attempts to do this. He suggests that the reason we feel sympathy for
Tony Soprano of The Sopranos, Tyrion Lannister of A Song of Ice and Fire, or Ethan Edwards in
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The Searchers is because, despite their flaws, they are morally better off than the other characters
in the fiction. Tony is surrounded by an astonishing array of violent, manipulative, power hungry
mobsters. Tyrion is a clever, witty, well-meaning louse with rotten family members. Ethan
Edwards is gruff and brutal, but also loyal and in possession of a certain code of honor. So when
we search the fictional world for an emotional allegiance, these are the characters we choose. I
will refer to this as the best of all characters solution.
The morally best individual in a group of bad people often does seem to us like the person
with whom we should throw in our allegiance, both in real-life and fictional worlds. Indeed, the
best of all characters explanation may explain a great deal of our pro-attitudes for immoral
characters.
However, I think that there are two significant problems with this view. First, the “best of
all characters” solution doesn’t explain why we ever have positive responses to an immoral
character. We can grant that Tony Soprano is the least bad of a sordid group of mobsters, and so
he wins out in gaining our affection. But this does not explain why we feel sympathy for an
immoral character to begin with. It’s possible that we are deliberately shown features of Tony
Soprano that are relatable and positive: his fears of growing old and impotent, his family woes,
etc. It’s another question whether these glimpses into Tony’s psyche override the overwhelmingly
abundant immoral actions that he performs—for instance, when Tony brutally attacks his driver
on a whim (to use Carroll’s example). Surely we should be disgusted by this portrayal of gratuitous
violence and turn off the television. And yet, we do not; we continue to watch Tony’s exploits
season after season, in spite of his immorality. The best of all possible characters explanation
cannot account for this.
The second worry is that the best of all characters solution does not apply to all cases.
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Perhaps we align ourselves with Tony Soprano because the other mobsters are far more immoral
than he is. But there are other fictions that portray morally praiseworthy characters alongside
immoral characters, as in The Silence of the Lambs. One could argue that we feel sympathy for Dr.
Lecter because he allies himself with the morally virtuous Clarice Starling. But does this alliance
really explain that sympathy? At best, I think that their relationship explains why we do not
condemn Lecter the way we would if he was completely unhelpful to Clarice’s investigation. It
does not explain the pity and compassion that we may feel for him. Or consider a reader’s
sympathy for Nabokov’s Humbert Humbert. Some readers may want HH to succeed in his
seduction of the young Lolita. But why? Surely the reader thinks that pedophilia is morally
repulsive even if it is presented to us in the guise of a clever, charming protagonist. And HH is
surrounded by characters that are far more morally praiseworthy than he is. Finally, think about a
story like Dexter, in which we feel sympathy for the immoral protagonist despite the fact that he
is certainly not the morally best character in his fictional world. We cheer on Dexter in his
murderous pursuits even as he faces the brash, morally upstanding Sergeant Doakes or even
Dexter’s principled sister, Deb. The best of all characters solution cannot explain our sympathy
for Dexter.
The distancing and best of all characters explanations both fall short of fully explaining the
SDP. Each of the potential solutions suggests that we can explain our sympathy for immoral
characters in terms of some kind of emotional manipulation. However, they do not propose a
particular emotion involved in shaping our positive responses to immoral characters. Perhaps
doing so would help flesh out an explanation of our pro-attitudes towards immoral characters.
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4. Fascination for the devil

My view explores sympathy for the devil as a psychological phenomenon. I contend that there is
a specific emotional response that underlies our sympathy for immoral characters. There are two
points to consider here. First, we should examine the immoral characters’ qualities to discover
what it is that makes us have such strong positive responses to them. Second, we should consider
the actual types of positive responses we have. This will give us a better idea of what kind of
explanation the SDP requires.
Recall Milton’s description of Satan in Paradise Lost. He is physically awesome,
intelligent, and deeply loyal to his family and friends. He has attractive mental and physical
qualities. The same can be said for other immoral but likeable fictional characters. Humbert
Humbert is deliberately portrayed as handsome, clever, and funny. The psychopathic serial killer
Dexter Morgan is also handsome, highly intelligent and innovative, and embodies an admirable
degree of loyalty to his family. As Carroll and others have noted, positive qualities like these
examples are imperative to our sympathy for immoral characters.
I want to push this line even further. Besides these attractive physical and mental traits,
Satan, HH, and Dexter are all exotic; we do not often encounter people like these in our daily lives,
if ever. They are those rambunctious “bad-boys” (to use a hopelessly gendered term; it’s an
interesting question in itself why most prominent fictional “devils” are men) that charm and allure
us with their daring and wild antics. In short, all of these characters possess desirable features
alongside their immoral ones. Now imagine a bland, intellectually dull, physically unattractive,
run of the mill Satan, HH, or Dexter. Would we still feel pro-attitudes toward such a character?
Surely we would not admire them to the same degree, if at all.
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Next, consider our actual responses to these characters. We find Satan, HH, and Dexter
intriguing. We are curious to learn more about them. We pity and feel compassion for them when
we learn about the awful things that happened in their past, or when other characters manipulate
or exploit them. We are often glad when they succeed, and generally disappointed when they fail.
Perhaps we recognize that our gladness and disappointment are, in some ways, perverse; we take
a secret delight in their badness. We know that it might be inappropriate to feel sympathy for an
immoral character, but we can’t help doing so. Such feelings may be reasonable in the context of
the story. There are probably instances in which we have negative emotional responses about these
characters. We feel anger or indignation towards an immoral action that appears completely selfinterested or entirely callous (e.g. when Hannibal Lecter eats the face off of one of his prison
guards) even if we accept some other undoubtedly immoral action that is somehow understandable
(plotting to “have Dr. Chilton for dinner”).
Synthesizing the previous two points—the nature of the immoral characters and our
emotional responses towards them—I want to suggest that underlying our pro-attitudes towards
immoral characters is a particular emotional response: fascination. I claim that fascination is a
specific type of emotion, similar to curiosity and interest, but distinct from them in terms of the
objects that elicit it. There are two questions worth asking here: 1) is fascintion actually an
emotion? and 2) How can this help us explain the SDP?
If fascination is an emotion-proper, then it has the same features as other emotions. Most
philosophers and scientists working on emotions argue that emotions are a kind of evaluation of
an object that bears on our well-being (see chapter 5). We feel fear about something that can harm
us or those we care about. This includes a rattlesnake basking in the sun next to a path where you
and a family member walk; it also includes fear of an upcoming test that. Both objects, the snake
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and the test, reflect our interests and well-being.
Theorists also generally argue that emotions have intentional objects: they are about
something. We do not just feel mad in general; we are angry because of a harm done to us. Many
theorists also argue that objects may possess a particular kind of emotionally relevant property.
For example, we will generally experience anger when we perceive an object in our environment
that has offended us in some way. We experience pride when we take credit for a something that
either we, or someone or something with which we identify, has achieved. We feel joy when we
realize a goal. These properties can be quite simple (potential harm to you and yours) or complex
(taking credit for something that you have achieved) (see Goldie 2000, Lazarus 1991, & Prinz
2004a).
I argue that fascination meets both of these emotional criteria: it is a reflection of an object
that serves our interest or well-being, an object that has a particular kind of property. We are
fascinated about particular objects that interest us in the right way; we are not just fascinated
vaguely or in general. There is a certain phenomenological, qualitative feeling that we associate
with fascination. There is a kind of absorption or interest that we have towards fascinated things.
This is important, since we generally think that emotions elicit feelings. Fascination meets this
criteria as well.
We also need to know what types of objects generally elicit fascination. I argue that
fascinating objects typically have three different features. First, they must be a curiosity; the object
must be unusual, unique, different, or exotic in some way. It must be something out of our ordinary
experience. Second, the object must be attractive. This could mean physically attractiven in the
case of people (James Dean as Jim Stark in Rebel without a Cause or Angelina Jolie as Lisa Rowe
in Girl, Interrupted) or concrete objects (a sculpture or building), mentally attractive in the case of
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people characterized by their cognitive abilities (I would hesitate to deem Anthony Hopkins’
Hannibal Lecter a standard of male beauty. Rather, it is Lecter’s intellectual brilliance that we find
attractive). Or perhaps the object is oddly agreeable in some way, as in the case of a fascinating
topic that we find worth pursuing. Lastly, fascinating objects are cognitively interesting. They
inspire us to learn more about them, and we think that by doing so there will be some kind of
cognitive payoff; we will gain some new experience, information, or perspective on the world.
There is no set limit to the types of things we can find fascinating. We can be fascinated
by a philosophical idea that we find original, important, useful, or astute. We can be fascinated by
artworks: a musical piece, painting, or story. Consider Gerhard Richter’s painting, Betty. You
might be struck by the beauty of the painting and be curious to know more about the artist and the
subject: who is that girl? Why is her face hidden from the viewer? Why did Richter paint her in
that soft, muted way? Although Betty is a representational painting, one could be equally fascinated
by an abstract work by Rothko, Pollack, or Reinhardt. Lastly, and most importantly for our
purposes, we can be fascinated by people that we find unusual, exotic, and attractive. Who is that
stranger at the café? Where is she going? What is that accent?
In short, I argue that fascinating things are attractive, interesting curiosities. Generally
speaking, these are the kinds of objects that we will be fascinated by; if an object lacks these
characteristics, then we probably will not be fascinated by it. Note that each feature can be broadly
construed so as to apply to a wide variety of cases. This is not a defect of the characterization, but
rather a virtue. Consider the imprecision of our characterization of anger-inducing objects. We are
angered by things that we find offensive. This characterization does not tell us which people or
actions specifically cause us to experience anger. We can tell a similar story about fear: we fear
objects that could potentially harm us, but this leaves open what those objects actually are.
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Like anger and fear, I leave my characterization of fascination open-ended, yet precise
enough to understand what we typically characterize as fascination-inducing. Not everyone will
find the same people or objects fascinating, just as not everyone will find the same things attractive,
anger-inducing, or scary.
I argue that fascination, so understood, is the key to understanding our pro-attitudes
towards immoral, fictional characters (see also Smith 1999). Each of the immoral characters I
have discussed so far fit my description of an attractive, interesting curiosity. Take the Count of
Monte Cristo: a revenge-driven, almost cruel, mysterious and charming noble. He is surely not the
kind of person we encounter on a regular basis! Perhaps we think that by taking an interest in this
character we can expand our folk psychology to include the vengeful and obsessive mindset the
Count represents. Fascination is the pre-condition for our sympathy towards immoral characters.
Generally speaking, we need to be fascinated by immoral characters before we feel sympathy for
them. Fascination is achieved by how the character is portrayed in the narrative as possessing the
exotic and curious traits that I have described. Once this is achieved, other aspects of the narrative
will cause us to feel sympathy for them.
This is not to say that fascination is sympathy. We can feel sympathy (in the narrow sense
or wide sense I have been employing) for someone with necessarily being fascinated by them. For
instance, I can feel sympathy for a close relative who, after many years of close contact, I do not
feel fascinated by. I can also be fascinated by things for which I do not feel sympathy, as we will
see in the next section.
The fascination approach seems to explain our pro-attitudes better than the other potential
solutions that I have considered. But is it enough to explain the SDP? The fact that an immoral
character is fascinating may not be enough to generate pro-attitudes towards them. There is still a
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missing ingredient in our account of the SDP.

5. The fascinated attention approach

Carroll denies that fascination with a character is enough to explain our pro-attitudes towards
immoral characters. It may be that we are often fascinated by Tony Soprano, but this fascination
does not explain our sympathy for them. There are many characters that we might find interesting
in The Sopranos, for instance, but we only feel sympathy for Tony. It is only through prefocusing
and the best of all characters vantage point, Carroll argues, that we feel pro-attitudes towards
immoral characters.
One interesting implication of my view is that we will often be fascinated by fictional
immoral characters, as well as real-life immoral people. Consider Truman Capote’s novel, In Cold
Blood, and Werner Herzog’s documentary, Into the Abyss. Both of these narratives portray serial
killers in a highly sympathetic light. We feel sympathy for these serial killers partly because we
are fascinated by the narratives’ portrayal of violence and “evil” personalities.
But fascination alone will not always engender sympathy. Consider contemporary readers’
continued fascination with historical figures like Adolf Hitler, Mao Zedong, and Joseph Stalin,
three people who are likely responsible for the greatest abuses of human rights in all history. Surely
they don’t deserve our positive responses. And yet these leaders’ biographies continue to be
popular. I would doubt, though, that the people who read these biographies would approve of or
feel strong sympathy for them, like we do for Satan in Milton’s tale. So what is the difference
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between the In Cold Blood-type cases and these biographies? It cannot be that the former are
simply told in a narrative and the latter are not. Biographies are, after all, a kind of narrative.
I argued in the previous section that a narrative draws out attractive, exotic features of
characters to make them fascinating to us. This is true for morally blameworthy and praiseworthy
characters. But our emotional and moral allegiances are not won solely based on what we are
shown about someone. Our pro-attitudes are also shaped by what we are not shown about a
character. What would it take for us to feel sympathy for a real-life serial killer, such as Ted
Bundy? I think that it would require a particular kind of narrative that utilizes a particular kind of
pre-focusing. The narrative must attract an audience’s attention towards the morally praiseworthy
features of a person or character and a shift of their attention away from their morally blameworthy
features.
Let’s consider an example. We saw in chapter 6 that the Harry Potter series presents us
with a paradigm immoral antagonist: Lord Voldemort. Voldemort is supposed to be a highly
unsympathetic character. Almost everything we know about him confirms this point. Voldemort
kills innocent people, including children, he abuses his followers, he is disturbingly racist, and he
fits every criterion for antisocial personality disorder. There are few instances in the story in which
one might feel sorry for Voldemort. Still, we may be fascinated by Lord Voldemort. We are curious
about his past and his motivations; we are in awe of his magical power. But we do not feel
sympathy for him. We do not wish for Voldemort’s “Magic is Might” plot to succeed, and we do
not feel compassion for him when he meets his fate at the end of the series.
We do not feel full-blown sympathy for Voldemort because we are also shown features of
him that override his potentially pitiable qualities (for instance, his difficult childhood and
loneliness). Imagine a retelling of the Harry Potter series from Voldemort’s perspective. There are
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several examples of this: Wicked (wherein audiences are retold The Wizard of Oz from the Wicked
Witch of the West’s perspective), Grendel (a retelling of Beowulf from the monster’s point of
view), and Wide Sargasso Sea (the story of Jane Eyre’s “mad lady in the attic”). In our retelling
of Harry Potter, we would learn more about Voldemort’s pitiable childhood and his justification
for why he began his life of crime and hatred. The story would brush over some of the more sordid
details of his violent behavior and highlight his fascinating characteristics. We would gain new
perspectives of the more likeable characters in the original Harry Potter series, such as
Dumbledore, McGonagall, and even Harry Potter himself.
The retelling may be successful in eliciting sympathy for the Dark Lord if we are shown
the pitiable aspects of Voldemort and are kept from considering others. We can generalize this
example. An audience must be given certain information in a story that will create pro-attitudes
towards the immoral character as well as distract their attention from the less admirable aspects of
his/her behavior and personality.
We now have the means to fully explain the SDP. Not only must we be fascinated by a
devilish character, we generally must also be shown particular features of a character that
deliberately focuses our attention away from her immoral behaviors or traits, and highlight the
fascinating characteristics. I call this the fascinated attention approach. Its two components
(fascination and attending to certain features of the character) are both in place when we feel
sympathy for an immoral character. This is a psychological claim rather than a metaphysical one;
fascination and prefocused attention may not always be necessary or sufficient for the SDP to
occur. I argue, however, that they generally are. If we think of the SDP in terms of our emotional
responses towards a character, then we can understand immoral characters with fascinating
features as the kinds of emotional objects towards which we would respond in our real lives. Not
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everyone will emotionally respond to the same objects, both in the case of fascination as well as
anger, sorrow, or joy.
The fascinated attention approach makes up for the shortcomings of the other explanations
of the SDP that we have discussed. My view highlights a defect in the distancing explanation: that
view is contradicted by the very phenomena of SDP, which is in part generated as a result of our
emotional identification with the immoral character, rather than our distance from it. Furthermore,
fascination approach tells us what it is about a character that makes us feel pro-attitudes towards
her, and so improves upon the pre-focusing model. Finally, my view also makes up for the defects
of the best of all characters solution. It is not just that Tony Soprano has some positive qualities
that outweigh his negative ones, or that he is better than other bad-to-the-bone characters. Indeed,
we can be fascinated by Tony because of—not in spite of—his negative features. His portrayal of
an immoral mobster is unusual, intriguing, and attractive: we do not normally experience someone
like Tony Soprano, and so we may have to gain a new perspective of a new character type by
studying him.
Additionally, the fascinated attention approach can also explain allegiances that might be
considered “incorrect” in the fiction—for example, compassion for Nurse Ratched in One Flew
Over the Cuckoo’s Nest or the Joker in The Dark Knight. Some people may be fascinated by these
characters while others are not; the former may be inclined to feel pro-attitudes towards characters
in a way that isn’t intended by the author. The fascinated attention approach also explains why we
often feel sympathy for multiple characters in a fiction, including ones that have conflicting aims.
This was the case with Dexter Morgan and his sister Deborah Morgan. The best of all characters
solution has difficulty accounting for these multiple allegiances.
Clearly prefocusing helps in terms of creating a fascinating immoral character. Aesthetic
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devices like music, point of view, editing, narration, etc. all contribute to the positive response we
have for antiheroes and villains. It is the task of the artist to create a work with a fascinating
character who holds our interest. We would not care that much for Tony if it weren’t for his
fascinating qualities. One might go so far as to say that portraying a fascinating character is the
raison d’etre for a great many fictional narratives.
This last point raises a question as to the moral significance of our pro-attitudes towards
immoral characters. It might make sense that we have pro-attitudes towards immoral characters.
But are such emotions appropriate? Should we be held morally blameworthy for having proattitudes towards immoral characters? Perhaps an answer to this depends on what one means by
blameworthy. If we mean that our fascination is potentially harmful, then I would reject this claim.
Generally speaking we do not harm actual people by feeling sympathy for immoral characters, at
least, not directly (see chapter 6).
Furthermore, contra Currie, my guess is that we often have pro-attitudes towards immoral
characters while at the same time condemning many of their immoral actions. We do not radically
shift our moral values for the duration of the fiction or imagine ourselves in an immoral character’s
position. I pity Hannibal Lecter even while I am repulsed by his brutal murder of the unsuspecting
ambulance drivers. I do not accept or condone Lecter’s immoral actions. Rather, I am fascinated
by this character even as I condemn his actions. It’s even likely that I’d be less fascinated if Lecter
was merely a morally praiseworthy, brilliant criminologist instead of a sociopathic cannibal.
Importantly, unlike Currie’s approach, my view is fully compatible with the SAV; nowhere
along the way have I appealed to unique or distinctive mental states involved in our sympathy for
immoral characters. In fact, I have suggested that the SDP is not uniquely fictional.
Near the end of his discussion of our pro-attitudes towards anti-heroes, Carroll states that
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sympathy comes cheap in real-life, but must be earned in a fiction. I disagree. I suspect that we
will sympathize with just about anyone on a screen, a stage, or in book that is presented to us for
any significant length of time. We do not even need much information about the character.
Consider our sympathy for Lola in Run, Lola, Run: who is this person? Why is she in this strange
situation? Why does she keep making such bad decisions? We care for her even before we learn
about how much she loves her boyfriend (her most redeeming quality). It does not matter that we
know very little about this character or that we disagree with her choices. We like her anyway. I
would go so far as to say that the character does not need to be portrayed in a positive light, like
Lola is. Fascination is cheap. If we are shown an interesting immoral character going about his
business, chances are we will have some kind of positive attitude towards him (like HH). That’s
just how we experience fictions.
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Chapter 8: The Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance

1. Resisting Humbert Humbert

The sympathy for the devil phenomenon captures one facet of our moral experiences of fictions.
We often feel pro-attitudes towards fictional characters that we would dislike or be disgusted by
in our real lives. One of my central claims in the last chapter was that we may feel sympathy for
these immoral people in real life if their stories were framed in the right way. We could be
fascinated by them and attend to certain aspect of their personality and history, while ignoring
others.
There are also cases in which we take a profound dislike to immoral fictional characters
even when an author may intend for us to admire them. Take the protagonist and narrator of
Nabokov’s Lolita, Humbert Humbert. As HH tells his story, we learn of his compulsory attraction
to young “nymphets,” and especially to the spritely Lolita. He propounds detailed arguments in
favor of pedophilia: it has been practiced through the ages, in more “civilized” times than ours, by
royalty, aristocracy, and many of the great artists; he is more interested in the spiritual aspects of
nymphets than the physical; he cannot help how he feels. Some readers probably remain
unconvinced of HH’s moral innocence despite his arguments. Others might feel torn by HH: we
admonish his tyrannical treatment of the young girl, yet at the same time feel betrayed right along
with him when Lolita runs away. HH is remarkably funny and clever and his storytelling is
evidence of genius.
Yet, for every quip, literary reference, and Quilty clue, there is some horrifying detail about
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Lolita’s desolate condition: her quiet sobs and winces, her raging outbursts, HH’s matter of fact
admission that she “had absolutely nowhere else to go” (Nabokov 1970, 144). Part of what makes
Lolita work is that some readers often do feel some sympathy for HH. Some readers, though, will
probably never feel sympathy for him. Perhaps this is an aesthetic flaw with the text; Nabokov
hasn’t done enough to motivate HH’s perspective and, further, no text should ever portray
pedophilia in a positive light. Alternatively, the reader herself may make a mistake by not feeling
sympathy for HH, thereby missing out on an important cognitive point of the narrative. 18 For
whatever reason, many readers resist Humbert Humbert.
Generalizing this case, some philosophers have suggested that readers will resist characters
whose immoral values and actions are sufficiently dissimilar from their own. These characters
stretch the limits of our literary imagination, but imagining these immoral characters might be
required for the narrative to work. As HH admonishes his readers before a pivotal scene: “Please,
reader: no matter your exasperation with the tenderhearted, morbidly sensitive, infinitely
circumspect hero of my book, do not skip these essential pages! Imagine me; I shall not exist if
you do not imagine me…” (ibid, 131).
Near the conclusion of “Of the Standard of Taste,” David Hume makes several remarks on
the moral status of fiction that are particularly relevant for us:
[Where] the ideas of morality and decency alter from one age to another, and where
vicious manners are described, without being marked with the proper characters of
blame and disapprobation; this must be allowed to disfigure the poem, and to be a
real deformity. I cannot, nor is it proper that I should, enter into such sentiments;
and however I may excuse the poet, on account of the manners of his age, I never
can relish the composition. ..And whatever indulgence we may give to the writer
on account of his prejudices, we cannot prevail on ourself to enter into his
18

In a BBC television interview, Nabokov declared Lolita his favorite book (P.D. Smith 1962). In
a Playboy interview, he joked: “I am probably responsible for the odd fact that people don't seem
to name their daughters Lolita any more. I have heard of young female poodles being given that
name since 1956, but of no human beings”(Toffler 1964).
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sentiments, or bear an affection to characters, which we plainly discover to be
blameable.
The case is not the same with moral principles, as with speculative opinions of any
kind.
These are in continual flux and revolution. The son embraces a different system
from the father. Nay, there scarcely is any man, who can boast of great constancy
and uniformity in this particular. Whatever speculative errors may be found in the
polite writings of any age or country, they detract but little from the value of those
compositions. There needs but a certain turn of thought or imagination to make us
enter into all the opinions, when then prevailed, and relish the sentiments or
conclusions derived from them. But a very violent effort is requisite to change our
judgment of manners, and excite sentiments of approbation or blame, love or
hatred, different from those to which the mind from long custom has been
familiarized (Hume 1757/1994, 90-91).

So began the discourse on the puzzle of imaginative resistance: although we may be willing to
accept factual or metaphysical discrepancies in a fiction, we may be loathe to accept deviant moral
values and practices that are not treated positively by the work.
Hume’s comments actually highlight several discrete puzzles, as others have pointed out
(Walton 2006 & Weatherson 2004). The first is the aesthetic puzzle: if an artwork in some way
embodies moral defects, do those defects detract from the aesthetic value of the work? Kendall
Walton believes that this puzzle may be only indirectly related to moral resistance (Walton 2006).
Second, the fictionality puzzle states that: “we easily accept that princes become frogs, or
that people travel in time, in the world of a story, even, sometimes, that blatant contradictions are
fictions. But we balk…at interpretations of stories of other fictions according to which it is fictional
that (absent extraordinary circumstances) female infanticide is right and proper…or that a dumb
knock-knock joke is actually hilarious” (ibid, 140). The fictionality puzzle concerns any sort of
value judgments, not just moral ones. People may often deny that a value that they reject in the
real world is correct in the fictional world (or vice versa). So we may refuse to accept that the
dumb knock-knock joke could possibly be funny, even in a fictional world. We may also be unable
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to accept that female infanticide is morally permissible in another world because we don’t believe
that it is in ours.
The last part of Hume’s worry, the imaginative puzzle, does not concern what is or is not
fictional, but rather what we can or can’t imagine at all. We might be able to imagine a situation
in which female infanticide is morally acceptable, even if we do not accept that it could ever be
fictionally true that it is. Alternatively, we might not even be able to imagine that female infanticide
is morally acceptable. We are unable to wrap our heads around the moral acceptability of female
infanticide, so to speak. The fictionality puzzle concerns what we are able to accept as true in the
world of the work. The imaginative puzzle concerns the limits of our imagination.
In this chapter, I will offer ways to reject each of the puzzles of imaginative resistance. I
will begin with the aesthetic puzzle. While my SAV does not necessarily favor one particular
solution to the aesthetic puzzle, I do think that it narrows the playing field. I will then turn to the
fictionality and imaginative puzzles. Traditionally, these puzzles have been kept distinct from the
aesthetic one. I think that this is a mistake. My response to the puzzle of imaginative resistance is
threefold. First, I deny that the phenomenon of resistance is as robust as some philosophers seem
to think it is. I will present several supposed cases of resistance and why they should not be
considered resistance in the sense others have argued. Second, I will compare the puzzle of
imaginative resistance to the SDP and attempt to show that supposed cases of imaginative
resistance are actually cases of emotional resistance. Finally, I will argue that some cases in which
we seem to resist fictions stems from an aesthetic flaw in the work or a failure on the part of an
audience to grasp a work’s cognitive value.
The puzzle of imaginative resistance might seem a bit innocuous after our lengthy
discussion of the sympathy for the devil phenomenon (SDP); if we can get ourselves to feel
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sympathy for devils, cannibals, and psychopathic serial killers, then surely we can get ourselves to
consider the possibility of deviant moral codes. I argued in the previous chapter that we typically
maintain our own moral beliefs and values throughout the duration of our engagements with
fictions. We undergo pro-attitudes towards immoral characters in spite of our moral values,
because of our fascination with them. The difference between the puzzle of imaginative resistance
and the SDP is that, for the latter, the work in question requires that we consider a deviant moral
outlook and condone it.

2. The aesthetic puzzle

I will begin my discussion of the aesthetic puzzle with a historical anecdote about the Whistler vs.
Ruskin libel case of 1877. This case illustrates a turning point in the theorizing about art’s purpose.
Indeed, the clash of the devout and revered critic, John Ruskin, against the arrogant and witty
painter, James McNeill Whistler, was less a legal case than an aesthetic one. Ruskin stood for the
established order that held that paintings should represent nature and serve a moral purpose. He
stated that “…fine art had, and could have, but three functions: the enforcing of the religious
sentiments of men, the perfecting of their ethical state, and the doing them material service”
(Ruskin 1870/2006).

He found these qualities lacking in Whistler’s controversial painting

Nocturne in Black and Gold: The Falling Rocket (1875). Ruskin denounced the Nocturne in the
July 1877 issue of his series of letters, For Clavigera. He stated:
‘For Mr. Whistler’s own sake, no less than for the protection of the purchaser, Sir
Coutts Lindsay ought not to have admitted works into the gallery in which the ill284

educated conceit of the artist so nearly approached the aspect of willful imposture.
I have seen, and heard, much of cockney impudence before now; but never expected
to hear a coxcomb ask two hundred guineas for flinging a pot of paint in the public’s
face’ (Whistler 1890/1967, 3).
Whistler then sued for libel. During the trial, the art critic Edward Burne-Jones attacked Whistler’s
painting on the grounds that it has “fine color” but lacked meaning, and “it would be impossible
to call it a serious work of art” (ibid, 14-15).
Ruskin and many of the other critics who denounced the Nocturne did not accept Whistler’s
rejection of their moralistic aesthetic standard. Whistler promoted the view that we should value
“art for art’s sake,” distinct from the moral, material, religious, and social obligations that Ruskin
believed validate a work. Whistler’s aesthete position marks one extreme of the range of responses
one can make to the aesthetic puzzle: art comprises an autonomous realm from social, moral, and
practical considerations (Carroll 2001a). Call this view aestheticism. Whistler’s aestheticism was
highly influential in years to come; Oscar Wilde and art theorists such as Clive Bell and Clement
Greenberg all adopted versions of it (Bell 1914/2003, Greenberg 1940/2003).
Ruskin’s position lies on the other end of the spectrum: a moral defect in a work of art is
always an aesthetic defect. Call this view ethicism. But Ruskin’s position goes to an even further
extreme: if a work of art lacks some display of positive moral values—as opposed to positively
presenting immoral values—then it is aesthetically defective. Plato seems to have held a similar
view. In Book X of The Republic, Socrates argues that mimetic artwork is inherently morally
corrupt, since mimesis is removed from reality—it does not pertain to the truth. But even an
abstract (non-mimetic) work like the Nocturne would be considered dangerous for encouraging
the movements of the baser parts of the human soul: the appetite and spirit (Plato 1985).
More recently, Berys Gaut (2007) has defended a position on the relation of art and
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morality that follows Plato and Ruskin in spirit. Gaut argues that there is an inherent connection
between aesthetic and moral value. A moral flaw makes the work of lesser aesthetic value; a moral
virtue in a work makes it of greater aesthetic value. To support this position, Gaut notes that we
generally accept that cognitive features of a work are aesthetically praiseworthy. For example, we
consider accurate portrayals of emotions and decision making, and interesting intellectual puzzles
to be part of the aesthetically good-making features of a work. The problem is that portrayals of
immorality are a kind of cognitive defect because it asks the audience to make moral mistakes.
Gaut argues that it is necessarily an aesthetic failure when a work misrepresents moral actions or
principles, solicits perverse moral responses, or condemns morally praiseworthy actions (Kieran
2006). This is because such portrayals involve a misunderstanding of how we should treat moral
actions or principles. They get the audience make poor moral judgments.
I will return to Gaut’s ethicist position in §5, when I argue that portrayals of immorality do
not necessarily constitute a cognitive defect. For now, we should not that there are a variety of
nuanced intermediate responses to the aesthetic puzzle, between Whistler’s aestheticism and
Gaut’s ethicism. One position maintains that aesthetic considerations are separate from moral
considerations in some circumstances, but not all. Carroll describes this view as moderate
autonomism. An artwork may be critiqued both in terms of its moral and aesthetic characteristics,
but its aesthetic features are distinct from its moral ones (Carroll 2001b). It may be appropriate to
morally evaluate an artwork like the Nocturne. But such evaluations do not bear on the painting’s
aesthetic value. The same can be said about fictional narratives that display moral failings. A critic
may praise Lolita for its displays of literary genius while at the same time condemn the work for
its positive portrayal of an immoral character.
Carroll’s own position, moderate moralism, states that certain genres of narrative fictions
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can be evaluated in terms of its moral features, and the work’s moral features may contribute to its
aesthetic evaluation (ibid, 299). This is the case when the moral features of an artwork are
paramount to our understanding the work as a whole. We saw in chapters 5 and 6 that audiences
often need to apply their own emotional and moral values to artworks in order to adequately
respond to a fictional narrative. Moderate moralism captures this point; it would be an aesthetic
flaw in some artworks for them to portray immoral actions or principles, since doing so would
render the audience incapable of adequately interpreting the narrative. Carroll cites the films
Natural Born Killers and Schindler’s List as aesthetically defective because of moral flaws—the
former because it “advertises itself as a meditation on violence, but it neither affords a consistent
emotional stance on serial killing, nor delivers its promised insight on the relation of serial killing
to the media…” (Carroll 2001a, 289), the latter because is excessively engages our moral emotions
to the point of sentimentality (ibid, 290).
The last position I will consider is immoralism. In contrast to the ethicists and moderate
moralists, immoralists argue that positive portrayals of immorality can sometimes constitute an
aesthetic virtue (Kieran 2006, Feagin 2010). Gaut argues that ethicism arises out of the recognition
that the cognitive virtues of artworks also constitute aesthetic virtues. Immoralists argue the exact
opposite. It may be an aesthetic virtue for a work to display a moral defect because doing so has
cognitive value.
Susan Feagin (2010) uses Gone with the Wind to promote a version of immoralism. She
argues that the moral insensitivity of a work may enhance its aesthetic features—in this case, that
positive portrayals of slavery may actually comprise a cognitive virtue and so an aesthetic one as
well. Both the novel and film adaptation of Gone with the Wind are generally thought to be classic
examples of imaginative resistance. We resist the positive portrayal of slavery and enslaved
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people. However, Feagin argues that doing so makes us miss out on the moral message of the film.
This message is revealed when Ashley Wilkes (arguably the moral compass of the story), decides
that he will free his slaves and turn away from the old way of life. Feagin states: “If the would-be
appreciators are so morally repulsed by the film’s introductory scenes that they are unable to
engage with the story, they will not be in a position to appreciate how those appearances are woven
into the rich character studies… that emerge out of the epic nature of the film’s narrative” (ibid,
28). Thus, Gone with the Wind’s supposed moral failings might actually be much more complex
than is typically assumed. The narrative could even serve as an opportunity for moral learning.
Moreover, the narrative’s cognitive virtues might also constitute aesthetic merits; the novel and
film are aesthetically better because its positive portrayals of immorality make some cognitive
point.
I will also argue for a version of immoralism in what follows. Against ethicism and
moderate moralism, positive portrayals of immorality may sometimes be aesthetic virtues. My
view also rules out aestheticism. Art and morality do not comprise completely separate evaluative
realms. We cannot help but treat artworks morally and we sometimes should evaluate the moral
features of a work for their aesthetic benefits or defects. However, the moral features of artworks
may not always bear on a work’s aesthetic qualities. We may respond negatively to a positive
portrayal of an immoral action and so judge the artwork as morally flawed even while recognizing
that the work is aesthetically good in spite of the moral flaw. So my immoralist position is
compatible with moderate autonomism.
I agree with Carroll that sometimes our emotional and moral capacities are sometimes
required for audiences to adequately interpret an artwork. However, Carroll’s moderate moralism
doesn’t spell out the cases in which a moral defect constitutes an aesthetic one; he contends that
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this will likely vary case by case (Carroll 2001a). Kieran (2006) thus contends that moderate
moralism incomplete. Carroll’s theory would collapse into ethicism once we stipulate the
conditions under which a moral defects constitutes an aesthetic defect. Furthermore, moderate
moralism cannot account for the advantages of portraying immoral values, like immoralism can.
Responding to the aesthetic puzzle doesn’t seem to help us with the most challenging
aspects of the puzzle of imaginative resistance—namely, why it is that we often seem to resist
immoral characters and scenarios. Most philosophers treat the aesthetic puzzle separately from
imaginative resistance. Whether or not an immoral feature of an artwork is also an aesthetic defect
is irrelevant to the question of how we can imagine a world in which an immoral action is
acceptable.
In contrast, I think that an immoralist solution to the aesthetic puzzle plays an important
role in answering the other two puzzles. Our resistance to immoral characters or scenarios may
sometimes be the result of the way a story is told and what information it provides about an
immoral character or action. One could argue, then, that some resistance we experience is an
aesthetic failing of a work, because the narrative is incomplete or doesn’t adequately convey the
cognitive significance of the positive portrayal of immorality. Other times, resistance may be due
to the audience who fails to adequately appreciated a point the film is making.
I will now discuss the fictionality and imaginative puzzles. As I mentioned in the
introduction to this chapter, there are three parts to my response to these puzzles. I will begin by
attempting to undermine the intuitive motivation behind the puzzles. Most philosophers working
in the resistance literature seem to think that imaginative resistance is a robust phenomenon. In the
following section, I will argue that many of the examples of imaginative resistance that are
typically appealed to are not, in fact, genuine cases of resistance.
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3. Evidence for the puzzle of imaginative resistance

Fictions often present us with unusual or seemingly impossible situations: amazingly coincidental
romantic comedies, zombie stories, time-travel, etc. Audiences usually take the bizarre or
impossible features of a story in stride. We often do not question historical inaccuracies or
anachronisms and we delight in physical impossibilities, like huge explosions in space or Star Trek
transporters that can move physical objects faster than the speed of light. There are exceptions, of
course. Consider the heated debates over historical television programs, like the History Channel’s
Vikings, which take artistic liberties with historical facts, or complaints about scientific mistakes
in fictions, like Alfonso Cuarón’s film Gravity. These audiences resist the fictional world because
of historical or scientific inaccuracies. These mistakes turn out to constitute aesthetic failings as
well—for some people, anyway. In general, though, I think that audiences tacitly apply a principle
of charity to fictional worlds. Scientific and historical discrepancies can be explained away
because the fictional world is distinct from the actual one. An audience might miss a work’s
cognitive or aesthetic qualities if they are uncharitable in this respect.
We need to know whether there are any limits to our artistic imagination, at least in
principle. Here are several examples that seem to push this limit to the extreme.
The first test case comes from obvious contradictions. This might include something as
simple as a round-square. Other inconsistencies can be far more complex. In “Sylvan’s Box,”
Graham Priest tells a story in which a character discovers a box that belonged to a deceased
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friend—a box which is both empty and occupied (Priest 1997). The story makes up approximately
two-thirds of the article. It is arguable that the background narrative is required in order for anyone
to buy into Priest’s contention about the inconsistency of the box, although my guess is that some
readers still will not be able to imagine the empty-occupied box (especially if they have previous
metaphysical commitments!). Even in cases where we accept obvious contradictions,
inconsistencies like these may be impossible to imagine imagistically. In other words, we cannot
picture them in our mind even if we can understand what it might mean for a box to be both
occupied and unoccupied.
Next, consider conceptual impossibilities. In “Coulda, Woulda, Shoulda,” Stephen Yablo
tells a hypothetical children’s story: “They flopped down beneath the great maple. One more item
to find, and yet the game seemed lost. Hang on, Sally said. It’s staring us in the face. This is a
maple tree we’re under. She grabbed a five-fingered leaf. Here was the oval they needed! They
ran off to claim their prize” (Yablo 2002, 485). A five-sided oval is conceptually impossible and,
again, perhaps impossible to imagistically imagine without undergoing duck/rabbit-like shifts
from one shape to another.
Third, there are metaphysical impossibilities. Brian Weatherson’s cites the “Restaurant at
the End of the World” in the second installment of the The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy:
The Restaurant at the End of the Universe is one of the most extraordinary ventures in the
entire history of catering.
It is built on the fragmented remains of an eventually ruined planet which is
enclosed in a vast time bubble and projected forward in time to the precise moment of the
End of the Universe.
This is, many would say, impossible… (Adams 1980/2002, 213; quoted in
Weatherson 2004, 9).

In fact, almost every futuristic sci-fi—Star Trek, Star Wars, Firefly, Battlestar Galactica—features
metaphysical impossibilities of some kind, such as space-travel or, indeed, a restaurant surviving
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the end of the universe. While it may be difficult to understand these impossibilities, we do not
generally resist them. Most viewers probably do not question warp-speed space travel in fictions.
They simply go along with this impossibility because it is stipulated in the story. Our world and
the fictional world of the fiction differ in this important respect. We are willing to take for granted
whatever technological or physical discrepancies that allow for this.
Finally, and most importantly for our purposes, we may resist deviant evaluative claims,
including moral claims. Yablo argues that we resist deviant aesthetic evaluations like the
following:
All eyes were on the twin Chevy 4x4’s as they pushed purposefully through the
mud. Expectations were high; last year’s blood bath death match of doom had been
exhilarating and profound, and this year’s promised to be even better. The crowd
went quiet as special musical guests ZZ Top began to lay down their sonorous
rhythms. The scene was marred only by the awkwardly setting sun (Yablo, 485).
Yablo contends that a typical reader would resist the claim that a “monster truck death match”
could be profound, yet the sunset could somehow be aesthetically awkward. Certainly we can think
of exceptions to Yablo’s resistance. Some people might admire monster trucks. They may think
that there is something primal and profound about a monster truck death match and something
rather ho-hum about a sunset. Such audiences would not resist Yablo’s short fiction, even if others
find it strange or implausible.
There are other evaluative claims that we might resist. Consider Walton’s dumb knockknock joke: “Knock, knock. Who’s there? Robin. Robin who? Robbin’ you! Stick ‘em up!”
(Walton 1994, 43). Walton argues that we cannot bring ourselves to think that this dumb knockknock joke is funny. We cannot imagine that it is, even in a fictional world. Again, I do not think
that this is quite fair. Just because I do not find this joke funny does not mean that I cannot imagine
that it is. I probably would have found this joke funny when I was five.
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This brings us to moral claims. Can we imagine a morally deviant situation and, further,
fictionally accept its truth? Take Walton’s female infanticide example: “In killing her baby,
Giselda did the right thing; after all, it was a girl” (ibid, 38). Walton suggests that a reader will
probably not be able to imagine the moral acceptability of female infanticide. The reader might
put down her book and walk away or do something else to prevent her from engaging with the
immoral statement. She certainly will not accept that female infanticide is morally acceptable in
the fictional world.
I do not find any of the previous examples of contradictions, impossibilities, and evaluative
anomalies to be strong evidence in support of the resistance phenomenon. As I’ve pointed out,
many people will not resist deviant evaluations or impossibilities and we can rather easily imagine
not resisting them. But some philosophers have taken the moral cases to be particularly
problematic. Why would this be?

4. Responding to the puzzles

There are three distinctions that we must make when considering the above examples. First, we
must be careful to distinguish between the imaginative puzzle and the fictionality puzzle. The
former concerns what we do or do not imagine, regardless of whether it is true in a fiction. We
resist imagining certain scenarios and propositions, including non-evaluative propositions and
scenarios. Our task is to determine whether this failing is the result of something in the story or
something about the subject. In contrast, the fictionality puzzle concerns our resistance to
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accepting that a deviant evaluative claim is true in a fictional world. This can include deviant
aesthetic and humorous claims, as well as moral ones. In many cases it will be important for us to
keep these two puzzles separate. As we will see, though, it is not always easy do so.
The second important distinction concerns the type of imagining involved in our resistance
to fictions. As the above examples show, we may find ourselves resisting to imagistically imagine
a scenario (difficulty in visualizing it), attitudinally imagine it (take the proposition as true in the
fiction), or constructively imagine it (create further propositions or scenarios in our imagination
that extend beyond what we are strictly given by the fiction). Generally, only attitude imagining
is considered in the literature on the puzzle of imaginative resistance (see Walton 1990 for an
exception). I think that this is a costly mistake; at least some of the confusion in explaining our
resistance could be eliminated if we distinguish between the types of imagining that we resist, as
in the Sylvan’s Box and Oval-Maple Leaf examples. This distinction will also help us evaluate
various different responses to the puzzles.
Finally, it is not always clear what is supposed to be the object of our resistance. There are
two possibilities: the particular evaluative, metaphysical, or conceptual deviance or the fictional
story as a whole. This is an important distinction. We may be perfectly able to interpret and engage
with a story that contains an impossibility even if we are unable to imagine a particular
impossibility contained within it.
Tamar Gendler (2000) argues that there are two basic ways to explain imaginative
resistance. We can be “cantians,” “wontians,” or some hybrid of the two. Cantians about resistance
argue that we are often unable to imagine certain kinds of impossibilities or evaluative deviances.
Wontians hold that resistance arises because we are unwilling imagine a situation in which a certain
impossibility or deviance is acceptable.
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I will examine three accounts of the fictionality and imaginative puzzles. First, Gendler
argues that imaginative barriers arise when the principles and background knowledge the reader
has accepted in the story leave no way for the impossible or deviant proposition or situation to be
true (Gendler 2006). This makes Genlder a cantian about the imaginative puzzle. We are unable
to imagine some deviant moral scenarios.

However, Gendler is a wontian concerning the

fictionality puzzle. Even if we could imagine some deviant evaluative response in a fiction, we
often will not allow ourselves to do so.
Walton takes the opposite approach: whereas Gendler is a cantian about the imaginative
puzzle and a wontian about the fictionality one, he argues for the reverse (Walton 2006). I may not
imagine a solid gold mountain or a round square, because I have an inability to imagine such a
thing. But when I do not imagine a female infanticide, it is not because I am unable to. Rather, it
is because I am unwilling to. So Walton is a wontian when it comes to the imaginative puzzle (see
also Moran 1994). Priest, another wontian, argues that we are able to understand stories that
contain inconsistencies like a both occupied and unoccupied box; if we do not imagine them, it is
because we are unwilling to.
For the fictionality puzzle, Walton argues that we are unable to imagine that some aesthetic
or moral evaluation is capable of evoking different kinds of responses than those we are used to.
This is because we cannot fully grasp what the world would have to be like for the bad the knockknock joke to be funny or for female infanticide to be morally acceptable. So Walton is a cantian
about the fictionality puzzle; we cannot imagine that evaluative deviances are fictionally true.
There is one more potential solution to the puzzles that I would like to review in some
detail: Gregory Currie’s notion of desire-like imagining (Currie 2002). Like his explanation of the
SDP, Curries suggests that positing a distinct attitude can account for our resistance to some
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deviant fictional evaluations. Currie suggests that imaginative resistance is the result of an
inconsistency in our desires, rather than our moral or aesthetic beliefs. I have not given our desires
about fictions any special treatment in this dissertation. In general, I think that we can treat them
the way we have beliefs, judgments, and emotions. Like these other states, desires play important
functional and inferential roles. Currie suggests that our desires about fictional objects aren’t
genuine desires they lack those typical roles. So we do not have genuine desires about fictions, but
rather desire-like imaginings.
Currie explains that we have both internal and external desires about fictional worlds. To
use his example, we do not want Desdemona to perish in the fictional world of Othello, because
we care for her and find her virtuous. This desire is internal, or about, the fictional world. However,
we may also possess an “external” desire for Desdemona to die, because her death would make
for a better tragedy. Currie contends that these desires are contradictory: we both desire
Desdemona’s death and desire that she lives. I disagree. On my view, the internal desire is a
genuine desire about the fictional world. My external desire is about Othello as a work of fiction,
external to the fictional world. These desires are not contradictory because they possess different
types of content.
Currie argues, again for functionalist reasons, that this response cannot adequately explain
the functional and inferential roles of desire. Desires motivate action. We would act on our desire
if we genuinely wanted Desdemona to survive. We do not act as if we want Desdemona to live,
so we lack the relevant desire. This is the standard DAV argument that I have rejected throughout
this dissertation. Desires may dispose or motivate us to act, but those dispositions need not lead to
actual behaviors. Or, if they do, the behaviors may be different than they would be if the desire
was about a real-life person. Such differences can be explained in terms of differences in the
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content of our desires.
Let’s suppose that Currie is right about desire-like imaginings. How is this supposed to
help us solve the puzzle of imaginative resistance? On this view, we lack a genuine desire for
Desdemona to live; rather, we have a desire-like imagining that she does. The desire runs offline
from its normal relations to beliefs and so does not result in behavioral output. Our external desire
that Desdemona dies in the fiction is a genuine desire just like any other desire about the real world.
Currie contends that it is relatively easy to suppose that something is true in a fictional
world—i.e. to form a belief-like imagining that diverges from things we believe about our actual
world. For example, we can easily suppose that a dangerous dragon named Smaug hides in a cave
on the Lonely Mountain, sleeping amongst his golden treasure. He even argues that we can easily
suppose that female infanticide is morally acceptable in some fictional worlds. However, it is
difficult for us to desire that female infanticide is acceptable, or even have a desire-like imagining
that it is acceptable in a fictional world. Currie argues that we cannot easily construct imaginative
replacements of “wicked desires” like we can with beliefs, even if it is possible in some cases. This
places Currie in a third camp: he is a hardian, rather than a cantian or wontian, about the two
puzzles. Deviant desire-like imaginings are not impossible and we may sometimes desire that an
immoral act to be fictionally true. However, it is very difficult to get ourselves in the right mindset
for this too occur—hence, the phenomenon of resistance. We have a very difficult time
imaginatively desiring female infanticide is fictionally true or, or even imaginatively desiring to
know what such a world would be like. These desire-like imagining are too far removed from our
actual desire that female infanticide shouldn’t be practiced.
Currie’s view may be able to explain both puzzles with one fell swoop. However, it faces
some serious challenges. What is it about desires—as opposed to beliefs—that make them the
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object of resistance? We can have all kinds of strange and unethical desires about real-life; why
can’t we do the same about a world that is not even our own? Currie owes the reader some
explanation for why we can easily construct bizarre or immoral suppositions about fictions, but
not desires and, further, what separates fictional desires from ordinary ones. So Currie’s response
to the puzzle of imaginative resistance fails.
Gendler’s and Walton’s explanations also face several problems. First, both suppose that
resistance is a robust, commonplace phenomenon. However, my interpretations of the examples
in the previous section suggest that resistance may not be as widespread as aestheticians think it
is. Second, some authors—including Yablo, Weatherson, and Priest—do not adequately
distinguish between what we imagine and what we are willing to accept as fictionally true. This
means that they fail to distinguish between the imaginative and fictionality puzzles. Walton
correctly points out that an inability to imagine does not equal resistance; we can try very hard to
imagine something, but simply be unable to do so (Walton 2006). That does not seem like a case
of resisting at all. He suggests that Gendler’s cantian response to the imaginative puzzle is mistaken
since “resistance” as she uses it conflates ability and resistance.
Third, some of the traditional responses trade on an equivocation on ‘imagination.’
Sometimes philosophers seem to be pointing out an inability to imagistically imagine a
proposition. Priest’s box and Yablo’s leaf example (also, perhaps, Weatherson’s Restaurant at the
End of the World) may be guilty of this. However, the real issue in the puzzles concerns attitudinal
imagining—imagining that something is the case. As Walton suggests, an inability to imagine is
not the same as resisting. This is true for imagistic imagining was well. We may be very eager to
imagistically imagine a five sided oval, but simply lack the ability to do so.
Fourth, each proposal under-specifies the source of our resistance: is it the fiction in which
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the impossibility or normative deviance occurs, or the impossibility/deviance itself (leaving the
rest of the story untouched)? Gendler holds the former position; Yablo and Walton suggest the
latter. Priest argues for both. This might seem like a trivial point, but I think that it is important for
understanding imaginative resistance in general. Just because a story features a proposition or
scenario that I do not imagine (either because I cannot or will not) does not necessarily mean that
I resist the story as a whole. This is true for any other types of imaginative resistance:
contradictions, metaphysical, conceptual, or moral. Consider the sci-fi stories from above, or even
Gone with the Wind. They all feature instances of imaginative resistance, and yet many people will
accept the story as a whole, perhaps by “setting aside” the impossibility, like in the Star Trek
example. Anyone who makes the stronger claim concerning the fiction as a whole needs to explain
why we can or will not accept a fiction if it possesses a point of resistance, especially since we
clearly often do.

5. Narrative resistance & immoral learning

On the one hand, it seems like imaginative resistance is an over-blown phenomenon. On the other,
there do seem to be some instances in which we resist works of fiction because they present us
with deviant moral characters and scenarios. In this section, I will present the second component
of my solution to the puzzle of imaginative resistance. Two relatively unexplored reasons why we
might seem to resist immoral aspects of fiction are either a) the fiction itself is not constructed in
the right way, or b) the reader does not understand a cognitive point that the fiction was intended
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to make. Importantly, I resist explaining resistance to fictions in terms of imagination. Like
Walton, I do not think that there is anything in principle that we cannot attitudinally imagine (see
also Camp, in prep). But there are things that we may have difficulty supposing to be true in a
fiction. The idea is that we can eliminate talk about imaginative resistance and instead discuss our
emotional resistance, as we’ll see in §6. As I’ve accepted all along, imagination may be involved
in our experiences with immoral aspects of a fiction. However, I contend that the so-called puzzle
of imaginative resistance isn’t a matter of imagination at all.

5.1. Narrative resistance
Some things, like a round square, may be impossible to imagistically imagine (or, at least, are very
difficult to imagine). But there does not seem to be anything that we are incapable of attitudinally
imagining. In my terms, this means that there is nothing in principle that we should not imagine in
a fictional world. Most of the time are able to “take up” morally deviant claims and accept that
they are true in a fictional world. It may not always be easy to do so, but it is possible.
Consider what would be involved in order for us to accept that female infanticide is morally
permissible. We must consider what it would be like for a person to live in certain circumstances
and follow certain rules that are very different than our own. We must suppose that it is biologically
true that women are inferior to men and the natural, political, and social climate is such that some
babies must be killed after birth. It may be very difficult for us to imagine the relevant
circumstances, but that does not mean it is impossible.
Gendler and Walton both contend that it is an author’s task to get her reader to imagine a
story in the right way so that she will accept the morally deviant claim. This is where the aesthetic
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and imaginative puzzles collide. An artwork may be aesthetically flawed if it does not enable its
audience to be able to think about and consider a deviant evaluative claim. Perhaps the artist has
not provided her audience with enough background information about the fictional world or
character. Perhaps the morally deviant proposal contradicts an episode that occurred earlier in the
narrative. In either case, the audience struggles to go along with the evaluative deviance.
Compare this to my discussion of the SDP. If an artist can get an audience to undergo proattitudes towards Satan, Hannibal Lecter, or Humbert Humbert, then why would she not, in
principle, be able to get us to imagine that female infanticide is acceptable? Given the right story,
we should be able to go along with female infanticide in a fictional world: to think about it and
understand what that world is like. A talented artist can get her to audience to engage with even
the most morally deviant characters. Like Feagin argues, there may a cognitive payoff for doing
so.
I don’t think that we can place the blame for an audience’s resistance entirely on the artist.
Audiences are not limited to what the author explicitly says in the text. Recall my arguments in
chapter 5 and 6 that readers each bring their own beliefs and values to a fiction. Our emotional
and moral experiences with fiction are a product of our own moral beliefs and emotional
tendencies. The same goes with our other beliefs and judgments. We may make judgments and
think about a fictional world beyond what the author lays out in a narrative. This can be an
important aspect of how we understand and evaluate the work as a whole. So a narrative might not
always give us enough information to imagine a morally deviant proposition. However, that does
not mean (contra Gendler and Walton) that we can’t make sense of the deviant proposition on our
own. We may have to do extra cognitive work in order to understand a fictional world in which
female infanticide is morally permissible.
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On my view, then, the imaginative puzzle is actually a matter of narrative resistance.
Audiences often find it difficult to accept deviant evaluative claims in a work of fiction either
because the narrative lacks sufficient information to them to do so or because they do not properly
engage with the story. This makes me a hardian about the imaginative puzzle, like Currie.
There remains the question of why audiences might not want to engage with a story that
positively portrays deviant moral actions or principles. Why would we not want to accept that an
immoral action is acceptable in a fiction? What is the source of our unwillingness? This is the basis
of the fictionality puzzle.

5.2. Immoral learning
There are very few cases in which we are unwilling to go along with a story and accept a fictional
truth. Indeed, if the artist has done her job correctly, we should be willing and able to engage with
all sorts of fictional characters and events. But even when she hasn’t, the reader may wish to fill
in the relevant gaps so as to make the story understandable and relatable. In a sense, the wontians
seem to think that some readers/audiences are not playing along with the fiction, just like those
viewers of Star Trek that cannot look past the metaphysical impossibility of traveling at light speed
in order to consider the work as a whole.
I think that the fictionality puzzle—cases in which we do not accept moral deviations in
the fictional world—is often the result of a worry concerning immoral learning. This occurs when
an audience worries that going along with fictional portrayals of immorality in a fiction will cause
us to adopt immoral practices and beliefs in our actual lives. Compare the possibility of immoral
learning to the fictionality thesis from chapter 6. The fictionality thesis states that we allow
ourselves to imaginatively respond to different features of a fiction simply because it is a fiction.
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This supposedly frees us to take pleasure in all sorts of things we normally wouldn’t in our real
lives. However, Gendler suggests that audiences often won’t accept fictional truths is because
doing so will somehow reflect on one’s own beliefs about the actual world. We may also worry
that there is a causal connection between a fiction and the real-world: reading about a morally
deviant character or scenario will cause one to become morally deviant oneself. Plato famously
cast the poets out of the ideal state in Book X of The Republic for this reason, stating: “their art
corrupts the minds of all who hearken to them, save only those whose knowledge of reality
provides an antidote” (595d). Fictions often influence our emotions and, in so doing, our moral
judgments. Plato worried that audiences might learn bad moral practices from works of art if we
are not careful.
It’s possible that people sometimes do misattribute immoral characteristics to a person
based on her emotional and moral responses to portrayals of immorality in a fiction. You might
look sideways at a friend who laughs when a fictional character is harmed. However, the
fictionality thesis contends that our friend has done nothing wrong here. Her laughing at the
fictional character’s pain may mean that she accepts that injury is sometimes acceptable in a
fictional world. It does not mean that our friend accepts this in the real world. The whole point of
fictions is that we recognize that the characters and actions portrayed in a story aren’t real.
In fact, I think that refusing to accept deviant fictional truths is sometimes a kind of
interpretive mistake. Consider the immoralist position from §2: there may be some aesthetic
benefit to the portrayal of immoral actions in a fiction. So if we refuse to accept the deviant fictional
truth, then we may also miss out on that aesthetic benefit.
Let’s go through an example. Suppose that you and an especially morally-correct friend
have just watched an episode of your favorite show, Mad Men. This episode, “Mystery Date,”
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portrays a great deal of sexual violence against women. The historical backdrop of the story is the
(real-life) Richard Speck murders in the late 1960’s, in which Speck kidnapped, raped, tortured,
and murdered eight nursing students in the Chicago area. Many of the fictional characters in Mad
Men are equally obsessed with and frightened by the Speck murders (Don’s young daughter, Sally,
can’t sleep after reading about Speck in the paper; her step-grandmother takes perverse pleasure
in discussing Speck with her friend on the phone). Other characters simply carry about their
business. The creative ad-man, Don Draper, and the young copy writer, Michael Ginsberg,
promote a sales campaign for Butler footwear. Ginsberg’s final pitch highlights the backdrop of
sexual violence in the episode:
‘We were gonna come in here and talk about Cinderella, but it’s too dark…I mean
she’s running down this dark side street, and it’s outside a castle so it’s got those
walls and the cobblestones. And she’s running but she’s only got this one incredible
shoe for her incredible gown, so she’s hobbling—wounded prey. She can hear him
behind her, his measured footsteps catching up. She turns a corner, those big
shadows. And she’s scared. And then she feels a hand on her shoulder and she turns
around, and it doesn’t matter what he looks like. He’s handsome at that moment,
offering her her shoe. She takes it. She knows she’s not safe, but she doesn’t care.
I guess we know in the end that she wants to be caught’ (Mad Men episode 5.4,
“Mystery Date”).

The Butler people gobble it up, oblivious to the menacing tone of this scene. Later in the episode,
Don has a dream in which he strangles his mistress after they sleep together. Finally, the episode
raises the specter of the office manager Joan’s rape by her then fiancé, Greg.
Some people may take delight in “Mystery Date.” The whole episode is dark and gloomy,
much more muted in both color and tone than a typical Mad Men episode. Maybe you take pleasure
in hearing about the Speck murders, in watching Don’s bizarre dream, and Ginsberg’s haunting
Cinderella tale. Your morally correct friend might be deeply disturbed when she realizes that you
take delight in a show that nonjudgmentally portrays violence against women. In fact, it’s unclear
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whether the show condones or condemns Don’s immoral behavior (how he treats women, his wife,
his children, his employees, etc.). Ginsberg’s sales pitch is mainly used to contrast the personalities
of the dour, stern Don and the impulsive young copy writer. Only clear judgment is against Joan’
husband, Greg, who so clearly disrespects his wife’s desires and ends up alone in Vietnam. The
moral ambiguity with which the narrative presents Don and the others bothers your friend, who
resists any glorification or even casual acceptance of the show’s portrayals of immorality.
Most people don’t think that violence against women is ever acceptable in the real world.
But Mad Men’s fictional world is just that: fictional. Don and Joan’s world may be very similar to
the actual world, but no real person suffers as the result of the events in this episode. Accepting
the sexual violence against the women in the show does not mean that one accepts violence against
women in the real world. You accept that this may be fictionally true, but not actually true. No one
is harmed by your taking delight in the portrayals of immorality in “Mystery Date.”
Fictions often portray immoral characters or actions that are not condemned in the
narrative. Like Kieran and Feagin, I argue that, generally speaking, these portrayals of accepted
immorality are supposed to prove some cognitive point. The audience is supposed to take the
portrayal of immorality as an opportunity for moral reflection and learning. You may watch
“Mystery Date” and enjoy all of its dark, immoral scenes. Maybe you don’t think about the
significance of the sexual violence at the time you watch it. You simply enjoy the episode. Upon
reflection, though, you may realize that there might be a deeper significance to some of the
violence in the episode. Mad Men is a partly a satire that reflects the social mores of both the
1960’s and the present. The ad-men casually accept violence against women and using women as
mere sexual objects. The show holds up the image of sexual violence in the show to reflect our
own society, either as it was or currently is. So watching portrayals of immorality on screen should

305

cause the viewer to reflect on her own moral beliefs.
This, perhaps, is the cognitive point that “Mystery Date” and other Mad Men episodes
attempt to make. Immoralists would count this opportunity for moral reflection as an aesthetic
virtue, something that makes Mad Men a good show. Indeed, we could contrast “Mystery Date”
with a show that simply glorifies sexual violence against women without making a similar
cognitive point. It may be right to resist the condoned violence in this case.
One could protest that it may be quite difficult to tell when a fiction attempts to make a
point by portraying violence and when it’s simply portraying violence for shock value. This is true;
it’s up the viewer to be able to draw out the cognitive point in some narratives and to decide for
herself when portrayals of immorality are unacceptable. Here, too, the worry is that taking pleasure
in fictional immorality will somehow transcend into real world immoral beliefs or actions. I will
return to this point in the following chapter when I discuss moral learning from fictions.
The Mad Men example I give here is intended to show that the fictionality puzzle may
sometimes be a kind of interpretive mistake. Audiences are typically quite willing to engage in a
morally deviant fiction so long as the narrative is presented to us in the right way, with a
sufficiently detailed plot, fictional world, the right cast of characters and, most importantly, an
interesting or important cognitive payoff. I do not think that it is a coincidence, or even a matter
of logistics and practicality, that the morally deviant propositions in the articles on imaginative
resistance are made-up cases by philosophers, not actual or complete fictions in themselves. If we
take a work of fiction as a whole—as Feagin says, a temporally extended object—then my guess
is that we will rarely resist accepting that some morally deviant proposition is true in the fiction.
Importantly, this does not mean that we need to consider the morally deviant proposition as true
in our actual world—even if the fiction presents us with a world that is remarkably similar to our
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own.

6. Emotional resistance

I have tried to explain away some cases of supposed imaginative resistance. Surely, though, there
are some genuine instances of the phenomenon. Genuine imaginative resistance amounts to an
unwillingness to imagine deviant evaluative claims in a fictional narrative. In this section, I will
argue that these supposed cases of imaginative resistance are really instances of emotional
resistance. I will focus on deviant moral claims, but my arguments apply to aesthetic evaluations
as well. Our resistance to positive portrayals of immoral characters and scenarios are due to a
difficulty in overcoming negative emotional responses to them.
Emotional resistance explains why we might only resist some immoral features of a fiction.
This is a challenge for other explanations of imaginative resistance. None of them explain what it
is about certain examples of moral deviances that cause us to resist them. As we saw with the SDP,
there are many instances in which we respond positively towards immoral characters. We either
overcome an initial resistance to the character or we experience no resistance to her at all.
In fact, the fascinated attention account of the SDP helps explain the puzzle of imaginative
resistance as well. A narrative can be constructed in such a way that we will feel pro-attitudes
towards an immoral character. We are willing to accept deviant characters and actions if the
narrative is presented in the right way. We may emotionally resist immoral characters or scenarios
in a fiction if we are not sufficiently fascinated by a character or if we are not shown his or her
sympathetic features.
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Moreover, a multi-level appraisal theory of moral judgments perfectly explains our
resistance to immoral aspects of fictions. Resistance may be the result of fast, subpersonal negative
reactions to portrayals of immorality. Suppose that you are watching The Godfather, a film that
not only presents murder, organized crime, drug trafficking, kidnapping, and theft, but often
glorifies these actions. Do we resist The Godfather or not, and why? If so, is the resistance to the
story as a whole, or an individual act within the story?
At the end of the film, Michael Corleone has the Dons of the other major crime families
sent “to sleep with the fishes,” thereby assuring his own dominance in New York mob scene. You
watch as one man after another is killed, contrasting with the sanctimonious shots of the baptism
of Michael’s nephew. What is your initial emotional response to this scene? Some people might
feel a sort of malicious glee due to their sympathies for the Corleone family. Others might
experience disgust, horror, or revulsion at the murders. According to the multi-level appraisal
theory, one’s disgust, horror, or revulsion is the result of the initial affective appraisal of the
murders that may or may not be consciously experienced. A positive response might suggest that
the viewer accepts Michael’s actions, at least initially.
From here, slower, cognitive appraisals of the murders might come about. The cognitive
appraisal may overturn the initial affective appraisal. We automatically have a negative response
to Michael’s actions but later decide that his was in the right. We do not resist his immoral deeds.
Alternatively, our cognitive appraisal of the murders might not overturn the initial negative
affective appraisal. Perhaps the viewer is sickened by the depravity of all the crime families. These
murders mark Michael’s moral turning point and herald in a new era of morally bankrupt,
avaricious organized crime. We resist the positive portrayal of the Don’s murders because we
cannot overcome our initial negative reaction to them.
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It is difficult to overcome our initial affective responses towards any situation: fictional or
non-fictional, moral or amoral. Imagine a scenario in which you suspect that your partner has
cheated on you. You notice all the late nights at work, the mysterious phone calls, and the
unaccounted for afternoons. You experience intense jealousy, rage, and hurt. But then you
discover that your partner was not cheating, but planning your surprise birthday party. You may
instantly feel relief while at the same time experience some residual hurt or jealous affective
feelings. It’s challenging to overcome our affective appraisals and feelings. We may have to
actively work towards overcoming them. This could also apply to our emotional responses to
fictions; we may have to remind ourselves of the point of the story and take other measures to
eradicate our initial negative response towards the murders (see Harris 2000).
Finally, it is possible that the viewer has misinterpreted the story. It’s not entirely clear that
The Godfather as a whole does condone the assassinations. Consider how hard Michael worked to
prevent himself from becoming involved in the family business, the tragedy of Apollonia’s death,
Connie’s dismay after Michael has her husband killed, or Kay’s horrified look at the end of when
Michael receives his caporegime. Perhaps, then, our viewer does not resist the positive portrayal
of murder because there is no positive portrayal to begin with!
As I’ve argued, we can make a similar point can be made for many stories that portray
immoral acts: they do so for some cognitive point, not because one is actually supposed to accept
them. We may have difficulty in accepting a character or action in a fiction because we typically
associate strong negative emotions towards such characters and actions in real life. It may be that
we are not given enough information about a character to care about her or to understand how an
immoral action—like Walton’s female infanticide example—could possibly be true. Thus, our
initial affective appraisal of the character or scene would not be modified by later cognitive re-
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appraisals. This could lead to our resistance: we refuse to watch a film that positively portrays
immoral actions or we cannot accept that the immoral action is acceptable partly because we have
no reason to update our initial negative reaction.

7. Dissolving the puzzle

My goal in this chapter was to show that the puzzle of imaginative resistance is not really all that
puzzling. Standard cases of imaginative resistance do not adequately motivate a robust puzzle to
be solved. They are not genuine examples of resistance or involve imagistic rather than attitudinal
imagining. Imaginative resistance is not as prevalent a phenomenon as is typically supposed. When
resistance does occur, it may often be due to a narrative or interpretive failure: what I have called
narrative resistance and the challenge of immoral learning, respectively. Finally, I have attempted
to show that imaginative resistance is better understood as emotional resistance—or, at least,
emotional difficulty.
If imaginative resistance is a genuine worry, it does not concern fiction alone (see also
Matravers 2014). We often encounter real-life stories that we resist due to moral deviances, such
as Triumph of the Will. We resist these stories for roughly the same reasons we would resist any
morally unacceptable action: we disagree with it. As in the purely fictional cases, we may resist
accepting the moral deviances in these works. This may be a matter of how difficult it would be to
change one’s moral outlook in order to accept the positive portrayal of Nazism. It may also be a
matter of overcoming our strong negative emotions towards Nazism, which would be quite
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difficult to do.
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Chapter 9: (Im)moral Learning from Fictions

1. Learning from Dexter Morgan

The last puzzle that I will discuss concerns the possibility of learning about real-world morality
from fiction. This is an extension of my arguments from the previous chapter: one reason why the
challenge of immoral learning is so persistent stems from the worry that portrayals of fictional
immorality will carry over into real world actions and beliefs.
Take the TV show Dexter. This show portrays the escapades of Dexter Morgan, Miami
Metro blood-spatter analyst by day, self-described psychopathic serial killer by night. Audiences
typically want Dexter’s plots to succeed, despite his murderous tendencies and sometimes callous
demeanor. We do not want him to be caught by the police even if his capture would be morally
justified all things considered. This is partly because Dexter is a serial killer with a code of honor.
He only kills people who (he thinks) deserve it: drug dealers, other serial killers, rapists, mobsters,
etc. Dexter follows this code to the tee and rarely strays from it. In fact, Dexter blames other serial
killers for not following his code and berates himself when he slips and impulsively harms an
innocent.
Another reason for our sympathy for Dexter is that he is not, strictly speaking, a complete
psychopath. He occasionally feels remorse and he often reflects on the morality of his actions.
“How evil could I be?” Dexter muses, as he runs off to help out a neighbor with some handy-work.
Dexter fits my fascination hypothesis from chapter 7: he is intelligent, attractive, loyal, out of the
ordinary, and interesting.
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I do not think that Dexter’s viewers will take this code to heart and take up murdering
neighborhood criminals. We discover the cost of Dexter’s type of vigilante killing—for instance,
the death of Dexter’s wife and his isolation at the conclusion of the series. But there may be a sense
in which we do learn something from Dexter’s immoral behavior. While some characters, such as
his sister Debra and his friend Lumen, start out repulsed by Dexter’s behavior, they come to admire
it. Dexter is never caught or punished by the authorities. He is portrayed as a generally nice guy
with a bit of a killing problem, and certainly a better moral agent than many of the people he
murders. Perhaps the worry is that accepting a serial killer—no matter his motives—will cause us
to eventually accept similar people in real life. Feelings about violence and vigilante crime in the
fictional world of the TV series could bleed into a viewer’s thoughts and actions about the real
world. Call this immoral learning.
I introduced Jenefer Robinson’s notion of a “sentimental education” from fiction in chapter
5. She argues that fictions allow a reader to gain experience in new emotional territory and gain
self-knowledge about emotional tendencies that we already possess. If we can learn about our
emotions from fictions, then it seems likely that we can learn about morality from fictions as well,
especially if morality is based on emotional responses.
In this chapter, I will explore the possibility of moral learning from fictions. I will begin
by discussing the plausibility of learning from fictions in general. I will examine several arguments
both in favor of and against this possibility. In §3, I will connect the moral learning debate with
another hot debate in the philosophy of film: the question of whether film can do philosophy. I
offer some evidence in support of the idea that fictions can do positive philosophy, as thought
experiments. I contend that the moral learning and film-as-philosophy debates are closely related,
even though they have not been understood that way in the aesthetics literature. In fact, the idea
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that some films can do philosophy is evidence that they can teach us about morality. I will end this
chapter by reexamining the possibility of immoral learning.

2. Learning from fictions: Nussbaum vs. Currie

2.1. The optimists
Robinson claims that readers can gain a sentimental education from fictions. Fictions engage our
emotional systems and, if we reflect on those emotions, we may acquire self-knowledge about our
own values and desires. We can also practice mindreading of fictional characters and consider
various hypothetical alternatives to emotional situations. Other philosophers have argued that we
can gain a moral education from engaging with fictions, and literary works in particular. Susan
Feagin (1983) and Martha Nussbaum (1990) take their cues from Aristotle (1947), arguing that
engaging with fiction plays an instrumental role in the development of one’s moral and intellectual
character (see also Gendler & Kovakovich, 2005).
Nussbaum claims that there are two ways in which fictions can aid moral learning. First,
fictions often present us with interesting and original moral content. She provides an extended
example of the character Maggie from Henry James’s novel, The Golden Bowl. Nussbaum
explores how James presents Maggie’s idiosyncratic, perfectionist conception of goodness and
fear of doing harm. The narrative suggests that Maggie’s absolute convictions are overly idealistic
and simplistic. The novel-length treatment of Maggie’s personal relationships sets up several moral
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problems and then “solves” those problems by determining each character’s fate (Nussbaum 1990,
132).
Of course, we could simply read about morality in a philosophy text. However, Nussbaum
doubts that readers would learn as much about the particular moral question at hand from a
philosophy paper as she would from James’ novel. Sometimes readers need particular cases and
examples in order to understand the complex social and practical implications of a moral principle.
Short, abstract philosophical works often cannot do justice to the intricacies of moral dilemmas in
our actual lives.
Fictions provide us with unique moral content to expand our understanding of moral values
and principles. Engaging with fictions also develops our moral skills. Presenting moral dilemmas
and principles in a story calls upon our moral faculties: our attention to morally relevant details of
a situation or person, reflection on our own moral behaviors and how others act in moral situations,
and exploring and weighing options in order to make moral decisions. Fictional dilemmas may
also trigger our moral emotions for a kind of “knowledge by acquaintance,” what I called
experiential knowledge in chapter 4. Fictions grant us access to situations and personality types
that we would never encounter in our daily lives. We practice our moral and emotional responses
on these fictional entities and learn from example. We can then apply any know moral insights we
gain to our own lives.
Some philosophers have argued that fictions can provide us with more general types of
learning, besides a sentimental or moral education. Peter Lamarque (2009) lists five different
categories of learning from fiction: vision, imagination, learning what it is like, conceptual
knowledge, and cognitive strengthening. Note that these learning categories were originally
thought of in terms of literary fiction, but I will make the case that they can apply to any fictional
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medium, at least in principle
First, philosophers such as Iris Murdoch (1970) and Hilary Putnam (1978) have argued that
fictions educate readers by helping them picture and understand real-life situations. The vision of
a work should be understood metaphorically; readers learn to view the fictional world in a certain
way, and apply that understanding to the real world. We learn an author or narrator’s vision
perspective on the world. As Putnam (commenting on Celine’s Journey to the End of the Night)
remarks: “I do not learn that love does not exist, that all human beings are hateful and
hating…What I learn is to see the world as it looks to someone who is sure that hypothesis is
correct” (ibid, 89; quoted in Lamarque 2009, 241). Perhaps I could previously imagine what it
would be like to learn that love doesn’t exist (for example), but encountering this perspective in a
fiction adds a new layer of experiential knowledge that I didn’t formerly possess.
Second, readers actively engage their imaginative faculties while reading works of
literature. In chapter 1, I discussed van Leeuwen’s three of types of imagining: imagistic,
attitudinal, and constructive. While reading a novel, we may imagistically call to mind characters,
constructively imagine scenarios and propositions true of the fiction, and attitudinally imagine
fictional objects. This kind of imaginative engagement with fictions may broaden the scope and
power of one’s imaginative abilities in other areas, such as hypothetical or forward-looking
thought. This is true even if, as I have argued, imaginative engagement is not necessary for fictional
experiences.
Third, fictions may teach us what it is like to be someone with different characteristics than
the reader possesses, or to be in a unique or unfamiliar scenario. Nussbaum and Robinson both
argue for this position. This is another kind of experiential learning; we may learn what it is like
to be a certain kind of person or in a unique moral situation. For example, I could begin to learn
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what it is like to suffer from severe depression after reading The Bell Jar. I may not learn exactly
what such a deep depression feels like, but I would have some idea of its effects on one’s daily
life.
Fourth, fictions may teach us about folk psychological concepts. We can gain selfknowledge of emotional tendencies, desires, or values that we did not know we possessed
(Nussbaum 1995, Robinson 2005). It may even be possible that fictions can grant us propositional
knowledge about folk psychology, a possibility I will explore in greater detail momentarily.
Finally, one might contend that fictions are unlikely to teach us anything new about
morality or emotions (for instance), but they may nevertheless enhance knowledge that we already
possess (Gibson 2003). We gain moral skills from fictions much in the way we would by practicing
sports: through the repeated application, development and enhancement of skills.
In sum, we can potentially gain three types of knowledge from fiction: propositional
knowledge about psychological or social concepts, knowledge of how to apply those concepts and
moral/emotional/social skills, and experiential knowledge of what it is like to be a particular type
of person or in an unfamiliar situation. In what follows, I will make the case for all three types of
moral knowledge. Each of the previous styles of learning can be applied to a reader’s moral
education; we can gain moral perspectives, learn about moral concepts, and practice moral skills
while engaging with some fictions. We may even gain self-knowledge about our own moral
responses to unfamiliar people and situations. Indeed, it seems like a platitude that engaging with
great works of fiction makes us more morally sensitive. What reasons do we have to doubt this
claim?
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2.2. The skeptics
It may seem like the authors in the previous section all assume the claim that we can learn from
fictions without putting forth any real argument in its favor. But what evidence do we have to
support this claim? Currie (2013) notes that philosophers like Nussbaum, Lamarque, Robinson,
etc. all assume that we learn psychological and moral truths from fictions. Unfortunately, these
philosophers do not provide any empirical evidence to support their optimism about moral
learning. Currie claims that there is such no empirical evidence. It may seem like reading great
works of fiction—those we would consider to be psychologically intuitive and revealing, such as
novels by Dostoevsky, James, Tolstoy, and Austen, or films by Godard, Mehlville, or Antonioni—
make their audiences more insightful, thoughtful, reflective, and morally and emotionally sensitive
in the course of their daily lives. But it is equally possible that readers who are already reflective,
insightful, thoughtful, and morally and emotionally sensitive are naturally drawn to great works of
literature that engage these faculties.
The optimist might protest that recent studies show that we can learn from fiction. In one,
the psychologists David Comer Kidd and Emanuele Castano (2013) found that people who read
literary fictions as opposed to or pop fiction do better on empathy and mindreading tests. Engaging
with literary fictions (such as a work by Anton Chekov) primes readers for empathetic thoughts
and behaviors. This conclusion seems to support the Robinson/Nussbaum line that we can gain a
sentimental and moral education from literary fictions, especially if we think that social cognition
and empathy are important components of how we morally engage with others.
The skeptics have a ready reply to these results. As the researchers note, it is unclear how
long these effects last—for a few hours? Days? Minutes? It’s not clear that we should count this
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as moral learning if the participants were merely primed to respond empathetically. It is also
possible that the differences in responses to empathetic and mindreading tests stem from how the
narrative was constructed and what faculties it employs and not necessarily from the fictional
content (what it supposedly reveals about the human psyche, for example). One final interpretation
could be that people who tend to be better at mindreading and empathy tests also happen to be
frequent or talented consumers of literary fiction. Reading the literary work draws upon a skill that
they already have.
The skeptics have another reason to doubt that we can gain knowledge from fictions. Even
if we can learn about morality or psychology from fictions in principle, most authors rely on faulty
psychological theories of character, intention, and decision-making. If this is so, then the great
works of fiction would not help us learn about how humans think (Currie, in prep). Currie sites
recent research in cognitive psychology on character and decisionmaking that undermines how
standard fictional characters think and behave.
First, some contemporary philosophers and psychologists have called into question the
notion of character as it is employed by virtue theorists (see Doris 1998 & 2002). Virtue theorists
seem to be committed to the existence of persisting character traits that help explain how people
will act: honesty, courage, loyalty, generosity, etc. An honest person will refuse to lie to their friend
or to a stranger and will also refuse to cheat on a test or steal from a store. It is assumed that a
person’s character trait will be reliable across various situations and over time (see Sreenivasan
2002).
Against this notion of character, studies like Stanley Milgram’s electric shock experiments
and Philip Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Experiment seem to suggest that ordinarily virtuous
people—who might appear to possess certain basic, virtuous character traits—can be made to do
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awful things when pressured to do so. Psychological situationists argue that our behaviors may
vary dramatically in different situations and do not raw upon constant personality traits. In John
Darley and Daniel Batson’s “Good Samaritan” study (1973), Princeton theological students
(ideally the utmost empathic and caring individuals) were studied to see if they would come to the
aid of a needy bystander. They found that self-ascribed traits such as empathy and compassion
were not suggestive of who would help the bystander. Rather, the determinant was which students
were in a hurry. Students who were told that they was running late for a lecture were significantly
less likely to help the bystander than if they were early or on time.
Based on research like this, philosophical situationists have argued that the traditional
virtue theoretic notion of a constant moral character is misleading (Doris 1998 & 2002, Harmon
2000). Kevin Timpe (2008) describes philosophical situationism in terms of three related claims:

1. Non-robustness: moral character traits are not robust—that is, they are not
consistent across a wide spectrum of trait-relevant situations. Whatever moral
character traits an individual has are situation-specific.
2. Consistency: while a person’s moral character traits are relatively stable over
time, this should be understood as consistency of situation specific traits, rather
than robust traits.
3. Fragmentation: There may be considerable disunity in a person’s moral character
among her situation-specific character traits.

If these claims are true, then situationism seems to present a problem for works of fiction. Currie
argues that great works of fiction present characters that possess constant character traits that shape
their behaviors. Examples abound: Luke Skywalker, Harry Potter, Frodo Baggins, Ned Stark, Jane
Eyre, even Batman all seem to act on the basis of constant character traits that are not easily swayed
by situational features. Rather, the character brings these traits to bear on difficult moral situations.
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Jane Eyre is honest, so she consistently acts honestly across most situations, even when she has
the perfect opportunity to act dishonestly. Furthermore, Jane possesses a unity of virtues; she is
not only honest, but loyal, brave, and hardworking. Her virtues are not fragmented. Situationists
would argue that his portrayal of a young woman is unrealistic and does not capture how people
actually behave or the values they actually possess.
Currie also argues that fictions present a faulty picture of decision making and causal
reasoning. For example, a narrative may present a character as faced with a moral dilemma and
she must reason through various options in order to reach a satisfactory conclusion. Her reasoning
serves as the main causal basis for the choice she makes. Why does Jane Eyre decide to leave Mr.
Rochester, the man she loves, in favor of an uncertain fate? Because she cannot bear the idea of
throwing aside her moral beliefs for a life of dishonesty and callousness to others. Jane seemed to
have conscious access to all of her reasons for leaving and was able to justify her actions to others
later in the story.
Recent work in cognitive psychology has brought this picture of decision-making into
question. In a famous study on the introspection illusion, Richard Nisbett and Timothy Wilson
(1977) presented participants with two pairs of stockings. The participants were able to present
justifications of their decision when asked which pair they preferred. For instance, they liked the
color better of one of the pairs; one of them looked like it was of a higher quality, etc. In fact, both
pairs of stockings were the same! The participants tended to prefer the pair on the right-hand side
for no other reason than that it was on that side. The verbal justifications for their decisions were
merely confabulations.
Similarly, Daniel Wegner (2002) has argued that conscious will is an illusion. We think
that our conscious thoughts cause our actions, when, in fact, it is possible that our brain primes
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action before conscious thinking takes place. We do not know that brain states give rise to actions,
of course, because these processes are conducted unconsciously. So we conclude that conscious
thoughts must have caused our actions. Benjamin Libet (1985) makes similar claims in his studies
on the timing of conscious voluntary actions (see also Graves et al 2010, Haggard 2005, Haggard
& Libet 2001).
Currie concludes that evidence from cognitive psychology on situationism, decisionmaking, and the conscious will undermines the idea that we can learn about psychology and
morality from fictions. Authors present fictional characters as possessing predictive character
traits, as having access to their own intentions and deliberative decision-making processes, and as
consciously willing to act. However, if the psychological data is correct, people don’t really think
or act the way fictional characters do. We are mistaken in thinking that we can learn about such
things from fiction
Perhaps we can gain pretend knowledge from fictions, as Currie suggests. We can
approach a literary work as if it presents a true picture of human psychology and see what we can
conclude on that basis (Currie, in prep). This is a natural implication of the DAV; we do not have
stereotypical mental states about fictions, so how can we learn anything about real-life mental
processes from them? Coupled with the skeptical evidence from cognitive psychology, it does
seem like the best we can learn from fictions is how we think mental states might work, not how
they actually do.
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3. Withstanding the skeptics

I want to resist Currie’s skeptical arguments. The optimist position faces two challenges. First, we
must respond to Currie’s claims concerning character and decision making in order to show that it
is possible for audiences to learn about fiction. We need to determine whether authors present us
with accurate depictions of the human psyche. But even if we can eliminate this negative claim,
the optimist still lacks a positive account of how consuming fictions makes us better moral agents.
I will turn to this challenge in the next section.
We can question Currie’s quick acceptance of the situationist literature as evidence against
the psychological reality of character. Currie’s situationist argument that character traits are weak
and unstable has not been universally accepted in the psychology and philosophy literature on
virtue (Annas 2005, Sabini and Silver 2005, Sreenivasan 2002 & 2009, etc.). Many virtue ethicists
argue that character traits need not entail inflexible or scripted behaviors. Rather, they are
predictive. It may be that a character trait for honesty disposes a person to tell the truth, and she
will in most circumstances. However, character traits may be flexible and context sensitive. An
honest person will, ceteris paribus, act honestly. This does not mean that she always will. An
honest response can be defeated by context sensitive factors and knowledge (Sreenivasan 2002).
This means that fictions may actually present us with an acceptable picture of moral
character. Do the brave characters always act bravely and the dishonest characters always act
poorly? Not necessarily. Inflexible fictional characters are boring and unrealistic. We are
fascinated by a villain with a compassionate streak and a generally honest protagonist who
sometimes lies or cheats. We like our fictional characters to be somewhat unpredictable. There are
also characters that seem to have stable personality traits who nevertheless change their minds due
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to the context in which they find themselves (e.g., Huck Finn and Anna Karenina).
What about Currie’s argument about conscious decision making? Do characters in the great
works of fiction always act on the basis conscious reasoning? This research presents a greater
challenge for the optimist. Decision making and deliberation does seem to be generally
unconscious and subject to unknown or inaccessible influences and biases. In contrast, fictional
characters have access to their own mental processes and states.
However, there are some literary works that show their characters acting on the basis of
emotional feelings and intuitions, or simply not knowing why they acted as they did. Dostoevsky’s
Crime and Punishment is my favorite example of this. Raskolnikov decides to go through with
murder of the old pawnbroker and her sister on a whim, even though he considered it for a long
time. He spends the rest of the novel agonizing over his motives (which vary depending on his
mood). Consider also the stream-of-consciousness techniques in works by the British modernists.
Virginia Woolf’s To the Lighthouse and James Joyce’s Finnegan’s Wake go to great lengths to
show that people do not act on the basis of orderly, deductive causal chains, but rather from general
impressions, moods, and memories. Of course, one could still argue that the stream-ofconsciousness is supposed to be conscious and so does not present a counterexample to Currie’s
claim. But it does show that our actions do not always proceed from rational deliberation.
Even if most literary works present us with inaccurate pictures of conscious decisionmaking and deliberation, not all of them do. It is possible, then, that fictions can provide us with
some knowledge about how we real people think and make decisions.
Moreover, it is far from obvious that artists are really concerned with presenting
scientifically accurate portrayals of psychological processes, or even that they take their stories as
a source of learning (moral or otherwise). Artists may be unconcerned with presenting a picture of

324

rational thought that squares with our best cognitive psychological and neuroscientific theories.
Instead, they write about how most people appear to act and make decisions. Artists present
characters in terms of what appear to be, prima facie, plausible psychological processes. Artists
offer us the building blocks of folk psychology. So the value of this approach may depend on the
value of folk psychology in general.
Imagine a fictional story with an omniscient narrator that does not explain why the
protagonist behaves as he does. The narrative would be quite confusing and chances are readers
wouldn’t find it very engaging. The reader would have to do a lot of work to understand how the
character thinks and feels. There may be some challenging, scientifically accurate stories out there.
It may be purposively difficult to understand the narrative of these stories, since everything we
know about a character typically comes from what we are told about her in the text. We don’t have
real world context or perceptual cues to inform our understanding of the character. Perhaps such
stories make some cognitive point about the incomprehensibility or opacity of human behavior. It
would be an interesting philosophical and psychological case study, but maybe not the most
engaging story.
We tend to treat fictional characters the way that we do real people. We assume that their
actions are motivated by character traits and reasons. This is part of what it means to take the
fictional stance; we recognize the character as a person like one in the real world, and doing so
helps us to understand the character. It could be that folk psychology is wrong in general. So we
may be mistaken about the decisions and virtues of fictional characters—but, then, we are also
wrong about real people. This is interesting and noteworthy for those working in cognitive science,
but knowledge of situationism and the illusion of conscious reasoning will likely not change how
we treat either real people or fictional characters.
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4. Fictional thought experiments

I have been fended off Currie’s charge that fictions utilize inaccurate notions from folk
psychology. There is another hurdle to cross before we can say that we can learn about morality
from fiction. The claim that we can gain any kind of knowledge from fiction is susceptible to
Currie’s challenge that there is no real empirical evidence in favor of the view that consuming
fiction enhances our psychological understanding.
In this section, I will make the case that some fictions are extended thought experiments. If
we think that we can learn about morality from thought experiments—which philosophers and
cognitive scientists take for granted—then there is no reason why, in principle, we should deny
that we can also learn about moral issues from some works of fictions.
There is a growing literature on the relationship between philosophy and film. Some
philosophers argue that film can do philosophy. Others deny this possibility. My arguments will
draw from this literature, but will not be limited to film fictions. Likewise, Currie’s claims
concerning literary fictions carry over to films. Film characters also seem to possess steady
personality traits and use conscious deliberation to make decisions that guide their behavior.
Indeed, many of the challenges facing film as a form of philosophy apply to literature and other
fictional media. I will point out differences between art forms when appropriate.
I will begin with several arguments against the claim that film can do philosophy. Like
many authors in this area, Bruce Russell (2000) grants that films can be counterexamples to
philosophical points or address philosophical theses. Woody Allen’s Crimes and Misdemeanors,
for example, presents a counterexample to Plato’s argument in The Republic that only virtuous
people can be truly happy. The Matrix illustrates Cartesian external world skepticism. But these

326

films do not actually do philosophy. While they illustrate or present counterexamples to
philosophical claims. But neither one presents original, unique, positive philosophical ideas.
Right away we can think of one good response to Russell’s skepticism. First, why is it that
counterexamples are not “real” philosophy? Thomas Wartenburg (2007) reminds us of Gettier’s
short paper “Is knowledge justified true belief?” (Gettier 1963). This paper presents several brief
counterexamples to the claim that justified true beliefs are necessary and sufficient for knowledge.
No one would deny that Gettier’s paper is philosophy even though it does not present a positive
theory of knowledge. Wartenburg (2006) also points out that many of the philosophy papers
published in journals each month do not make unique contributions to their area. Instead, they may
elucidate, bolster, or reject established philosophical claims. Russell’s notion of what it means to
“do philosophy” is too limiting.
Russell also points out that films cannot establish truths about the actual world. He states
that: “[an] imaginary situation cannot supply real data” (Russell 2000, 390). Films present us with
specific moral examples, but we cannot learn about real-life from them. This is because the
fictional examples cannot be generalized or the medium is incompatible with doing philosophy.
This charge proves more difficult to argue against without some positive account of how films can
do philosophy, so I will hold off on responding for the time being.
Another skeptic, Paisley Livingston (2006), also claims that film has limited philosophic
potential. Livingston’s arguments form two horns of a dilemma. Underlying each is the notion of
medium specificity (see Carroll 2008). In order for film to do philosophy, one would have to show
how the film medium can uniquely capture philosophic ideas in terms of its unique qualities. These
features of the film medium that are unique to it, such as its capacity to depict movement. The first
horn of the dilemma accepts this medium specificity claim, but notes that “exclusively cinematic
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insight cannot be paraphrased” in the way that a philosophical argument requires (ibid, 12). The
medium specific qualities of a film—its ability to utilize editing, camera movement and angle,
focus, correlations between sounds, music, and a shot, etc.—cannot capture succinct, verbally
articulated arguments as philosophy does. This is one area in which literature may have an
advantage over film—literature is linguistic, so there is no medium specific reason why literature
cannot do philosophy.
The second horn of the dilemma rejects the medium specificity requirement. However,
doing so amounts to a trivialization of the notion that film can do philosophy. An important feature
of film is its ability to visually and aurally represent and record ideas and stories. Livingston argues
that these general cinematic capacities merely represents philosophy—for instance, presenting a
character as spouting philosophical theses. The film itself cannot make a unique philosophic
contribution in virtue of its medium specific capacities to visually and aurally represent and record
ideas. Thus, accepting either horn of the dilemma bars film from making a unique contribution to
philosophy. Like Russell, Livingston holds that films like The Seventh Seal can be a useful
complements to philosophy, especially for pedagogical purposes in illustrating philosophical
points. However, Livingston denies that these purposes amount to positive philosophy.
In sum, there are three main charges against film as philosophy (Wartenburg 2007). First,
there is the explicitness objection: film as a medium cannot capture the conceptual determinacy of
philosophy (1st horn of Livingston’s argument). Second, the generality objection states that
philosophy is concerned with general concepts about reality, whereas film can only capture
particular examples that do not generalize (Russell’s objection). Finally, the imposition objection
states that film can be used for philosophically interesting purposes, like providing
counterarguments or illustrating philosophical ideas, but cannot add to positive philosophy (both
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Russell and the 2nd horn of Livingston’s argument).
Russell and Livingston make a universal claim against the possibility of film as philosophy:
no films can do philosophy due to the nature of the film medium. In general, optimistic accounts
of film and philosophy carefully avoid universal statements. It’s not that all films can do
philosophy, but rather that some can. For instance, Carroll argues that there is at least one case of
film as philosophy: the short structuralist film, “Serene Velocity” (Carroll 2006). Carroll argues
that “Serene Velocity” presents an argument of sorts concerning the nature of the motion picture,
similar to Andy Warhol’s film Empire. Structuralist films are version of minimalism. Minimalist
visual artists like Frank Stella, Sol LeWitt, Donald Judd, and Robert Morris created works that
attempted to capture the essence of their art form. They stripped away what they deemed to be all
the unnecessary components of painting, such as the representations of objects. Doing so reveals
the true essence of painting: color, form, shape, or line. Carroll argues that the goal of “Serene
Velocity” is similar to those of the minimalist painters. It is a kind of “metafilm”; a film that
comments on and puts forth an idea concerning the real essence of cinematic art. The way the
narrow hallway is still, yet also seems to move with the changing camera zooms creates a sense of
the possibility of movement which, indeed, is the essence of cinematic art (ibid 178; see also Danto
1979).
If Carroll is right, then we have at least one example of a film that does positive philosophy
even to Livingston and Russell’s standards. Of course, this example might not persuade us that
film in general can do philosophy. After all, it does not present a general philosophic idea, such as
free will or mind-body dualism. We still need a way to respond to Livingston and Russell’s point
that film can present us with general philosophic ideas in areas like metaphysics, epistemology,
and ethics.

329

I think that there is an answer to this charge. Both Carroll and Wartenberg suggest that
films can also do philosophy by acting as thought experiments. One might think that thought
experiments can illustrate philosophical points or even draw out philosophical conclusions, but
they are not actual works of philosophy. As we have seen, philosophers like Russell and Livingston
deny that illustrative thought experiments can do positive philosophy. But it is unclear why this is
so. After all, many philosophers utilize thought experiments in the course of their arguments.
Plato’s Allegory of the Cave and the Myth of Gyges from The Republic are two such cases.
Thought experiments are not mere illustrations of a further point. They contribute to the
philosophical argument that the author proposes. So if fictions can be thought experiments, then it
is possible that fiction can do philosophy both in virtue of and in spite of the limitations of its
medium (Wartenburg 2006 & 2007).
Tamar Gendler states that “To perform a thought experiment is to reason about an
imaginary scenario with the aim of confirming or disconfirming some hypothesis or theory” (2002,
388). Different philosophers use different kinds of thought experiments in order to bolster their
own view or undermine their opponent’s. For example, a thought experiment can be used as a
counterexample to a philosophical thesis, principle, or idea (Wartenberg 2007). Examples include
the Gettier cases, Judith Jarvis Thomson’s trolley and footbridge dilemmas, and Frank Jackson’s
Mary (Jackson 1982). A thought experiment may also be used to establish the possibility of a
philosophical claim. Descartes’ first Meditation establishes the possibility that our senses can
deceive us and that we are the victim of a dreaming or evil demon hypothesis (ibid, 60). Thought
experiments can also confirm a theory. Wartenberg cites Plato’s long discussion of a just state as
a thought experiment that explains and justifies his theory of a just soul. As we saw in chapter 3,
Arthur Danto’s Testadura example in “The Artworld” helps to confirm his notion of the ‘is’ of
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aesthetic identification (Danto 1964). Wartenberg also argues that thought experiments can
demonstrate the impossibility of a claim, as in Quine’s “gavagai!” case, which is intended to show
the indeterminacy of translation (Quine 1960). Finally, thought experiments can establish
necessary connections, such as how Locke’s cobbler and the prince example aims to establish the
necessary connection between memory and the self.
Our goal, then, is to show how films (or any fiction) can be or contain thought experiments
in one of these ways. Consider The Walking Dead “walker-in-the barn” thought experiment from
the beginning of chapter 6, based on the episode “Pretty much dead already.” We might interpret
that as a thought experiment concerning the nature of our moral judgments. Or, my Boondock
Saint’s example from chapter 1 could be interpreted as a thought experiment concerning the
intuitive likelihood of the DAV. Both qualify as thought experiments according to Gendler’s
definition: they ask viewers to consider a fictional example that attempts to confirm or disconfirm
some theory or philosophical idea.
These examples are not unique. Several of Christopher Nolan’s films make “metafilm”
critiques that could be interpreted as thought experiments; Inception illustrates external world
skepticism, but also challenges that notion that films must have a tidy conclusion that answers
every question it raises (see Jensen 2010). Carroll (2009) argues that the way in which Leonard’s
experiences are presented in Memento comment on film narration in general. As Russell pointed
out, Woody Allen’s Crimes and Misdemeanors can be interpreted as an immoralist challenge to
Plato’s virtue theory, just like Glaucon’s Myth of Gyges in The Republic. Dostoevsky’s The
Brothers Karamazov lives up to this philosophical challenge as well, presenting an argument in
favor of Ivan’s concept of “everything is permitted,” then arguing against that position with the
story of Father Zossima (as well as Ivan’s fate at the end of the novel).
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However, not every text or film that incorporates philosophical themes counts as a thought
experiment. Terence Malick’s films The Thin Red Line, The New World, and Tree of Life each
present a distinction between Nature and Grace that may engender philosophical thought. I would
hesitate to count them as doing philosophy, though, partly because the films are quite vague in
terms of presenting an argument (contrast with the above examples which explicitly mention
philosophical themes). It’s possible that these films are designed to inspire the viewer as opposed
to present a philosophical concept or argument.19
If at least some fictions can do philosophy, then I argue that it is possible to learn from
them. The “walker in the barn” case may teach us something about how we should treat other
people, if we are responsive to it. Inception may teach us something about skepticism and how we
interpret film narratives. As we’ve seen, Crimes and Misdemeanors may challenge us to reconsider
Plato’s notion of justice in The Republic.
We lack direct empirical evidence to support the idea that we can learn from fictional
thought experiments. However, it seems obvious that we can gain knowledge from philosophy,
including philosophical thought experiments. After all, we can learn something conceptual from
traditional philosophical thought experiments: Putnam’s Twin Earth, Plato’s Cave, Jackson’s
Mary, and Thomson’s trolley and footbridge problems are cases in point. These thought
experiments are intended to teach us something about metaphysics, knowledge, the mind, and
ethics by either presenting positive claims or rejecting others. There is no direct empirical evidence
for the claim that reading these works makes us more psychologically or morally sensitive.
Consider Shaun Nichols’ point that even if psychopaths were to read great works of moral

19

Malick studied under Stanley Cavell as an undergraduate philosophy major at Harvard. Cavell
was one of the original supporters of the idea that films can be philosophy, or at least philosophical.
See Cavell 1971.
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philosophy, it is very unlikely that they would become more morally sensitive (Nichols 2004a).We
take it for granted that studying these philosophical works will teach the thoughtful reader about
the subject at hand. If we can learn from traditional thought experiments, then it does not seem
like there is good reason, in principle, why we cannot learn from fictional thought experiments.

5. Immoral learning

I want to return to Plato’s point that fictions can engender immoral practices and values in
unsuspecting audiences. This is also Hume’s concern in “Of the Standard of Taste”: if immoral
actions and characters that are not condemned in a work then an unsuspecting audience may take
an immoral attitude to be morally acceptable in his real-life (Hume 1757/1994).
Both Plato and Hume worry that consumers of fiction can be easily manipulated into
believing that what they witness in a fiction bears, in some way, on reality. But does this actually
happen? Recall my discussion of the puzzle of imaginative resistance. Sometimes audiences fail
to accept a proposition as true in the fictional world simply because they disagree with the same
proposition in the actual world. I have argued that this sometimes occurs when audiences worry
that going along with fictional immorality will make themselves more likely to be immoral.
I also suggested that resistance to portrayals of fictional immorality is the result of negative
emotional reactions to immoral acts. As we saw with the SDP, it is possible that we do not harshly
judge a character like Dexter Morgan because we are drawn to him in some way. But that does not
necessarily mean that we accept it to be true, even imaginatively, that his immoral actions are
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acceptable in either our world or in the world of the fiction. Moreover, I think that portrayals of
immorality in artworks generally serve some cognitive or aesthetic purpose. As such, they can
present cases of learning from immoral actions. Ideally, acknowledging the cognitive benefits of
portrayals of immorality should quell the worries against some fictions.
Consider the Mad Men “Mystery Date” example from the previous chapter. This episode
portrayed acts of sexual violence towards women and a general tendency to objectify women for
men’s desires. I argued, though, that this episode probably used the immoral treatment of women
to make some point: to cast a light on how women are used in the work place, how casual sexual
violence might sometimes seem, and the power struggles that women still face on a daily basis.
Fictions often portray immoral characters or actions that are not condemned in the narrative, or at
least not explicitly so. I argued that these portrayals of immorality are quite often supposed to
make some cognitive or aesthetic point. That is, the audience is supposed to take the portrayal of
immorality as an opportunity for moral reflection and learning.
Here’s another example. You have now just finished watching Quentin Tarantino’s latest
film, Django Unchained. Some critics have blasted this film for its overt racist elements (Spike
Lee is one outspoken critic of the film). There is one scene in particular that seems stands out in
terms of its negative portrayal of African Americans. Django, a slave, has agreed to help the white
Dr. Schulz with his bounty-hunting after the doctor promises to free him from slavery and help
him to find his wife, Bromhilda. Dr. Schulz gives Django some money and tells him that he can
buy whatever new clothes he would like. The next scene shows Django, on horseback, proudly
sporting his new frock—an absurdly fancy suit made of bright-blue velvet and an abundance of
frilly lace. You laugh.
Why? What’s so funny about this scene? Well, the clothes, obviously. But is the source of
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amusement simply the ridiculousness of the suit itself? I think it is more than that. It seems like
this scene is funny because it is a former slave—a black man—who wears the stereotypical get-up
of a wealthy white man. There is an incongruity between what we expect from Django and what
we actually see (Morreall 1986).
One could straightforwardly interpret this scene as Tarantino poking fun at a former slave
who ignorantly assumes that he can pull off the garb of a powerful white man. But there is another,
probably better, interpretation of this scene. Along with the amusement that one might experience,
a viewer might also feel strangely uncomfortable by his or her own amusement at Django’s new
clothes. I think that this is the point of many of the racist elements in Django Unchained: we are
supposed to laugh and then feel uncomfortable about our own amusement. Tarantino seems to be
pointing out that, despite our firm denial to the contrary, many white audiences still take African
Americans as sources of amusement that should fulfill traditional stereotypes, such as Mammy in
Gone with the Wind. So we find it comical and a bit absurd when they try to break out of those
stereotypes.
If we are sensitive to this aspect of the film then, ideally, we will reflect on our own
responses and maybe even gain some kind of self-knowledge about our tacit acceptance of harmful
racial stereotypes. I take this to be both a cognitive and aesthetic achievement. If Django did not
present these racist elements in the way that it did, then one might argue that it negatively portrays
African Americans and should be condemned. But the immoral portrayals of Django seem to be
of both aesthetic and moral value. The worry remains, though, that many people will not get the
lesson behind portrayals of immorality. Some of Django’s viewers won’t make the cognitive point
that I have suggested here. They will not realize that they should feel uncomfortable about their
laughter—they just laugh. And this might be morally troubling.
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I have argued in this chapter that one can learn about morality from fictions. I suggested
that our learning from fictions can be either a type of knowhow, propositional knowledge, or
experiential knowledge. As the “Mystery Date” and Django examples show, it’s possible that we
can gain these types of knowledge from portrayals of immorality in a work of fiction. Moreover,
these portrayals will generally have some kind of meta-cognitive or aesthetic value. But surely, as
the last point about Django suggests, there are examples of fiction that do not seem to make a
cognitive or aesthetic point, or make a point that is lost on the audience. Should we be worried
about them?
Consider the growing concern that violence in the media—including films, TV shows, and
video games—leads to real-life violence (see Provios, Kambam & Bender 2013). Intuitively, it
seems like exposing oneself to fictional portrayals of extreme violence is, somehow, causally
connected to violence in real-life. We might think that there is some explanatory power to the fact
that a serial killer’s favorite film is Scarface and his favorite video game is Grand Theft Auto.
Others will deny this, citing anecdotal or even empirical evidence that violent films do not directly
cause real-life aggression or anti-social personalities. Perhaps the prominent cases of gun violence
are the product of other social factors, not watching violent films or TV.
The empirical evidence on the relationship between fictional and real-life violence has so
far been inconclusive. In a meta-analysis of studies, the psychologists Haejung Paik and George
Comstock (1994) found that there does seem to be a correlation between short-term exposure to
media violence and actual violence. Likewise, other researchers found that watching excessive
amounts of violent TV (more than two hours per weekday) was associated with antisocial behavior
in early adulthood (Robertson et al 2013). Despite these results—and more like them—there does
not seem to be any direct causal link between media and real-life violence.
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Perhaps the worry is that exposing oneself to immoral actions and characters will make
one accustomed to bad things. The concern is that violence might become blasé whether it is
portrayed positively or not. Perhaps we will not feel the horror towards real-life violence that we
should feel if we are accustomed to seeing it in the media. And it is not just violence that we should
be worried about: consider the potential long-term effects of sexist and racist practices (see
Shottenkirk 2013 & Vadas 1987). The portrayal of sexism and racism may reinforce harmful
stereotypes that are already pervasive in our society. Maybe, then, portrayals of immorality in
artwork should be condemned.
For the sake of argument, let’s suppose that cognitive scientists do find a direct causal
relation between media violence and real-life aggression or exposure to racist or sexist fictions
cause racism and sexism in real life. What then? Should we, in a moment of Platonic fervor, banish
all immoral artworks from our society?
I do not have a good response to this challenge. But I think that there are at least two reasons
why we should not censor immoral artworks (besides appeals to freedom of choice and freedom
of speech). First, it may be that the supposed immoral act in an artwork is trying to point out some
immoral feature of our own society, as in my Django example. The immoral features of the fiction
are intentionally subversive. The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn is the perpetual example of this:
Huck knows that freeing his friend Jim from slavery is morally wrong in his society. Huck chooses
to free Jim anyway because Jim is his friend. Contemporary audiences praise Huck’s decision
despite the fact that he may have been found blameworthy by some readers during Twain’s time.
A fiction can highlight the harmful tendencies of our own society by portraying them in a fiction.
Second, there is also something to be said for being tolerant and open-minded of the moral
practices of other people and cultures. For example, suppose that you watch a film that takes place
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in an Arabic nation where gender relations are quite different from what they are in your society.
Should we condemn the artwork because it portrays moral values that are different from our own?
Some viewers will undoubtedly say that we should, but others will disagree.
I do not intend for either of these reasons to be a full justification against the censorship or
condemnation of immoral artworks. However, I do think that we should be sensitive to the
potential moral lesson that we can draw from portrayals of immorality in some artworks, like
Django. Plato may not be assuaged, but, nevertheless, I think that there are quite compelling
reasons to be tolerant of fictional portrayals of immorality.
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